

**Organization, Structure and Image in the Making
of Chinese Foreign Policy since the Early 1990s**

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Abstract

After reviewing existing scholarly approaches and theoretical models to Chinese policy making, this research adopts the Bureaucratic Politics Model to examine changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process since the early 1990s

This study presents a comprehensive overview of the Chinese foreign policy-making process. It describes the structural and functional changes in the increased number of components in the Chinese policy-making establishment since the early 1990s. Not only does it examine the major governmental organs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the military, and the Office of Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, it also scrutinizes the evolution and functional shifts in the apparatuses of the Central Committee of the CPC that are related to foreign policy making, including the leading groups (LGs), the Department of International Relations, and the International Communications Office. In particular, it provides the most detailed illustration of the LGs to date, identifying their origin, growth, shifting status, components, and functions in foreign policy-making. The analysis reveals that the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/National Security has taken on an essential consultative and coordinating function. The general operational process is revealed through an examination of two case studies.

In addition, this research examines three categories of Chinese foreign-policy think tanks and their respective networks, indicating how Chinese policy-makers have become increasingly dependent on these institutions to access information and to make foreign-policy recommendations.

The study concludes that the Chinese foreign policy-making has become less personalistic and further institutionalized, due to China's rapid economic growth and its new status in the international arena, as well as by China's new self-image, which has stimulated a rethinking and a redefining of its national interests and responsibilities.

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Contents

Abstract.....	ii
List of Figures.....	vi
List of Tables.....	vi
List of Abbreviations.....	vii
Chapter One: The Bureaucratic Politics Model and Research on the Chinese	
Policy-Making Process.....	1
Application of Western Approaches to Chinese Foreign Policy-Making.....	1
Studies on the Chinese Foreign Policy-Making Process.....	20
Concepts and Theoretical Framework Used in This Research.....	26
The Organization of the Thesis.....	36
Chapter Two: The Structural Changes in the Components of the Chinese	
Policy-Making Establishment since the Early 1990s.....	40
The Structure of the Chinese Foreign-Policy Establishment.....	40
The Politburo and Its Standing Committee.....	43
The Power of the General Secretary.....	50
The Secretariat and the Shift in the Power Balance.....	58
Structural Changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.....	63
Changes in the Department of Policy Planning.....	74
A Working Group on Relations with the American Congress.....	79
The Taiwan Affairs Office and Its Increasingly Important Role.....	82
The Creation of the Ministry of Commerce and Its Changing Functions.....	86
The Functions and Structure of the Ministry of Commerce.....	92
The Military Departments Related to Foreign Policy Making.....	109
The Role of the Military in the Policy-Making Process.....	112
Intelligence Collection and Policy Recommendations.....	120
Coordination in Foreign Policy Making.....	122
The Role of the Chinese President in Diplomacy.....	124
Chapter Three: The Role of the CPC Apparatus in Foreign Policy-Making.....	
Evolution of the Leading Groups.....	135
Important LGs in the Field of Foreign Affairs.....	144
The LG on Foreign/National Security Affairs.....	148
Office of Foreign Affairs.....	153
The Leading Group on Taiwan Work.....	155
The Office of Taiwan Work.....	160
The Leading Group on Finance and Economy.....	167
The Work of the Leading Groups.....	169
The International Department of the CPC Central Committee.....	171
The Structure of the International Department.....	179
The Work Style of the International Department.....	188
Relations with the Workers' Party of North Korea.....	194
The International Communication Office/the State Council Information Office.....	199

The Study Group of the CPC Politburo	207
Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs of the CCP Central Committee	209
Chapter Four: The Proliferation of Think Tanks in Foreign Policy-Making.....	213
The Development of Think Tanks in the First Decade of the Post-Mao Era	227
Categories of International Studies Think Tanks in China.....	237
Information Flows.....	267
The Main Forms of Think Tank Engagement in Foreign Policy Making	272
Conclusion	288
Chapter Five: Two Decision Making and Implementation Cases.....	290
Chinese Foreign Aid	290
The History of Chinese Foreign Aid.....	292
The Structure of the Chinese Foreign Aid Decision-Making Establishment	311
A Typical Foreign Aid Policy-Making Procedure.....	319
Foreign Aid to Sudan and the Darfur Conflict	324
New Projects and New Approaches.....	336
Policy-making during the Belgrade Bombing Crisis.....	341
Decisions of the First Expanded Meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee and their Implementation.....	345
Discussion and Implementation of the Policy Decisions of the Second Expanded Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo	354
The Discussion and Implementation of the Policy Decisions of the Third Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo	364
On the Investigation and Compensation.....	369
Policy-Making and Domestic Politics	371
Conclusion	375
Chapter Six: What are the Reasons for the Changes in Chinese Foreign Policy-Making?.....	380
The Fundamental Reasons for the First Decade of Changes	380
The Impact of Chinese Economic Development on Its International Status.....	384
One Hundred Years of Humiliation.....	387
China's Self-image	392
Victim Mentality.....	399
A Responsible Big Power and Peaceful Rise	402
The Road from a Challenger to a Responsible State	415
Arms Control	419
Environmental Protection	428
Human Rights	441
Conclusion	445
Bibliography.....	450
<i>Resume of Qi Zhou</i>	470

List of Figures

Figure 1.1	The Relationships between the Three Variables and the Three Hypotheses	38
Figure 2-1	Chinese Political Structure.....	41
Figure 2-2	The Current Leadership Relationships.....	42
Figure 5-1	BBC World Service Poll - Chinese Influence.....	410

List of Tables

Table 2-1	The Politburo Standing Committee of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPC (from October 2007).....	45
Table 2-3	Division of Labor among Ministerial Officials in the MFA.....	71
Table 2-4	Components of the Ministry of Commerce (excluding the party committee).....	95
Table 2-5	Ministers of the Ministry of Commerce.....	96
Table 2-6	Successive Chinese Presidents.....	125
Table 3-1	The Current Leading Groups of the Central Committee of the CPC.....	145
Table 3-2	The Composition of the LGFA/LGNS (until October 2007).....	151
Table 3-3	Composition of the LGTW (October 1997-October 2000).....	158
Table 3-4	Composition of the LGTM (Since March 2003).....	159
Table 3-5	Director of the Office of Taiwan Affairs.....	163
Table 3-6	Departments of the Office of Taiwan Affairs.....	163
Table 3-7	Current Composition of the LGFE (since 2003).....	169
Table 3-8	The Division of Labor of Regional Bureaus of the International Department	181
Table 3-9	Former Ministers of the International Department.....	183
Table 3-10	Structure of the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee/the State Council Information Office.....	202
Table 4-1	Principal Foreign Policy Think Tanks in China.....	240
Table 4-2	Institutes of International and Taiwan Studies at CASS.....	243
Table 5-1	2001-2005 China's Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (partial list).....	308
Table 5-2	China's Expenditure on Foreign Aid and Its Ratio to GNP (1950-2005)...	309
Table 6-1	GDP of "Golden BRICs".....	386

List of Abbreviations

ACFTA	ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
AFPC	American Foreign Policy Council
AMS	Academy of Military Science of the PLA
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
BPM	Bureaucratic Politics Model
CACDA	China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
CAS	Chinese Academy of Sciences
CASFU	Center for American Studies of Fudan University
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CCIS	China Center for International Studies
CDP	Commission on Development and Planning
CFISS	Chinese Foundation for International and Strategic Studies
CICED	Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development
CICIRs	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
CIISS	China Institute for International Strategic Studies
CIS	Center for International Studies
CMA	China Meteorological Administration
CMC	Central Military Commission
CNEFT	Commission on National Economy and Foreign Trade
CNN	Cable News Network
CNOGEDC	China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation
CNPC	Chinese National People's Congress
CPC	Chinese Communist Party
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DFA	Department of Foreign Aid
DFEC	Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation
DPP	Department of Policy Planning
EMM	Environment Ministers' Meeting
Eximbank	Export-Import Bank
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GSD	General Staff Department of the PLA
IAPS	Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
IAS	Institute of American Studies
ICIS	Institute of Contemporary International Studies
ICO	International Communication Office
ID	International Department of CPC Central Committee
IIR	Institute of International Relations
IIS	Institute of International Studies
IISS	Institute of International Strategic Studies
ILAS	Institute of Latin American Studies
IWAAS	Institute of West Asian and African Studies
LG	Leading Group
LGFA	Leading Group on Foreign Affairs
LGFE	Leading Group on Finance and Economy
LGTW	Central Taiwan Work Leading Group
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MEAs	multilateral environmental agreements
MEC	Ministry of Economic Cooperation

MFN	Most-Favored Nation
MFT	Ministry of Foreign Trade
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MPS	Ministry of Public Security
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
MOFTEC	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
MSS	Ministry of State Security
NCA	National Command Authority
NCCCC	National Coordination Committee on Climate Change
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NDU	National Defense University
NEPA	National Environmental Protection Agency
NLGACC	National Leading Group to Address Climate Change
OFA	Office of Foreign Affairs
OTA	Office of Taiwan Affairs
OTW	Office of Taiwan Work
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PNTR	Permanent Normal Trade Relations
PRNK	People Republic of North Korea
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEPA	State Environmental Protection Administration
SIIS	Shanghai Institute of International Studies
SOIPP	State Office of Intellectual Property Protection
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
WTO	World Trade Organization
XCWA	Xinhua Center for World Affairs
ZCMT	Zambia-China Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture

Chapter One: The Bureaucratic Politics Model and Research on the Chinese Policy-Making Process

As a rising power, China has become increasingly influential in the international community, and, consequently, its foreign policy is now a key subject for practitioners and scholars of international relations. To understand the characteristics of China's foreign policy, as well as its international strategy and its policy toward a certain country or on a specific issue, one must understand its foreign policy-making process. In fact, an increasing number of scholars who have devoted their research to examining Chinese domestic politics and/or international relations now realize the significance of and the need for an examination of the Chinese policy-making process.

Application of Western Approaches to Chinese Foreign Policy-Making

For a long time there was almost no research on the Chinese policy-making process in a strict sense in the way that there has been research on the policy-making process of the Western countries. The first edition of *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*—a best-seller in political science that has been in print continuously for over a quarter century—was published in 1962; Jervis's famous *Perception and Misperception*—which has been broadly used as a theoretical framework to illustrate the policy-making process—was published in 1970; and other studies comprising qualitative and quantitative literature of foreign policy-making have been compiled. However, all of these works seemed irrelevant to China studies for about a quarter of a century.

The first book to emphasize the importance of Chinese bureaucratic institutions is A. Doak Barnett's *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (1967).

During the same period, Michel Charles Oksenberg's PhD dissertation on *Policy Formulation in Communist China: The Case of the Mass Irrigation Campaign, 1957-58*¹ was a pioneering work in preparation for using the bureaucratic politics model for China's policy-making analysis. Employing a case study method to illustrate the Chinese decision-making process regarding water policy, in this dissertation Oksenberg notes how bureaucratic politics impacted China's water policy making. He reveals that in terms of water policy formulation, Mao Zedong's activities and initiatives were very important, but, unlike generally believed at the time, Mao also faced many constraints in exercising his power. "At all times, Mao faced a narrow range of alternatives, his options shaped by developments beyond his control, the information placed at his disposal manipulated by subordinates to protect their interests."² Among the factors that caused the gradual changes in water policy in addition to the changing economic and social conditions, bureaucratic practices were regarded as important.³ Oksenberg argues that China's policy-making should be seen as "a combination of the initiative and guidance provided by Mao and the top leaders and the day-to-day decisions made by lower level officials in the many agencies involved in administering water policy." The influence of Mao and his close associates was decisive in terms of formulating broad policy guidelines and changing the balance of power among competing bureaucratic interests. But when these leaders intervened, the information available to them and the alternatives they encountered were shaped by the previous activities of the agencies involved in water

¹ Michel C. Oksenberg, *Policy Formulation in Communist China: The Case of the Mass Irrigation Campaign, 1957-1958* (submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Philosophy, in the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, 1969). Oksenberg's dissertation was never formally published and it is held by only six libraries in the United States, thus it is not widely known.

² Ibid., p. 2.

³ Ibid.

conservancy. “When it came to water policy, at least, Mao and his associates at the pinnacle of power were, to a degree, captives of the bureaucracy over which they presided.”⁴

Oksenberg also carefully examines the divergence between bureaucratic interests and the specialized concerns of middle-level personnel, revealing that several kinds of professional and organizational interests were intertwined with water conservancy policy. This led to conflicts of interest between the central government and local units, among the local units, among various functional agencies, and among personnel with different professional commitments (planners, technicians, administrators, CPC overseers, and so on).⁵ Therefore, although Oksenberg does not consciously use the bureaucratic politics model to analyze China’s water policy-making in his 1969 dissertation, his work prepared the way and paved the road to the future adoption of the model to examine the Chinese policy-making process in general.

Harry Harding’s *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976* (1981) is one of the early attempts to apply the theory of bureaucracy to research on the Chinese system. Yet here the foremost concern is how the Chinese leaders manage the bureaucracy, since Harding believes that ineffectiveness in this area may be a great challenge to the Communist Party’s ruling capacity; and its purpose, as Harding himself states, is not to provide “an objective description of the structure and operation of the Party and State,” but rather to examine “Chinese organizations through the eyes of Chinese leaders, seeking to understand their diagnoses of their country’s organizational problems, the debates they have conducted on organization questions, and the programs

⁴ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

they have adopted in their attempts to manage the Party and state bureaucracies.”⁶

Therefore, Harding does not actually apply policy-making theories to analyze the features of the Chinese bureaucracy and decision-making process.

In 1982, David M. Lampton edited a volume entitled *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*. Focusing on a particular phase of the policy process—the stage between policy formulation and feedback of the effects to the policy-makers—this volume examines the relations between the central policy-making establishments and the huge number of subordinate functional and local agencies, revealing that the central authority in Beijing was highly fragmented and the Chinese system was diversified, which led to possible inconsistencies between the stated intention of policy-makers (as shown in formal policy documents) and actual policy outcomes.⁷ In spite of the enlightening views that it provides, however, the volume does not attempt to illustrate the entire picture of the Chinese policy-making process, since its purpose is only to investigate the implementation phase. Hence, Lampton does not suggest any model that can be applicable to analysis of the overall process.

Another attempt to bridge the gap between China studies and social science theory is Quansheng Zhao’s *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy* (1997). After discussing all possible choices of theoretical frameworks and comparing their merits and defects, Zhao

⁶ Harry Harding, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. viii, 8.


⁷ David M. Lampton, ed., *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 4-5.

adopts a sophisticated “micro-macro linkage” approach,⁸ which “emphasizes the channels and mechanisms connecting a wide variety of factors at different levels” to scrutinize Chinese foreign policy at both the micro and macro levels. Zhao’s model focuses on the processes, situations, and structures, such as the international environment, domestic constraints, and individual decision-makers, which, he believes, have a combined impact on Chinese foreign policy.⁹ His purpose, however, is to provide an overview of Chinese foreign policy since the establishment of the People’s Republic instead of the policy-making process itself and the change in the essential character of Chinese foreign policy behavior since the beginning of China’s opening and reform in 1978. Thus, his book does not reveal, nor does it intend to reveal, an overall and clear picture of Chinese institutions and the foreign policy-making process. Although his research provides many valuable points of view for understanding Chinese policy decisions, it does not present a systematic and distinct portrait of the China foreign policy-making process.

Much progress and many new discoveries have been made to strengthen and improve the applicability and explanatory power of the bureaucratic politics approach, and there have been attempts to apply the bureaucratic politics model to foreign

⁸ Quansheng Zhao’s micro-macro linkage approach is shown in the following:

Macro-Level:



Micro-Level:



See Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

policy-making in various countries, for instance, the Soviet Union and Israel,¹⁰ as well as the United States. However, this model apparently has been ignored in studies of the Chinese political system. Its applicability to an analysis of Chinese politics was doubted until the late 1980s, when Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg formally raised the question of whether the bureaucratic politics model also is valid to examine Chinese policy making, principally domestic policy making.

The failure to incorporate the bureaucratic politics model in Chinese policy-decision studies is well summarized by Lieberthal and Oksenberg. They conclude that, “in the case of China, scholars to date have tended to neglect the complex structure of the state itself as a significant determinant of the political process and policy outcomes.”¹¹ They list four forms as competing explanations for Chinese policy,¹² and find that none of them integrate the structural dimension of the Chinese bureaucracy into their analysis. They further identify two approaches to the study of Chinese politics that emerged in the 1970s in the common effort to depict the Chinese policy process. One approach

¹⁰ On Russia’s foreign policy making, see Jeffrey Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia’s Changing Foreign Policy,” in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Europe* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995); Irina Kbrinskaya, “The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Russia,” in Jakub M. Godzimirshi, ed., *New and Old Actors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2000); and Neil Malcolm, “Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” in Peter Shearman, ed., *Russian Foreign Policy since 1990* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). On Israeli foreign policy making, see Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

¹¹ Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure and Process* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 3.

¹² These forms are 1.) Policy X was adopted pragmatically to solve the new policy problems pressing upon the leaders; 2) Policy X was promulgated in order to keep alive the ideological vision of its proponents; 3.) Policy X was adopted as a tactical ploy of one or several temporary allied leaders to rebuff a challenge from rivals; or 4.) Policy X was adopted by a dominant and enduring faction for the rewards it bestows upon its network of loyalists. According to Lieberthal and Oksenberg, the first two explanations assert that policies are reasoned responses to perceived policy problems, the latter two attribute policies to the struggle for power among the top leaders or factions into which they coalesce. See *ibid.*, p. 3.

concentrated on the revolution in policy in particular areas: agriculture, science, public health, education, agricultural mechanization, and so on. The other was preoccupied with elite political struggles which generated symbolic policies: the Hundred Flower Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, or the post-Mao reforms.¹³ They then propose two terms for these two approaches: the former is called the “rationality model” since it focuses on the response of the policy-makers to the changing economic and foreign policy environment, and the latter is labeled the “power model” since it attributes the incentive for policy change to the struggle for power and leading status among the top officials. However, Lieberthal and Oksenberg do not see this twofold division as absolute. “Most analysts of a policy issue also draw upon the ‘power’ model, while many studies of elite strife incorporate aspects of the ‘rationality’ approach.”¹⁴

Benedict Stavis’ study in *The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in China* is exactly based on the “rationality model.” Published in 1978, this book analyzes how China faced the political and social dimensions of agricultural mechanization, a policy derived from a “political choice.”¹⁵ Chinese political leaders began without a technical understanding of the meaning of agricultural mechanization, but with great hopes that it could be used to solve many social and economic problems: to improve the rural standard of living and to narrow the gap between urban and rural conditions.¹⁶ Stavis concludes that China’s policy choices regarding agricultural mechanization were made consistently, regardless of the intense political conflict at the top levels, constant purges,

¹³ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Benedict Stavis, *The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 7.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 260.

and the obvious disarray in high-level political institutions. He seems to accept the notion that rural interest benefits prevailed over the continuous struggle and disarray, since they led to a weakening of the bureaucracy and urban industrial interests. Hence, there is no place for power struggle or bureaucracy in Stavis' analytical framework.¹⁷ The factors that shape the effect of agricultural mechanization are all non-personal, but they include institutional factors—the types of agricultural mechanization under consideration; the existing and potential cropping system, which in turn is the result of the natural environment, available agricultural techniques, the labor supply, and price levels; and social institutions, including land tenancy, patterns of urbanization and industrial development, entrepreneurial and managerial skills, and the specific financial arrangements for mechanization.¹⁸

Harry Harding's *Organizing China* also is seen by Lieberthal and Oksenberg as an example of a policy-making study based on the rationality model, owing to its assumption of a connection among what it terms the “diagnoses,” “debate,” and “program” stages of the policy process, and its conclusion that the “repeated reorganizations of the processes for handling consumer goods is in large part the product of sharp clashes among the elite over the priorities” in the conflicting values of maximizing equality, preserving order, and increasing productivity.¹⁹ Two other examples, provided by Lieberthal and Oksenberg, of this model are A. Doak Barnett's *Uncertain Passage* and Dorothy Solinger's *Chinese Business under Socialism*. Representatives of those scholars of Chinese politics who favor the “power model”

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

include Roderick MacFarquhar, Lowell Dittmer, and Avery Goldstein. As H. Lyman Miller points out, they “have devoted themselves to the investigation of Chinese politics, but their inquiries have focused on the informal dynamics of the regime, looking at policy disputes, factional bases, and power contests mainly among a few individual leaders.”²⁰

The distinction between the “power” and the “rationality” models is clear to Lieberthal and Oksenberg. The first and most significant difference is that the rationality model advocates assume that the top leaders of China choose policy options in terms of their perceptions of national interests, whereas the power analysts stress that policies are evaluated in terms of individual or factional interests. The second difference is that the former tend to ignore struggles over power as a core interest in politics, whereas the latter usually do not explore in depth the substantive issues at stake. Yet there is an appreciable similarity between the two models: they both agree that policies are created primarily at the top and that the leaders pursue a purposeful ending.

Lieberthal and Oksenberg also assert that the “power” analysts, although aware of the formal procedures at the peak, never carefully examine the divergent relations between the top leaders and the bureaucracies they lead, nor do they adequately investigate the extent to which the leaders and bureaucracies share policy preferences that are recommended by the bureaucracies.

They thus draw insightful and significant conclusions about Chinese policy making, including:

²⁰ H. Lyman Miller, “Politics Inside the Ring Road: Sources and Comparisons,” in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., *Decision-Making in Deng's China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 224.

1. The bureaucratic structure of authority is fragmented, decision making is central, and consensus building is necessary, whereas policy-making is a rambling, incremental, and long drawn-out process.

2. This structure of authority requires that any major project or policy initiative gain the active cooperation of many separate bureaucratic units that comprise the entirety of authority.

3. Since the various organizations in the bureaucracy have their own interests, bargaining and competition for benefits are inevitable.

4. The outcome of policy-making comes from compromise, thus the policy choice usually is not optimal.

5. This type of policy-making process is within the explanatory power of the bureaucratic politics model.²¹

Lieberthal and Oksenberg's set of conclusions represent a new state of knowledge about Chinese politics and policy making, and inevitably have had a revolutionary effect on studies in this field.

Nevertheless, one certainly should not discredit earlier efforts in Chinese political studies. It is understandable why before the late 1980s there was an emphasis on studying institutional building or political strife inside the ruling group and why there was almost no interest among scholars to examine the Chinese policy-making process. In the early stages of the People's Republic of China after the Communist seized control of the country, the Chinese Communist Party faced the difficult task of rebuilding efficient institutions to manage domestic and foreign affairs on the debris of the political

²¹ Lieberthal and Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure and Process*, chap. 1.

apparatus that had been constructed under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek. However, within ten years after the 1949 transfer of the regime from the Kuomintang Party to the Communist Party, and with Mao's personality cult swelling within the Communist Party, Mao had evolved into the paramount leader with absolute authority in various policy decisions. He rejected any and all criticism of him as a disguise of or pretext for ideological, political, and class struggle. Under his leadership from 1958 through the Cultural Revolution, Mao's will controlled the political process, which was carried out from the top to the bottom of the political apparatus, as well as through almost the entire society. If he so wished, Mao's "super directions" and instructions could determine policies in every field, from agriculture, industry, defense, education, and scientific research to foreign policy.

Although conflicts among political factions within the party and bureaucracy were a constant feature of Chinese political life, Mao did not confront a fatal challenge to his rule and he won virtually every contest on domestic and foreign policies. As a result, the political process became so personalistic and totalitarian that organizational interests and processes hardly existed in a non-factional form. For example, in the field of foreign policy, Mao's decisions to bombard Quemoy in September 1954²² and to invite

²² The Korean War, which broke out in 1950, fundamentally changed U.S. strategy in Asia. Following the Mutual Defense Treaty with the South Korean government in August 1953, the Eisenhower administration was considering a similar treaty with Taiwan. On his way from the Geneva Conference at the end of July 1954, Zhou Enlai received a cable from Mao Zedong, notifying him that China should "raise before the entire country and to the world the call to 'liberate Taiwan,' in order to break up the U.S.-Chiang military and political alliance." Three months later, Mao ordered the bombardment of Jinmen. The bombardment lasted for five hours, with some 6,000 rounds of artillery shells pouring onto the island. However, this military operation did not "break up" U.S.-Taiwan ties; instead, it pressed Eisenhower to conclude a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. It is unlikely that Mao's idea met any opposition among his colleagues, but Mao's logic why the Chinese resolution to liberate Taiwan would prevent the U.S. from concluding the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan is quite confusing. He Di, "Evolution of the CCP's

the American table tennis team to visit China in 1971 show how Mao's personal preferences became the final policy choices without sufficient consultation or voting in such crucial and complicated situations.²³ The former decision probably had a negative effect on China's international relations given that it pushed President Eisenhower to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, in which the U.S. accepted formal responsibility to defend Taiwan in the case of invasion.²⁴ The latter decision had a positive effect not only on Chinese foreign relations, but also on international politics, in terms of opening the door for the Sino-American rapprochement. It paved the way for the subsequent normalization of bilateral relations between the two states and China's return to the international community through recovery of its seat in the United Nations and the UN Security Council. Mao's decisions thus fundamentally changed the balance of power between the superpowers during the Cold War. It is safe to say that China's foreign policy during this period was made more through a rational than a bureaucratic process, and that if a serious analysis of the Chinese foreign policy-making process had been undertaken, probably a rational model would have had more explanatory power than the other models, since one person's will and deliberation were dominant over all other individuals or groups at the high decision-making level, and exclusively acted in the

Policy towards the United States: 1944-1949," unpublished paper, 1987, cited in Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 118-121; Zhang Baijia, "'Resist America': China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars," in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp. 179-214.

²³ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 260-261. Chen Jian's book vividly describes how Mao made the final decision to invite the American table tennis team to visit China, based on deliberation of Chinese international strategy but without consulting any of his colleagues or senior advisers. This decision foresaw the dramatic change in China's relations with the United States during the Cold War.

²⁴ Jun Niu contests this. See Jun Niu, "Chinese Decision Making in Three Military Actions Across the Taiwan Strait," in Swaine and Zhang, eds., *Managing Sino-American Crisis: Case Studies and Analysis*, pp. 296-298.

calculation of state benefit. Hence, it is understandable that Harding's book *Organizing China*, whose interest is the effectiveness of bureaucracy building from 1949 to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, emphasizes the rationality model in Chinese policy decision making.

Similarly, the statement that “policy is the aggregate response of leaders or factions of the participants, their strategies for advancing their beliefs and political interests, and their differentiated understanding of the problem at hand”²⁵ is also reasonable. It largely reflects the reality during the special and abnormal period of PRC history, especially the Cultural Revolution, which symbolized the peak of factional struggle when all rationality was abandoned and factions naturally opposed any issues supported by their political rivals. Therefore, the literature that depicts Cultural Revolution policy as a so-called “power model” portrays at least one of the important facets of policy decision making during that time. This observation, as well as the observations above, parallel the statement by Lieberthal and Oksenberg: “Our information does not allow our identifying one model as the most powerful analytical tool from among the alternatives, all of which place boundaries on the explanatory power of the ‘rationality’ or ‘game theoretic’ model.”²⁶

However, this concession should not be taken as an excuse for the lack of a comprehensive acknowledgement of the entire picture of Chinese politics and policy making. As the old Chinese proverb notes, two blind men attempted to determine what an elephant looked like by touching it, but they could only tell the features of the part of the elephant that they had touched. As a result, one described the elephant as a wall

²⁵ Lieberthal and Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure and Process*, p. 15.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

since he touched its huge body; the other portrayed it as a pillar since he happened to hold one to of its big legs. Both of the blind men were correct in part, but they were both mistaken for substituting the components for the entirety. Similarly, though the “rational model” and the “power” model are not totally invalid during a particular period of PRC history, they are not applicable to all periods and therefore have limited explanatory power. The Chinese political process has become more institutionalized since 1978 with the shift in leadership and the beginning of a new era. The orthodox Maoist theory of class struggle was discarded and the four modernizations were adopted as the main goal of the Chinese Communist Party at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC.

Indeed, since 1978 Chinese politics has been transformed, becoming less personalistic and more institutionalized. This fact has been increasingly recognized among scholars in Chinese political and foreign policy studies and has stimulated these scholars to search for a new paradigm. Even Harry Harding, one of the leading experts in China studies to have adopted the “rationality” model, admits, “The prevailing paradigm of Chinese policy-making is no longer the ‘Mao-in-command’ model of the 1950s and early 1960s, or the ‘two-line struggle’ model of the late 1960s and 1970s (manifested in the Cultural Revolution), both of which focused almost entirely on the central elite level.” He notes that the prevailing paradigm of Chinese policy-making has been a model of “fragmented authoritarianism,” which assumes a “complex process of bargaining between the top leaders and the bureaucracy, particularly in the provinces.”²⁷

²⁷ Harry Harding, “The Contemporary Study of Chinese Politics: An Introduction,” *China Quarterly*, No. 139 (September 1994), p. 700.

The lack of adequate information and communication between China and the Western countries, particularly the U.S., also seriously restricted the application of the bureaucratic model to analysis of Chinese policy making. For a long time, political science in China was not regarded as a normal discipline, and thus the theory of comparative politics was not acceptable. This is revealed in the fact that not a single textbook in political science was published and no single department of political science existed in the universities until well into the 1980s.²⁸ The first textbook on the Chinese government structure was published in the early 1990s,²⁹ after the policies of reform and opening up had been implemented for more than a decade. This means that Western scholars who investigated Chinese policy-making could not benefit from serious objective and scientific research on this subject by the Chinese themselves

In general, artificial class and factional struggles, the lack of transparency in the Chinese policy-making process, and the viewing of Chinese political power as highly personalistic prevented students of Chinese domestic and foreign policy from using the comparative frameworks to study Chinese policy-making process that experts used to analyze policy-making in the West. Nevertheless, the increasing changes in China coupled with the intensive field research in China by many American experts, for

²⁸ Only three universities had a department of international politics, that is, Beijing University, Fudan University, and People's University, and no university had a department of politics until 1990 when the first department of politics was separated from the department of international politics at Fudan University.

²⁹ One of the earliest published books on the Chinese governmental system was *Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu* (The Contemporary Chinese Political System) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1990), edited by Fudan University professor Pu Xinzuo. Thereafter, other books were published, for instance, Qianwei and Pu Xinzuo, *Dangdai Zhongguo xingzheng* (Contemporary Chinese Administration) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1993); Li Shouchu, *Zhongguo zhengfu zhidu* (The Chinese Governmental System) (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1997), among others.

instance, Oksenberg, finally permitted and promoted a new perspective on the characteristics of Chinese political institutions.

It is well recognized that the Chinese policy-making process underwent a dramatic change after Deng Xiaoping initiated the “reform and opening up” policies in 1978. The change from a totalitarian to an authoritarian system triggered changes in policy making. Unlike under Mao Zedong’s leadership, during the Deng Xiaoping years there was no longer a paramount leader who had absolute authority over grand strategic decisions. Deng’s power was balanced by the faction of moderate reformers, often referred to as the “conservatives,” led by Chen Yun. Compared with Deng, Jiang Zemin, Deng’s successor, was significantly less powerful. As general secretary of the Communist Party of China, he was more often seen as “the first among the equals.”³⁰

The breakthrough in examining Chinese policy-making came with Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s book *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure and Process* that presents case studies on China’s energy policy-making in 1988. These authors, as well as some similar-minded colleagues, for instance David Lampton and Susan Shirk, thereafter began to extend their inquiry beyond the top political elite and to adopt a bureaucratic approach to explore the policy-making process in China. Their studies put more

³⁰ David Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 30. In his chapter, “Understanding the Historical Record,” Michael Swaine states: “...with the emergence of the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership, China’s leaders are becoming less “absolutist.” Swaine and Zhang, eds., *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, p. 13. In *China’s Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), Cheng Li comments that what is most evident in Chinese politics during the post-Deng period is the broad trend away from an all-powerful single leader such as Mao and Deng to a greater collective leadership, which is characteristic of the Jiang era. There is more power sharing, negotiation, consultation and consensus building than there was in the decision making of his predecessors. Under such conditions, after Deng it is no longer suitable to call the Chinese president the “paramount leader,” as he is called in Lu Ning’s *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 8-9.

emphasis on formal government and party organizations and show that although power at the summit is dominated by individuals, formal decisions are made by and implemented through established bureaucratic institutions.

Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton later edited a volume entitled *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao* (1992), which postulates that, unlike that which is generally assumed, in Chinese authoritarianism, policy-making is not totally controlled by the top leaders; on the contrary, policy-making is full of competition and arguments for the interests of organizations or sections, and therefore bargaining and compromise are inevitable. A typical example can be found in the decision-making process around the construction of the Danjiangkou dam at the border of the two provinces of Henan and Hebei. The dam's height could not be determined by the central planners, since the interests of the two provinces, as well as that of the Ministry of Electrical Power, the Ministry of Water Conservancy, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Animal Husbandry were all involved. At the local level, the height of the dam affected the interests of the two provinces, since it was related to how much electric power could be generated and distributed, how effectively flooding could be controlled, how many acres of agricultural land in each province would be submerged by water, how many emigrants would be resettled, and how much in subsidies each province could receive from the central government; at the central level, there were concerns about electric-power generation, flood control, and irrigation, but these objectives contradicted one another. Technically, the dam's height could be from 140 meters to 175 meters, but this would depend on the balance of gains and costs and on the bargaining power of each

involved organization and locality. Ultimately, the dam's height was fixed at 157 meters, the decision being made through bargaining and compromise.³¹

Lieberthal and Oksenberg's book was followed by *Decision-Making in Deng's China* (1995), edited by Carol Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, and Kenneth Lieberthal's *Governing China* (1996). Hamrin and Zhao's volume, *Decision-Making in Deng's China*, which covers the Deng era until 1989, emphasizes the new feature of pluralization in the Chinese policy-making process in the course of the 1980s reforms. It reveals that in the post-Mao era, the properties of different policies brought about divergent roles and influences of individual leaders and institutional actors; thus, the policy-making process in China became increasingly pluralized. Lieberthal's book *Governing China* illustrates how China's political system works and portrays the Chinese bureaucratic structure—both formal and informal—as structurally complex, yet where officials adhere to personalistic norms of behavior. However, these two books, as well as Lieberthal and Lampton's *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post Mao China* (1992), are mainly related to Chinese domestic policy making.

It can be argued that Oksenberg, Lieberthal, and Lampton, as well as some other experts in China studies, were the first scholars to apply Western political science theories on bureaucracy and policy implementation to Chinese policy-making studies based on substantial evidence. They find, as H. Lyman Miller points out, “all factors make inter- and intra-bureaucratic dynamics complex and often highly fragmented processes in the U.S. described in Hedrick Smith's *The Power Game: How Washington*

³¹ David M. Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 45-48.

Works also work in the Chinese policy-making process.”³² They conclude that the resulting Chinese policy process, at least in some policy sectors and in some policy areas, assumes a process of bargaining and compromise of a similar nature to that found in Western bureaucratic systems, recalling in sometimes startling ways Smith’s description of the American system as “fluid, fragmented and floating.”³³

Obviously, although there has been more access to both direct and indirect information over the past thirty years, the lack of transparency in Chinese decision making is still one of the major obstacles to research in this area. Consequently, in spite of the development of a new perception, unlike in the discipline of economics where cases in the Chinese economy, such as Chinese foreign trade policy and exchange rate policy, have increasingly been regarded as typical case studies in textbooks on international trade and monetary theories, neither the theories of comparative politics or the theories of international relations have been included in studies of Chinese political and economic institutions and the policy-making process (classical textbooks on comparative politics and theories of international relations draw almost no concepts and theories from China-related cases). The fact that China studies has not made a significant contribution to the establishment of theory is indicative not only of the special characteristics of the Chinese cultural, political, and economic systems and the Chinese transition process, but it also demonstrates the relatively young and immature state of China studies compared with other regional studies, such as Japan and Latin America, not to mention Western European studies. There is no doubt that without overall theoretical

³² H. Lyman Miller, “Politics Inside the Ring Road,” in Hamrin and Zhao, eds., *Decision-Making in Deng’s China*, p. 223.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

progress in comparative studies, efforts to describe and understand the Chinese foreign policy-making process within the framework of the theories of foreign policy-making will face serious, and sometimes insurmountable, difficulties. Therefore, in order to advance China studies and to fill the gap between China studies and other regional studies, theory-based research on Chinese foreign policy-making should be the goal of students in the field of China studies.

Studies on the Chinese Foreign Policy-Making Process

Research on the foreign policy-making process of the PRC does not have a long history, but still there has been substantial progress. A “landmark work” in this field is A. Doak Barnett’s *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, which appeared in 1985. By putting together information collected through interviews with senior Chinese leaders, for instance Premier Zhao Ziyang, the author makes the first significant contribution to a description of the institutional picture of the Chinese foreign policy-making process, and to explaining “how the various components of the process interrelated and how the personalities of specific leaders ... affected both the processes and the outcomes.”³⁴ Indeed, Barnett had already observed that although ultimate decision-making power on foreign and domestic policies is highly concentrated among the political elite, “the basis for making major policy decisions had been considerably broadened. ... The policy-making process is more systematic, regularized, and rationalized than it has been for many years.”³⁵ He also found that the rapid expansion

³⁴ Cited in Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Defense Policy in the Era of Reform*, p. 31.

³⁵ A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure of Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 2, 3.

of China's foreign relations motivated Chinese leaders to accept more bureaucracies and experts in the process of foreign policy-making or implementation.³⁶

In the 1990s, a number of American experts in China studies began to engage in research on Chinese foreign policy and the process of foreign policy making, thus generating additional literature on these issues. Among them, Lu Ning's *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Making in China* (1994) fills a void in the literature regarding the Chinese foreign policy-making process and clarifies many aspects and points in this process that had long been misunderstood by Western scholars and politicians. Lu Ning's contribution was followed by other studies, such as Quansheng Zhao's *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy* (1997), Huang Quanyu, Joseph Leonard, and Chen Tong's *Business Decision Making in China* (1997), and Michael Swaine's *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking* (1998).

Business Decision Making in China focuses on Chinese business decision making, but the volume also describes the structure of government organization, the organizational structure of the Chinese central government in general and of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular, as well as the characteristics of business decision making.³⁷ Michael Swaine's *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking* provides a ground-breaking and comprehensive picture of China's national security policy process. It describes and analyzes the leadership, structures, and interactions governing the formulation and implementation of China's national security strategy and the resultant foreign and defense policies, concluding that the

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 3, 4.

³⁷ Huang Quanyu, Joseph Leonard, and Chen Tong, *Business Decision Making in China* (Binghamton, NY: International Business Press, 1997).

military does not dictate policy in any one of the four sub-arenas. At the top of the hierarchy of the Chinese decision-making system, senior military leaders interact in a generally collaborative and consultative fashion with their civilian counterparts, though military views on certain defense-related policies may often be reflected in final decisions.³⁸

The most noteworthy recent book on the Chinese foreign policy-making process is *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (2001), edited by David Lampton. Its significant contribution is its broad perspective on the way Chinese foreign and security policy is made, and how it has changed during the reform era. As the most in-depth and comprehensive account of Chinese foreign and security policy formulation and implementation to date, this book covers the longest period in PRC political history—it investigates the major changes in Chinese foreign policymaking that took place with the leadership transfer from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, then to Jiang Zemin. It covers all the components of the process, including elite and social opinions and the influence of the international system, as well as case studies, including studies on Chinese non-proliferation and arms control policy making, Chinese decision making regarding Taiwan, China's accession to GATT/WTO, and so on. By articulating these changes, each of the chapters in the volume provide support for what David Lampton summarizes as the new characteristics in Chinese foreign policy making: professionalism, corporate pluralization, decentralization, and globalization.

According to Lampton, professionalism includes the trend toward a deep intensity of expertise among the Chinese leaders and bureaucrats, the extension of expert-based

³⁸ Michael Swaine, *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking*, rev. ed. (Santa Monica, CA: Center for Asia-Pacific Policy, Rand, 1998), pp. x, 4, 11.

bureaucracies in the policy-making process, and the increased dependence of decision-makers on information provided by the specialized bureaucracies.

Corporate pluralization refers to the propagation of organizations, groups, and sometimes individuals in the policy-making process.

Decentralization means the gradual decentralization of power at both the central and local levels, infrequently in policy formulation and more often in implementation. This trend is evident in the area of economics and trade.

Globalization, specifically economic and information globalization, implies that the increasing degree to which national security must be multilaterally negotiated inevitably leads to international interdependence, which in turn is presumed to encourage cooperation. Globalization thus has reshaped the Chinese leadership's concepts of national interest and its practice of *realpolitik*.

Lampton finds that these changes are evident in the fact that the bureaucracy has more say on routine decisions; decision-makers rely on more information provided by experts; cooperation among different components of the foreign policy establishment has become more important; and divergent thinking over Chinese foreign policy and geopolitics compete for adoption by the central leadership.³⁹

Research on the Chinese foreign policy-making process also benefits from the cluster of literature addressing China's bilateral and multilateral relationships, and the historical and perceptual roots of these ties. These books include Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (1994); Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*

³⁹ See Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, pp. 5-27.

(1998); Robert G. Sutter, *China's Policy Priorities and Recent Relations with Southeast Asia* (1999); *China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils* (2005); and Robert Suettinger, *Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000* (2003), Susan L. Shirk, *China, Fragile Superpower* (2007); etc.

Michael Swaine's *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking* and Huang Quanyu, Joseph Leonard, and Chen Tong's *Business Decision Making in Chinese Foreign Relations* can be grouped with Ming Wan's *Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations* (2001) in a category of works on Beijing's perceptions and practices in various aspects of foreign policy, for example, arms control, trade, and human rights policy.

A recently published volume edited by Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis* (2007), should be mentioned as another important book in this area. Comparing different decision models in specific area of crises management from the Mao years through Deng and Jiang, the authors conclude that there have been dramatic changes in policy-making during periods of crisis in China. Although Mao Zedong was the dominant decision-maker in all major crises or near-crisis from the 1950s until the early 1970s, and Deng Xiaoping dominated decision making before and during crises, such as during the Sino-Vietnam border war of 1979,⁴⁰ Jiang Zemin's ability to control crisis decision making was largely weakened for reasons of political structure and personal relations. This reflects one of the important features of a looser authoritarian regime.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Swaine and Zhang, eds., *Managing Sino-American Crisis, Case Studies and Analysis*, p. 41.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

The availability of information has improved, as recognized by many American scholars,⁴² but it is still extraordinarily difficult to find information about the Chinese foreign policy-making process in formal Chinese-language publications. This is demonstrated by the fact that *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu jigou gailan* (An Outline of the Government Apparatus in the People's Republic of China) (2002), edited by the National Administrative College, omits an introduction to the Ministry of Defense; and *Guowuyuan jigou gaige gailan* (An Outline to the Reforms in the State Council Apparatus) (1988), edited by *Liaowang zhoukan* (a publication affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), omits parts of the introduction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. Obviously, Chinese foreign policy decision making, which traditionally was more centrally controlled and has remained so during the reform era, is still seen as a sensitive subject related to Chinese security and national interests, thus open discussion in China is limited. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that even though there have been some Chinese scholars, for instance Professor Zhang Qingmin at the Foreign Affairs University, who have concentrated on the Chinese foreign policy-making process for years, so far there has not been a single book published on this subject in Chinese in the People's Republic of China. Yet, some books published in China on Chinese foreign policy or on China's international relations offer subtle clues about Chinese foreign policy decision making.

Nevertheless, in the early years of the 21st century, the most apparent progress in the transparency in the China's governance is that the majority of major ministries under the State Council and some departments of the CPC central Committee have established their

⁴² Lieberthal and Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes*, p. 19; Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, p. 32.

own websites, so that information on their components, functions and important activities are in most cases available. This change has provided unprecedented convenience in studying Chinese foreign policy making.

In an overview, Lieberthal's description of research on Chinese foreign policy-making progress remains valid: "The study of Chinese diplomatic history has become fairly well developed, [while] the study of Chinese foreign policy-making remains much undeveloped."⁴³

Concepts and Theoretical Framework Used in This Research

The bureaucratic politics model used by Lieberthal, Oksenberg, and Lampton in their studies on Chinese decision making will be adopted as the theoretical framework to guide this research. Unlike the rational model, which assumes that psychological or bureaucratic biases have little impact and that decision-makers (or decision-making units) make calculations in more or less the same way, the bureaucratic politics model focuses on psychological or bureaucratic factors combined with individual organizations, thus often demanding concrete and sufficient information on specific groups or on bureaucratic structures and processes.

In the United States, the bureaucratic politics model was developed by those independently studying the politics of policy making, mainly the politics of making foreign and defense policy in the early 1960s. These scholars include Richard E. Neustadt, Gabriel A. Almond, Charles E. Lindblom, Warner R. Schilling, Samuel P.

⁴³ Cited in Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 13.

Huntington, and Roger Hilsman.⁴⁴ They describe policy as a result of negotiation and bargaining among the major participants, and they focus on the role and power of bureaucracies in policy making.⁴⁵ However, not until the late 1960s and the early 1970s when the “second generation” of the bureaucratic politics model was formed, represented by Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, were the propositions from the earlier contributors to the model refined and developed.⁴⁶

Graham T. Allison applies the bureaucratic politics model to the Cuban missile crisis in his now famous book entitled *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1962). He formulates three decision-making models, representing three possible explanatory frameworks for U.S. decision making: 1) the rational choice model, 2) the organizational politics model, and 3) the governmental process model.⁴⁷ His formulations were further developed through cooperation with Morton Halperin into a combination of Model 2 and Model 3, popularly known as the “bureaucratic politics” model of decision making.⁴⁸ Their work was followed by that of Morton H. Halperin, I.

⁴⁴ Roger Hilsman, with Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weitsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993), p. vii.

⁴⁵ Jerel A. Rostatt, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” *World Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (January 1981), p. 234; Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics*, p. viii; Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” *Policy Science*, Vol. 4 (1973), at p. 468; Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” *World Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (January 1981), p. 234; Dan Caldwell, “Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (September/October 1977), p. 88.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁴⁷ Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (NY: Longman, 1999).

⁴⁸ Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

M. Destler, and Alexander L. George. Since then, in spite of criticism due to confusion in applying the bureaucratic model to policy-making behavior, Allison's approach to decision-making theory has come to be appreciated as "one of the most widely disseminated concepts in all of social science."⁴⁹

In the perception of those who advocate the bureaucratic politics model, governments are not single, rationally calculating units. Instead, they are composed of organizations and individual actors who hold differing opinions about government policy options and who compete with one another to influence decisions.⁵⁰ Government decision making is usually a group game rather than an individual activity; it is actually a political process rather than a cognitive, rational process. Bargaining and compromise among the members of the group permeate this process. Indeed, many China studies authors have discovered such a phenomenon in the Chinese foreign policy-making process.⁵¹

The bureaucratic politics model (BPM), as summarized by Jerel A. Rosati, comprises four basic propositions: 1) For any issue, the executive branch of the government is composed of numerous individuals and organizations, with varying interests and goals. 2) No preponderant individual or organization exists; the President,

University Press, 1972), and Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1974), pp. 40-79.

⁴⁹ Robert P. Haffa, Jr., "Allison's Models: An Analytics Approach to Bureaucratic Politics," in John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, eds., *American Defense Policy*, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 224.

⁵⁰ Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," and Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 41. Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," pp. 234-252.

⁵¹ For instance, in chap. 1 (p. 13) of *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, Lampton argues "The need to solicit, digest, bargain, and balance a greater number of views slows down the policy formulation process, as I have argued with respect to domestic policy-making."

if involved, is merely one participant, though his influence may be the most powerful.

3) The final decision is a “political resultant”—the outcome of bargaining and compromise among the various participants, thus a decision is the result of the “pulling and hauling” among the various participants as they attempt to advance their concepts of personal, group, organizational, and national interests. 4) A considerable gap usually exists between the formulated decision and its implementation. The first two propositions refer to the structure of the decision-making establishment; the latter two are related to the decision-making process.⁵²

The BPM reveals the driving force of bargaining and compromise in the decision-making process: the organizational position determines the policy stance. In the famous phrase “where you stand [on policy issues] depends on where you sit” (that is, where you are organizationally situated), an idea borrowed from role theory,⁵³ the “maker” of government policy is not a calculating decision maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both government decisions and actions. Each organization, including the foreign affairs ministry, the defense ministry, and the intelligence agencies, has its own well-defined interests. Moreover, each organization has its own important institutional goals: more missions; more autonomy from outsider interference; greater influence

⁵² Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” pp. 237-238.

⁵³ Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics*, p. 61; Don K. Price, cited in Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, p. 176.

within the government; greater capacities, resources, and personnel; and a larger financial source.⁵⁴

Role expectations are pressures that encourage the individual to modify his or her attitudes and behavior to accord with the perceived requirements of the position.

Policy-making involves conflict and competition, and political elites struggle among themselves to exert power over policy-making. The chance for policy decision making mobilizes a variety of political forces (both inside and outside the government) to join in the political conflict. Thus, it is essentially a pluralist model of policy-making—many political actors and organizations are presumed to be involved in making decisions.⁵⁵

This point is important in studies on the Chinese foreign policy-making process as it provides one of the reasons why the policy-making process can be pluralist in a basically non-pluralist society like China: bureaucratic politics invites bargaining and compromise.

The bureaucratic politics model may explain the bargaining, compromising, and competition at the executive branch level. It might not, however, be able to explain the bargaining, compromising, and competition at the interest group and individual levels, and why those groups and individuals prefer the bureaucratic politics model, in spite of the suboptimal outcomes of the process. Therefore, public choice theory is a useful theoretical tool to complement the bureaucratic politics model in analyzing the motivations for individual participation in collective action and the reasons for bargaining in the political process.

⁵⁴ Greg Cashman, *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1993), p. 90.

⁵⁵ Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making In Defense and Foreign Affairs*.

Public choice theory, also called collective choice theory, explains the means through which interests are reconciled and the constraints within which individuals act. In this theory, the motivation behind an individual action is assumed to be the maximization of utility or interest. Individuals choose to realize aims collectively rather than individually because they find that their utility or interests are increased by collective action. Collective actions may cost less than private actions by individuals, or may guarantee some extra or external benefits that cannot be gained through personal actions. Thus, from the point of view of the individual participants, a considerable investment of time and resources in “bargaining” is rational. Given a defined bargaining range, the decision-making problem is a zero-sum game. “Bargaining between individuals or their representatives in organizations ceases only when ‘equilibrium’ is reached.”⁵⁶ But this theory does not provide insight into what the equilibrium in politics is.

Given these conditions, the issue in policy-making is not so much which policy choice is best, but how to reconcile all the conflicting views over what constitutes the best policy. Decisions are the results of bargaining, compromising, “pulling and hauling,” coalition building, competing, and conflicts among individuals organized in hierarchical roles. In other words, decisions are determined through a political process rather than through a logical, intellectual process. Decisions depend not only on the reasons or rationales used to support a particular course of action, but also on the relative power and political skills of those involved in the competition. As a result, final

⁵⁶ James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 4, 25, 42, 120; and James M. Buchanan, “Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems,” in James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, eds., *Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), pp. 11-12.

decisions are likely to be neither rational nor optimal. They might be suboptimal, but capable of reconciling conflicting views and organizational interests.

Another important question to consider when applying the BPM to the Chinese foreign policy-making process is how the BPM describes the role of the president. The BPM assumes that no individual or organization has dominant power, even the president. It admits that the American president has a wide range of powers, from appointing higher-level personnel within the executive branch, setting the rules of the game, and determining which participants will have access to him and the decision-making process, to being capable of promoting or frustrating most plans.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the BPM insists that although the president's authority may be powerful, it is by no means omnipotent. According to this theory, the president, if he is involved, is merely one participant among many. The BPM implies a kind of "bureaucratic captivity" of the U.S. president (or of the central decision-makers in other countries), who is seen as heavily reliant on the bureaucracy for information, for identification and analysis of alternatives, for the advocacy of solutions, and for policy implementation.⁵⁸ Compared with the American president, however, the power of the current Chinese president in foreign policy decisions is more constrained, in that he does not have power to directly select the heads of government departments, to set the rules of the game, or to determine which actors engage in which policy decisions, as the American president generally does. Decisions in China normally are made collectively through prolonged bargaining and compromise. The degree of "bureaucratic captivity" of the current Chinese president

⁵⁷ Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," p. 246.

⁵⁸ Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy*, 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003), pp. 476, 480.

may be different from that of the American president due to the totally different political systems, but the assumption of the president's reliance on the bureaucracy is no doubt relevant in the Chinese foreign policy-making process in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, as has already been revealed by many authors.

The question then should be asked: On what occasions are bureaucratic interests decisive in the formulation of policy? Theoretically, when bureaucratic politics operate, some policy options are never presented due to bureaucratic imperatives, and often the president cannot create options apart from those placed before him by the bureaucracies. But it is suggested by the BPM that the key on such occasions is the president's performance: asserting his power or showing his indifference. In the latter case, the bureaucracies are likely to maximize their function in policy decision making. It is argued that "the ability of bureaucracies to independently establish policies is a function of Presidential attention. Presidential attention is a function of Presidential values."⁵⁹ In China, as we will see in the following chapters, this it is also the case, though to a different degree. The other important factor affecting the president's involvement is the decision-making environment. During crises, the president and his closest advisers are likely to be regularly and heavily involved in decision making, but during routine situations they are less involved and leave bureaucracy to play the biggest role in day-to-day affairs.⁶⁰

Advocates of the BPM have used it to explain a variety of different national security policy decisions, including decisions on procurement of weapon systems, international

⁵⁹ Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," p. 246.

⁶⁰ John Spanier, *Games Nation Play: Analyzing International Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 32-42.

economic policy, arms control policy, and alliance policy. Lampton's volume on Chinese foreign and defense policies demonstrates that the BPM can also be used to explain Chinese foreign policy decisions on such issues as arms control, China's entry into the WTO, policies toward the U.S, and so on.

The use of the BPM to examine the Chinese foreign policy-making process does not mean that one should ignore the individual level. According to psychological explanations of policy decisions, at the individual level of analysis individuals do indeed make a difference. Thus it is necessary as well to understand the individuals who are responsible for the policy decisions. In the case of Chinese foreign policy making, when investigating policy decisions it is thus also necessary to understand the personal characteristics of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, as well as their outlooks on China and the world.

On the other hand, the bureaucratic model does not tell whether there are differences or different degrees in the reactions of the various bureaucracies to the changing policy-making environment, which, in China's case, lies principally in China's increasing integration into the international community and China's new image in the world. Thus the following two relevant questions about Chinese policy-making can be asked. First, do the different bureaucracies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, or the PLA, share the same attitudes toward China's international responsibilities? Second, if there are differences, how do these differences shape the Chinese policy-making process?

It can be assumed that in China, the attitudes of the different bureaucracies toward international rules are the functions of the degree of their opening to the outside world

and the nature of their work. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has more regular contact with foreign countries, its work is more political in nature than that of the Ministry of Commerce, which in recent years has been more involved in bilateral and multilateral economic and trade relations and international organizations. On the other hand, the Chinese military, which is responsible for protecting Chinese territory and sovereignty, is less open to the world and naturally most sensitive about China's security situation. The distinctions in the changes among them are embodied in their respective stances on international rules. As described by a Chinese scholar and noted by Susan Shirk, the officials of the Ministry of Commerce believe that if China joins an international organization, it should follow the rules. The military believes that such rules, if they are made by the U.S.-led Western countries, are aimed at restricting China, and therefore China should make efforts to change the rules.⁶¹ It is noted by many Chinese scholars that officials in the Ministry of Commerce are more open-minded and more ready to accept the rules of international organizations, and although they try their best to bargain for better conditions, they tend to regard these rules as inevitable. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in the middle, because its tasks are more political in nature and more relevant to Chinese sovereignty than those of the Ministry of Commerce, but less sensitive than those of the military. Thus, in China on the whole the bureaucracies share the view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "China gains by acting like a team player," even though party leaders may also believe that the United States manipulates "the international games against China."⁶²

⁶¹ Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 108-109.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 108.

The Organization of the Thesis

This research will focus on the changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making structure and process since the early 1990s. Emphasis will be placed on the reorganization and establishment of new agencies in major departments related to foreign affairs, changes in the function of these agencies, the power structure of foreign policy-making in the bureaucracy, for instance, the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the military, on different issues related to foreign policy, and the bureaucracy's role in general in policy-making vis-à-vis some other institutions, such as the Chinese Communist Party and foreign policy-related think tanks. The research will also explore the reasons for these changes, the implications of these changes for the Chinese foreign policy-making process, and the impact that these changes have on Chinese foreign policy.

For the purposes of this research, three basic hypotheses will be tested:

1. There have been dramatic changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process since the early 1990s. The process has become less personalistic and further institutionalized.⁶³

⁶³ Different definitions of institutionalization have been formulated for different purposes. For the purpose of this research, two are especially useful. One defines institutionalization as the point at which an innovative practice loses its "special project" status and becomes a part of the routine behavior of the system. (Paul Berman and Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin: *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change*, Vol. I: *A Model of Educational Change* [Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1974]). The other defines institutionalization as "the creation of the repeatable process that is essentially self-sustaining: it is one in which all the relevant actors can resort to well-established and familiar routines" (David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century* [Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998]). These definitions seem rather negative. But my meaning, as in the case with many political scientists looking at the Chinese political process, is rather positive.

Here by institutionalization I mean that certain institutions are established and gain authority over parts of the policy-making process, which confers greater predictability to the outcomes of the process. David Lampton refers to four characteristics in Chinese foreign policy making, two of which—professionalism and corporate pluralization—can also be seen as manifestations of institutionalization: the bureaucracy has more say on routine decisions,

2. Unlike the changes in the first decade of the reform era, when changes in the foreign policy-making process were caused by shifts in the top leadership and the corresponding policy transition toward reform and opening, the changes since the early 1990s have been due to China's new economic and political status in the world—the result of the policies of reform and opening.

3. China's new self-image stimulates a rethinking and redefining of China's national interests and responsibilities.

Two factors present in H2 and H3—China's economic and political status in the world (here called Factor I) and China's self-image (here called Factor II)—are selected as the independent variables. The dependent variable is the factor present in H1—the changes in Chinese foreign policy-making process. In other words, China's economic and policy status in the world and China's self-image have been the two major direct causes of the changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process since the early 1990s.

China is coming to see itself not so much as a victimized developing nation but as an emerging great power. Accordingly, it has started to look at international rules and regimes in a different way—not so much as constraints imposed by the U.S.-led Western powers or their own interests, but as tools to promote the common interests of the international community and to maintain the international economic and political orders. Changes in the way China views the WTO and intellectual property rights are two typical examples.


Although Factor I and Factor II are independent variables, they are correlated with each other. China's new world economic and political status certainly contributes to

decision-makers rely on more information provided by experts, and cooperation among different components of the foreign policy establishment has become more important.

changes in China's self-image, directly or indirectly, and vice versa. H2 implies that China's expanding responsibilities and interests have required an increasing capability to carry out its responsibilities and to look after its interests, whereas H3 implies that increasingly viewing itself as a rising power and recognizing its responsibilities as such, China has become more willing to cooperate with the international community to address global issues. The boundary between the effects of Factors I and II may be not easy to differentiate, but the actions motivated by the former tend to be passive and protective, whereas the actions motivated by the latter tend to be active and cooperative.⁶⁴

The relationship between the variables and the three hypotheses is indicated in the following:

Figure 1.1 The Relationships between the Three Variables and the Three Hypotheses



⁶⁴ For instance, the establishment of the Bureau of Arms Control in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was motivated by two purposes: to protect China's national security interests (a passive and protective motive) and to cooperate with the international community to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (an active and cooperative motive), the result of recognition that preventing proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide is also in China's own interests.

H1 will be tested by illustrating the changes. H2 and H3 will be tested by showing that as an outcome of the first decade of reform, since the early 1990s China has a diversity of national interests to look after and a diversity of responsibilities to carry out, and by demonstrating how the change in China's self-image correlates with Chinese policy-makers' rethinking and redefining of China's national interests and responsibilities.

The following chapters are arranged as follows: Chapter Two describes the structural changes in the components of the Chinese policy-making establishment since the early 1990s, specifically four major organs—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, the military, and the Office of Taiwan Affairs under the State Council. Chapter Three analyzes the role of the Chinese Communist Party and its foreign policy-making apparatus. In addition to the Politburo and its Standing Committee, three other units are very important—the Leading Groups, the International Department, and the Office of International Communication of the CPC Central Committee. Chapter Four discusses the proliferation of research institutions and their functions. Three types of think tanks are examined: institutes affiliated with different government, party, or military apparatuses; institutes for international studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; and research institutes in colleges and universities. Chapter Five provides the case studies. Two types of cases are scrutinized: China's foreign aid and policy in a crisis. Finally, Chapter Six explores the reasons for the changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process and draws conclusions from this research.

Chapter Two: The Structural Changes in the Components of the Chinese Policy-Making Establishment since the Early 1990s

Before exploring the changes of the Chinese foreign policy-making process since the early 1990s, we need to get a whole picture of what the Chinese foreign-policy establishment looks like and what its characteristics are.

The Structure of the Chinese Foreign-Policy Establishment

It is well recognized that the Chinese political structure can be understood by looking at it as being composed of three major vertical systems: the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), the government, and the military. Each system is a hierarchy with five layers: central, provincial/army, prefectural/division, county/regiment, and township/battalion.⁶⁵ These complicated Chinese political institutions, however, cannot fit into any other model in the world. Although the five layers of the three systems are parallel to each other, generally their powers are by no means equal. After more than a half a century of development from 1949, from the preliminary period of the establishment of the political apparatus to the Cultural Revolution, and then entering the 21st century, party leadership in state affairs remains consolidated in spite of changes in the functioning of the leadership (see Figure 2-1).

At the top level, the party's highest bodies, the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Politburo, are superior to the State Council (the managing body of the state

⁶⁵ Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 39; and Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution through Reform* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995), pp. 159-163.

system) and the PRC Central Military Commission (or the Central Military Commission of the State; the two bodies comprise the same members, representing the administrative

Figure 2-1 Chinese Political Structure


Three Major Vertical Systems		
CPC	Government	Military
Politburo	State Council	CMC
Province (Committee)	Province (Government)	Army
Prefectural (Committee)	Prefectural (Government)	Division
County (Committee)	County (Government)	Regiment
Township (Committee)	Township (Government)	Battalion

apparatus of the military system). The state and military systems are de facto under the control of party leaders, whereas the governmental and military systems are parallel, and in fact independent of each other. The State Council has no power to control the armed forces, though formally there is a Ministry of Defense in the State Council⁶⁶ (Such a power structure is illustrated in Figure 2-2). The idea of the Communist Party’s leadership is reinforced in Hu Jintao’s report to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPC held from October 15 to 21, 2007. In stressing party leadership in Chinese political life, Hu stated that the CPC “must keep to the path of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, and integrate the leadership of the Party, the position of the

⁶⁶ Interview with a military researcher, November 2007.

people as the masters of the country, and the rule of law,” and “ensure that the Party leads the people in effectively governing the country.”⁶⁷

Figure 2-2 The Current Leadership Relationships



As early as 1987, an important political reform measure was initiated at the Thirteenth Congress of the CPC, that is, to separate the party from the government, or rather, to separate the party’s functions from the government’s functions,⁶⁸ by establishing a chief executive responsibility system, meaning the chief executive would

⁶⁷ Chapter Six of Hu Jintao’s Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPC, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568.htm.

⁶⁸ See “Zhao Ziyang zai Zhongguo gongchandang dishisanci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao” (Zhao Ziyang’s Report to the Thirteenth Congress of the CPC), October 25, 1987, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65447/4526369.html>.

be in charge of the affairs of his or her government agency.⁶⁹ This would also be the case in different level enterprises or institutes (*shiye danwei*), where their work is related to a special expertise, such as universities or hospitals. But at different levels of the local governments, such as the provincial, county, or township levels where affairs were to be managed comprehensively, the position of party leader is still regarded as higher than the position of the chief executive. For instance, the authority of the party secretary of Shanghai Municipality, a position formerly held by Jiang Zemin, is higher than that of the mayor of the city, formerly occupied by Zhu Rongji. On the other hand, as part of the centralized political arrangement, each local government department is also obligated to answer to a higher-level department in the same system. For instance, the Offices of Foreign Affairs at the provincial levels are simultaneously responsible to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Offices of Foreign Affairs at the county levels are responsible to the Offices of Foreign Affairs at the provincial level. The *tiao/kuai* relationship, which is clearly described in *Governing China*,⁷⁰ still remains intact in the reform era and continues to apply to the foreign policy-making area.

The Politburo and Its Standing Committee

At the very top of the power structure is the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. The party constitutions of 1969, 1973, 1977, and 1982 all stipulate that the Politburo is to be elected by the Central Committee in full plenary session and to act on its behalf when the Central Committee is not in session. The day-to-day work of the

⁶⁹ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 14.

⁷⁰ Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution through Reform*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), pp. 186-188.

Politburo is handled by its Standing Committee, the apex of the pyramidal structure of the party.⁷¹ Membership on the Standing Committee has varied from five to nine members. For instance, the 1982 Twelfth Party Congress elected a six-member Standing Committee, but the Standing Committees of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth congresses are both composed of nine members. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, however, the Politburo and its Standing Committee lost some of their power in decision making, due to the fact that Central Work Conferences (*zhongyang gongzuo huiyi*) were frequently summoned, and presided over by Premier Zhou Enlai, to deal with significant issues.⁷²

Accordingly, the highest foreign policy decision-making institution is the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Because of its relatively large size, the inconvenience (not all members of the Politburo reside in Beijing), and the lack of knowledge (not all members are familiar with foreign affairs), except for the Standing Committee members and some of the members of the Politburo who supervise specific foreign affairs-related departments in the government and party, most Politburo member are only slightly engaged in foreign policy making.⁷³ Most members of the Standing Committee living in Beijing meet once a week. If an emergency occurs, a special meeting may be held.

⁷¹ "Constitution of the Communist Party of China, adopted by the Eleventh National Congress on August 18, 1977," in James C. F. Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999), p. 77.

⁷² A. Doak Barnett explains that because Mao asserted his personal domination over policy, all institutionalized processes were disrupted. See A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 8.

⁷³ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, p. 9.

These meetings usually are summoned by coordinating agencies, such as the Office of Foreign Affairs of the CPC Central Committee.⁷⁴

Table 2-1 The Politburo Standing Committee of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPC (from October 2007)

Name	Positions
Hu Jintao	General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC President of the PRC Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PRC
Wu Bangguo	Chairman and Party Secretary of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
Wen Jiabao	Premier of the State Council Secretary of the Party Group of the State Council
Jia Qinglin	Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
Li Changchun	No other formal post
Xi Jinping	Secretary of the Secretariat Party Secretary of Shanghai Municipality*
Li Keqiang	Party Secretary and Head of the People's Congress of Liaoning Province
He Guoqiang	Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission Head of the Organization Department of the CPC
Zhou Yongkang	State Councilor, Member of the Party Group of the State Council Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission of Political Science and Law Minister and Party Secretary of the Ministry of Public Security

Source: *China Newsweek*, October 29, 2007.

* Position held when appointed member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

Normally, the Standing Committee includes the chairman (or general secretary) of the CPC, the state president (these two positions may be filled by the same person), the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the premier of the State Council,

⁷⁴ Interview with Chinese researcher, March 2006.

the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). For example, the Seventeenth Party Congress generated a nine-member Standing Committee (see Table 2-1) and a twenty-four-member Politburo (including the nine members of the Standing Committee).

Here two facts stand out. First, all the chiefs of the highest apparatuses of the party, state, and military are included on the Standing Committee of the Politburo: In addition to Hu Jintao, who leads all three, the heads of the State Council (Wen Jiabao), the heads of the National People's Congress (Wu Bangguo); the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress (Jia Qinglin); and a significant organ of the CPC, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (He Guoqiang); and deputy secretary of the Central Commission of Political Science and Law (Zhou Yongkang) are also Standing Committee members. Second, only one member, Li Changchun, does not hold any other post, but it is well known that he is in charge of propaganda within the party.

Normally, in order to effectively direct and manage the apparatus responsible for state and party affairs, the Chinese policy-making establishment is divided into several major functional sectors (*kous*) that cut cross the three major systems of the party, government, and military. For instance, there are sectors for military affairs, political and legal affairs, and foreign affairs. One or more members of the Politburo or its Standing Committee oversee(s) one or more sectors. For instance, for a time during the Jiang Zemin period, Li Peng was in charge of the State Council, Li Ruihuan supervised propaganda, and Qiao Shi oversaw party organization, discipline inspection, and domestic security. Senior leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, when they were still

active, also engaged in policy making, and made governance suggestions.⁷⁵ The members of the Standing Committee oversee these sectors through an institutionalized body, for instance, a commission or a non-standing organ such as a leading group (LG).⁷⁶ For example, the Leading Group on Finance and Economy oversees financial and economic affairs; the Central Commission on Political Science and Law oversees political and legal affairs; and the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA) oversees the foreign affairs sector.⁷⁷

The use of LGs represents a non-institutionalized mechanism that provides greater flexibility and is easy to apply to situational transformations, since a Leading Group is not a formal and permanent apparatus and both its creation and abolition can be accomplished without the formal approval of the National People's Congress, requiring only a decision by the Politburo. In contrast, for institutionalized bodies, such an approval is required, for instance in the case of the 2003 abolition of the National Economic Cooperation and Trade Commission (*guojia jingji maoyi weiyuan*)⁷⁸ during the institutional reform.

It is recognized that there are two kinds of policy making: one concerns strategic policy, the other routine policy. The Standing Committee of the Politburo, because it is the most powerful decision-making body, handles Chinese grand strategy and general principles. This division of labor embodies the governing principle of the CPC since 1987, that is, the Communist Party leadership sets the political direction. Thus, policies

⁷⁵ Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004), p. 204.

⁷⁶ Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," p. 40.

⁷⁷ The history and details of the LGs can be found in Chapter Three.

⁷⁸ Two interviews with a senior Chinese official, April and May 2006.

with strategic significance, such as China's relationship with the United States, Russia, Japan, and North Korea, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, and issues such as China's entry into the WTO, arms control, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the waiver of Chinese debts to other countries, China's energy supply, and the Free Trade Zone with ASEAN all definitely fall into this category.⁷⁹

Some issues perceived to be sensitive to the populace are also subject to Politburo decisions. For instance, on April 28, 2003, the Politburo discussed the recent loss of submarine No. 361 and collectively made the decision to publicize this accident. The announcement of a military accident, which was agreed to by Jiang Zemin as chairman of the CMC, marked the first time the Chinese Communist leadership had ever taken such a step since it took power in 1949. Thus, a May 2, 2003 Xinhua News Agency cable reported: "According to a source in the Chinese People's Navy, a Chinese naval submarine with conventional power, which was on duty in Chinese territorial waters east of Neichangshan recently, was wrecked due to mechanical failure, and all seventy soldiers and officials unfortunately died as a result of the accident."⁸⁰

The departments in the state system with functions related to foreign policies at the implementation level are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of State Security, and the PLA. In addition, the Office of Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, which shares staff members with the Central Taiwan Work Leading Group (LGTW) Office, has been increasingly involved in foreign affairs since the mid-1990s—mostly indirectly—given that the affairs under its jurisdiction have

⁷⁹ Interview with a former Chinese ambassador, April 2007.

⁸⁰ Liu Tong, "Bushu yitong dianhua qi changwei lumian" (Seven Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo Show Up after Bush's Phone Call), *Kaifang zazhi* (Open Magazine) (Hong Kong) (June 2000), p. 15.

considerable impact on China's bilateral relations, particularly those with the U.S. and Japan, and on multilateral relations, for instance, in international organizations. In the party system, the International Department can be regarded as the party's foreign ministry; in the state system, there is an Information Office of the State Council,⁸¹ which shares staff members with the International Communication Office of the State Council,⁸² that, though under a different name, is in charge of presenting China to foreign countries. One of the responsibilities of the Information Office related to Chinese foreign affairs is to compile and publish White Papers on various Chinese policies. In the military system, the PLA General Staff Department is the central military agency charged with information collection and analysis.

It is apparent that since the March 1998 Ninth National People's Congress when Li Peng retired as premier following Deng Xiaoping's death in 1997, foreign policy has been part of the portfolio of the general secretary. Previously, without holding any formal position, Deng was still the ultimate arbiter of disputes, and Li Peng as premier was deputy head of the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs. It is said that Li Peng and Liu Huaqiu, the director of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office, who reported to Li Peng, could circumvent Qian Qichen, the minister of Foreign Affairs, and issue orders or instructions to officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that were not

⁸¹ The Department of the United Front (DUF), one of the four departments of the Central Committee of the CPC, is in charge of traditional united front work—relations with other “democratic” parties in China, such as the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang (Zhongguo guomintang geming weiyuan hui, the Democratic Revolution Party, the reorganized Kuomintang in mainland China); it does not have responsibility for cross-Taiwan Strait relations. Yet, it has traditionally been assigned to be in charge of Tibetan affairs. Interview with a government employee. Because of this, this thesis will not provide a detailed introduction to the structure and activities of the DUF.

⁸² The former English name for the Waixuanban was the Propaganda Office until it was realized that “propaganda” is a negative term in English. The translation has now been changed to the International Communication Office, but the name in Chinese remains.

necessarily agreed to by either Qian or Jiang Zemin. Therefore not until 1998, when he consolidated his power, could Jiang guarantee his dominant power in foreign policy making.⁸³ This division of labor among the leadership was accepted by the next leaders: General Secretary Hu Jintao is simultaneously the head of the LGFA and the LGTW, and Premier Wen Jiabao is mainly in charge of domestic affairs, particularly economic development.

The Power of the General Secretary

The actual power structure of the top leadership and the roles of the general secretary, the premier, and the Politburo in the policy-making process can be illustrated by examining Zhu Rongji's visit to the U.S. in 1999.

In early April 1999 the question of whether Premier Zhu Rongji should visit the United States aroused heated debates among the Chinese foreign policy-making elite and the Politburo. The opponents argued that the visit should be postponed because of the U.S. bombing of Yugoslavia and the U.S. decision to mobilize Western countries to support a resolution of the UN Human Rights Commission condemning China for its human rights record. At a Politburo meeting, Jiang Zemin's personal inclination tipped the balance by stressing that U.S.-China relations were of paramount importance for China's international strategy, and that mutual understanding could be gained through communications between the two states. Therefore, because Sino-U.S. relations faced grave difficulties, Zhu's trip was necessary.

⁸³ David Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 293, 330.

In this policy decision making, General Secretary Jiang Zemin's personal inclination was decisive, as publicly noted by Zhu at an April 8, 1999 joint press conference in the U.S.: "But President Jiang Zemin decided that I should come as scheduled, and he is number one in China so I had to obey him."⁸⁴ Jiang not only pushed for a supporting resolution in the Politburo on Zhu's trip beforehand, but also managed to obtain a positive Politburo assessment even before Zhu had returned to China, in order to dampen criticism from various bureaucracies, including the military, the ministries, departments of the State Council, the party, provincial governments, and academic circles. On April 15, accompanied by Generals Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, Vice President Hu Jintao attended a symposium of the three services and four General Departments of the PLA to communicate the Politburo's assessment of Zhu's visit. On the same day, Qian Qichen and Zeng Qinghong transmitted this information to a joint meeting of the central party and State Council ministries, departments, commissions, and offices. At the same time, Wei Jianxing, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and Li Ruihuan, member of the Standing Committee and chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, respectively passed the appraisal on to an enlarged meeting of the party group of the Standing Committee of the NPC and the party group of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. On April 16, the Central Secretariat convened a telephone conference, conveying this assessment to the party and government leaders of the various provinces. The telephone conference, which lasted for only twenty-five minutes, is one of the briefest telephone conferences ever held by the Central Secretariat.

⁸⁴ Luo Bing, "Beijing ping Zhu fangwen baobian buyi" (Beijing's Divergent Assessments of Zhu's Visit), *Zhengming* (Hong Kong) (May 1999), p. 8.

During the conference, Hu said:

Prime Minister Zhu Rongji is taking a trip to the United States exactly at a time when the United States is making another round of anti-China uproar, and at the same time, this hegemon is manipulating a military invasion to and launching an air attack on the sovereign state of Yugoslavia; within the party and military, and among the populace, there is a strong demand on the party center to cancel or postpone Premier Zhu's visit indefinitely and recall the Chinese ambassador from the United States. However, the Politburo repeatedly discussed and studied the situation, and listened to the views of some retired old cadres of the party, state, and military, and then decided that from the perspective of long-term strategy regarding the United States, Zhu should make the trip. The Politburo has predicted the worst and most undesired consequences. First, both sides could hold onto diametrically opposing views, then the gap between them would be further enlarged, and the Sino-American relationship would fall back to its lowest ebb since the early 1990s, when both sides recalled their ambassadors. Second, both sides could state their own stances for the sake of form without producing any essential outcome; then the relations between the two countries would continue to cool. The third possible outcome could be that both sides would hold onto their respective political stances and values in their strategic interests, but through mutual visits and the exchange of opinions the present tensions between them could be alleviated. Moreover, as for the other focus—China's entry into the WTO—there could be a concrete and real breakthrough and resolution, and to some extent understanding about China in American political and social circles could be deepened. This is the most optimistic consequence. Zhu's actual visit to the United States has proved that the Politburo's decision was correct, has had certain strategic effects, and the visit has reaped achievements.⁸⁵

The following six points were emphasized in Hu Jintao's speech:

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

- Premier Zhu Rongji's visit was a strategic success. It won international influence for China. What occurred in the United States during Zhu's visit was within the realm of the Politburo's analysis and expectations;
- During his visit to the United States, Premier Zhu Rongji adequately articulated the party's diplomatic line, and the strategy, principles, and policy toward the United States worked out by the party center with Jiang Zemin as the core;
- During his visit, Premier Zhu Rongji let the United States and the international community hear China's voice, demonstrating China's international status;
- During his visit, Premier Zhu Rongji on behalf of the Chinese government formulated firmly, definitely, and wisely the issues on which disagreements and contradictions exist between China and the U.S.;
- China made certain concessions and promises for its entry into the WTO. These concessions and promises for a certain period of time and within certain limits will have an influence and impact, causing a negative effect on China. However, in the mid- and long-run, being a member of the WTO is the correct choice, and will benefit China's economic development and reform, making them applicable to international trends.
- During his visit, Premier Zhu Rongji always remained in consultation and in concert with the Politburo and with General Secretary Jiang Zemin on the changing situation.

“At present, we should be alert to and expose the slanderous rumors made and spread by some anti-China and anti-Communist Western powers about the internal political power struggle within the CPC. Deliberately using the media to spread rumors to stir up bad

feelings among the leaders of the party center is a conventional means of the Western states and the authorities on Taiwan.”⁸⁶

Domestically, criticism was very fierce. A voice from the military argued that in the new anti-Communist and anti-China wave in America, the United States had once again revealed its hegemonist nature in its brutal military invasion of the state of Yugoslavia that had been friendly to China. Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to the U.S. exactly at this moment violated the Chinese diplomatic line and strategy and policy toward the U.S., and did not gain any essential achievement, except for somehow showing off the premier’s diplomatic grace and art.

The views of the central party and the State Council ministries, departments, commissions, and offices, and local party and government establishments were generally that China’s initiative, Zhu’s trip to the United States, to some extent and for a certain period of time, alleviated the tensions between the United States and China. In principle, Zhu’s frankness, quick-wittedness, courage, resourcefulness, erudition, and persistence won China its deserved international status. However, the concessions and promises to the U.S. on China’s entry into the WTO in the future might have a damaging impact on the stabilization of the Chinese domestic political situation. This was of utmost concern.

The view of academic economic circles was represented by that of the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Zhu’s visit to the U.S. might have overcome some U.S.-posted obstacles to China’s entry into the WTO by making big concessions in opening the fields of Chinese agriculture, finance, services, and

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

telecommunications, etc., within three, five, or seven years. These concessions will have an effect in alleviating the present tensions between the United States and China. But we should be sober about whether China can afford to make such concessions and we should make practical preparations for the potential crises and turbulence to which the concessions might lead.⁸⁷

Making an assessment regarding an official visit and communicating it broadly among high-ranking officials within the party, government, and military before the visit had concluded was very rare and unusual in the fifty-year history of the PRC. Obviously, the effort to reach a consensus within the party in this way implies that there were large disagreements regarding Zhu's trip. This also demonstrates how the CPC and the Chinese government implement major policies, such as its the policy toward the United States, when there are divergent views, and what role the general secretary can play in the foreign policy-making process in the post-Deng era when the holder of this position wields real power.

The above case stands in contrast to the case in 1995 when Jiang Zemin had to draw support from Deng Xiaoping's authority to defend against criticism toward himself and the Standing Committee because of their decision on China's reaction to the U.S. issuance of a visa to "President of the Republic China" Lee Teng-hui. This reaction was criticized by some military officials as constituting a "rightist" line, meaning being too soft and capitulationist. Jiang Zemin conveyed a speech of Deng Xiaoping to the CMC and some retired generals on this matter during a June 15, 1995 Politburo meeting. Zhang Zhen, the deputy chairman of the CMC, also passed on the content of his speech to

⁸⁷ Ibid.

a meeting of high-ranking officials in the armed forces. In this speech, Deng backed and praised the current central leadership's strategy and stance toward the U.S. and Taiwan.

The themes of Deng's speech can be summarized as: 1) China's current policy toward the United States is correct; there are no right deviations or illusions about American hegemony and might. The central (leadership) is well prepared for any eventuality, thus China might have a showdown with the U.S. at any time (if the latter openly supports Taiwan independence). The great cause of China's reunification will always taken precedence over Sino-American relations. The U.S. strategy toward China is to play the Taiwan card to contain China. If the United States does not change its policy, Sino-American relations will flounder. If the situation continues, sooner or later the suspension of relations or confrontation between China and the U.S. will occur. 2) China's policy toward Taiwan is to seek peaceful reunification. Until there is reunification, by no means will we will promise to settle the issue without force. In recent years, the Taiwan authorities and Lee Teng-hui, with U.S. cooperation, bustled about to pursue a policy of Taiwan independence, one-China, one-Taiwan, or two Chinas. Thus we have been prepared for either eventuality on the Taiwan question. We should be better prepared. Then once there is a dramatic change, we will be able to take the initiative and solve the problem in a relatively short time.⁸⁸ Deng's speech apparently was directed against the hard-liners in the military, who strongly criticized the Jiang Zemin-headed Politburo at a May 30 enlarged meeting of the CMC.

⁸⁸ Luo Bing, "Daodan shishe neiqing" (Inside Information on the Missile Test), *Zhengming* (Hong Kong) (August 1995), pp. 6-7; Luo Bing, "Dui mei zhengce gezhiyici, dang zheng jun da fenzheng" (The Party, the Government and the Military Hold Different Views on China's Policy towards the U.S.), *Zhengming* (Hong Kong) (July 1995), p. 10.

Even though Jiang had consolidated his power as number one leader in the Chinese power structure, he was not paramount in the sense that he did not have absolute authority. He had no power to directly appoint a high-ranking government official (like the American president, with the Senate's approval). The appointment of a ministerial-level or higher official remains within the jurisdiction of the powerful Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, with formal approval of the NPC. If Jiang preferred one particular candidate, he could make a recommendation, but the nomination had to be discussed and decided upon by the Politburo. Sometimes his favorite candidate could actually be appointed. One well-known case is that of Tang Jiaxuan's appointment to succeed Qian Qichen as minister of Foreign Affairs. It is no secret within the MFA that Qian was at odds with the other candidate Liu Huaqiu,⁸⁹ then the director of the General Office of Foreign Affairs of the CPC Central Committee. Qian had close relations with Jiang and shared his views on major Chinese foreign policies and international strategy, and therefore could have an influence Jiang's choice of candidate. Therefore, in the end Tang Jiaxuan won out.⁹⁰

When meeting prominent foreign politicians, Jiang Zemin always had to consult with the other top leaders in advance. When he gave reports to important meetings, the draft of his report had to be circulated among the members of the Standing Committee for their evaluation. Every member's signature was required for final approval. If someone had a question or different opinion, he would write it down on the document,

⁸⁹ Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations 1989-2000*, p. 330; Michael Swaine, *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking*, revsd. ed. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1998), pp. 25-26. Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," p. 47.

⁹⁰ Interviews with a professor and a government official, April and August 2006.

requesting an explanation or solution.⁹¹ On all major policies, the final decision by the Politburo depended on the majority opinion, based on a one-member, one-vote principle.⁹² Sharing power and asking for others' opinions in this way are the hallmarks of China's collective leadership.

The Secretariat and the Shift in the Power Balance

Another apparatus which should be mentioned here is the Secretariat. Its functions have shifted considerably over time. In January 1934, the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Congress of the CPC changed the name of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC to the Secretariat, so that from 1934 to 1956, the Secretariat was the highest decision-making body within the CPC. In September 1956, at the Eighth Congress of the CPC, the name of the Secretariat was restored to the Standing Committee of the Politburo; at the same time, a new Secretariat was established for managing day-to-day party affairs.⁹³ Thus, for most of its existence, the Secretariat has functioned as staff support for the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPC. From 1956 to 1966, the Secretariat was the executive and staff agency that oversaw party departments, prepared documents for Politburo consideration, and transferred Politburo decisions into operational instructions.⁹⁴ The Secretariat was drawn from the principal members of the Central Committee, ranging in size from five to a dozen members. For about a decade, Deng Xiaoping, as CCP general secretary, was in control of the Secretariat, and through

⁹¹ Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 204.

⁹² Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of the PRC's Diplomatic Institutions* (PhD dissertation), March 12, 2005, p. 138.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁹⁴ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, p. 10.

working together with his colleagues in the Secretariat, he was able to make some significant policy decisions, some of which Mao Zedong, chairman of the party, complained about for having not been consulted in advance.

The Secretariat was abolished during the Cultural Revolution, but it was reestablished at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in 1980. The renewal of the post of general secretary with new authority in the CPC and the abolition of the post of party chairman were taken as measures to prevent the “over-concentration of power in the hands of one person” such that had occurred during the Mao period.⁹⁵ The resolution on the establishment of the Secretariat declares that given the shift in the stress in party work during the reform and opening period, in order to allow the Politburo and its Standing Committee to concentrate on decision making on major internal and external issues, and to facilitate the Secretariat’s running of the day-to-day work of the Central Committee of the CPC efficiently and without delay, since it was facing extraordinarily arduous and complex tasks, the central party leadership decided to establish the Secretariat.⁹⁶ As for the portfolio of the Secretariat, Deng Xiaoping said it encompassed everyone, including the party, government, military, civilians, workers, peasants, business people, students, and soldiers. According to Lu Ning, “When it was revived in 1980, it continued its past tradition of a broader role that encompassed the military.”⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, p. 80.

⁹⁶ Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Central Committee, “Guanyu chengli zhongyang shujichu de jueyi” (Resolution on the Establishment of the Secretariat), February 28, 1980, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5103/5207/20010428/454987.html>.

⁹⁷ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, p. 11.

Deng explained that the jurisdiction of the Secretariat was to handle those affairs that did not need to be reported to the Politburo or its Standing Committee for instruction.⁹⁸

The 1982 Party Constitution clearly stipulates that the Secretariat is the executive body of the Central Committee of the CPC charged with handling day-to-day work under the overall direction of the Politburo and its Standing Committee.⁹⁹ Therefore, officially the Secretariat is not a decision-making body. However, in practice, each of the secretaries elected to the Secretariat at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982 was to be responsible for a particular aspect of state or party policy. For instance, Wan Li was assigned responsibility for agricultural policies and rural reforms; Wan Li and Yao Yilin both became vice premiers in the State Council; and Hu Qili was in charge of party organizations.¹⁰⁰

During the period when Hu Yaobang was general secretary from 1980 to January 1987 (with Zhao Ziyang becoming premier in 1980), the daily administration of the government establishment rested with the Secretariat and the key members of the State Council. Consisting of mostly elderly leaders, such as Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, and Chen Yun, the Standing Committee of the Politburo did not even hold regular meetings, and usually its meetings were initiated by the Secretariat when major policies were to be

⁹⁸ Deng Xiaoping said, "It isn't necessary for all members of the Secretariat or the State Council to take part in settling every question—sometimes it is enough for a few persons to discuss and decide on them. Some matters can be acted on as they are being reported to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Those which require discussion by the higher bodies can wait, but not those which only need to be reported for the record." Deng Xiaoping, "Jianchi dang de luxian, gaijin gongzuo fangfa" (Adhere to the Party Line and Improve Methods of Work), February 29, 1980, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) Vol. 2, 1975-1982 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), p. 282.

⁹⁹ 1982 Constitution of the CPC. See "Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng bufen tiaowen xiuzheng'an (1987)" (Revision of Some Articles of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China 1987), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/02/content_2637610.htm.

¹⁰⁰ Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, p. 81.

formulated. But Politburo members, especially its Standing Committee (though more on an individual basis) had to be consulted on major policy decisions. When it played an important role in policy making, the Secretariat met twice a week.¹⁰¹ At these meetings, members initiated and formulated policies on anything they regarded as significant. High-ranking officials in industry, commerce, agriculture, science, and education were invited to offer views on current issues. This practice was in fact a sign of less institutionalization. In any event, the Secretariat's power reached a new height at the September 1982 Twelfth Party Congress, when, with a total of twelve members, four were concurrently members of the Politburo (one had died in January 1983). However, major decision making in foreign policy, as in other areas, was never beyond the power of the Standing Committee led by Deng Xiaoping. For instance, the 1982-83 independent foreign policy of keeping equal distance from the Soviet Union and the United States and the new 1985 judgment on the possibility of world war were both ultimately made by Deng Xiaoping himself.

At the Thirteenth Party Congress (October-November 1987), significant changes occurred with respect to election to and the role of the Secretariat. Under the revision of Article 21 of the CPC Constitution, the Secretariat's function changed from "under the leadership of the Politburo and its Standing Committee to handle the Party center's day-to-day work" to "the Secretariat is the executive agency of the Politburo and its Standing Committee." In addition, the members of the Secretariat were no longer elected by the Central Committee; instead, they were now "nominated by the Standing

¹⁰¹ See Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, pp. 3, 10.

Committee of the Politburo, and were subject to endorsement by the Central Committee in plenary section.”¹⁰²

For the purpose of separating the party from the government, a policy initiated at the 1987 Thirteenth Congress, a host of senior government and military officials left the Secretariat, reducing its size to only six members. Among them only Qiao Shi as a vice premier held an important post in the government. Since then, the role of the Secretariat has been confined to the handling of party affairs. Actually, with the downfall of General Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 1987, the Secretariat’s influence has declined. After the June 4 tragedy, four members of the Secretariat were dismissed: Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Rui Xingwen, and Yan Mingfu.¹⁰³ Even CMC Secretary General Yang Baibing’s joining the body at the Fifth Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Congress in late 1989 did not help it regain its lost power.

On November 11, 1992, the First Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress of the CPC further confirmed the Thirteenth Congress’s arrangement for the Secretariat. Of the five members of the Secretariat, Hu Jintao presided over overall work, party affairs, organization, and personnel; Ding Guan’gen, as the head of the CPC Propaganda Department, was in charge of culture and education; Wei Jianxing, secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee, was assigned to look after discipline inspection; Ren Jianxin, secretary of the CPC Political and Legal Commission, was responsible for political and legal affairs. This configuration formed the background to

¹⁰² “Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng bufen tiaowen xiuzhengan (1987)” (Revision of Some Articles of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China 1987), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/02/content_2637610.htm.

¹⁰³ Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of the PRC’s Diplomatic Institutions*, p. 129.

the framework whereby the Secretariat is in charge of party affairs, and the State Council is in charge government affairs.

The degrading of the Secretariat's status and the shift of the locus of power to the Politburo Standing Committee parallel the upgrading of the LGs. Generally, although in fact the Secretariat has at times engaged in some substantive decision making, it has never played a major role in policy-making on foreign affairs, because most of its members have lacked experience in foreign affairs, and ultimate power remained in the hands of Deng Xiaoping as the chairman of the CMC and member of the Standing Committee. In October 1997, the First Plenum of the Fifteenth Congress of the Central Committee made the decision to appoint Zhang Wannian, vice chairman of the CMC, who was in charge of day-to-day affairs of the CMC, as a member of the Secretariat, thus confirming the jurisdiction of the Secretariat over military affairs.¹⁰⁴

In 2007 the newly selected Secretariat of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPC consisted of six members: Xi Jinping, Liu Yunshan, Li Yuanchao, He Yong, Ling Jihua, and Wang Huning. Among them, the first three are members of the Politburo, with Xi Jinping also a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Structural Changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In the government system, the most important ministry in charge of foreign affairs is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Created in 1949, since 1978 the Ministry has grown rapidly. Up to 1982, it contained only some two hundred employees; in the

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 129-130.

1990s, the number increased to 2,660; and by 2003, it reached over 4,300.¹⁰⁵ Including its diplomatic envoys abroad, the MFA ranks first in size on the list of government bureaucracies. According to the Law on State Council Organization, the MFA, like other ministries of the government and party, utilizes a minister-in-charge system, with one minister in the lead, responsible for summoning and presiding over the meetings of the respective departments to discuss major affairs and to sign important reports to the State Council and instructions from the latter. He is associated with four to six deputy ministers, who participate in the meetings of the ministry and act as the collective leadership of the ministry. The minister of Foreign Affairs has power to negotiate with foreign delegations, to participate in international conferences, and to sign international treaties under delegation of power by superior authorities. He has all diplomatic privileges and diplomatic immunities.¹⁰⁶

Currently the MFA consists of a General Office, eighteen external affairs departments and offices of departmental rank, and nine internal affairs departments (see Table 2-2).

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the eighteen departments that deal with external affairs are divided into two categories: regional departments and functional departments. Of the eighteen departments, seven belong to regional departments—Asia, West Asia and North Africa (Middle East), Africa, Europe and Central Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania, Latin America, and one that should also be regarded as a regional department,

¹⁰⁵ “Waijiaobu ganbusi sizhang Wu Ken 2004 nian 8 yue 20 ri yu shengyuan yuanxiao xuesheng zaixian jiaoliu dawen quanwen” (Full Text of Answers to Questions Online from Students at Universities that Provide Candidates for Employees to the MFA, by Wu Ken, the chief of the Department of Personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 20, 2004), <http://www.gwyzl.net/www/html/2004/09/20040901201848-1.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ Cai Dingjian, *Zhongguo renmin daibiao dahui zhidu* (Chinese People’s Congress System) (Beijing: Faluchubanshe, 1998), pp. 288-289, 393.

but is in charge of territories of China: the Department of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Affairs. The ten functional departments and offices include: the General

Table 2-2 The Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State Council

1. General Office
2. Department of Policy Planning
3. Department of Asian Affairs
4. Department of West Asian and North African Affairs
5. Department of African Affairs
6. Department of European-Central Asian Affairs
7. Department of European Affairs
8. Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs
9. Department of Latin American Affairs
10. Department of International Organizations and Conferences
11. Department of Arms Control
12. Department of Treaties and Laws
13. Information Department
14. Protocol Department
15. Department of Consular Affairs
16. Department of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Affairs
17. Department of Translation and Interpretation
18. Department of Foreign Affairs Management
19. Department of External Security Affairs
20. Department of Personnel
21. Bureau for Retired Personnel
22. Administrative Department
23. Department of Finance
24. Bureau of Archives
25. Department of Supervision
26. Bureau for Chinese Diplomatic Missions Abroad
27. Department of Services for Foreign Ministry Offices at Home and Overseas

Source: "Departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbj/zjg/default.htm>.

Office, the Department of Policy Planning, the Department of International Organizations and Conferences, the Department of Arms Control, the Department of Treaties and Laws, the Information Department, the Protocol Department, the Department of Consular Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs Management, and the Department of External Security Affairs.

The main functions of the departments and offices that are responsible for foreign relations are shown in table 2-2.

The Departments of Asian Affairs, African Affairs, European-Central Asian Affairs, West Asian and North African Affairs, European Affairs, North American and Oceanian Affairs, and Latin American Affairs.

These seven regional departments are respectively responsible for keeping abreast of and studying the circumstances and situations in the relevant regions and countries in these regions. They are in charge of diplomatic contacts with the regions and the countries in the regions and other concrete matters related to foreign affairs. They also coordinate concrete policies on bilateral relations with the countries in these regions and provide guidance to the respective Chinese embassies and consulates in their diplomatic work.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ "The Department of Asian Affairs," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/default.htm>;

"The Department of African Affairs," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/default.htm>;

"The Department of West Asian and North African Affairs," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xybfs/default.htm>;

"The Department of European-Central Asian Affairs," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/dozys/default.htm>;

"The Department of European Central Asian Affairs," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,

The Department of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Affairs

It carries out, in the diplomatic field, the general and specific policies of the central authorities concerning Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and coordinates the formulation and implementation of foreign affairs related to the Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan questions.¹⁰⁸

The ten functional departments' responsibilities are the following:

The General Office (bangong ting) assists the leading personnel of the Ministry in handling routine affairs, coordinates the vocational work in the Ministry, helps communications between various departments of the Ministry; and circulates documents, telegrams, and information. It also supervises such vital units as the Confidential Communications Bureau (*jiyao ju*), and controls the Confidential Traffic Division (*jiyao jiaotong chu*), and the powerful Secretariat (*mishu chu*). Though it carries only a departmental rank, this office is a first-among-equals department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also plays the role of a channel between the MFA and the provincial foreign affairs offices through its Office of Local Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁹

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xos/default.htm>;

“The Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/default.htm>;

“The Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/lmzs/default.htm>.

¹⁰⁸ “The Department of African Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/default.htm>.

¹⁰⁹ “The Central Office,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bgt/default.htm>; Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, p. 21.

The Department of Policy Planning

It analyzes issues of overall and strategic importance in the global situation and international relations, lays out foreign policies, analyzes global and regional economic and financial situations and China's foreign policies in the field of economics, and coordinates assessments on situation and policy analysis conducted by all departments within the MFA and by Chinese embassies and consulates abroad. It is also responsible for drafting speeches and documents on foreign affairs for party, government, and Ministry leaders. In addition, it supervises writings on the history of China's diplomacy.¹¹⁰

The Department of Arms Control

It is in charge of handling issues related to arms control, disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear export controls, and global and regional security; implements the general and specific policies in the above-mentioned fields; and conducts diplomatic affairs related to the above-mentioned fields in conjunction with the related departments of the PLA.¹¹¹

The Department of International Organizations and Conferences

It conducts research on the international situation and developmental trends in the area of multilateral diplomacy; and is in charge of handling political, economic, social,

¹¹⁰ "The Department of Policy Planning," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/zcyjs/default.htm>.

¹¹¹ "The Department of Arms Control," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjw/cijk/>.

and cultural issues addressed by the United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations.¹¹²

The Department of Treaties and Laws

It is in charge of research on and handling of issues concerning treaties and laws in diplomatic work. It hears foreign country-related cases involving treaties, laws, territories, boundaries, and maps; is responsible for holding or participating in international conferences and bilateral talks related to treaties and laws; it also assists the relevant departments in examining domestically-formulated laws and regulations concerning foreign countries or nationals.¹¹³

The Information Department

It releases news and statements regarding China's position concerning international issues, China's foreign policy, and foreign relations; it handles affairs related to resident and visiting foreign journalists; and it coordinates the domestic press in reporting on foreign countries or nationals.¹¹⁴

The Protocol Department

It is in charge of the state's foreign protocol matters; it studies and handles courteous receptions and diplomatic privileges and immunities accorded to foreign diplomatic

¹¹² "The Department of International Organizations and Conferences," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/default.htm>.

¹¹³ "The Department of Treaty and Law," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/default.htm>.

¹¹⁴ "The Information Department," Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xws/default.htm>.

missions in China; and guides Chinese embassies and consulates abroad and local offices of foreign affairs in protocol matters involving foreign countries or nationals.¹¹⁵

The Department of Consular Affairs

It is in charge of negotiations with foreign countries for signing consular treaties, agreements on establishing consulates and other agreements concerning consular affairs; it guides the local offices of foreign affairs in handling matters related to foreign consulates in China, and guides Chinese consulates abroad in work concerning consular and overseas Chinese affairs. It also assists other departments in handling major cases involving foreign countries or nationals, issues passports and visas, provides notarization and authentication, and serves legal documents through diplomatic channels.¹¹⁶

The Department of External Security Affairs

It implements the principles and policies of the MFA in the field of non-traditional security; is in charge of related studies and analysis; and coordinates and handles relevant foreign affairs-related issues.¹¹⁷

The Department of Foreign Affairs Management

It forwards requests by various districts and various departments for instruction from and reports to the State Council concerning foreign affairs, and revises regulations

¹¹⁵ “The Protocol Department,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/lbs/default.htm>.

¹¹⁶ “The Department of Consular Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/lss/default.htm>.

¹¹⁷ “The Department of External Security Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/swagsws/default.htm>.

regarding foreign affairs work. It also conducts investigations and issues proposals regarding the management of foreign affairs.¹¹⁸

The MFA currently has one minister and five deputy ministers, each of whom holds a specific portfolio (see Table 2-3).

Table 2-3 Division of Labor among Ministerial Officials in the MFA

Name	Post	Portfolio
Yang Jiechi	Minister	
Dai Bingguo	Deputy Minister	Executive work of the MFA
Qiao Zonghai	Leading member of the Ministry	General Office, work of discipline inspection, Department of Chinese Diplomatic Missions Abroad, and archives
Zhang Yesui	Deputy Minister	Policy research
Wu Dawei	Deputy Minister	Treaties and laws
Lü Guozeng	Deputy Minister	NA
Li Jinzhang	Deputy Minister	Personnel, administration, financial affairs, party affairs and services
Li Hui	Assistant Minister	Eastern Europe and Central Asian affairs, and foreign affairs management
Cui Tiankai	Assistant Minister	Asian affairs, international organizations and conferences, and arms control
He Yafei	Assistant Minister	North American, Oceanian, and Latin American affairs, foreign affairs related to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, protocol and external security
Zhai Jun	Assistant Minister	West Asian, North African, and African affairs and the Department of Translation and Interpretation
Kong Quan	Assistant Minister	European region, information and consular affairs

¹¹⁸ “The Department of Foreign Affairs Management,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/wsgls/default.htm>.

Sources: Biography of Dai Bingguo, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/dbg/default.htm>;
Biography of Qiao Zhonghuai, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/qzh/default.htm>;
Biography of Zhang Yesui, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/zys/default.htm>;
Biography of Wu Dawai, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/wdw/default.htm>;
Biography of Lü Guozeng, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/lgz/default.htm>;
Biography of Li Jinzhang, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/ljz/default.htm>;
Biography of Li Hui, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/lh/default.htm>;
Biography of Cui Tiankai, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/CTK/default.htm>;
Biography of He Yafei, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/hyf/default.htm>;
Biography of Zhai Jun, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/zje/default.htm>;
Biography of Kong Quan, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyl/kqe/default.htm>.

The components of the MFA did not undergo any obvious change in their regional departments since the end of the Cold War, except for one, that is, the name of the Department of the Soviet Union and East Europe was changed to the Department of Europe and Central Asia, reflecting the political and territorial changes in this region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast, there have been significant changes in the functional departments. Among them, the Information Department may be one of the few departments that on the surface have only undergone a small change, but in fact it now bears more responsibilities—to communicate with the Chinese populace through its new division: the Division of Public Diplomacy (*gonggong waijiao chu*). When Li Zhaoxing took charge of the MFA, this new division was assigned the task of contacting

the Chinese population. An Open Day for Diplomacy was arranged to take place several times per year. The project is designed to inform ordinary Chinese people about China's foreign policies. It allows them to hear a sober voice from the MFA, in order to win their support or at least to reduce their opposition on specific policies, particularly when the populace demonstrates dissatisfaction with official Chinese policy, for instance toward Japan, or complains that the policy toward U.S. is too soft.

The Department of Treaties and Laws was derived from the Department of International Organizations and Conferences, which before the 1980s was formally a division in charge of affairs related to international treaties and law. The creation of such a department shows that as China has become much more involved in bilateral and multilateral treaties and international organizations, a thorough understanding of international laws has become increasingly significant.

The Department of External Security Affairs (*zonghe anquan si*) was set up after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S., when non-traditional security factors came to be perceived as grave threats to national security throughout the world. It is responsible for five separate matters, including Tibetan independence, Xinjiang independence, Taiwan independence, the Falungong, and the Democracy Movement, as these issues represent serious threats to Chinese territorial integrity and national security. The jurisdiction of the department has now been expanded to cover counter-terrorism.

The Center for Consular Protection has recently been established to deal with such matters as overseas students and murders and kidnappings of Chinese citizens based in foreign countries. It deals with such matters as Chinese overseas students and the murders or kidnapping of Chinese citizens in foreign countries. Before 2002 there was

no agency in the MFA with responsibility for such matters. However, in 2002, a number of Chinese workers were murdered or kidnapped abroad. The Chinese leadership was very concerned about such incidents, since they could be a source of domestic dissatisfaction. Thus, a new department was established to deal with them.

The establishment of the Department of Arms Control is another important change. Its predecessor was the Arms Control Division, which was established in the 1980s. With the Chinese government increasingly recognizing the significance of arms control, a new separate department was established in order to effectively engage in and cooperate in international arms control issues.¹¹⁹

For coordination within the MFA, the heads of the departments meet once every two weeks to exchange information and perceptions on international and regional situations, and determine how to deal with current major issues.

Changes in the Department of Policy Planning

One of the most obvious changes has taken place in the policy research realm. The body which was responsible for research on foreign policy before 1995 was the Office of Policy Research. However, being regarded as “the home for destitute old people,” this department was not taken seriously as no real policy research or policy planning were needed in Chinese foreign policy-making since Chinese diplomatic relations were so limited and policy-making power was centralized at the top level of the Chinese political establishment. Following the changes in the characteristics of the Chinese foreign policy-making process, not only was the size of the Office of Policy Planning enlarged,

¹¹⁹ Zhang Qingmin, “Shehui bianqian beijing xia de Zhongguo waijiao juece pingxi” (An Analysis of Chinese Foreign Policy Making against the Background of Social Changes), *Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu* (International Politics Quarterly), No.1 (2006), p. 48.

and its new name, Department of Policy Planning (DPP) approved by the State Council in 2004, but it also received increased attention from the leaders of the MFA.

About ten years ago, the Office of Policy Planning contained only three divisions: the Division of International Politics, the Division of World Economy, and the Division of Comprehensive Affairs (*zonghe chu*), which was responsible for those issues seen as neither political nor economic. Now it has seven divisions. The Division of General Affairs, which remains intact, is currently also called the Division of Articulation. Its responsibilities include drafting the texts of speeches delivered by ministerial leaders on formal occasions, such as at press conferences, and preparing unified statements and background materials for strategic dialogues with counterparts of other governments, and so on.¹²⁰

A new division was created out of the Division of International Politics—the Division of Strategic Research. Soon thereafter another division—the Division of Situational Analysis—emerged, from which one additional division was ultimately separated—the Division of Research Coordination. The function of the latter is to coordinate research conducted by different departments within the MFA, as each of department has a different focus, and with the research work of the Chinese diplomatic missions abroad. The function of the latter is to coordinate research conducted by the different departments, since they each have different focuses. For this purpose, the Division of Research Cooperation periodically summons inter-agency meetings on macro analysis of the international situation, assigns tasks to diplomats in China's embassies abroad on a regular basis, and provides direction on research within the MFA and at its

¹²⁰ Interview in February 2008.

embassies.¹²¹ Given the regional departments' inclination to speak for the interests of their own regions, the cooperative role encouraged by this department promotes the MFA acting as one unified body, forming objective judgments, and serving as a supplier of better policy options for the top policy-makers.

The set-up of the Strategic Research Division, which emphasizes the importance of the strategic research function of the DPP, testifies to the recent thinking among Chinese diplomatic elite that strategic research is now essential and significant for China's international strategy making. Traditionally viewed as involving powers reserved exclusively for the top leaders, thinking about international strategy was never regarded as a duty of the MFA. It has even been alleged that the MFA was criticized by the Chinese leadership for becoming too involved in international strategy recommendations. Nevertheless, two factors have now changed the thinking on this. First, changes in China now have a strong impact in the world. Second, China should not merely observe the international situation and react to its dynamics, but should also think about how to act pro-actively, since it is now seen as a rising big power with more international responsibilities.

Two additional divisions were successively set up—the Division of Policy Planning (*zhengce guihua chu*) and the Division of Diplomatic History (*waijiaoshi chu*). The latter, which came into being through the merger of the Division of Diplomatic History and the Division of Research on Diplomacy, is the first agency in the department whose research object is diplomacy itself. It is responsible for writing the *White Papers* on Chinese foreign policy and for research on Chinese diplomatic history. This merger

¹²¹ Interview, June 2006.

allowed room for a new Division of Policy Planning, which is responsible for coordinating the visits of MFA leaders to foreign countries and the strategic dialogues.

In the MFA, the enhanced status and the structural changes in the Division of Policy Planning evidently indicate the current stress on information collection and information processing, and on research not only for specific policy options but also for strategic recommendations. The change in the status of the DPP is exemplified by the change in attitude among young employees in the MFA. In the past, young employees were reluctant to work in the DPP. One of the reasons was that a deputy minister had never been promoted from this section. This meant that those who worked in this section had fewer opportunities to be promoted than those who worked in other departments, particularly in such important regional departments as the Departments of European Affairs, Asian Affairs, and American and Oceanian Affairs, and such functional departments as the Department of Information and the Department of International Organizations and Conferences. Among the former deputy ministers or ministers of the MFA, they have always had experience working as the chiefs of these departments. For instance, Qi Huaiyuan, the former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, and Qian Qichen and Li Zhaoxing, both former ministers of Foreign Affairs, had all been chiefs of the Information Department. Since each deputy minister or assistant minister is assigned to oversee one or more departments, experience working in this/these department(s) is considered essential. For instance, the deputy minister who is in charge of multilateral relations and the UN theoretically should come from the Department of International Organizations and Conferences; the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs, and the Department of Asian Affairs should produce the deputy minister responsible for

the affairs of these regions. But Cui Tiankai's 2006 promotion from chief of the Department of Policy Planning to assistant minister encouraged young employees working in the DPP (though Cui had previously been the chief of the Department of Asian Affairs before he moved to the Department of Policy Planning).¹²² So far only two departments have never generated a deputy minister, i.e., the Department of Consular Affairs and the Department of Treaties and Laws.

It should be emphasized that the Division of Economic Diplomacy and Cooperation ranks higher in the Department of Policy Planning than other divisions. Its director ranks as a counselor. The reason for this is that the coordination of economic factors in foreign policy-making by the MFA is increasingly important. Thus a special body for coordinating with economy-related parts of the government apparatus, such as the Department of Foreign Aid and the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of Commerce (on issues related to foreign aid, foreign investment, and the exchange rate of the RMB, etc.), is viewed as more significant than before.

So far the actions of the MFA remain *reactive*. In the past, the MFA's own goal in the economic field was to create a good diplomatic and political environment for economic development. However, now it has been assigned the additional function of providing direct services for promoting economic policies. Nevertheless, the extent of the MFA's economic function is still questionable. Still, it has been observed that the

¹²² Wang Yi was the first deputy minister to head the Department of Policy Planning, but he was promoted deputy minister from the position of head of the Department of Asian Affairs and was simultaneously appointed head of the Department/Office of Policy Planning in 1997. Thus, strictly speaking, he was not promoted directly from the Department of Policy Planning. In fact, Wang's appointment can be regarded as a consequence of the MFA leaders' intention to strengthen policy research within the MFA.

MFA's cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce on foreign aid has been quite smooth, even though the two ministries have different priorities.

A Working Group on Relations with the American Congress

Another important change is that the Working Group on Relations with the American Congress, which was set up in Division I (American Affairs) of the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs in 2004, was separated from the Division and became an independent division—Division V. Its function, as the name suggests, is to improve understanding and relations between China and the American Congress. The impetus for this new organization grew out of the perception that since the end of the Cold War the American Congress has played an increasingly important role in Sino-American relations; without its cooperation with the executive branch of the American government or with the American President, a sound relationship between China and the U.S. is impossible.

The first time the Chinese were ever aware of the important role of the Congress (on most occasions, the role is negative) was in 1995. On June 17 of that year, in a meeting in New York, President Clinton's Secretary of State Warren Christopher promised Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qian Qichen that the Clinton administration had no intention of permitting Taiwan's leader Lee Teng-hui to make a "private visit" to attend an alumni reunion at Cornell University; Lee's visit did not accord with the non-official nature of relations between China and the U.S.; and the Clinton administration would at most consider issuing him a transit visa. However, soon thereafter the House and Senate passed a resolution, 360 to 0 and 97 to 1 respectively, urging the President to issue Lee a visa. Under pressure from Congress, the White House on May 22 officially

announced that it would permit Lee to visit the U.S. Christopher explained this decision to Qian Qichen by saying that “The President’s consideration is to gain the initiative to prevent the passing of a law which might make U.S.-Taiwan relations seem to be official.”¹²³ In his address at Cornell University on June 9, Lee exulted in his trip, calling it an achievement of the “Republic of China on Taiwan.”¹²⁴

The Clinton administration’s decision had a damaging impact on Sino-U.S. relations. This decision and Washington’s reaction to the Chinese missile maneuvers in July 1995 and March 1996 in the Taiwan Strait following Lee Teng-hui’s visit and on the eve of the first “presidential election” in Taiwan in 1996—sending two aircraft carriers to approach the Taiwan Strait as a deterrence to China’s further military action in this area—brought about the next crisis in the Taiwan Strait. This crisis caused Sino-American relations to gravely deteriorate to their lowest ebb since the early 1970s.¹²⁵ Beijing was shocked by the American President’s swallowing of his words in an international transaction, and at the same time was perplexed by the fact that the American President had to look to the Congress for foreign policy decision making.¹²⁶ Chinese top officials asked themselves:

¹²³ For the context of the crisis, see Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy* (New York: Harper Collins, 2005), pp. 143-144. However, another version of the story is told by Warren Christopher. He writes, “The problem was aggravated by a misunderstanding with Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian. I had told him when I met with him in April 1995 that we did not intend to make any change in our fundamental policy of only ‘unofficial’ relations with Taiwan, but I had also warned him that overwhelming congressional support for the Lee visit ... could not be ignored. This warning was intended to alert Qian that a visa might be issued. But he heard only the first half of my statement.” See Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 287.

¹²⁴ Robert L. Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises’,” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., *Managing Sino-American Crisis: Case Studies and Analysis* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p.277.

¹²⁵ For the process of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, see *ibid.*, pp. 276-278.

¹²⁶ Qian Qichen said, “Christopher had promised me in person that the United States would not allow Lee Teng-hui to visit.” Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), p. 243; In the

“Are there two U.S. presidencies?”—meaning why did decisions on foreign policy in the U.S. have to be compromises between the President and Congress? From this crisis, the American side learned that the Chinese government is firmly determined to maintain China’s sovereignty on Taiwan at any cost; and the Chinese side learned that unlike in the Cold War period, the role of the Congress in U.S. foreign policy-making cannot be neglected. From then on, research on the U.S. Congress has been emphasized in China.

However, in a country like China in which a congressional tradition is lacking and a representative system does not really function, it is hard for people to understand the “checks and balances” in the Western states’ political process. Recently, Chinese officials and ordinary people have become more familiar with the Congress’s negative role in terms of China’s Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status, Chinese human rights, intellectual property rights, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Sino-U.S. trade deficit, and the exchange rate of the *renminbi*, and have started to learn how to lobby the Congress. As a result, in the Chinese Embassy in Washington, the Congressional Group, headed by an attaché, was set up to improve mutual understanding between the Chinese government on the one hand, and congressmen and senators on the other. However, in 2005, the American Congress successfully blocked the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company from merging with the American Unocal Corporation, once again shocking the Chinese side. This time it was Chinese businesspeople and business-related officials who were

Chinese version of this book, there is an additional sentence that was deleted from the English edition: “One cannot but be shocked and indignant when the secretary of state of a superpower did not keep his promise.” Qian Qichen, *Waijiao shiji* (Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003), p. 306.

astonished and painfully felt the need to learn how to deal with American domestic politics.¹²⁷

The Taiwan Affairs Office and Its Increasingly Important Role

The Office of Taiwan Affairs (OTA) was formally established on September 25, 1988, in accordance with the September 9, 1988, resolution on institutional reform approved at the meeting on day-to-day affairs of the State Council. In fact, the existence of the OTA can be traced back to 1972 when the Shanghai Communiqué between China and the U.S. was signed. This office, which at that time was a covert agency headed by Liao Chengzhi, acting under the direct leadership of Zhou Enlai, was responsible for collecting information, receiving visitors, creating a development plan, summoning meetings, and submitting reports on policy recommendations. It survived the 1979 adjustment of agencies on Taiwan work. In early 1987 at the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Lin Chengzhong, the vice president of the Central Committee of the Taiwan Association, suggested setting up an Office of Taiwan Affairs under the State Council to manage overall interactions with Taiwan, including introducing Taiwan funds and technology into China, promoting cultural exchanges, helping Taiwanese visit their relatives or settle down on the mainland, and promoting the "three links" (*san tong*), i.e., direct cross-strait transportation, trade and postal services, and mutual visits. In the 1988 institutional reform of the central government, in accordance with the "Circular on Installing Organs in the State Council" (*Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Shezhi Tongzhi*), and the party Politburo order to include Taiwan work in governmental day-to-day work, on September 9, 1988 the twenty-first

¹²⁷ Interview with a Chinese economist who is close to the CEO of the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation.

State Council meeting on day-to-day affairs decided to establish the Office of Taiwan Affairs. Thereby, the Office of Taiwan Affairs came out from its shadow.¹²⁸

Obviously, Taiwan affairs are not foreign affairs for the Chinese, who are very sensitive about China's sovereignty over Taiwan. This fact was confirmed by the following: at the March 10, 2000 official press conference during the Third Plenum of the Ninth Congress of the National People's Congress, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan's alleged negligence of the nature of the Taiwan question aroused intense debate among governmental and party departments, ministries, and the military. Tang cited China's resolute counterattack on the "Two-Country Theory" as an achievement of China's diplomatic work in 1999. On the same day, the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC, the Department of Public Relations, the Xinhua News Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Information Office received some 530 telephones and faxes, asking how such a mistake could have been made, since Taiwan affairs were not considered within the category of foreign affairs. On March 12, Tang made a self-criticism, confessing that this political blunder was due to an error in his work.¹²⁹

As in foreign affairs, the intermediate agency between the Politburo and the Office of Taiwan Affairs is the Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs (LGTA). However, unlike in the realm of foreign affairs, it is the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC (*zhonggong zhongyang bangongting*) that summons meetings of the LGTA. Under Jiang Zemin's leadership as general secretary, Jiang headed this leading group. The

¹²⁸ Shen Jianzhong, "Zhonggong 'guotaiban,' zuzhi, renshi yu yunzuo gongneng fenxi" (The CPC's Office of Taiwan Affairs, An Analysis of Its Organizations, Personnel, Operations, and Functions), *Zhonggong wenti* (Studies on the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. 22, No. 4 (1994), pp. 9-10.

¹²⁹ Li Zijing, "Tang Jiaxuan shiyan zhenjing quandang" (Tang Jiaxuan's Indiscreet Remark Shocks the Entire Party), *Zhengming* (Hong Kong), No.4 (2000), p. 18.

chairmanship shifted to Hu Jintao after he succeeded Jiang as general secretary of the party.

It is well known that the day-to-day affairs of cross-strait relations fall within the jurisdiction of the OTA. In fact, the military is another principal agency whose opinion has an important influence on policy related to Taiwan affairs. Traditionally it has been the military that has been the most concerned with the Taiwan question, and it is probably more hard-lined than any other government or party department. Not surprisingly, however, as on other issues regarding national security, the opinion of the military on the Taiwan question is not necessarily accepted by the top leaders. Policy toward Taiwan is always seen as a policy of strategic importance; it is so significant to China that it cannot be left either to the OTA or to the military. Decision-making power for Taiwan policy rests ultimately with the top leaders of the CPC—the Politburo. This is understandable, because the Taiwan question has always been seen as the remaining issue in the three-year civil war between the Communists and Nationalists that immediately followed the Second World War.

One of the shortcomings in mainland policy-making linked to Taiwan affairs is that no high-ranking officials in the OTA have ever visited Taiwan, at least on behalf of the OTA. Only those who are in mid-to-lower positions have had such an opportunity. This is not because the OTA's ignores the importance of direct contacts with officials, party leaders, or local people in Taiwan, but rather, because of a political reason, that is, the principle held by the PRC that mutual visits must be reciprocal. Since no member of the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council or the Straits Exchange Foundation (*caituan faren haixia jiaoliu jijin*) have visited mainland China—they are not permitted to do so

according to the regulations of the Taiwan authorities—no mainland counterparts have been able to pay a visit to Taiwan. The second shortcoming is that few officials working on Taiwan affairs understand American domestic politics or foreign policies very well. Since the Taiwan question is a key issue between China and the U.S, it is questionable how those working in the OTA can communicate well with the U.S. Zhou Mingwei, one of the former deputy chiefs of the OTA, may be the only exception. He majored in international relations and studied at Harvard University as a visiting scholar for one year in the early 1990s. His educational background permitted him to look at Taiwan policy from a broader perspective.¹³⁰

The Taiwan question as defined by the OTA is an internal issue bearing on the U.S. factor. This is not only because the Taiwan issue was originally caused by the U.S. intervention in the Korean War, but also because the U.S. has continually sold weapons to Taiwan and has ambiguously held treaty responsibility for Taiwan. There is also a Taiwan question in Sino-Japanese relations and in Sino-European relations. For this reason, three official forums on the Taiwan question between mainland China and the

¹³⁰ Zhou Mingwei's experience during President Clinton's visit to Shanghai demonstrates how a professional official who is in charge of foreign affairs can help improve China's international relations. When Clinton visited China in 1998, Zhou Mingwei, the director of the Office of Foreign Affairs of Shanghai Municipality, was in charge of arrangements for the visit to Shanghai. Some unprecedented programs were designed for Clinton, including first lady Hillary Clinton's speech at the No. 13 Middle School, National Security Adviser Madeleine Albright's visit to a Jewish synagogue, and a televised conversation between President Clinton and Shanghai Mayor Xu Kuangdi as well as their directly answering questions phoned in by ordinary Shanghai citizens. Due to the effective and unexpected high-level reception, the head of the advance group for Clinton's visit, who had never been in China and had quite a deep preconceived view about "Communist China," changed his mind after working with Zhou and his team. Clinton was so deeply impressed by and pleased with Zhou's arrangements that in Shanghai, on his last stop in mainland China, as his hosts desired, rather than in Hong Kong as planned, he publicly offered the assurances that have come to be known as the "Three No's" policy toward Taiwan. After the announcement, Clinton tapped Zhou's shoulder and said "now you are satisfied!" The "Three No's" refers to what Henry Kissinger privately said to Zhou Enlai in July 1971, "We do not support independence for Taiwan; or two Chinas; or one Taiwan, one China." Cited in Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000*, p. 102.

U.S., Japan, and Europe respectively were set up in 2001. Track II dialogues—dialogues between scholars on the two sides—have also been initiated. On the other side, the U.S. views the Taiwan question, in addition to North Korea, as a flashpoint in Asia. Thus the U.S. is recognized as a stake-holder in this region. This understanding on the part of China in fact represents a breakthrough in China's policy toward Taiwan.¹³¹ In the past, Chinese policy-makers always unrealistically emphasized that the Taiwan question was only an internal affair of China and had nothing to do with the U.S.

The components of the OFA/OFW and its main functions will be introduced in Chapter Three as an agency of the CPC Central Committee.

The Creation of the Ministry of Commerce and Its Changing Functions

The predecessor of the Ministry of Commerce before 2001 was the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). It was first named MOFTEC and appeared on the list of ministries and committees within the State Council in 1993 in accordance with the 1993 institutional reform project of the State Council apparatus approved by the First Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the NPC. The reform was aimed at changing the functions of the State Council organs and strengthening macroeconomic regulation, coordination, service, administration, and supervision.¹³²

The emergence of this ministry itself was the outcome of the reforms that started in 1978.

¹³¹ Interview with a senior scholar who has long focused on the Taiwan question.

¹³² Secretariat of the General Office of the State Council and the Department of General Affairs of the Office of the Establishment Committee for Central Institutions, *Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou* (The Apparatus of the Chinese Central Government) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1994), p. 265.

From 1971 to 1982 when Zhou Enlai first made efforts to revive the Chinese economy from the edge of ruin, some ministries/committees were brought back into the bureaucracy of the State Council, and some new agencies were established. At that time, two ministries and an association were given responsibility for foreign trade and economic cooperation—the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT), the Ministry of Economic Cooperation (MEC), and the China Council for the Promotion of International; the latter was nominally a non-governmental organization, but in reality it was semi-governmental. The functions of the two ministries were very limited. The MFT was responsible for economic communications and devising economic cooperation projects either by China in developing countries or by other countries within China. In total 156 projects were introduced and completed, for which the Swiss franc was used to settle the accounts. Trade with the Soviet Union and the East European states, as well as with other socialist countries, including border trade and normal trade by keeping accounts (*jizhang maoyi*), was also under the jurisdiction of the MEC. Outside of the socialist camp, bilateral trade was undertaken through the Foreign Trade Promotion Committee, such as trade with forty-eight British companies via Hong Kong. Chen Muhua, who was later in charge of negotiating the Tanzania/Zambia Railway Assistance Project, was the minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation.¹³³

It is obvious that prior to China's reforms, there was little foreign trade. There was almost no foreign trade in a real sense, with the only exception of trade with Britain. Thus the MFT was small, its jurisdiction was narrow, and it had little status in the State Council. Compared to the MFT, the MEC was larger and more powerful, since it

¹³³ Interview with a senior official, June 2006.

introduced some large projects into China from other Communist countries and the ratio of Chinese economic aid to GNP was much greater (the ratio reached a peak of 2 percent in 1973, see Table 5-2). This situation remained for some years until the early 1980s, several years after the reform and opening policies under Deng Xiaoping's leadership.

The first merger of these two ministries was carried out in 1982. Immediately after the beginning of the reforms, China's economic aid to other countries had dramatically dropped. Simultaneously, the work of dealing with foreign investment and foreign trade increased tremendously, but qualified personnel with experience in the Ministry of Foreign Trade were lacking; thus it was necessary for the agency that took care of foreign trade to take advantage of the knowledge and experience of the employees in the Ministry of Economic Cooperation.

In the second institutional reform of the State Council in 1988, the focus of which was a functional change in agencies involving economic management,¹³⁴ the State Planning Committee was reorganized by merging it with the State Economic Committee. Many professional economic ministries were abolished, including the five ministries of Coal Industry, Oil Industry, Nuclear Industry, Machinery Industry, and Electronics Industry. This reorganization was motivated by the idea that a socialist economy was a planned commodity economy based on public ownership, and by the consensus opinion that the new economic mechanism ought to be based on the principle "the state regulates and controls the market, the market in turn directs enterprises," and that without

¹³⁴ Xia Hai, *Zhengfu de ziwo geming: Zhongguo zhengfu jigou gaige yanjiu* (The Self-Revolution of the Government: Research on the Reforms of Chinese Government Institutions) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 2004), p. 37.

fundamental reform in economic institutions, a breakthrough in general institutional reforms would be impossible.¹³⁵

The next institutional reform, in 1993, was aimed at further accelerating the transformation of governmental functions.¹³⁶ All agencies with overall economic functions, such as the National Commission on Development and Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Chinese People's Bank (the Chinese Central Bank), and the newly created State Economic Commission,¹³⁷ were required to stress macro-economic regulation, focusing on the economic design of the developmental strategy, developmental programming, and balancing the economy, production policy making, fostering the market, and regulating private economic activity.¹³⁸ The Commission of National Economy and Foreign Trade was established, in order to emphasizing the new function of coordinating domestic and foreign trade balances and relations, in addition to conducting research on national economic developmental strategy, working out mid- and long-term programs, and designing and implementing projects on enterprise programs. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade was transformed into the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). The latter organization survived the fourth institutional reform in 1998. At that time, the Ministry

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 37-38.

¹³⁶ The transformation of government functions was one of the main aims of the institutional reforms carried out since the 1980s. The report to the 2002 Sixteenth Party Congress of the CPC defines the main functions of government as "economic regulation, market supervision, social management, and public services" (*jingji tiaojie, shichang jianguan, shehui guanli, gonggong fuwu*).

¹³⁷ The predecessor to the Commission on the National Economy and Foreign Trade was the State Economic Committee. It was one of the oldest and most powerful commissions related to economic management, matched only by the parallel Planning Commission of the State Council. It disappeared during the Cultural Revolution, was re-created in 1981, but was dismantled once again during the 1984 institutional reform, since its function of directly intervening was no longer needed.

¹³⁸ Xia Hai, *Zhengfu de ziwu geming: Zhongguo zhengfu jigou gaige yanjiu*, p. 40

of Internal Trade was abolished and its functions merged into the MOFTEC. In spite its different name, the range of its responsibilities was almost identical to those that would be granted to the Ministry of Commerce in the 2003 institutional reforms. Also in 1998, the Office of Special Economic Zones, which had been set up in 1982, was dismantled, since the special economic zones were no longer “special” in the sense that the model was already being imitated in many other regions in China. The management of the SEZs was integrated into the routine work of the various provinces, with the policy-making for SEZs assigned to the MOFTEC.¹³⁹

However, the jurisdictional boundary between the MOFTEC and the Commission on the National Economy and Foreign Trade (CNFET) was never clear. The key reason for establishing the CNEFT was that when Zhu Rongji was appointed as vice premier in the First Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the NPC (he became vice premier and director the Office of Production of the State Council in 1991, but had not been approved by the NPC) in 1993, based on the suggestions of some economists, he intended to establish a “grand CNEFT” analogous to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan, which was broadly viewed as a model of a “developmental state” in a country’s economic development and attributed to the Japan’s economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁴⁰ Zhu anticipated that such a grand ministry could play a role in the Chinese economic “developmental state” similar to that of its Japanese counterpart during the

¹³⁹ Interview with a former senior official at the Development Research Centre of the State Council, 2006.

¹⁴⁰ Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was created in 1949 from the merge of the Trade Agency and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, MITI bore primary responsibility for formulating and implementing international trade policy. It served as an architect of industrial policy, an arbiter on industrial problems and disputes, and a regulator, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. About MITI’s role in the Japanese Miracle, see Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982).

stage of the Japanese takeoff. Thus, the Ministry of Commerce (the *shangye bu* in Chinese is not the *shangwu bu* that was established in 2003 and whose responsibility is principally domestic) was abolished, with its functions partially merged into the CNEFT. The CNEFT took charge of comprehensive reconciliation among the different organizations of the state apparatus with economic functions. In this sense, theoretically, its status was higher than that of the MOFTEC. However, since the MOFTEC was assigned responsibility for foreign trade and economic cooperation, which was vital for Chinese GDP growth and economic development, the CNEFT could not monitor the activities of the MOFTEC, as other commissions under the State Council could with respect to other professional ministries. An additional problem was that as a result of the “demolition and recovery” (*zhengdun yu huifu*), there had been a brain drain in the CNEFT. Those who shifted to other government departments usually lost their positions or privileges when the CNEFT was disbanded. For this reason, there were no talented people left in this body. Consequently, the knowledge and administrative capacity of its officials and employees decreased. This lessened the possibility that these officials could take over the leadership of the MOFTEC.¹⁴¹ In 1998, the MOFTEC had 457 employees. Among them was one minister, five deputy ministers (including one deputy minister ranking as first negotiator), and sixty-seven departmental-level officials (including three assistant ministers and one full-time deputy secretary general of the party committee).¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Interview with a senior official, June 2006.

¹⁴² Secretariat of the General Office of the State Council and the Department of General Affairs of the Office of the Establishment Committee for Central Institutions, *Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou*, p. 313.

In the fifth institutional reform in 2003, the name of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) was changed to the Ministry of Commerce (*shangwu bu* in Chinese), but its jurisdiction was not changed very much. Since the disappearance of the CNEFT, the Ministry of Commerce has become the key bureaucratic body, whose functions briefly are: 1) to devise and implement policies and reform programs in foreign trade, economic cooperation, and foreign investment; to draft and implement laws and regulations in foreign trade and investment; to direct the reforms in state-owned enterprises linked to foreign trade. 2) To devise and implement mid- and long-term import-export programs and to initiate strategy on foreign trade; to manage China's foreign assistance and to devise and implement foreign aid policies.

As decisions regarding China's foreign trade and economic relations with foreign countries are often considered less sensitive politically, the Ministry of Commerce often has a higher degree of control over decisions on foreign trade and economic cooperation, especially those that are domestic-related. Its decision-making process is similar to that of the MFA, though many issues are handled directly by the authoritative Leading Group on Finance and the Economy (LGFE), consisting of the premier and four deputy premiers. After more than two decades of reforms and opening to the outside world, foreign economic policy is one of the most important policies that affect China's relations with the rest of the world.

The Functions and Structure of the Ministry of Commerce

More specifically, according to the official explanation, the main functions of the Ministry of Commerce are:

1. Functions in devising development strategy include: to formulate development strategies, guidelines and policies on domestic and foreign trade, international economic cooperation, and foreign investment; to draft laws and regulations governing domestic and foreign trade, economic cooperation, and foreign investment; to devise implementation rules and regulations; to study and put forward proposals on harmonizing domestic legislation on trade and economic affairs as well as bringing Chinese economic and trade laws into conformity with multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements; to formulate development plans for domestic trade, to study and put forth proposals on reforming the commercial distribution system, to foster and develop urban and rural markets, and to promote the restructuring of the commercial sector and the improvement of modern distribution modalities.

2. Functions directly or indirectly linked to foreign relations: to study and work out measures for the regulation of import and export commodities; to formulate and execute policies concerning trade in technology and state import and export control and policies encouraging the export of technology and complete sets of equipment; to study, put forth, and implement multilateral and bilateral trade and economic cooperation policies; to be responsible for multilateral and bilateral negotiations on trade and economic issues, for coordinating domestic positions in negotiations with foreign parties, and for signing the relevant documents and monitoring their implementation; to establish multilateral and bilateral intergovernmental liaison mechanisms for economic and trade affairs and to organize related work; and to handle major issues in country-specific economic and trade relationships and to regulate trade and economic activities with countries that do not have diplomatic and trade relationships with China.

3. In China's relationships with world trade organizations and China's international economic relations: to handle the relationship with the World Trade Organization on behalf of the Chinese government, to steer the work of the commercial branches of China's Permanent Mission to the WTO, to the UN, and to other relevant international organizations, as well as of officials in the economic sections in the Chinese embassies to foreign countries; to keep in touch with the representative offices of multilateral and international economic and trade organizations in China; to be responsible for the training, selection, and management of Chinese professionals working in the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the World Trade Organization, and the Economic and Commercial Counselor's Offices of the Chinese embassies and missions to other international organizations; to guide the work of chambers of commerce for imports and exports and other relevant associations and societies.

4. Functions in economic cooperation and economic aid: to supply general guidance to nationwide efforts in foreign investment; to be responsible for China's foreign economic cooperation efforts; to be in charge of China's efforts in providing aid to foreign countries and regions; to formulate and implement China's foreign assistance policies and plans, and to sign the relevant agreements; to compile and execute annual foreign aid programs; to supervise and inspect the implementation of China's foreign aid projects; to manage China's foreign aid funds, preferential loans, special funds, and other foreign aid funds of the Chinese government to facilitate the reform of foreign aid provision modalities.

5. Responsibilities in making economic and trade policies related to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan: to formulate and implement economic and trade policies as well as

Table 2-4 Components of the Ministry of Commerce (excluding the party committee)

1. General Office
2. Department of Human Resources
3. Department of Policy Research
4. Department of General Economic Affairs
5. Department of Treaty and Law
6. Department of Finance
7. Department of Asian Affairs
8. Department of West Asian and African Affairs
9. Department of European Affairs
10. Department of American and Oceanian Affairs
11. Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao Affairs
12. Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs
13. Department of WTO Affairs
14. Department of Foreign Trade
15. Department of Trade in Service
16. Department of Electromechanical Products and Science and Technology Industry
17. Department of Market System
18. Department of Commercial Reform and Development
19. Department of Market Operation Regulation
20. Department of Foreign Investment Administration
21. Department of Aid to Foreign Countries
22. Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation
23. Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports
24. Bureau of Industry Injury Investigation
25. Department of Information Technology
26. Department of Foreign Affairs

The two offices are:

State Office of Intellectual Property Protection of the PRC

Office of the Representative for Negotiations

Source: Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/>.

Table 2-5 Ministers of the Ministry of Commerce

Name	Position	Portfolio
Chen Deming	Minister	Overall work, particularly the General Office and the Department of Human Resources.
Yu Guangzhou	Deputy Minister	To assist the Minister in guiding the overall work of MOFCOM, and to oversee the Department of General Economic Affairs, Department of European Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, the MOFCOM Party Committee, Department of Retired Cadres' Affairs, the Center for China Foreign Trade, and China-Europe Association.
Wei Jiangguo	Deputy Minister	In charge of the Department of Western Asian and African Affairs, the Department of Electromechanical Products & Science and Technology Industry, the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation and China Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export of Machinery & Electronic Products.
Ma Xiuhong	Deputy Minister	In charge of the Department of Treaty and Law, the Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, the Department of Foreign Investment Administration, Investment Promotion Agency, the China Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment, and the China Council for International Investment Promotion.
Liao Xiaoqi	Deputy Minister	In charge of the Department of Policy Research, Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, the Department of Information Technology, China International Electronic Commerce Center, the China Association of International Trade, the China International Institute of Multinational Corporations, and the Association of Economy and Trade Across the Taiwan Strait.
Gao Hucheng	Deputy Minister	In charge of the Department of Foreign Trade, the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports, the Bureau of Industry Injury Investigation, the Office of the Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Quota and License Administrative Bureau, and the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Textiles.

(Continued)

Name	Position	Portfolio
Jiang Zhengwei	Deputy Minister	In charge of the Department of Commercial Reform and Development, the National Office for the Rectification and Regulation of Market Economic Order, and the MOFCOM Logistics Bureau, and responsible for contact with the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.
Yi Xiaozhun	Deputy Minister	In charge of the Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, Department of WTO Affairs, and China Asia-Pacific Association for Promoting Economic and Trade Cooperation.
Chen Jian	Assistant Minister	In charge of the Department of Asian Affairs, Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation, the China International Contractors Association, the Association of International Engineering Consultants, and China International Economic Cooperation Society; also to assist Vice Minister of Commerce Ma Xiuhong in her responsibilities with respect to the Investment Promotion Agency.
Fu Ziyang	Assistant Minister	In charge of the Department of Finance, the Trade Development Bureau, the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, the MOFCOM Training Center, the China Enterprises' Association, the China International Freight Forwarders Association, the Accounting Society for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of China, and the Statistical Society for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of China.
Huang Hai	Assistant Minister	In charge of the Department of Market System Development, Department of Market Operation Regulation, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Light Industrial Products & Arts-Crafts, China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters, China Chamber of Commerce of Import and Export of Foodstuffs, Native Produce & Animal By-Products, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Medicines and Health Products, and Slaughter Technique Identification Center; also to assist Vice Minister Liao Xiaoqi in his responsibilities with respect to the Department of Policy Research..

(Continued)

Name	Position	Portfolio
Chong Quan	Assistant Minister	In charge of the General News Agency, the Special Commissioners' Offices in different localities, and the Economic and Commercial Counselors' Offices of the Chinese Embassies in foreign countries; also to assist the Minister in his responsibilities with respect to the General Office
Wang Chao	Assistant Minister	In charge of the China Association for NGO Cooperation; to assist Vice Minister Wei Jianguo with respect to the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, and Assistant Minister Chen Jian with respect to the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation

Source: "Chen Deming," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://boxilai2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Yu Guangzhou," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://yuguangzhou2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Wei Jianguo," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://weijianguo2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Ma Xiuhong," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://maxiuhong2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Liao Xiaoqi," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://liaoxiaoqi2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Gao Hucheng," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://gaohucheng2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Jiang Zengwei," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://jiangzengwei2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Yi Xiaozhun," Website the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://yixiaozhun2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Chenjian," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://chenjian2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Fu Ziyang," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://fuziyang2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Huang Hai," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://huanghai2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Chong Quan," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://chongquan2.mofcom.gov.cn/>;
"Wang Chao," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://wangchao2.mofcom.gov.cn/>.

mid- and long-term trade planning for the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions and the Taiwan region.¹⁴³

In order to perform its complex functions, the Ministry of Commerce is composed of twenty-six departments or offices (see Table 2-4). For this wide-ranging work, one minister, seven deputy ministers, and five assistant ministers manage the affairs of the Ministry of Commerce (see Table 2-5).

¹⁴³ See "Main Mandate of the Ministry of Commerce," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/mission/mission.html>.

In the following, the functions of some departments and offices of the Ministry of Commerce are introduced:

Department of Policy Research

To study on economic globalization and the development trend of world economy and trade; on multilateral trade institutions; the trends in regional economic cooperation; to study on domestic macro economy, industrial economy, regional economy, the major trends in domestic market development; to study on reforms in domestic and foreign trade circulation and managerial institutions; to study on and analyze situations in domestic and foreign trade, and international economic cooperation, as well as on major, knotty and heated issues in commercial work; and to put forth policy suggestions regarding all these fields, draft files, and coordinate research on major projects within the Ministry.¹⁴⁴

Comprehensive Department

To work out and organize implementation of the development strategy, the mid- and long-term plans, and the annual plans on domestic and foreign trade; to monitor the overall situation of domestic and foreign trade and international economic cooperation, to make economic forecasts and to provide economic warnings, and to provide policy recommendations on economic operational trends and major issues; to synthesize statistics and information on domestic and foreign trade; to study the forms of domestic and foreign trade and the forms of international cooperation, based on which it will

¹⁴⁴ "The Major Functions of Policy Research Department," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://zys.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300002437.html>.

provide comprehensive policy recommendations; to organize the drafting of the Ministry's comprehensive reports and reports on special topics submitted to the party center, the State Council, the National People's Congress, and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; to coordinate implementation of comprehensive policies and measures formulated by the party center and the State Council; to coordinate major policies on domestic and foreign trade; and to undertake other tasks as assigned by the leaders of Ministry.¹⁴⁵

The Department of Treaties and Laws

It is obvious that the Department of Treaties and Laws became more important with China's integration into the world economy and its participation in multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements. This department is authorized to work out and implement legislative projects and annual plans on domestic and foreign trade, international economic cooperation, and foreign investment; to draft and explain laws and regulations, departmental rules on internal and foreign trade and international economic cooperation, and to put the rules on the record; and to make sure domestic laws and rules and regulations are consistent with international treaties and agreements. For these purposes, the department is

- responsible for examining and compiling multilateral and bilateral treaties, international covenants and agreements, and drafting and negotiating international treaties; in charge of multilateral and bilateral negotiations on intellectual property rights, reconciling China's domestic stance and

¹⁴⁵ "The Major Functions of Comprehensive Department," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200207/20020700033817.html>.

implementing multilateral and bilateral investment protection; and dealing with affairs related to international public laws.

- responsible for trade disputes related to China in international trade organizations.¹⁴⁶

Departments of Asian Affairs, West Asian and African Affairs, European Affairs, and American and Oceanian Affairs

These four departments are in charge of putting forth and carrying out strategies for the development of economic and trade cooperation in these nations or regions respectively; for investigation, supervision, and analysis of bilateral trade operations; for reconciling the position among domestic agencies, and dealing with important affairs in the economic and trade relations with the countries in these specific regions. Moreover, they are responsible for supervising the observation of treaties and agreements by foreign governments and for negotiations aimed at helping Chinese enterprises gain market entry in the respective regions/countries.¹⁴⁷

Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao

¹⁴⁶ “The Major Functions of the Department of Treaty and Law,” Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003991.html>.

¹⁴⁷ “The Major Functions of the Department of Asian Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://yzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300002509.html>;

“The Major Functions of the Department Western Asian and African Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300002546.html>;

“The Major Function of the Department of American and Asian Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://mids.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300002592.html>.

In addition to its responsibilities for drafting economic and trade development strategy and mid- and long-term projects, and cooperating on and promoting the fulfillment of the targets for the economic development of Hong Kong and Macao, most noticeably, the department is in charge of affairs regarding the central government strategy of promoting the “three links” (*san tong*), including:

To work out policies toward Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao on economic cooperation and trade, and organize their implementation; to provide macro direction in the work economic cooperation and trade with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and to coordinate governmental stance on economic relations with them.

- To work out projects on direct trade relations, to organize authorized people-to-people economic and trade organizations, to negotiate and sign documents, and to organize their implementation.
- To administer and guide exports to Taiwan, to organize and coordinate important exports to Taiwan; to approve visits by firms from mainland China to Taiwan, and to approve Taiwan’s business people’s trade and economic activities in mainland China; and to approve the setting up of permanent agencies of Taiwan firms on the mainland.
- To settle significant multilateral and bilateral economic and trade issues with Taiwan.¹⁴⁸

Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs

¹⁴⁸ “The Functions of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs,” Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://tga.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200207/20020700034473.html>.

The functions of the department include: to deal with, on behalf of the Chinese government, the agencies that are responsible for development within the United Nations system, and to work out and organize implementation of China's policies with these agencies or organizations; to work out and implement strategy and policy on China's participation in regional economic integration; to take charge of economic and trade affairs and to organize implementation of the activities of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN; to organize China's participation in negotiations on various regional economic cooperation and trade arrangements, to reconcile domestic views in the process of negotiations, to devise projects under negotiation, and to be responsible for negotiations on multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements; to negotiate, sign, implement, and manage grants donated by foreign governments and agencies of the United Nations, etc.¹⁴⁹

Department of WTO Affairs

The main responsibility of this department is to deal with the WTO on behalf of the Chinese government, including being responsible for China's multilateral and bilateral negotiations under the WTO framework; participating in WTO activities on behalf of the Chinese government; taking charge of examination of policies on foreign economies and trade in the WTO; reconciling and unifying the stance of the WTO with other international economic and trade organizations, regional economic and trade organizations, and bilateral negotiations in which China takes part; carrying out China's

¹⁴⁹ "The Major Functions of the Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200308/20030800114927.html>.

WTO obligations in reporting on China's policy, laws, and regulations related to trade and investment, and so on; and managing standardization work, coordinating studies, investigations, statistics, and evaluations on technical trade barriers, and coordinating their countermeasures; etc.¹⁵⁰

Department of Foreign Trade, Department of Trade in Services, and Department of Mechanic, Electronic and Hi-Tech Industry

These departments are the agencies in charge of China's foreign trade. The former is responsible for working out projects on the reform of foreign trade institutions and development strategies for exports and imports. It is also responsible for working out the administrative methods for exports and imports, the export and import goods catalogue, and the export and import quotas, etc.¹⁵¹ The latter works out and implements policies, regulations, and mid- and long-term projects and an annual guidance plan for the export and import of electromechanical products and sets of equipment, and for the processing trade.¹⁵² The functions of the Department of Trade in Services for trade in services are similar to those of the Department of Electromechanical Products and Science and Technology Industry for mechanical, electronic, and hi-tech industries.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC,
<http://wms.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003218.html>.

¹⁵¹ "The Major Functions of the Department of Foreign Trade," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC,
<http://wms.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003218.html>.

¹⁵² "The Major Functions of the Department of Mechanic, Electronic and Hi-Tech Industry," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC,
<http://cys.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003730.html>.

¹⁵³ "The Components of the Department of Trade in Services," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC,

Department of Foreign Aid

This department is the principal department in charge of foreign aid. Its responsibilities include: to devise and implement policies on foreign aid; to draft laws and regulations on foreign aid, and to devise the Ministry's rules on foreign aid; to study and promote reforms on foreign assistance; to work out and implement foreign aid plans; and to work out and make decisions on foreign aid projects. It is also in charge of negotiations between Chinese and foreign governments, discussing and signing foreign aid agreements, dealing with inter-state aid affairs and the transfer of completed foreign aid projects to aid recipients and the repayment of aid loans and reorganization of debts. It also is responsible for checking the qualifications of firms bidding on various foreign aid projects, organizing biddings for foreign aid projects, assigning foreign aid tasks, and supervising and inspecting the implementation of aid projects. It is in charge of using the funds for foreign aid, supervising and managing preferential loans and funding programs for foreign aid joint venture cooperation, and settling major intergovernmental issues. In addition, it is responsible for guiding the foreign aid work undertaken by the Department of International Economic Cooperation.¹⁵⁴

Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation

<http://fwmys.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/guanywm/200606/20060602426834.html>. This Department was established in April 2006, but there is still no clear definition of its functions, which should be formulated by the Department of Personnel.

¹⁵⁴ "The Major Functions of the Department of Foreign Aid," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://yws.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003746.html>.

Since 1995, this department had close relations with the Department of Foreign Aid in terms of responsibilities since China's foreign aid has been combined with China's foreign economic cooperation (see Chapter Five); to organize and coordinate implementation of the "going out" strategy; to direct and regulate foreign economic cooperation, such as investments, research and development on processing trade, and resource exploration in foreign countries, contractual work, labor service cooperation, and exports of trade in services; to draft laws and regulations on foreign economic cooperation, to work out policies for promoting, securing, monitoring, and regulating foreign economic cooperation; and to work out and organize implementation of development strategies and projects on foreign economic cooperation; to examine, approve, monitor, and regulate investment and establishment of enterprises in foreign countries; etc.¹⁵⁵

Department of Foreign Investment Administration

To direct and comprehensively administer national work to attract foreign investments; to draft laws and regulations to attract foreign investment; to put forth recommendations on how to attract foreign investment; to engage in devising development strategies and mid- and long-term projects to utilize foreign capital; to work out and organize implementation of related regulations, policies, and reform projects; to

¹⁵⁵ "The Major Functions of the Department of the Foreign Economic Cooperation," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200307/20030700105079.html>.

take charge of the examination and approval process for nationwide foreign investments; etc.¹⁵⁶

State Office of Intellectual Property Protection

In order to strengthen central leadership in intellectual property protection, in 2004 the State Council decided to set up a State Working Group on Intellectual Property Protection. Led by Vice Premier Wu Yi, the Working Group consists of seventeen IPR-related member agencies, including the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Information Industry, the Ministry of Commerce, the Customs General Administration, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, the National Copyright Administration, the State Administration of Food and Drugs, the State Intellectual Property Office of the PRC, etc.¹⁵⁷

The State Office of Intellectual Property Protection (SOIPP) in the Ministry of Commerce is in charge of day-to-day work of the State Working Group on Intellectual Property Protection and is responsible for urging that major cases of violation of intellectual property protection be brought to trial. The chief of the office is a vice minister.

The main responsibilities of the SOIPP are as follows:

¹⁵⁶ "The Major Functions of the Department of Foreign Investment Administration," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003759.html>.

¹⁵⁷ "An Introduction of the State Office of Intellectual Property Protection," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://zgb.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200704/20070404541637.html>;

"The Major Functions of the State Office of Intellectual Property Protection," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://zgb.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200704/20070404541847.html>.

- to research and propose guidance, plans, and policy recommendations on national IPR protection work;
- to organize and coordinate special nationwide campaigns on IPR protection and to make decisions on the focal tasks of IPR protection;
- to supervise the disposition of major IPR infringement cases, and to deal with letters from the population related to IPR protection;
- to organize an “IPR Protection Publicity Week” activity in order to raise the consciousness of ordinary people with regard to IPR protection;
- to set up communication and coordinating mechanisms with foreign-invested enterprises and to organize regular meetings with them;
- To promote law enforcement, personnel training, and education on IPR protection, and to undertake international exchanges and cooperation.¹⁵⁸

China Office of the Representative for Trade Negotiations

The full name of this office is the Office of the Representative for Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. It is in charge of policy research on foreign negotiations; business coordination; legal consultations; information control/management; press conferences, international relations, and participation in negotiations.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ “An Introduction of the State Office of Intellectual Property Protection,” Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://zgb.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200704/20070404541637.html>.

¹⁵⁹ “The Functions and Components of the Office of Representative for Trade Negotiation,” Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://tpb.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200612/20061204041452.html>.

The Military Departments Related to Foreign Policy Making

The Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, made up of the same members of the Central Military Commission of the PRC, is China's highest military organ. As such it allegedly "can be considered the Chinese equivalent of the National Command Authority (NCA) in the United States."¹⁶⁰ The functions of the Commission, according to a textbook on national institutions, are to lead and command the national armed forces, make decisions on military strategy and combat policy for the armed forces, direct and administer PLA building, work out projects, and devise and organize their implementation. The Commission also formulates military regulations according to the Constitution and laws, and issues decisions and commands; and makes decisions on the appointment, training, examination, and awards and punishments of members of the armed forces according to the tasks and responsibilities of the general departments, military regions, the groups of arms, services, and other military-level units. It is in charge of approving development projects on equipment of the armed forces and military institutions, coordinating the leaders of the State Council on administration of national defense scientific and technical research and production, and managing the national defense budget. In addition, it is responsible for performing other functions provided by laws and regulations. The State Military Commission has adopted chairman-in-charge system, in which the chairman of the CMC commands the national armed forces.¹⁶¹

The CMC exercises its operational command of the People's Liberation Army through four departments: the General Staff Department, the General Political

¹⁶⁰ Interview, March 2006.

¹⁶¹ Su Zhirong and Mu Xiankui, *Guofang tizhi jiaocheng* (Textbook on National Defense Institutions) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1999), p. 125.

Department, the General Logistics Department, and the General Armament Department. The General Armament Department was established on April 3, 1998. Although the four general departments constitute the second level in the organizational hierarchy of the PLA, the General Staff Department (GSD) is seen as “the first among the equals,” standing out from the other general departments because it is the agent through which the CMC exercises operational command of the seven military regions.”¹⁶² The Ministry of Defense is under the State Council; however, management of the PLA has nothing to do with the State Council. It is completely under the jurisdiction of the CMC and the Politburo.¹⁶³

The General Staff Department (GSD) is an important participant in foreign policy making. Among the agents under the General Staff Department, the Second Department of the General Staff Department (or the Military Intelligence Department, *Qingbao Bu*) is responsible for comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis. This department is one of the major intelligence organizations under the direct control of the GSD (the other is the Third Department which is responsible for signals intelligence [SIGINT]). It also delivers military attachés to Chinese embassies in foreign countries through its Third Bureau (Military Attachés).¹⁶⁴ Currently, there are about sixty to seventy Chinese military attachés stationed abroad. Their number has increased since the collapse of the

¹⁶² David Finkelstein, “The General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, and Missions,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., *The People’s Liberation Army as Organization* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2002), pp. 122-144, at pp. 125-126; and Ka Po Ng, *Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 28.

¹⁶³ In their book Su Zhirong and Mu Xiankui state that the Ministry of Defense is a ministry of the State Council, but it is also under the Central Military Commission. This statement does not correspond to the reality. See Su Zhirong and Mu Xiankui, *Guofang daxue jiaocai*, pp. 53-54.

¹⁶⁴ Finkelstein, “The General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, and Missions,” p. 104.

Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. The attachés are regarded as the representatives of China's armed forces to foreign countries. Their mission is to promote military relations and to understand the military situation abroad. According to one author:

The Second Department of the PLA General Staff Department is mainly responsible for collecting military intelligence, which can be divided into three major parts: First, sending military attachés to Chinese embassies abroad; second, sending special agents to foreign countries under the cover of various identities; and third, conducting military intelligence analysis based on information published in foreign countries.¹⁶⁵

The structure and function of all putative seven bureaus of the General Staff Department have been described by Nicholas Eftimiades and David Finkelstein.¹⁶⁶

The other organ in the military that has an influence on foreign policy-making is the Liaison Department of the General Political Department, which is in charge of psychological warfare against Taiwan and foreign militaries to destroy the enemy's morale. It also collects economic and military intelligence which it submits to the CMC and the Politburo.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Dang Bo, "Zhonggong de qingzhi ji waishi jigou yanjiu" (Chinese Research Institutions on Intelligence and Foreign Affairs), *Zhengming* (Hong Kong), No. 9 (September 1996), p. 30.

¹⁶⁶ Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), chap. 2; and Finkelstein, "The General Staff Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, and Missions," pp. 122-144. Yet, Finkelstein admits that there is no accurate information on the structure of the Second Department and the functions of each of its subagents.

¹⁶⁷ Dang Bo, "Zhonggong de qingzhi ji waishi jigou yanjiu," p. 30.

The Role of the Military in the Policy-Making Process

The institutional arrangement of the military is regarded by Chinese researchers as “a guarantee of the Communist Party’s absolute leadership of the military.”¹⁶⁸ In decision making on defense policies, on the question of what military means China should adopt as countermeasures, such as blockades, missile launches, a military presence, or other types of military actions, the military has an obligation to set forth its own projects and to hand them first to the General Staff Department, then to the Central Military Commission, or directly to the latter, if so required by the Commission or if they are extraordinarily important; ultimately the policy recommendations may reach the Politburo. The Politburo tends to listen to the military carefully when a major decision on Chinese strategy is deliberated, but the final decision is definitely made by the Politburo itself.¹⁶⁹ It is said, on the other hand, that within the military, on almost every issue, there are, unlike in the past, always different voices in the discussions. Some are very hard-line and emotional, and others are moderate and more rational. But reports to the Politburo from the military represent only one voice, while, at the same time, there are many other voices in other ministries and departments vying for Politburo consideration.

The Central Military Commission must obey the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Although the military has an influence on the Politburo, it does not have absolute influence. It is interesting to note that during Hu Jintao’s first term, there was not a single military officer on the Standing Committee of the Politburo; Guo Boxiong

¹⁶⁸ Interview with a senior military researcher, March 2006.

¹⁶⁹ In China, people frequently refer to the center (zhongyang), but few seriously consider what they actually mean by “center”: the Central Committee of the CPC, the central government, the Central Military Commission, or the State Council? In fact, there is an integrated center of the party, state, and military, focused in the Politburo and its Standing Committee.

and Cao Gangchuan, minister of National Defense, were members of the Politburo. Among military officials, they held the highest party positions, together with the vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, with Guo Boxiong in charge of routine work.¹⁷⁰ The third vice chairman of the Central Military Commission is Xu Caihou. All the vice chairmen are military officials, but the Chairman has not been a military man since Deng Xiaoping retired from this position in 1989. Jiang Zemin, who has never been in the military, succeeded Deng as chairman, and then Hu Jintao, another civilian official, took over the position of chairman in 2004. The other members of the Commission are the heads of the four General Departments of the PLA.

One of the advantages of placing a civilian officer in the position of chairman of the Central Military Commission is said to be that it decreases the influence of factional appointments. When Lin Biao was Defense Minister, most important positions were held by military officials from the Fourth Field Army that Lin Biao had commanded during the Chinese Civil War. Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng were all from this army. Later on when Deng Xiaoping became chairman of the CMC, more officials were from the Second Field Army, since Deng had been its commissar. Yang Shangkun, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and his cousin, Yang Baibing, a former Politburo member, chief of the General Political Department and secretary general of the Central Military Commission, were dismissed in 1992 allegedly for organizing a clique. They too were both from the Second Field Army.

¹⁷⁰ Interview, March 2006.

It has been argued that the principle underlying the relationship between the army and the party has been widely misunderstood. During the Chinese Civil War and the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the Communist forces consisted of only two basic institutions, the Communist Party and the army. Therefore, Mao's claim that "the party commands the gun" really implied "civilian control of the military."¹⁷¹ The argument actually touches on the essential relations between the army and the party. On the surface, there is "civilian control of the military, but this ignores three important facts. First, although the Communist Party did not gain national power until 1949, it had established a revolutionary government in the revolutionary bases even before the Long March in 1935. Moreover, in Yan'an after 1936 it had created a solid central revolutionary base and a multi-functional government. In fact, Communist national power grew out of this embryonic form of political power. Second, in Chinese politics, the party has always been superior to the government. The final decision on security policy related to the PLA is in the hands of the Politburo. Thus a popular slogan about party-military relations in Chinese politics has always been "the people's army is loyal to the party." Third, one of the initiatives of the Chinese political reform was to place the army under the command of the government (*jundui guojiahua*) rather than under the leadership of the party, but this proposal was generally viewed as too radical to be taken seriously. Formally, the army is controlled by civilians, but these civilians are always top party leaders. Thus, in essence, it is the party that dominates the army.

A broadly shared view now holds that the PLA largely stays out of domestic politics. An important reason is that since the Cultural Revolution there has not been any political

¹⁷¹ Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," p. 415, n. 40.

clash among the leadership. The lack of the charisma, privileges, and personal loyalty of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping has not prevented Jiang Zemin and then Hu Jintao from wielding the institutional power that goes with their position. The conformity of the PLA to the political policies and processes is largely derived from mutual acceptance, rather than from the absolute obedience that existed under Mao's and Deng's leaderships.¹⁷² Although a generous defense budget and institutional autonomy may win military support for the political leadership, one should not ignore the fact that from the beginning of the reforms to the mid-1990s, the PLA was continually asked by Deng Xiaoping to be "patient," meaning the military should tolerate its moderate budget until an economic foundation could be built. On January 16, 1980, Deng said, "Successful national defense construction is impossible without a certain economic foundation."¹⁷³ China's new security concept that developed at an enlarged meeting of the party Central Military Commission in mid-1985 reinforced Deng's argument. Deng and his colleagues in the CMC assessed that the probability of large-scale war involving China in the near future was low; accordingly, they made the decision to reduce the number of military personnel by one million and decreed that military modernization in China would be pursued on the foundation of overall economic development as the first priority. As a result, throughout the 1980s China's official defense spending was relatively reduced (in inflation-adjusted terms) or even absolutely reduced, but the military did not protest.¹⁷⁴ As a senior officer of PLA commented, "The PLA made great sacrifices for

¹⁷² Nan Li, *Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People's Liberation Army* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 2.

¹⁷³ Deng Xiaoping, "Muqian de zingshi he renwu" (The Present Situation and Tasks), in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 2, 1975-1982 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), p. 240.

¹⁷⁴ Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000*, pp. 72, 73.

Chinese economic modernization for two decades. It was asked to have patience, and it obeyed without any complaints.”¹⁷⁵ This reveals the dominance-obedience relationship between the party and the PLA.

The role of the PLA in China’s foreign policy decision making is basically confined to certain activities of the military departments.¹⁷⁶ This reflects the fact that the PLA is in no position to challenge the authority of the party.¹⁷⁷ With the exception of the Taiwan issue, serious involvement of the PLA in foreign policy only began with the decision of the Chinese leadership in the 1980s to allow the PLA to sell surplus arms overseas in exchange for foreign currency in order to upgrade its equipment. However, since 1993, the demand for “rectification and reform” of military-related businesses was initiated by the CMC itself. According to official statistics, in the first part of 1993 there were already 10,000 firms, with 80,000 employees, run by the PLA, most of which had been established in the late 1980s.¹⁷⁸ The ratio of soldiers involved in production activities largely exceeded 5 percent of all forces, which was the ceiling imposed by the Central Military Commission.¹⁷⁹

Joint working groups of the three general departments conducted a series of nationwide surveys on PLA businesses for several months, and then the Department of General Logistics collected the views and summarized the suggestions of the working groups in a report to the CMC. After heated discussions at a meeting of the CMC in mid-July 1993, a consensus was reached that the military’s engagement in business to

¹⁷⁵ Interview with a senior official of the PLA, October 2007.

¹⁷⁶ Nan Li, *Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s Liberation Army*, p. 54.

¹⁷⁷ Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 94.

¹⁷⁸ Zhang Zhen, *Zhang Zhen huiyilu* (Zhang Zhen’s Memoirs) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2003), p. 399.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

compensate for its budget shortfalls and to guarantee supplies for the armed forces was no longer serving its purpose: it was attracting energy that otherwise could be used for overall military construction, thus affecting the military training of the forces; some units even used military facilities and misappropriated defense budget funds for business activities. As a result, these activities had a negative effect on the military. In addition, some of these business activities fed corruptive behavior, such as bribery, tax evasion, and smuggling, even involving high-ranking officials. With the agreement that rectification of military businesses brooked no delay, a “Resolution on Rectification and Reform of the Work of Military Production Businesses” (*Guanyu zhengdun he gaige shengchan jingying gongzuo de jueding*) was passed at the meeting.

On August 20, 1993, another meeting of the CMC, presided over by Jiang Zemin, was convened. Major decisions were made on military businesses: combat corps was banned from production business activities. The resolution passed at the meeting was a major measure to implement the central party’s instructions to combat corruption, with significant implications for strengthening military construction and increasing the cohesive combat forces of the PLA. The resolution required various levels of party committees and leaderships to enhance comprehension of the decision, to unite their thinking and action, to firmly implement the CMC’s policy making, and to carefully and meticulously complete this significant work. To supervise implementation of the resolution, the Leading Group on Rectification and Reform of Military Businesses was set up headed by Fu Quanyou, the chief of the Department of General Logistics, with deputy chiefs of each of the three general departments as deputy heads.

After Jiang Zemin's approval, the resolution was circulated among the PLA on October 30. It stipulated that combat corps could no longer be involved in production businesses; all existing military enterprises would be subjected to unified management by military regions and services and arms; military construction and production businesses would be separated, with each on its own track; and the profits of the enterprises would be distributed evenly to ensure they would be used for military construction and would serve to enhance the combat forces of the military. By the end of 1994, over 60 percent of the enterprises were under unified management, and many illegal activities had already been punished. But this represented only a gradual transition to a complete ban on military businesses. Following Chinese economic development and the augmentation of financial capacity, compensation for a part of the lost revenues through regular budgetary appropriations was pursued by Jiang Zemin led by the party center.¹⁸⁰

After the Fifteenth Congress of the CPC in 1997, the CMC made a new decision that the combat corps would end all engagement in businesses in March 1998. After July of the same year, the party center made a clear decision that all military and armed police forces would be prohibited from running businesses, and the PLA would hand over all its businesses to civilian authorities by the end of the year,¹⁸¹ thus ending the PLA's autonomy in arms sales.

Generally, the PLA's views and interests are reflected in the foreign/defense policy-making process through its representatives in the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/Leading Group on National Security and the Politburo. In this way the military

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 401-407.

¹⁸¹ Zhang Zhen, *Zhang Zhen huiyilu* (Zhang Zhen's Memoirs), p. 407; David Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000*, pp. 74, 73; and Nan Li, *Chinese Civil-Military Relations, the Transformation of the People's Liberation Army*, p. 55.

can shape policy-making “at the apex of China’s power structure.” The military voice can also be heard in the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference through its representatives there. However, although those military men who are members of the Politburo can make the military conditions and desires known to the Politburo, conventionally they are not regarded as representatives of military interests.¹⁸² They are required to consider policies from the broader perspective of the national interest.

Personal relationships among top leaders have been explored to analyze party-military relations, as have trends in the Chinese military been fully examined by experts on the Chinese military.¹⁸³ It has been found that functional differentiation and technical specialization have facilitated the professionalization of the PLA, and more definite institutional boundaries between the military and politics, and the army and the party, have been identified. “This trend has particularly been reflected in the substantial reduction of the PLA’s role in the party and societal politics, the remarkable decline of the cross-boundaries circulation of the elites, and concentration of the PLA on military modernization.”¹⁸⁴ Indeed, this point of view is shared by some PLA officials themselves. They believe that “With modernization and standardization, the PLA’s

¹⁸² Interview with a senior military researcher, November 2007.

¹⁸³ Since in the post-Deng era, no Chinese leader holds absolute power (even Deng did not really have absolute power); Jiang Zemin was viewed as “first among the equals” and the designation “paramount” was thus not applicable to Jiang.

¹⁸⁴ Ellis Joffe, “The Military and China’s New Politics: Trends and Counter-Trends,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., *The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999), pp. 43-46. Nan Li, *Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s Liberation Army*, p. 2.

involvement in politics is diminishing; the military are returning to the military camps.”¹⁸⁵

However, despite changes in the domestic and international environments, although more voices have been heard calling for civilian control of the armed forces as a fundamental principle of governance, the doctrine “the party commands the gun” is still strictly followed. Indeed, in spite of the trend of increasing professionalization and autonomy in the PLA, so far the nature of party-army relations essentially has not changed—the PLA as an institution remains loyal to the party.¹⁸⁶ To a large extent, the institutional loyalty is in fact a manifestation of the institutionalization of the political structure and the policy-making process. Nevertheless, theoretically, fundamental changes in the party-army relations can only occur under the precondition that the CPC is no longer dominant in the political process, and the Chinese political system has been transformed from a one-party system into a multiparty system. Insofar as this cannot be expected to occur, a fundamental change in the party-army relationship will not be possible.

Intelligence Collection and Policy Recommendations

In Chinese foreign policy and international relations, an important and noteworthy issue—arms control—is under the jurisdiction of the General Staff Department (GSD), rather than under the General Armaments Department. But arms development, because it is a high priority, is dominated by the Central Military Commission. There is said to be a Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament in the GSD which is responsible for

¹⁸⁵ Interview with a senior military researcher, November 2007.

¹⁸⁶ Nan Li, *Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People's Liberation Army*, pp. 2-6.

analyzing the disarmament situation in different countries, how China should deal with this issue, and what China should do in terms of disarmament. Presumably, this department is relatively new, as China only started to be active in the arms control arena in the 1990s, roughly around the time when the Department of Arms Control in the MFA was established.¹⁸⁷ The reason for setting up such an organization is obvious: China has become increasingly involved in the international arms control regime and the PLA has more responsibility for this issue.

The organ coordinating national defense policy between the Politburo and the Central Military Commission is the Leading Group on National Security. The members of this group are the chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, the vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, and representatives from other ministries, including the minister of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the State Security, and the Ministry of Commerce (For details on this LG, Chapter Three).

Today military-related intelligence is more essential than ever, since China's security interests have multiplied and its international strategy requires intelligence analysis. Thus, some new military-related think tank/institutes have been established, and the functions of the previously existing bodies have been strengthened. These think tanks include the China Institute for International Strategic Studies under the GSD's Second Department and the Foundation for International Strategic Studies related to the GSD Department that plays an important role in establishing exchanges between the PLA and foreign defense organs and personnel, etc. Military think tanks of lesser importance include the Center for Peace and Development under the General Political Department's

¹⁸⁷ Finkelstein, "The General Staff Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, and Missions," p. 123.

Liaison Department, which reportedly has particular strength on Hong Kong and Macao-related intelligence. As for intelligence on weapons technology, this is the purview of the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center which was transferred from the control of the former Commission for Science and Technology of National Defense to the General Armaments Department created in 1998.¹⁸⁸

The Chinese military must speak in one voice even though it comprises many departments. When a policy is under deliberation, representatives are encouraged to voice opinions at the meetings of the various agencies. Thus different voices can be heard. But when the military reports on intelligence analysis or provides policy recommendations, there is only one channel through which the military can reach the Standing Committee of the Politburo, that is, the CMC. The CMC unifies the voice of the military before it reports to the Politburo. On any decision related to the armed forces, the final decision is dominated by the Politburo. The military is merely one of several different bureaucracies whose voice can be heard by the top leaders through reports, though on strategic issues, the voice of the military is considered extremely important.¹⁸⁹

Coordination in Foreign Policy Making

As Lu Ning observes, researchers in different central bureaucracies almost never communicate with one another officially, and these bureaucracies communicate only at the ministerial level.¹⁹⁰ However, researchers or officials in different government ministries and party departments now have increasing opportunities to exchange opinions

¹⁸⁸ Ka Po Ng, *Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness*, pp. 28-29.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with a senior military official, March 2006.

¹⁹⁰ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, p. 32.

informally in various seminars, discussions, and conferences organized by the different research institutions. Moreover, as a consequence of China's integration into the world and the rapid expansion of China's international affairs, official coordination on foreign policy-making is seen as vital. Today there are more than several dozen kinds of coordinating meetings at the ministerial level in Chinese policy decision making. The topic determines who summons such a coordinating meeting. For instance, the Ministry of Commerce, with Wu Yi in charge, is the coordinator of the Joint Committee on the Sino-American Economy, in which all relevant agents participate. A working group on the U.S., a non-standing body, is also a coordinating body that calls irregular meetings. The problem with such meetings is that they usually adopt a one-vote/veto convention. No resolution can be passed, and no steps can be taken, if any one ministry does not agree to the resolution. Frustrated by this situation, it has been suggested that the principle of "big powers' right to veto" should be abandoned and replaced by a majority-pass principle. Such coordination usually occurs when devising concrete policies or implementing policies for which the principles and guidelines have already been formulated by the top policy-makers.

The key coordinating body in foreign policy or national security policy-making is the LGFA/LGNS. However, there is some confusion over higher- and lower-level power relations in this arrangement. For instance, in the MFA, Dai Bingguo is a deputy minister, but at the same time he is the director of the Office of the LGFA, whose authority is higher than that of Li Zhaoxing, the minister of Foreign Affairs. Thus a confusing situation has been created: in the MFA and the State Council, Dai Bingguo is subordinate to Li Zhaoxing, but in the party system and on the occasion of the LGFA

meetings, the former has more authority than the latter.¹⁹¹ Similarly, in the military, Xiong Guangkai, then the deputy chief of the General Staff Department, was more powerful than his direct boss in the foreign/security policy-making process, the chief of the General Staff Department, since the former was a member of the LGFA/LGNS, but the latter was not. Because of this confusion, some argue that a central coordinating body for foreign and national security policy making, analogous to the U.S. National Security Council, should be established.

The Role of the Chinese President in Diplomacy

It has been noted that Chinese presidents in past years have been more active on the diplomatic and international scene. The evolution of the presidency in terms of its role in Chinese diplomacy has undergone the following changes:

The idea to establish a state presidency and vice presidency was initiated at the First Congress of the National People's Congress in September 1954, when the first Constitution of the People's Republic of China was passed. This Constitution provided for the establishment of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the presidency of the People's Republic of China; simultaneously, it abolished the Central People's Government. It also provided that the presidency, an independent institution in the Chinese political establishment, be both the representative and symbol of the Chinese state. The term, status, method of selection, and functions of the presidency were also clearly defined.

¹⁹¹ Interview with a military researcher, November 2007.

Table 2-6 Successive Chinese Presidents

Name	Period	Title
Mao Zedong	Oct.1, 1949 – Sept. 27, 1954	President
Mao Zedong	Sept. 27, 1954 – Apr. 27, 1959	President
Liu Shaoqi	Apr. 27, 1959 – Oct. 31, 1968	President
Song Qingling	(Oct. 31, 1968 – Feb. 24, 1972)	Deputy President (performs the functions of the president in the name of a vice president)
Dong Biwu	Feb. 24, 1972 – Jan. 17, 1975	Deputy President (performs the functions of the president in the name of a vice president)
Song Qingling	May 16, 1981	Granted the title of Honorary President on her death
Li Xiannian	Jun. 16, 1983 – Apr. 8, 1988	President
Yang Shangkun	April 8, 1988 – Mar. 27, 1993	President
Jiang Zemin	Mar. 27, 1993 - Mar. 15, 2003	President
Hu Jintao	Mar. 15, 2003 – present	President

Source: “Zhongguo linian de zhuxi mingdan” (List of the Successive Chinese Presidents of the PRC), Baidu Website, <http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/4453943.html>.

From 1954 to 1964, the presidential system operated normally. From September 1954 to April 1959, Mao Zedong and Zhu De respectively held the positions of president and vice president. In 1959 and 1965, Liu Shaoqi was twice elected president. Between 1954 and 1965, according to the decision of the National People’s Congress and

its Standing Committee, the president issued numerous laws and acts, summoned meetings on state affairs, received diplomatic envoys from foreign countries, and participated in other activities that were within the purview of the duties of the presidency. However, due to the purge and political persecution of Liu Shaoqi during the Cultural Revolution, the position of president was left vacant for a decade and a half from 1968 to 1982 of China, receives foreign diplomatic representatives and, in pursuance of the decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, appoints or recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad, and ratifies or abrogates treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states.”¹⁹² This means that the presidency and vice presidency have been restored, and the functions that had been taken over by the chairman of the NPC in 1975 were returned to the presidency. Peng Zhen, then chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, reported to the Fifth Plenum on the amendment to the Constitution, emphasizing, “Chinese practice since the establishment of the PRC proves that to set up a state presidency is necessary to improve Chinese political institutions, and also to meet the customs and desires of divergent ethnic groups in China.”¹⁹³ Since then, the 1982 Constitution has been revised four times—in April 1988, March 1993, March 1999, and March 2004—but the article on the presidency has remained essentially unchanged, and, in practice, the state presidency system has been strengthened.

It should be noted that the amendments to the Constitution in 2004, approved by the Second Plenum of the Tenth Congress of the NPC, expanded the functions of the Chinese

¹⁹² *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa* (The Constitution of the People's Republic of China) (1982) (Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi Chubanshe, 2004), p. 56.

¹⁹³ In “Peng Zhen guanyu zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiugai cao'an de baogao” (Peng Zhen's Report on the Draft Amendment of the Constitution of the PRC), <http://www.people.com.cn/item/xianfa/08.html>.

state president by adding to Article 81 that “The President of the People’s Republic of China, on behalf of the People’s Republic of China, *engages in activities involving state affairs...*”¹⁹⁴ It is assumed that this change was motivated by China’s increased international contacts and mutual visits between Chinese and foreign heads of state, following the rapid development of the Chinese economy and the enhancement of China’s international status. These changes have required that the Chinese state head be legitimated to engage in more internal and external activities involving state affairs and to act on behalf of the PRC on the international scene. This amendment to the 1982 Constitution has also had a significant impact on Chinese political life, since it established the principle that the president of the PRC is the formal state representative. In fact, the new provision on the presidency in the 2004 Constitution is no more than de facto recognition of the fact that after Jiang Zemin took over the office of the presidency, the president has actively “engaged in activities involving state affairs on behalf of the PRC.” Thus, although Jiang had already retired from the presidency in 2003, the Constitution legitimized his earlier activities.

It is interesting to note that the leaders of foreign countries have recognized the gradual real change in the nature of the Chinese presidency. There are a number of examples. First, with an invitation from President Reagan, Zhao Ziyang visited Washington from January 10-16, 1984. During his visit, in spite of his position as premier, Zhao was treated as chief of state (the formal head of state at that time was Li Xiannian). Zhao was received at a White House lawn ceremony presided over by President Reagan and he was invited to meet all significant government officials. Zhao

¹⁹⁴ The part of italic is the amendment to the 1982 Constitution. See *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa* (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China) (1982) (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe, 2004), p. 56.

had a long meeting with President Reagan; he met Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, etc., exchanging opinions on major international and bilateral issues between the U.S. and China. In contrast, when President Li Xiannian was planning to visit the U.S., the Chinese were initially informed that Washington could not provide Li and his team a high-level reception such as a ceremony on the White House lawn, which is usually given to a visiting head of state. Beijing was frustrated and embarrassed. However, when Vice Premier Li Peng and the secretary of the Secretariat Wang Zhaoguo were added to the list of visitors, the American side was very ready to raise the level of the reception.¹⁹⁵ As a result, Beijing considered the reception given to Li Xiannian on his visit to the U.S. in July 1985 to be unexpectedly high.

In any case, the amendment to the Constitution changes the diplomatic functions of the Chinese president and his role as a policy-maker, since he now can have direct contacts, private talks, and exchanges of opinion with his counterparts or with high-ranking officials in other countries on international occasions. He is more informed and more confident in his knowledge of international relations and Chinese bilateral or multilateral relations, and is more capable of agilely and flexibly handling foreign policy issues. This in turn has strengthened his authority and his say in foreign

¹⁹⁵ Interview, August 2007.

policy making, as seen during Jiang Zemin's two terms as president. As a reflection, it can be said that China now has a "diplomatic chief."¹⁹⁶

For complex reasons—the Cold War, the isolation of China by the West in the international community, the split between China and the Soviet Union and their ideological disputes—China had limited foreign relations until its entry into the United Nations in 1971 and Nixon's ice-breaking visit to China in 1972. Even after China formally became a member of the international community, for reasons of domestic politics and the international environment, it took another twenty years for an active Chinese president to appear on the international stage. There is no tradition of the president serving as diplomatic chief in PRC history: Mao Zedong paid only two visits abroad, both to the Soviet Union. Liu Shaoqi, the second president of the PRC, visited many foreign countries, but most of his visits were to countries on China's borders. After the restoration of the presidency in 1982, Presidents Li Xiannian and Yang Shangkun successively increased their trips abroad and their participation in international affairs, but the number of visits was still limited¹⁹⁷ and the ceremonial nature of the position of president lessened the importance of their activities in China's foreign relations and policies.

In contrast, in 2002 alone, President Jiang Zemin attended the UN Millennium Summit, a gathering of more than 150 countries, the annual ASEAN summit, the Asian-European Summit, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, etc., and he delivered addresses, took part in discussions at meetings with leaders of various nations,

¹⁹⁶ Zhang Qingmin, "Shehui bianqian beijing xia de Zhongguo waijiao juece pingxi," p. 47. Zhang Qingmin's understanding of "chief" in China includes not only China's chief of state, but also the premier, the head of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and the head of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 46.

and at the summit meeting of member-states of the Security Council of the UN, as well as at meetings of the heads of the member-states of the Standing Committee of the UN Security Council; on his visits, he met with leaders of developing countries, as well with leaders of the United States, Russia, France, Japan, Italy, Jordan, Ukraine, etc. During his first ten-day trip abroad in 2002, he visited Russia, attended the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, took part in the ceremony marking 300th anniversary of Saint Petersburg, and engaged in the North-South dialogue meeting in Evian in France.¹⁹⁸ In the ten years from March 1993 to March 2003, Jiang Zemin, as president of the PRC, paid thirty-three visits abroad, visiting over one hundred countries, more than the total number of countries visited by all Chinese chiefs of state from 1949 to 1993.¹⁹⁹

The changes in the diplomatic role of the Chinese presidents can be attributed to two reasons. First, after the end of the Cold War and with the development of economic globalization, bilateral and multilateral relations grew exponentially. Summits of various organizations are now held to solve common global issues, and bilateral meetings among heads of states have increased in importance for inter-governmental cooperation. Second, parallel to the remarkable expansion of China's international contacts, the Chinese president now has more duties to perform on the international scene on behalf of the PRC. When the presidency and the position of general secretary is combined in the same person, as it has been since Jiang Zemin, the person who holds the position of the head of state also holds real power in foreign policy making, thus putting him a position to serve as China's "diplomatic chief."

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of the PRC's Diplomatic Institutions*, p. 134.

Chapter Three: The Role of the CPC Apparatus in Foreign Policy-Making

When investigating the Chinese foreign policy-making process, the nature of the Chinese Communist Party's dominant role and the party-state relationship in the Chinese political institutions cannot be neglected.²⁰⁰ The reform to separate party and state powers, coupled with the deepening of the reform of economic institutions in the 1980s, has bestowed more independent power on routine policies at the central-government level, and government power of policy-making and administration according to the direction of the CPC at the local level. The final decisions on major crucial issues remain in the control of the party, especially in the realms of foreign and military affairs. In the 1982 Chinese Constitution, the Communist Party is referred to four times; each time points to its "leadership" role in the Chinese political process. The Constitution provides that "under the leadership of the Communist Party of China ... the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue" to establish "socialism with Chinese characteristics."²⁰¹ The "CPC's leadership" means the party's exclusive guidance of economic, social, military, and political goals, with other parties' cooperation with the CPC through the system of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The CPC's leadership is guaranteed by the institutional arrangement of the "boundless" power of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the party's control of the crucial departments of personnel and propaganda (now called "publicity"), and the different levels of CPC

²⁰⁰ James C. F. Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999), p. 71.

²⁰¹ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa* (The Constitution of the People's Republic of China) (1982) (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe, 2004), p. 7.

organizations.²⁰² There are now a total of over seventy million party members, among China's population of 1.3 billion. The point here is that the CPC does not replace the state functions but rather the two are intermingled and interwoven administratively, but in three crucial dimensions the party is the dominant factor—political, ideological, and personnel through the Politburo and the four departments of the CPC Central Committee.²⁰³

Under the Politburo, the most important organs of the CPC in policymaking are the leading groups of the CPC Central Committee. These groups are the least transparent and least understood by experts in China studies,²⁰⁴ though all of the literature recognizes their significance. A leading group of the CPC Central Committee by virtue of its name is a party organ. It is an informal institution, set up between the Politburo and the party or state departments, and it actually performs a wide range of functions of coordination, communication, consultation, supervision, and decision making.²⁰⁵ The

²⁰² See Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, p. 89. Much of the Chinese literature has a similar description of the Communist Party's power in political life, but their respective conclusions are different—the CPC does not have dominant power, but plays a political leadership role, or more precisely, it dominates crucial decision making and recommends officials to the important positions of the state apparatus. In other words, it “carries out the party's view of the state through legal procedures.” See Pu Xinzun, ed., *Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu* (The Contemporary Chinese Political System) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1990), pp. 459-462. Li Shouchu's book refers to the CPC's leadership in three dimensions: “political leadership,” “ideological leadership,” and “organizational leadership.” See Li Shouchu, *Zhongguo zhengfu zhidu* (The Chinese Political System) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2005), pp. 74-77. However, none of these descriptions reveal the extent to which the society is an important factor in decision making.

²⁰³ Three organs of the CPC Central Committee control these three key dimensions: the Politburo controls the political dimension; the Department of Publicity (formerly the Propaganda Department) handles ideology; and the Department of Organization is responsible for personnel issues for high-ranking officials.

²⁰⁴ See Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution through Reform* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 213.

²⁰⁵ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China*, 2nd ed. (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 11.

existence of the leading groups is justified to lessen the overburdened senior policy-makers, and to add coordinating and arbitrating bodies across organizational and functional lines, particularly for complex and major issues. In foreign affairs, since more government/party departments apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are now participating in the process of foreign policy-making as the result of China's continuing and increasing integration into the global economy and international community, a body to perform such a coordinating function has become more essential and significant.

In addition to the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, the four departments subordinate to the Central Committee of the party to different degrees directly or indirectly engage in foreign affairs. The Organization Department (*zuzhi bu*) has significant power to recommend and examine the qualification of officials at the deputy ministerial level and above, including officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the approval of the National People's Congress, but the latter rarely rejects recommendations by the former; the Department of the United Front (*tongzhan bu*) is traditionally assigned, among other tasks, to deal with Tibet-related issues; the Department of Publicity (*xuanchuan bu*) is responsible for regulating press reports on international events, foreign affairs-related issues, and foreign countries, in order to ensure that the reports are consistent with official policies or within permitted limits. It can be said that these departments are indirectly involved in Chinese decision making. But the role of the International Department (ID) (*lianluo bu*, formerly called *the Liaison Department*) is much different. It takes charge of the CPC's relationships with other parties abroad. As a result, the International Department is able to become directly involved in Chinese foreign affairs and foreign policy making. Its important role is

reflected in the fact that the International Department is the only party agency that has a representative on the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/Leading Group on National Security. In addition to these departments, there is also another organ whose portfolio is related to foreign affairs, that is, the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee, which is responsible for external reporting about China.

In order to understand the CPC's status in political institutions it is important to understand the relationship between the CPC and the Chinese Constitution. It is commonly believed in the West that the CPC is superior to the Constitution. Technically, that is incorrect, as the Article Five of the Chinese Constitution of 1982 explicitly states that "all state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings in the country must take the Constitution as the basic norm of conduct."²⁰⁶ However, in practice, the CPC can ignore its constitutional subordination to the National People's Congress (NPC), since it controls legislation or amendments to the Constitution by submitting draft legislation and constitutional amendments to the NPC. All four constitutional amendments in PRC history were first discussed at plenary meetings of the National Party Congress of the CPC or at the National Party Congress itself, and the National People's Congress has never rejected any constitutional amendment from the CPC. Yet, this seems to be changing somewhat. For example, in 1993 the NPC refused to allow the party to directly submit constitutional amendments on the grounds that the party was not a state organization. This represented a warning to the party that at least formally it needed to

²⁰⁶ The 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic Of China, Tianjin jiaoyan wang (Website of Tianjin Teaching and Research), <http://www.tjjy.com.cn/xklyxt/new/lis/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=1320&BigClassName=%E7%90%86%E8%AE%BA%E5%9B%AD%E5%9C%B0&BigClassID=18&SmallClassID=7&SpecialID=0>

respect the state institutions. On the other hand, many Chinese scholars and officials argue that the constitutional provision on the CPC's subordination to the Constitution is a useful tool to prevent arbitrary decisions and the emergence of a personality cult in the party, such that occurred during the Mao period. The principle of rule of law manifested in this provision in fact demands the institutionalization of the political process and decision making. Any organization, including the CPC, which is committed to rule of law and democracy, must observe this provision. In this respect, this requirement represents progress.

Evolution of the Leading Groups

The idea to establish leading groups (LG) of the CPC Central Committee derived from the need for such a group in financial and economic policy-making during the 1950s. According to Bo Yibo's recollections, the establishment of the first LG was closely related to Mao Zedong's basic distrust of Zhou Enlai, when in 1953 the State Council initiated a revision of the tax policy without reporting in advance to the CPC Central Committee and to Mao. Mao actively blamed Zhou and emphasized that there is only one institution for political design (i.e., policy-making), that is, the party center,²⁰⁷ and stated the need to strengthen party leadership over state departments. Soon thereafter, in Zhou's drafting of a resolution of the CPC Central Committee, the necessity of strengthening the reporting system by the state departments to the Politburo and of reinforcing the party's leadership over state work was stressed. This resolution

²⁰⁷ The phrase the "party center" is consistently used as a Chinese political term, but its meaning is not clear. It cannot be the CPC Central Committee, because the CPC Central Committee does not meet frequently and does not make decisions on daily work. Thus, the "party center" in this context can only refer to the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee.

provided that every major matter should be reported to the Politburo and party groups²⁰⁸ working in different government ministries should be directly subject to the decisions of the Politburo. For the purpose of underscoring the ministers' responsibility to the party, work systems (*kous*) were classified according to the nature of the work, including work systems for planning, finance and the economy, politics and law, foreign affairs, transportation, agriculture and forestry, labor, and culture and education. These *kous* can be seen as the precedents to the LGs.²⁰⁹ From then on, the party began to control strategies and major policies; policy-making power was centralized in the party committees at different levels; and legal and executive sections which originally were responsible to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee were now responsible to the CPC committees at the different levels. State ministries reported to and solicited instructions from the party center through party groups within the departments.

On January 11, 1958, at the Nanning work meeting for top Chinese leaders and some provincial and municipal party committee secretaries, apart from criticizing the anti-“rash advance” movement, Mao also stated that “the political design institution (for policy making) should be the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. He found, “the finance and economic bodies in the State Council only offer us output, and do not allow the Politburo to participate in design and do not report to the Politburo.”²¹⁰ Mao

²⁰⁸ A “party group” (*dangzu*) is a ministerial-level party committee.

²⁰⁹ Here the series of “work systems” are different from those discussed in Chapter One, i.e., the systems of party, government, and the military, though they are also called “*kous*” in Chinese. Shao Zonghai, “Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu de zuzhi dingwei” (The Organizational Identification of Chinese Leading Groups), *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (Mainland China Studies). Vol. 48, No. 3 (September 2005), p. 4.

²¹⁰ Central Document Research Office of the CPC, ed., *Chen Yun zhuan* (Biography of Chen Yun), Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), p. 1121.

referred to this circumventing of the Politburo as “dispersionism.” Thereafter, Mao started to control economic affairs more tightly.

In February 1958 Mao further developed his doctrine by stating: “Big powers should be dominated (by the party center), small powers may be dispersed, decisions should be made by the different levels of the party committees, and policies should be implemented by different agencies” (*daquan dulan, xiaoquan fensan, dangwei jue ding, gefang quban*).²¹¹ Following the Fourth Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the Central Committee in May 1958, a decision was made on June 10, 1958, to establish LGs on Financial and Economic Affairs; Political and Legal Affairs; Foreign Affairs; Scientific Affairs; and Cultural and Educational Affairs. The domination of the party over government affairs was thus further strengthened. As described by Bo Yibo, who was a member of the first LG on Finance and the Economy, in 1953 the ministries of the State Council were reduced to some *kous* responsible to the central party, and then reduced to the *kous* of the State Council directly under the LGs of the party. On the other hand, Mao weakened the premier’s executive power by setting up the LGs, making the party the superior institution in the power structure.²¹²

The only LG that is publicly referred to in the memoirs of the elder generation of Chinese leaders is the LG on Finance and the Economy (LGFE). An understanding of this LG will provide insight into the role of the other LGs. The first LGFE consisted of twelve high-ranking officials, including its director Chen Yun, deputy directors Li

²¹¹ Article Twenty-eight of the Sixty Articles of Working Methodology, in Mao Zedong, “Gongzuo fangfa liushi tiao,” (the Six Articles of Working Methodology) (draft), January 31, 1958, <http://www.langsong.net/lstd/wxshk/htm/xiandai/xiandai2/zl/1958/001.htm>.

²¹² A comment given by Tangliang, cited from Shao Zonghai, “Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu de zuzhi dingwei” (The Organizational Identification of Chinese Leading Groups), *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (Mainland China Studies), Vol. 48, No. 3 (September 2005), p. 4.

Fuchun, Bo Yibo, and Tan Zhenlin, and members Huang Kecheng, Deng Zihui, and Nie Rongzhen, among others. The notification on the decision to establish LGs provided that “These LGs belong to the party center, are directly subordinate to and directly report to the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and the Secretariat. *Strategy and principal policies are dominated by the Politburo, and detailed arrangements are the responsibility of the Secretariat. There is only one, rather than two, “political design institutes.” All major strategic policies and concrete arrangements are centralized; there is no dispersion between the party and government. The power of concrete implementation and detailed decision making is in the hands of government agencies and the party groups within them. The government agencies and the party groups have power to make recommendations on strategy and major policies and on concrete arrangements, but the decision-making power is monopolized by the party center. The government agencies, and party groups within them, share supervisory power for implementation*”²¹³ (italics in the original). Obviously, the arrangement embodied Mao’s view of the relations between government agencies and the party in terms of policy making. Based on this designation, unlike the previous “Economic Affairs Five-Person Group”²¹⁴ or the Central Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs, the LGFE was not an agency guiding national economic work according to the decisions

²¹³ Mao Zedong, “Dui zhongyang jueding chengli caijing, zhengfa, waishi, kexue, wenjiao ge xiaozu de tongzhigao de piyu yu xiugai” (Instruction and Revision on the Draft Notification on the Central Decision to Establish Leading Groups of Financial and Economic Affairs, Political and Legal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Science Affairs, and Cultural and Educational Affairs), in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Establishment of the State), Vol. 7 (January 1958-December 1958) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992), p. 268.

²¹⁴ On January 10, 1957, the Politburo made the decision to set up a “Central Economic Affairs Five-Person Group” under the Politburo, headed by Chen Yun; the members included Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Li Xiannian, and Huang Kecheng. See Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu*, p. 790.

of the Politburo. However, the functions of the LGs were not clearly defined, but they were described as “belonging to the party center, directly subordinate to the Politburo and the Secretariat, and reporting directly to the two bodies.”²¹⁵ In any case, the activities of the LGFE soon diminished until they stopped completely.²¹⁶

In the wake of the January to February 1962 7,000 Cadres Conference and the Xilou Conference (*xilou huiyi*) (a meeting of the enlarged Standing Committee of the Politburo), Mao took a major step to rebuild the LGFE and to unify leadership over national financial and economic work. On April 19, 1962, the General Office of the Central Committee issued a notification that Chen Yun had been appointed as head of the LGFE, Li Fuchun and Li Xiannian as deputy heads, with eight other members, including Zhou Enlai. According to Xue Muqiao, one of the differences between the old and new LGFE was, “as Comrade Liu Shaoqi pointed out to Comrade Chen Yun, the LG would be changed from its previous consultative role into a decision-making agency.” The new LGFE thus became the highest decision-making body on strategy and principles in national financial and economic affairs, and its urgent task was to revise the 1962 economic plan. The revised plan was approved by Mao Zedong and distributed on May 26, 1962.²¹⁷

Chen Yun’s tenure as the head of the LGFE was actually terminated after the July 1962 Beidaihe Conference, because he had suggested to Mao Zedong that “the fixing of farm output quotas for each household” (*baochan daohu*) be applied as a measure to recover the gravely damaged agricultural sector after the three bitter years since the 1958

²¹⁵ Mao Zedong, “Dui zhongyang jueding chengli caijing, zhengfa, waishi, kexue, wenjiao ge xiaozu de tongzhigao de piyu yu xiugai,” pp. 268-269.

²¹⁶ Central Document Research Office of the CPC, ed., *Chen Yun zhuan*, Vol. 2, p. 1135.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1318-1319.

Great Leap Forward movement. But Chen's proposal was attacked by Mao for destroying the rural collective economy and the People's Communes, and as a revisionist Chinese-style socialist road.²¹⁸

Not until the late February 1980 Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress of the CPC was the reorganization of the LGFE placed on the agenda. Zhao Ziyang was appointed head, and Yu Qiuli, Fang Yi, Wang Li, Yao Yilin, and Gu Mu were members. In the same year, the LGFE worked out an economic adjustment plan.²¹⁹ After Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang's stress on the separation of party and government work in 1988, the party role in government policy was transformed into party dominance of decision-making power on strategies and major principles, leaving daily and specific policy decisions and policy implementation to the State Council and its ministries. The pattern of party leadership thus changed from direct control of policy-making during the Mao period into providing direction during the Deng years. An analyst argues that with the 1980s as a watershed, the role of the LGs changed considerably, from coordinating policies, initiating new concepts, supervising implementation of policies, and providing recommendations on personnel arrangements to coordination and decision making. The initial subordination of the LGs to the Secretariat was also replaced by the LGs being parallel to the Secretariat, and directly under the Politburo or its Standing Committee after the 1987 revision to the CPC Constitution.²²⁰ In other words, the function of the

²¹⁸ Zhou Taihe, "Chen Yun tongzhi sixia nongcun diaocha qianhou" (Prior to and after Comrade Chen Yun's Four Investigations in the Rural Areas), in *Chen Yun yu xin zhongguo jianshe* (Chen Yun and New China's Construction) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), pp. 168-169.

²¹⁹ Central Document Research Office of the CPC, ed., *Chen Yun zhuan*, Vol. 2, p. 1605.

²²⁰ The 1987 CPC Constitution provides that the status of the CPC Secretariat change from an agency in charge of daily policy decision making to an executive institution providing staff services (*banshi jigou*); the LGs' status was enhanced to be parallel to the Secretariat.

LGs was extended from coordination to a combination of coordination and policy decision making.²²¹

The increasing importance of the LGs in policy-making was due to the following factors. Different priorities, preferences, and even interests existed among the different bureaucracies and individuals who had become increasingly involved in the policy-making process since the 1980s. Bargaining and compromise were therefore inevitable in the process of reaching agreement. Before a final decision could be made by the Politburo Standing Committee, diverse opinions and proposed policies had to be analyzed, assessed, and compared in detail until a consensus on the issues and related policies could be reached among the heads of the various bureaucracies. The LGs provide a forum for bargaining and compromise, or rather “consultation and reconciliation,” as it is preferred to be referred to by the Chinese,²²² and for policy analysis and assessments to reach a consensus. In this way, it is easy for the Politburo or its Standing Committee to make final decisions based on the consensus and policy recommendations reached at the LG level.²²³ Moreover, without the LGs, the Politburo and its Standing Committee would have to deal with the ministries of the State Council

²²¹ Xu Zhijia, *Zhonggong Waijiao juece yanjiu* (A Study of Chinese Communist Party Foreign Policy Making) (Taipei: Shuiniu chubanshe, 2000), p. 138.

²²² With different priorities, preferences, interests, and consequences regarded as normal, competition and bargaining are seen as inevitable among organizations in Western organizational theory. However, in China, because of the value of harmony or concert in society, competition and bargaining traditionally have not been encouraged and sometimes have even been regarded as politically incorrect. Thus it is preferred to call the same course of competition and bargaining in China a process of consultation and conciliation, and to see its result—compromise—as a component of the conciliation process.

²²³ The LGs’ functions are described as “much of actual work of the Politburo is done ‘in committee,’” with the functional commissions or LGs serving as forums for policy discussion by the members of the Politburo, supported by advisers and policy research organs.” See Carol Lee Hamrin, “The Party Leadership System,” in Kenneth G. Liberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, p. 114.

directly, and it would be difficult to cooperate and integrate party and state work when the administrative principle is based on separation of party and state. The fact that the LGs' functions have expanded from cooperation to a combination of both cooperation and policy decision making implies the increasing importance of the bureaucracies in policy making, since the heads of the various relevant ministries sit in on the meetings of the LGs, and the proposals or suggestions made by the LGs are rarely rejected by the Politburo or its Standing Committee.²²⁴ This demonstrates that although the LGs may not have the final say on foreign policy decisions, in most cases their policy preferences and suggestions are likely to have a critical influence on the final results of the policy-making process.²²⁵

The LGFE has now become the most important body in economic policy-making under the Politburo. However, before the beginning of the reform and opening in 1978, there was very little foreign trade or economic cooperation with other countries, except with the Soviet Union. Foreign trade and economic cooperation were not aims, but rather tools, for pursuing China's foreign, political, and security interests. Most economic cooperation in foreign trade was actually handled by the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA). Since 1978, however, the priority has been reversed: China's foreign and security policies now serve China's national economic interests. The LGFE has thus taken on increasing functions of consultation, coordination, and policy decision making on foreign trade and economic cooperation.

From time to time new LGs are established as major new issues are encountered and need to be dealt with, and LGs are abolished as the domestic and international situations

²²⁴ Interview, August 28, 2007.

²²⁵ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China*, p. 11; and interviews in Beijing.

change. One example is the LG on the Falungong that was supposedly established after April 1999²²⁶ to handle the resultant political problems. Another example is the LG on Taiwan Work, which was created in 1987²²⁷ to reinforce work on Taiwan as Jiang Jinguo and the Kuomintang showed a willingness to talk with the CPC on future unification. Similarly, when the problems related to three “*nong*,” i.e., rural areas, farmers, and agriculture (in Chinese, they are called the *sannong*—*nongcun*, *nongmin*, and *nongye*) became evident, to overcome the predicament in agriculture, a new LG on Rural Area Work was founded in 1993, with Premier Zhu Rongji as its head. In the recent three years since 2005, the No. 1 document of the CPC Central Committee each year has always focused on the “*sannong*.”

The greater utilization of LGs for decision making also implies that the concept of *kou*, for example the culture and education *kou*, used in the earlier years of the PRC is now less relevant. A definition of the concept of “to bring into systems” (*guikou*) used for the division of labor in central government administration has never been clear. In the past, “to bring into systems” was relatively simple, since the nature of work was not too complex and could be easily separated from other work. But this is no longer the case. For instance, foreign policy affairs can involve financial, economic, trade, arms control, educational, cultural, scientific affairs, and so on. Management has become so complex and professionalized that no single central agency can actually control a *kou*, or a realm of affairs. Consequently, *kous* are less often referred to, and correspondingly,

²²⁶ On April 25 more than 10,000 Falungong practitioners gathered to demonstrate in silence in front of Xinhua, the main gate to Zhongnanhai where the offices of the Chinese central leaders are located. On the same day, Jiang Zemin wrote a letter to the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and persons concerned urging them to be vigilant, to take this organization seriously, and to take effective measures as soon as possible so as to prevent this kind of event from occurring again in the future.

²²⁷ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China*, p. 13.

the number of LGs for state affairs has been reduced to only four, i.e., foreign affairs, financial and economic affairs, Taiwan work, and rural area affairs. The LGs are now employed more as task-oriented groups. When there is a need to have an organ with consultative and coordinating functions on a major issue, a LG is established. An example is the LG on maintaining stability. Its jurisdiction cannot be seen as a *kou* of state affairs, but it was necessary for Jiang Zemin's central government to set up such an organ to take unified measures to handle some nationwide stability issues that could not be solved by a single ministry. Some of these tasks are temporary. As soon as they are accomplished, there is no longer a need for a specific LG to deal with them. Apparently, the advantage of this type of management is its flexibility. The duration of the existence of a LG is indicative of how much central coordination is required with respect to its area of focus, such as foreign affairs, Taiwan work, or financial and economic affairs. It is at least partially for this reason that these LGs are not listed as formal establishments of the party.²²⁸ Members of LGs all hold other positions in government or party branches, except for those full-time chiefs of staff, whose positions can be as high as deputy minister or minister, and the office staff serving the LGs.

Important LGs in the Field of Foreign Affairs

The key LG in foreign affairs is the LG on Foreign Affairs, which is a consultative and coordinating body for the Politburo to play a dominant role in foreign affairs. A LG is usually composed of member(s) of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, who are assigned to take charge of the affairs of the respective field, and the heads of the respective ministerial-level agencies.

²²⁸ Author's interviews with two officials, 2007 and 2008.

As a non-standing body, a LG consists of a head, one or two deputy head(s), and ministerial officials from the state or party ministries/departments related to the affairs in question. Currently there are at least eight LGs (see Table 3-1).

Table 3-1 The Current Leading Groups of the Central Committee of the CPC

Leading Group on Party Establishment (LGPE)
Leading Group on Maintenance of Stability (LGSM)
LG on the Falungong Issue (LGFI)
LG on Rural Area Work (LGRAW)
LG on Finance and Economy (LGFE)
LG on Foreign Affairs/National Security (LGAF/NS)
LG on Taiwan Work (LGTW)
LG on Combating Commercial Bribery
LG on Campaign to Preserve the Advanced Nature of the CPC

Source: Interviews; see also “Zhonggong Zhongyang jigou shezhi” (The Organizations of the CPC Central Committee), Junzheng zaixian (The Military and the Government Online), <http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/thread.php?fid=49>.

These LGs are not formal bodies and they have never appeared in formal documents of the CPC, but they have occasionally been mentioned in public speeches of the top leaders or in historical files, and sometimes they can be found on the Internet in lists of bodies directly affiliated with the CPC Central Committee. The executive agencies of three of these eight LGs are included on the formal list of the CPC apparatus: the executive agency of the LGPE is the Policy Research Office; the executive agency of the LG on Foreign Affairs is the State Council Foreign Affairs Office (or the Foreign Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee), now headed by Deputy Minister Dai Bingguo; and the executive agency of the LG on Taiwan Work is the Office of the LG on Taiwan

Work (sharing the same staff as the Office of Taiwan Affairs [OTA] of the State Council). The OTA is a deputy ministerial-level agency, with six bureaus. These three offices are formal, independent, and permanent agencies, even if the relevant LGs are abolished. Their chief staffs are all ministerial-ranking officials, whose names are listed with the ministers of other departments, affiliated directly with the party center, including the four party departments—the Department of Organization, the Department of Publicity, the Department of the United Front, and the Department of the International Relations.²²⁹ In addition to the LGFA, the LGTW, and the LGPE, other LGs also have offices serving the same purpose, for instance, the LGFE has its own Office on Financial and Economic Affairs. However, a major difference is that the former three offices are independent ministerial-level agencies under the State Council or the CCP Central Committee, whereas the latter office is merely affiliated with the LG, though its directors also hold a deputy ministerial position. Every LG has a director and several deputy directors. The LGs convene regular meetings to discuss issues, exchange views, and provide recommendations for policy choices to the Politburo and its Standing Committee.

The LG offices are responsible for embellishing general policy guidelines as specific, concrete policy work plans and supervising their implementation. They coordinate policy research, channel information and draft policy documents, and make formal assignments for actual implementation by the relevant agencies.²³⁰

²²⁹ “Zhongguo zhengyao” (Principal Chinese Politicians), *Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan* (Chinese Newsweek), based on March 16, 2006 openly published information and distributed with No. 10 (2006).

²³⁰ Carol Lee Hamrin, “The Party Leadership System,” in Kenneth G. Liberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 103.

It has been alleged that the establishment of the National Security Leading Group in 2000 was due to the fact that after the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, China could not come up with a clear immediate reaction. Thus, there was a growing feeling that there was an urgent need to reform the bureaucracy related to Chinese foreign policy making, and that a National Security Council similar to the U.S. White House National Security Council should be set up in order to integrate efforts of the party, state, military, and information systems to deal with national security-related issues, especially in times of crisis. In 1999, a preparatory group was set up with nine members, including Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and other leaders in the party, government, and military, and Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the Department of Staff, and Liu Huaqiu, the Director of the Office of the LGFA, were responsible for day to day work.²³¹ However, for some reason, the body that was finally established was not a National Security Council, but rather another LG, called the Leading Group on National Security (LGNS). It was agreed that this LG should include all the above-mentioned agencies and leaders of agencies related to Taiwan affairs. But the LGNS actually shares the same members as the LGFA. Hence, it is another body with another name, but with the same members. Nevertheless, the two LGs do not share staff services, since the superior Office of Foreign Affairs/National Security contains two bureaus, with one bureau providing staff services on national security issues and the other working on foreign affairs issues.²³²

Furthermore, though they are all called LGs, they do not share the same status. For example, the members of the LGFE hold higher positions than the members of the

²³¹ Interview with an informed American researcher.

²³² Interviews with researchers, August 2007.

LGRAW, thus the latter is a lower level LG than the former. In fact, the director of the Rural Area Work Office is the deputy director of the LGRAW.²³³

The LG on Foreign/National Security Affairs

The LGFA/LGNS is a consultative and coordinating body through which the Politburo makes policies on foreign affairs and national security affairs.²³⁴ The LGFA/LGNS is composed of Standing Committee members and members of the CPC Central Committee who are in charge of foreign affairs, government ministers/party departments whose duties are closely related to foreign affairs and national security, and more recently a deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, a senior professional military representative.

The LGFA was originally established in 1958 with other four LGs. Its first head was Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, with “second-echelon leaders” such as Chen Yi, Li Kenong, Wang Jiexiang, and Zhang Wentian as members.²³⁵ During the Cultural Revolution, like the other LGs, the LGFA was disbanded. Following the Thirteenth Party Congress in spring 1981, the Central Committee decided to rebuild the LGFA. The new LG was headed by Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC Li Xiannian, and his deputy was Vice Premier Wan Li, with Premier Zhao Ziyang as one of the members. In 1982, Ji Pengfei, state councilor responsible for coordinating

²³³ Interviews with economists, Beijing, August 2007.

²³⁴ “Zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu” (The Leading Group on Foreign Affairs), Jun zheng zaixian (the Military and the Government Online), http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0801/1272.html, posted on January 10, 2008.

²³⁵ David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” *China Quarterly*, No. 171 (September 2002), p. 580.

foreign policy, became the deputy head of the LGFA. In June 1983, State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian became another deputy head.²³⁶

Prior to Zhao Ziyang being purged during the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, the LGFA contained all organizations concerned with foreign affairs. In a meeting with A. Doak Barnett in 1986, Zhao referred to it as an “advisory rather than a decision-making body.” Its principal function was “to exchange views, to study problems, and to communicate.” It met as often as once a week, but without a regular schedule, and it did not decide concrete measures.²³⁷

In March 1988, Li Peng, who succeeded Zhao Ziyang as premier, became the head of the LGFA, and Vice Premier Wu Xueqian was appointed his deputy. Notably, Minister of Defense Qin Jiwei, as the first professional PLA representative, appeared on the list of members of the LGFA.²³⁸ This was the first time that the Chinese military had a formal representative in the foreign policy-making process (even though Chen Yi was granted the military rank of marshal in 1955, he had long been vice premier since 1954 and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1958, and he held no formal post in the PLA), also marking the first time foreign affairs was considered together with national security affairs. It can be said that Qin Jiwei’s seat on the LGFA was also a harbinger that sooner or later a high-level body for national security affairs would be needed.

²³⁶ Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, p. 44; “Zhongyang waishi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu” (The Leading Group on Foreign Affairs), http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0801/1272.html, posted on January 10, 2008.

²³⁷ “Zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu/zhongyang guojia anquan lingdao xiaozu” (Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/National Security), Jun zheng zaixian (the Military and the Government Online), <http://www.chinajunzheng.com/bbs/simple/index.php?t20243.html>; *ibid.*, p. 45.

²³⁸ Lu Ning, “Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy*, p. 45.

The other change linked to the military occurred in April 1994, when Liu Shuqing took the position of general secretary of the LGFA and director of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office. After the Fourteenth Congress of the CPC in October 1992, Jiang Zemin took the post of President of the PRC and at the same time the chairmanship of LGFA,²³⁹ with Qian Qichen, member of the Politburo, Vice Premier, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the deputy head. Li Peng served as the other deputy head. In 1998, Li Peng retired from the premiership and moved to the National People's Congress as the Chairman of Standing Committee of the NPC. Responding to the change, new Premier Zhu Rongji, along with Qian Qichen, replaced Li Peng as the other deputy head of the Group.²⁴⁰ Other members included Wu Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of Defense Chi Haotian, and Minister of State Security Xu Yongye. Since then the membership of the LGFA has been expanded and elevated.²⁴¹

In September 2000 the CPC Central Committee made the important decision to establish a Leading Group on National Security. From its inception until March 2003, Jiang Zemin chaired both LGs, with State Councilor Qian Qichen as his deputy. According to Taiwan's *Zhongguo shibao* (China Times), Singapore's *Lianhe zaobao*, and

²³⁹ Conversation with an informed professor in February 2008. Lu Ning says Jiang Zemin took charge of the LGFA in 1998, see Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party departments," p. 45; David Shambaugh writes that Jiang Zemin had chaired LGFA since 1997. See David Shambaugh "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," *China Quarterly*, No. 171 (September 2002), p. 580. However, both of them were not correct in saying so. A conversation with an informed professor.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Lu Ning, "Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," p. 45; "Zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu/zhongyang guojia anquan lingdao xiaozu" (Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/National Security), Jun zheng zaixian (the Military and the Government Online), <http://www.chinajunzheng.com/bbs/simple/index.php?t20243.html>.

the Xinsheng Website, the LGNS periodically issues a *Report on National Security Strategy*, after consulting with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State Security, and other relevant central government and party agencies. In the past, foreigners could only learn about the latest Chinese strategic concepts from the political report to the National Party Congress and the report on government work of the State Council. Now the *Report on National Security Strategy* provides additional information.²⁴² The LGNS began to perform its function of crisis management during the EP-3 incident in April 2001.

The latest and most important change in the LGFA occurred in November 2002 and March 2003, when Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as general secretary of the party and state president respectively. Logically, Hu Jintao also took over from Jiang Zemin the chairmanship of the LGFA/LGNS, with Vice President of the PRC Zeng Qinghong as his deputy. Two years later, in April 2005, Dai Bingguo, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and general secretary of the Foreign Affairs Office, was appointed director of the LGFA/LGNS Office. His deputies were Qiu Yuanping and Chen Xiaogong.²⁴³

Table 3-2 The Composition of the LGFA/LGNS (until October 2007)

Position	Held by	Posts in Government and Party Apparatus
Head	Hu Jintao	General Secretary of the CPC, president of the PRC, and chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC
Deputy	Zing Qinghong	Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and vice president of the PRC

²⁴² See Shao Zonghai, "Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu de zuzhi dingwei," p. 18.

²⁴³ "Zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu" (The Leading Group on Foreign Affairs), Jun zheng zaixian (the Military and the Government Online), http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0801/1272.html, posted on January 10, 2008.

(continued)

Position	Held by	Posts in Government and Party Apparatus
Member	Liu Yunshan	Member of the Politburo, secretary of the Secretariat, minister of Publicity Department
Member	Wu Yi (female)	Member of the Politburo, deputy premier
Member	Zhou Yongkang	Minister of Public Security, member of the Politburo, secretary of the Secretariat, and State Councilor
Member	Cao Gangchuan	Member of the Politburo, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, State Councilor, and minister of National Defense
Member	Tang Jiaxuan	State Councilor
Member	Liao Hui	Vice Chairman of the National People's Political Consultative Conference, and Director of the Office of Hong Kong and Macao of the State Council
Member	Li Zhaoxing	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Member	Dai Bingguo	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Member	Wang Jiarui	Minister of the Department of International Relations of the party
Member	Cai Wu	Director of the International Communication Office of the party, and the Director of the Information Office of the State Council
Member	Xu Yongyue	Minister of State Security
Member	Bo Xilai	Minister of Commerce
Member	Chen Yujie (female)	Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council
Member	Xiong Guangkai	Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA
Secretary General	Tang Jiaxuan	(same as above)
Director of the Office	Dai Bingguo	(same as above)

Source: Interviews; see also "Zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu/zhongyang guojia anquan lingdao xiaozu, (The Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/National Security, Jun zheng zaixian (The Military and the Government Online) <http://www.chinajunzheng.com/bbs/simple/index.php?t20243.html>; "Zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu" (The Leading Group on Foreign Affairs of the CPC Central Committee), http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0801/1272.html, posted on January 10, 2008.

Office of Foreign Affairs

According to the 1993 Circular on Establishing State Council Organs, the function of the Office of Foreign Affairs (OFA) is to act as “an executive body of the State Council in charge of the management and coordination of foreign affairs, and concurrently the executive body of the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group.”²⁴⁴ In particular, the functions of the office include:

1. To make policy recommendations based on examinations of major issues in the international situation and in the implementation of foreign policies, and on the management of foreign affairs work;
2. To sponsor all-member meetings of the LGFA and to provide staff services for the meetings; to facilitate implementation of the resolutions; to undertake coordination in foreign affairs work;
3. To draft and revise national legal documents in foreign affairs work in the name of the party center and the State Council, and to examine and verify principal regulations on foreign affairs of the central party and government apparatus, and of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government;
4. To deal with requests for instruction from and reports to the LGFA and the State Council on foreign affairs by the central party and government apparatus, and of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government;

²⁴⁴ General Office of the Secretariat of the State Council and the General Office of the CPC Central Establishment Committee, eds., *Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou* (Organs of the Central Government Organization) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 1995), p. 390.

5. To undertake other work as assigned by the party center and the State Council.²⁴⁵

In October 1994, Liu Huaqiu, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, took over the post of general secretary of the LGFA and chief of staff of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office.²⁴⁶ However, in August 1998, the Politburo decided to abolish the Foreign Affairs Office of the Council Foreign Affairs Office and to establish the Foreign Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee as the central LGFA executive body. Liu was shifted to director of this newly established office. The background to this reorganization is allegedly connected with Liu's personal role in foreign affairs. Due to the personal trust of Li Peng as the deputy head of the LGFA, Liu's office, even though it was a State Council office, served to work out the agenda for LGFA meetings, circulating documents and connecting bureaucracies related to foreign affairs, and sometimes providing analytical reports and recommendations to the LGFA members, particularly to Li Peng.²⁴⁷

The State Council OFA has sometimes taken over extra functions that should be performed by the LGFA, for instance, holding partial LGFA meetings in OFA space. On most occasions, the policy stance developed through the process directed by Liu Huaqiu was approved by the full LGFA largely based on the original content of the documents, and further by the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and then by the Politburo. In this way, Liu Huaqiu gained powerful influence on the formulation of Chinese foreign policy, and largely extended the power and authority of the OFA.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 390.

²⁴⁶ "Zhongyang waishi lingdao xiaozu/zhongyang guojia anquan lingdao xiaozu" (Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/National Security), Jun zheng zaixian (the Military and the Government Online), <http://www.chinajunzheng.com/bbs/simple/index.php?t20243.html>.

²⁴⁷ Michael Swaine, *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking*, rvsd. ed. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1998), pp. 25-26.

Aimed at enhancing the status of his office to something analogous to the U.S. National Security Council, Liu Huaqiu's efforts created a backlash, since he challenged the role of Qian Qichen, then the minister of Foreign Affairs and the key adviser to powerful foreign policy-makers who had differing views from those of Liu Huaqiu on Chinese foreign policies. The competition between Liu and Qian for influence on foreign policy decision making in September 1998 subsequently led to the change of name from the OFA of the State Council to the OFA of the CPC Central Committee, as an executive body of the LGFA, and some of the staff returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, there was no longer an OFA under the State Council. Liu Huaqiu and his office hence lost authority in coordination and supervision within the MFA; meanwhile, the function of the OFA of the CPC Central Committee for a while was confined only to consultation.²⁴⁸ At the same time, a new bureau—the Department of Foreign Affairs Management (*waiguan si*) was set up to take care of some affairs that had been within the jurisdiction of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the State Council. Not until 2005 when Dai Bingguo took the position of general secretary, was the OFA revitalized as a key agency in Chinese foreign affairs.

The Leading Group on Taiwan Work

The Leading Group on Taiwan Work (LGTW) is the CPC consultative and coordinating body for guiding Taiwan work. Like the LGFA, the LGTW consists of members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, members of the CPC Central Committee in charge of Taiwan work, and ministers whose portfolios are closely related

²⁴⁸ Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," p. 47.

to Taiwan affairs. The LGFA is responsible for decision making on significant issues in Taiwan affairs. Its executive body is the Office on Taiwan Work (also the Taiwan LG Office), which shares the same staff with the State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs. The Office on Taiwan Work belongs to agencies directly subordinate to the CPC Central Committee.

The LGTW was first established in 1956. For a long time, Taiwan-related affairs were personally handled by Liao Chengzhi, son of a founding member of the Kuomintang Party, who reported directly to Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. Its work came to a halt probably during the Cultural Revolution, but it was rebuilt in 1979, presumably to reinforce the CPC's Taiwan work, responding to the situation after the establishment of formal relations between the United States and China. The LGTW was headed by Deng Yingchao, Zhou Enlai's widow and a member of the Politburo, the second secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, with Liao Chengzhi serving as acting deputy, and Luo Qingchang as deputy and director of the office. In December 1981, Wang Feng, first secretary of the Communist Party Committee of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, was appointed full-time deputy head. After Deng Yingchao's retirement, Yang Shangkun, member of the Politburo and acting vice chairman of the CMC, took over the chairmanship of the LGTW on August 26, 1987. In June 1989, Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Party, became its head. In Oct. 1997, the LGTW was reorganized. Under Jiang Zemin's leadership, LGTW had one head and one deputy head (see Table 3-3).

The members of the LGTW regularly meet once a year to make annual arrangements. But they may meet more often if there is a crisis or an unexpected event.

All policies with strategic significance to Taiwan affairs are within the portfolio of the LGTW or the Politburo. A LGTW meeting may be expanded to include non-members of the LGTW if the meeting is on a topic of comprehensive or urgent interest. In such a case, all members of the LGTW do not necessarily attend the meeting, but the head (and deputy heads) of the Office of Taiwan Work and the General Staff Department of the PLA are always present. Whether the representatives of other agencies participate in the meeting depends on the subjects under discussion. Sometimes, if the subjects are related to trade or the economy, representatives from the Ministry of Commerce are invited to participate. Strategic issues such as cross-Taiwan Strait trade, areas open to Taiwan investment, the treatment of Taiwan compatriots and businessmen, permission to live in certain cities or to study at certain schools or universities in mainland China, and the tuition requirements for students from Taiwan; or on economic issues, such as what industries Taiwanese are allowed to invest in China; and whether mixed funds, for instance Taiwan-U.S. funds, can enjoy privileges as Taiwan funds in investment, are also regarded as strategic decision-making issues.²⁴⁹ The representation of the PLA on the LGTW reflects the role of the military in Taiwan policy. Considering that the current Taiwan leader has never abandoned a de facto independence policy, PRC leaders continue to insist that military force may be used as a last resort to reunify Taiwan and mainland China. The next round of reorganization of the LGTW occurred in October 2000, with Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen remaining as head and deputy head respectively.

²⁴⁹ Interview with an officer in 2006.

Table 3-3 Composition of the LGTW (October 1997-October 2000)

Position	Held by	Current Posts in the Government and Party Apparatus
Head	Jiang Zemin	General Secretary of the CPC, president of the PRC, chairman of the CMC
Deputy head	Qian Qichen	Member of the Politburo, vice premier
Member	Zeng Qinghong	Alternate member of the Politburo, secretary of the Secretariat
Member	Wang Zhaoguo	Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, minister of the United Front Department of the CPC Central Committee
Member	Wang Daohan	Director of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)
Member	Xiong Guangkai	Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA
Member	Xu Yongyue	Minister of State Security
Member	Chen Yunlin	Director of the Central Taiwan Affairs Office, director of the State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs
Secretary General	Zeng Qinghong	(Same as above)

Source: "Zhongyang duitai gongzuo lingdao xiaozu, zhongyang taiwan gongzuo bangongshi/guowuyuan taiwan bangongshi" (The Leading Group on Taiwan Work and the Office of Foreign Work of the LGTW/The Office of Taiwan Affairs of the State Council), http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0801/1260.html.

In November 2002, as soon as Hu Jintao took over the position of general secretary of the CCP Central Committee from Jiang Zemin, he became the head of the LGTW; Jia Qinglin, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo became the deputy head; Guo Boxiong, member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the CMC replaced Zhang Wannian; and Wang Gang, alternate member of the Politburo, and Liu Yandong, the minister of the United Front Department, became new members, replacing Wang Zhaoguo. In March 2003, the latest reorganization of the LGTW took place, with Hu

Table 3-4 Composition of the LGTM (Since March 2003)

Position	Held by	Posts in Government and Party Apparatus
Head	Hu Jintao	General Secretary of the CPC, president of the PRC, chairman of the CMC
Deputy Head	Jia Qinglin	Member of the Politburo, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
Member	Liu Yunshan	Member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Secretariat, and Minister of Public Relations
Member	Wu Yi	Vice Premier
Member	Guo Boxiong	Member of the Politburo, vice chairman of the CMC
Member	Wang Gang	Alternate member of the Politburo, secretary of the Secretariat
Member	Tang Jiaxuan	State Councilor
Member	Wang Daohan	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (Died)
Member	Liu Yandong	Vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
Member	Chen Yunlin	Director of the Office of Taiwan Work of the CPC Central Committee, director of the State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs
Member	Xu Yongyue	Minister of State Security
Member	Xiong Guangkai	Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA
Secretary	Tang Jiaxuan	(Same as above)

Source: "Zhongyang duitai gongzuo lingdao xiaozu, zhongyang taiwan gongzuo bangongshi/guowuyuan taiwan bangongshi" (The Leading Group on Taiwan Work and the Office of Foreign Work of the LGTW/The Office of Taiwan Affairs of the State Council), http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0801/1260.html.

Jintao and Jia Qinglin, now chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, staying in their same positions in the LGTW²⁵⁰ (see Table 3-4).

The Office of Taiwan Work

The Office of Taiwan Work (OTW) is the LGTW's executive agency on the list of agencies directly under the CPC Central Committee. It has the same staff as the Office of Taiwan Affairs (OTA) of the State Council, but a different name. The OTA of the State Council is the State Council's executive agency responsible for Taiwan affairs.

The functions of the OTW and OTA are the same, except for the one difference, instead of the function of OTA as a department of the State Council "to accomplish other tasks that the State Council assigns," as a Party's organ, the OTW also undertake other tasks assigned by the LGTW.

Since the OTW is an independent deputy ministerial-ranking agency, it is much larger than the other LG offices. Established in 1988, the OTA originally was composed of five groups: the Secretariat and Administration Group, the Research Group, the Exchange and Liaison Group, the Personnel Exchange Group, and the Economy, Science, and Technology Group. In April 1993, the OTA merged with the Leading Group on Taiwan Work, under which there were eight agencies, including the Department of the Secretariat, Department of Integration, Department of Research, Department of Information, Department of the Economy, Department of Contacts, Department of Exchanges, and Department of Liaison. In the early 2000 reorganization

²⁵⁰ "The Leading Group on Taiwan Work, the Office of Taiwan Work (the Taiwan Office of the State Council)," http://www.ourzg.com/bbs/htm_data/49/0801/1260.html.

of the party and government apparatus, the OTA underwent an internal adjustment: the Department of Contacts was disbanded, a Department of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs related to Taiwan was created, and affairs related to the “three links” (*san tong*) were assigned to both the Department of the Economy and the Department of Exchanges. In 2005, two more departments were established within the OTA, i.e., the Department of Laws and Regulations and the Department to Reconcile Complaints.²⁵¹ This expansion was necessitated due to the increase in cross-strait trade and personnel exchanges.

The Office of Taiwan Affairs is a deputy-ministerial agency under the State Council. Given its position, its size is not very large—only about 200 employees and officials work in the Office. The OTA is entrusted with following functions:

1. To study and draft guidelines and policies related to Taiwan affairs; to implement and carry out guidelines and policies related to Taiwan stipulated by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council; to examine and formulate policy on Taiwan work; to implement the policy determined by the Politburo and the State Council with respect to Taiwan work.
2. To organize, guide, administer, and coordinate the work related to Taiwan affairs of the departments under the State Council and of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government; to check and investigate the implementation of CPC Central Committee and State Council guidelines and policies by central and local departments.
3. To analyze the situation in Taiwan and trends in the development of cross-strait relations, to coordinate with the departments concerned, and to draft laws and

²⁵¹ Kuo Kuihua, “Analytical Survey of the Expanding Organization of China’s Office of Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council,” *Zhanwang yu Tansuo* (Prospects and Exploration), Vol. 3, No. 9 (September 2005), p. 5.

regulations involving Taiwan; to coordinate with overall planning of legal affairs related to Taiwan.

4. According to the arrangement and authorization of the State Council, the OTA takes charge of relevant preparations for negotiations and agreements with the Taiwan authorities and its authorized public organizations.
5. To administer and coordinate direct links in mail, transport, and trade across the Taiwan Strait; to take charge of the media and publicity work related to Taiwan and to release news and information concerning Taiwan affairs; to handle major incidents related to Taiwan.
6. To guide and coordinate with the departments concerned regarding overall planning for economic cooperation and trade related to Taiwan, and exchanges and cooperation in such areas as finance, culture, academic research, sports, science and technology, health, etc.; to manage personnel exchanges, observations and symposia between the two sides, and relevant work on international conferences involving Taiwan.
7. To accomplish other tasks as assigned by the State Council.²⁵²

Currently, one minister, three deputy ministers, and two assistant ministers constitute the leadership of the OTA of the State Council (see Table 3-5). According to their different responsibilities, the OTA is composed of ten functional departments (see Table 3-6).

²⁵² "Main Functions of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council," Website of the Office of the Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=Introduction&title=Introduction&m_id=3.

Table 3-5 Director of the Office of Taiwan Affairs

Director Chen Yunlin, member of the CPC Central Committee, from 1997
Deputy Director Zheng Lizhong, alternate member of the Central Committee of the CPC, from June
2005
Deputy Director Wang Fuqing, from April 4, 2000
Deputy Director Sun Yafu, from February 2004
Deputy Director Ye Kedong, former secretary to Hu Jintao, from June 2005
Assistant Director Chen Yuanfeng
Assistant Director Li Yafei

Source: "Principal Officials of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the State Council," Website of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the State Council,
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=Introduction&title=Introduction&m_id=2.

Table 3-6 Departments of the Office of Taiwan Affairs

1. Department of Secretariat and Personnel
2. Department of Integration
3. Department of Research
4. Department of Information
5. Department of the Economy
6. Department of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Related to Taiwan
7. Department of Exchanges
8. Department of Liaisons
9. Department of Laws and Regulations
10. Department to Reconcile Complaints

Source: Kuo Kuihua, "Analytical Survey of the Expansion of the Organization of China's Office of Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, *Zhanwang yu Tansuo* (Prospects and Exploration), Vol. 3, No. 9 (September 2005), p. 5; and "The Structure of the Office of Taiwan Affairs," Website of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the State Council, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=Introduction&title=Introduction&m_id=4.

The Functions of the departments are as follows:

Department of the Secretariat and Personnel

In the area of the Secretariat, to coordinate the routine and vocational work of the OTA; to perform comprehensively the work of circulating documents and telegrams, arranging meetings, handling letters, appeals, and complaints, preserving secrecy, handling communications and processing information; and to be in charge of collecting and managing archives, distributing newspapers, periodicals, reference books, and providing rear-services for the entire office. In the area of personnel, to take charge of assessments, appointments and removals, promotions, and salaries and welfare of the staff in the OTA; to arrange the organizational structure and the personnel quotas of the institutions directly affiliated with the Office of Taiwan Affairs of the State Council; to organize and guide the work of training and educating cadres in both the OTA and the subordinate systems around the country related to Taiwan affairs.

Department of Integration

To handle the routine affairs of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS); to coordinate the handling of unexpected emergencies concerning the Taiwan issue and other related matters; to manage donations from Taiwan compatriots and their relatives.

Department of Research

To analyze the situation in Taiwan and cross-strait relations, drafting reports on the actual situation and putting forward proposals on policy planning; to guide and coordinate the situation assessments and policy analysis of the relevant central and local departments.

Department of Information

To coordinate media and publicity work concerning the Taiwan question, to hold press conferences concerning Taiwan; to inform the cadres and masses of the guidelines and policies of the central authorities in coordination with the relevant departments regarding settlement of the Taiwan question.

Department of the Economy

To coordinate and guide economic work related to Taiwan; to manage and provide services for enterprises with investments by Taiwan businesspeople; to deal with economic disputes and provide related information for Taiwan investors. Bilateral trade up to the October 2007 amounts to US\$7044600 billion²⁵³, with Taiwan's exports to the mainland ranking number one, and imports from the mainland ranking number four or five. Because of the limits on political exchanges across the strait, economic exchanges are the most active area of exchanges.

²⁵³ Up to the end of 2006, the amount of the cross strait trade was US\$ 603.645 billion; from January to October 2007, the amount of the trade was US\$100.8 billion. See Sun Zhaohui, "Haixia liang'an jingmao fazhan licheng yu qushi" (The Course and Trend of Economic Cooperation and Trade cross the Taiwan Strait), April 13, 2007, <http://ldxsc.buu.com.cn/taiyanyuan/list.asp?wz=627>; "2007-2008 liang'an jingmao xingshi huigu yu zhanwang" (A Review on the Situation of Economic Cooperation and Trade cross Taiwan Strait in 2007-2008), January 17, 200, http://www.china.com.cn/overseas/txt/2008-01/17/content_9548136.htm.

Department of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Related to Taiwan

To handle affairs related to the Taiwan issue in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region in coordination with the relevant departments.

Department of Exchanges

To examine, approve, manage, and coordinate cross-strait exchanges in the areas of culture, films and television, academic research, education, health, sports, ethnic groups, publications, religion, etc.; to manage visits of mainland personnel to Taiwan in private capacities.²⁵⁴

Department of Liaisons

To arrange mutual cross-strait visits of high-ranking officials of mainland China and Taiwan.

Department of Laws and Regulations

To conduct research on and revise policies on laws related to Taiwan, to work with agencies concerned with drafting laws and norms, and to guide and coordinate work on legal affairs related to Taiwan.

²⁵⁴ "Office's Structure of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council," Website of the Office of the Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=Introduction&title=Introduction&m_id=4.

Department to Reconcile Complaints

To deal with cases of major complaints and letters and visits by compatriots from Taiwan and their relatives.²⁵⁵

The Leading Group on Finance and Economy

The Leading Group on Finance and Economy (LGFE) is the consultative and coordinating body of the Politburo for economic work. When the LGFE was reorganized in March 1980, Zhao Ziyang, then Premier (holding the position from 1980 to 1987) and the vice general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, became the head; the deputy heads were Yu Qiuli, Fang Yi, Wang Li, Yao Yilin (vice premier and deputy director of the National Planning Commission), and Gu Mu.

In June 1989, when he was selected by Deng Xiaoping as chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Jiang Zemin simultaneously took over the position of head of the LGFE. In 1991, Zhu Rongji, vice premier and the director of the Production Office of the State Council (*guowuyuan shengchang bangongshi*), became deputy head. In March 1993, Wen Jiabao, alternate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Secretariat, was appointed general secretary of the LGFE. Then, in August 1994, Zeng Peiyan, the deputy chief of staff was appointed the deputy general secretary of the LGFE and director of the LGFE Office. In March 1998, following his promotion to premier, Zhu Rongji took over the post of head of the LGFE, and Wen Jiabao, member of the Politburo, secretary of the Secretariat, and vice premier, was appointed secretary general of the LGFE; Hua Jianmin was appointed deputy head and chief of staff of the LGFE Office.

²⁵⁵ Website of the Office of the Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/tbjs/nsjg.htm>.

In 1992, the LGFE was headed by Jiang Zemin, with Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier Zhu Rongji as deputy heads; the members included several members of the Politburo and other vice premiers, such as the minister of Finance, the president of the Chinese People's Bank, and director of the State Planning Commission Zou Jiahua. Soon thereafter, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations with the U.S. on China's entry into the WTO and to eliminate internal differences, General Secretary of the CPC Jiang Zemin remained in the post of head of the LGFE, and Zhu Rongji, who replaced Li Peng as premier in 1991, was selected as his deputy.

By 2002, retired General Secretary Jiang Zemin was relieved of his position as head of the LGFE; he was replaced by the new general secretary and soon-to-be president, Hu Jintao. Jiang would keep his position as chairman of the Central Military Commission until 2004, when his term fell due. This implied that except for his military position, Jiang had transferred all his power to Hu Jintao. The new deputy head was the new premier, Wen Jiabao, and the members included Vice Premiers Huang Ju, Wu Yi, Zeng Peiyan, and Hui Liangyu.

Apparently, the personnel changes in the LGFE reflect the personnel changes in the State Council. Since March 17, 1980, when the Standing Committee of the Politburo made the decision to reestablish the LGFE and Premier Zhao Ziyang was appointed as its head, the premier had always been the head of the LGFE, until Jiang Zemin took over the position himself in 1992,²⁵⁶ (see Table 3-7).

²⁵⁶ Shao Zonghai, "Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu de zuzhi dingwei" (The Organizational Identification of Chinese Leading Groups), *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (Mainland China Studies). Vol. 48, No. 3 (September 2005), p. 5.

Table 3-7 Current Composition of the LGFE (since 2003)

Position	Held by	Posts in the Government and CPC Apparatus
Head	Hu Jintao	President of the PRC, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee
Deputy Head	Wen Jiabao	Premier
Member	Huang Ju (died in 2007)	Vice Premier
Member	Wu Yi	Vice Premier
Member	Zeng Peiyan	Vice Premier
Member	Hui Liangyu	Vice Premier

Source: Interview with a senior officer in 2007.

The directors and deputy directors of the LGFE Office include:

Director Zhu Zhixin Acting Deputy Director of National Development and Reform Commission, and the Director of the Rural Area Work Office

Deputy Chief Staff Chen Xinwen

Deputy Chief Staff Liu He

Deputy Chief Staff Tang Renjian²⁵⁷

The Work of the Leading Groups

It is difficult to find precise details in the record about how the LGs work. In the biographies of the elder generation of Chinese leaders, one can find information about the decision of the CPC Central Committee to establish the LG on Financial and Economic Affairs as well as information about the LGFE meetings, for instance in the biographies of Chen Yun and Bo Yibo,²⁵⁸ but there is no official record about the history of the LGFA. A careful reading of Wu Lengxi's memoirs on the ten years of polemics with

²⁵⁷ Source: Interview with a senior officer in 2007.

²⁵⁸ Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* (Recollections on Some Major Decisions and Events), rvsd. ed. 2 Vols. (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1997); Central Document Research Office, ed., *Chen Yun zhuan*, Vol. 2.

the Soviet Union²⁵⁹ reveals that the expanded Politburo meetings were often an occasion to discuss how to reply to Soviet accusations. The LGFA was set up in 1956, but it seems that it did not play an important role in the Sino-Soviet conflict, or in other major policies. This may be because the conflict was a macro problem, and too “impractical” or ideological, but the fact that Wu Lengxi never mentions a single discussion sponsored by the LGFA to deal with the Soviet Union at least indicates that the consultation and coordination that was supposed to be undertaken by the LGFA were not needed during the Mao period, at least not with respect to the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The pattern of the decision-making process in the LGs is now characterized by collective decision making, or in Chinese it is referred to as “democratic-centralization.” The head of a LG usually does not make the final decision; rather, a conclusion is drawn after intensive discussions.²⁶⁰ Before a formal meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and a meeting of the Politburo to make a final decision, different views can be articulated, arguments are encouraged, and bargaining among various agencies are seen as natural. As a rule, many consultative meetings are held before the LG meetings. For instance, countless meetings are held by the LGFE to listen to different voices from scholarly, social, and local representative circles. Assessments by the public, statistical analyses, surveys, calculations, and comparisons of different methodologies are all

²⁵⁹ Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan, 1956-1966: ZhongSu guanxi huiyilu* (Ten Years of Polemics, 1956-1966: Reminiscences on Sino-Soviet Relations) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), pp. 12, 34, 43, 48, 62, 175, 595, 599, 655, 705, 777, 798, 848, 856, 910, 937, etc. During the August 17 to 31, 1958 discussions on the National Economic Plan and the People’s Communes, the Politburo decided “to bomb Jinmen and Mazu in order to warn the Guomindang Party, and to deter it from harassing the coast of the Chinese mainland.” The other purpose of the bombing was to warn the U.S., in the hopes that U.S. military action in the Middle East would wind down. See *ibid.*, p. 175.

²⁶⁰ Shao Zonghai, “Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu de zuzhi dingwei,” p. 7.

essential procedures. For foreign affairs, the LGFA often summons consultative meetings with specialists on international relations; this has been the case particularly after Dai Bingguo took over the position of director of the LGFA Office. A resolution made at a LG meeting is rarely rejected by the top leaders, but regardless, the policy recommendation must be formally approved first by the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and then by the Politburo.²⁶¹ The Politburo member or the Standing Committee member who presides over the LG is likely to be the person to explain or defend the policy recommendation at the meeting of the Politburo or its Standing Committee.²⁶² There may be differences in the style of the LGs owing to their diverse members and subjects of discussion, but the process is analogous, i.e., a conclusion is drawn after adequate discussion, and a decision is reached collectively. The LGs not only provide a channel for specialists to present their views to the top leaders, but also provide a forum for exchanges of opinion between the top leaders and chiefs of the related ministries.²⁶³ In the Chinese political system, the final say on major policy rests with the number-one person in the CPC. When the decision is made, every one must follow it.

The International Department of the CPC Central Committee

It is well recognized that of all apparatuses, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the military, and one of the four departments affiliated with the CPC Central Committee, i.e., the International Department (ID), are the four most

²⁶¹ Interview, August 28, 2007.

²⁶² Shao Zonghai, "Zhonggong zhongyang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu de zuzhi dingwei," p. 7.

²⁶³ Xu Zhijia, *Zhonggong waijiao juece moshi yanjiu* (A Study on the Model of Chinese Communist Party Foreign Policy-Making) (Taipei: Shuiniu chubanshe, 2000), p. 138.

influential organs in the Chinese foreign policy-making process.²⁶⁴ The former two are under the authority of the State Council, the military is subordinate to the state and party CMC (but it is the CPC that has ultimate power to control the military), whereas the International Department is a “pure” party apparatus. The function of the International Department in the CPC is comparable to that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the government. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of governmental foreign relations and formal foreign affairs, the International Department is responsible for all political relations and non-governmental relations with other countries.

Established in 1951 and previously called the Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee, the International Department is under the direct authority of the CPC Central Committee. From its establishment until the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s, it acted as a party agency dealing with relations with various Communist, leftist, and labor parties, trade unions, and other non-government organizations throughout the world. However, since the 1978 Third Plenum of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, it has engaged in full implementation of party guidelines on external relations. It has actively conducted new types of party-to-party exchanges and cooperation in an effort to help promote the development of state-to-state relations. The purposes of its work are to serve the Chinese leadership’s reform and opening policy and modernization drive as well as the overall strategy of state diplomacy, to help strengthen the position of the ruling party, and to contribute, like other departments of the party and

²⁶⁴ In his chapter on “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” Lu Ning refers to five departments—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, which since 2003 has been called the Ministry of Commerce, the International Liaison Department (called the International Department) of the CCP Central Committee, Xinhua News Agency, and the People’s Liberation Army, pp. 50-55.

the apparatuses of the government, to “socialism with the Chinese characteristics.” As a result, its relations and exchanges with the outside world have been extended to include national and socialist parties in the developing countries, and statesmen bearing various ideologies and belonging to different types of parties, including social democratic and conservative parties in the developed countries as well as their international organizations, while still maintaining its original function of developing relationships between the CPC and other parties/organizations with similar characteristics.

In spite of the non-governmental nature of its connections with other parties and organizations, these connections are sometimes more important than formal diplomatic relations as they promote China’s interactions with other countries in international relations, and create conditions and an environment for Chinese foreign policy-makers to keep in touch with different political forces and help the government resolve international issues for which purely inter-governmental contacts are ineffective. From the CPC leaders’ point of view, China’s party-to-party relationships with other countries that do not have formal foreign relations are meaningful as they facilitate overcoming the obstacles created by the lack of formal relations. Wang Jiarui, minister of the International Department, describes its work as “paving the way or constructing a bridge between parties, politicians, and the people of China and other countries.”²⁶⁵

Due to the efforts of the International Department, the CPC has established friendly connections with over 400 parties and organizations in 160 countries, one-third of which are ruling parties or parties participating in government. It is believed that party diplomacy should meet the needs of state diplomacy and promote the development of

²⁶⁵ See “Wang Jiarui Talks on the Party’s Current Foreign Affairs Work,” June 29, 2005, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/ziliao/wenzhang/050629.htm>.

inter-state relationships; should automatically and actively assist state diplomacy by taking advantage of contacts with socialist countries and countries without formal foreign relations with China, and with politicians, especially rising stars.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, the International Department has also initiated and engaged in economic, social, cultural, and educational exchange programs.

The International Department has four functions: to implement the principles and policies of the Central Committee in foreign affairs, to closely follow in its research the developments and dynamics in the world situation and key global issues, and to provide analytical reports on certain regions or countries and policy proposals to the Central Committee; to conduct exchanges with foreign political parties and organizations as entrusted by the CPC Central Committee. In addition, it also coordinates the international exchanges of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, and other departments directly subordinate to the CPC Central Committee and party committees at different levels.²⁶⁷

The new pattern in the CPC's international relations is described as "all-round, multi-channel, wide-scope, and in-depth party-to-party exchanges and cooperation." The goal of the International Department's work is described as "making bosom friends in every corner of the earth and finding kith and kin across the oceans" (*hainei cun zhiji, tianya ruo bilin*). There is awareness that "as the scope of the party's international exchanges has been further enlarged, their contents are becoming richer and their forms

²⁶⁶ "Fayang guangrong chuanguotong, zaichuang lishi huihuang—Wang Jiarui buzhang tan dangde duiwai gongzuo 55 nian" (Advancing the Glorious Tridition, Recreating Historical Brilliance—Minister Wang Jiaorui Talks about 55 Years of International Work of the Party," <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/ziliao/wenzhang/060201.htm>.

²⁶⁷ "The Function Features of the International Department," Website of International Department of the CPC Central Committee," <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/profile/features.htm>.

more diversified. High-level contacts, working visits, study trips, theoretical discussions, leadership training, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and the like have enriched the content of this new type of party-to-party relations. Direct guidance and the personal involvement of party and state leaders have given a powerful push to the development of the party's external work.”²⁶⁸

The aim of the International Department in the twenty-first century is to strive to establish itself as a research institution for international studies, having an influence with distinct characteristics both at home and abroad, and providing policy recommendations to the Central Committee for its foreign policy decision making and running of the party and state. It should serve as an important window for the Chinese Communist Party to get to know and better understand the outside world, and to reach out to the outside world with more confidence. It is believed that in this way the party's international activities will play an even more vital role in ensuring comprehensive and overall state diplomacy and realizing the cause of reunification of the motherland. It has been stated that the International Department's purpose, like that of the state departments, is to “strive for a peaceful and stable international environment favorable to China's development in the new century, thus making fresh contributions to safeguarding world peace, promoting common prosperity, and advancing the cause of progress of mankind.”²⁶⁹

The International Department has fundamentally changed its way of working. As a party department, before the reform era it was inclined to conduct its work covertly.

Every activity it conducted, and every program it carried out, was regarded as a CPC

²⁶⁸ “The Function Features of the International Department,” Website of International Department of the CPC Central Committee,” <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/profile/features.htm>.

²⁶⁹ “The Department Profile of the International Department,” Website of International Department of the CPC Central Committee,” <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/profile/brief.htm>.

secret. An example is that for a long time, unlike all the state ministries, there was no nameplate on the gate of the building where the department was located. However, when the department expanded its functions and accordingly changed its way of cooperating with foreign policy-related state departments, its name in large red characters was erected on the top of its new and modern building. This image is even shown on a popular CCTV program.²⁷⁰ Moreover, instead of keeping its activities secret as it did in the past, since 2002 almost all important events or activities involving Chinese party leaders or foreign visitors arranged by the International Department have been reported on its Website.

Before the reform era, the assigned task of the International Department was explicit: to advance the international communist movement, support communist party development, and promote Chinese diplomacy through revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, the International Department's power reached its peak. At that time, although China's foreign relations were reduced to relations with only a few socialist countries, the International Department maintained relations with several dozens parties and organizations, and at its height with over one hundred parties. As such, the International Department appeared to be more important than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of Chinese diplomacy. Even newly appointed ambassadors would be briefed by the International Department before assuming their posts.²⁷¹

The turning point was 1978, when the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress of the CPC redefined China's new target of the four modernizations, and the international

²⁷⁰ Interview with an official in the DIR.

²⁷¹ Interview with a retired senior official in the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, September 23, 2006.

strategy of Chinese foreign policy changed dramatically, as embodied in Deng Xiaoping's twenty-four -character foreign policy.²⁷² China adjusted its relations with the Southeast Asian countries, stopped selling weapons and exporting revolution, and restored relations with many communist parties worldwide. Enrico Berlinguer's Italian Communist Party was no longer referred to as a "revisionist" party,²⁷³ Tito's Yugoslav system was recognized as a form of socialism, on grounds developed by CPC leaders that the independence and autonomy of the socialist countries implied diversity in the socialist world. Relations with revolutionary parties in Southeast Asia were adjusted, and arms sales came to an end. Throughout the 1980s, China focused on economic construction rather than supporting leftist and anti-revisionist movements.²⁷⁴ By 1983-84, formal relations with all East European communist parties except for the Soviet Communist Party had been restored. The three preconditions for rapprochement with the Soviet Communist Party were clearly stated by Deng Xiaoping. With the increasing normalization or establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries, the responsibilities of the International Department were taken over by the MFA. As the MFA was restored as a normal government organ to handle foreign affairs, the role of the International Department came to be seen as a distinct branch of MFA work.

²⁷² Deng Xiaoping's Twenty-four character foreign policy is translated as, "Adopt a sober perspective; maintain a stable posture; be composed in dealing with the challenge; be apt to conceal capacity; don't aspire to be in the lead; but still do something to make a contribution" (*lengjing guancha, wenzhu zhenjiao, chenzhuo yingfu, shuanyu shouzhuo, juebu dangto, youshuo zuowei*).

²⁷³ In August 1977, the Central Committee of the CPC invited the president of Yugoslavia and the chairman of the Federation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to visit China. In April 1980, an Italian Communist Party delegation headed by its general secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, visited China. See Zhang Zhiyu, "Jiedai Berlinguer, yige guanjianxing de kaiduan" (Receiving Berlinguer, A Decisive Beginning), *Shijie zhishi*, No. 24 (2005), pp. 17-19.

²⁷⁴ Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, p. 48.

The 1989 democracy movement presented Chinese leaders with a new international dilemma. The dismissal of the Soviet Communist Party by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in 1991 underscored the questions of whether it was necessary for the International Department to continue to exist and what constructive roles it could play to complement or supplement the role of the MFA in Chinese foreign policy. The new situation motivated officials in the International Department to try to come up with a new role: to devise ways for Chinese top leaders to be invited abroad by foreign countries, especially after the crisis of 1989 when many Western countries blocked diplomatic contacts with China, and to make more foreign friends broadly through “people’s diplomacy” (meaning making friends through non-governmental organizations, such as the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas and other organs to achieve China’s strategy of reform and opening).²⁷⁵ The first such attempt was the 1993 successful arrangement for Zeng Qinghong, then the director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, to visit Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. The International Department also arranged Li Changchun’s trip abroad. In addition, the International Department became responsible for approving visits by foreign leaders and arranging whom they would meet on the Chinese side.²⁷⁶

The International Department has thus found new important functions, and by doing so, its status in the Chinese establishment related to foreign affairs has been reestablished and stabilized. The International Department’s important role is manifested in its chief’s membership on the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs/Leading Group on National Security. The balance of power between the International Department and the MFA has

²⁷⁵ Interview with a former senior official in the DIR, September 23, 2006.

²⁷⁶ Interview with a former senior official in the DIR, September 23, 2006.

changed in favor of the latter. But simultaneously with the collapse of the communist movement with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the mandate of the International Department was enlarged. Its contacts are no longer confined to the international communist movement, but rather have been expanded to socialist, social democratic, and labor parties, as well as various political parties in Third World nations.²⁷⁷

The Structure of the International Department

With few exceptions, the structure of the International Department (ID) has not undergone any obvious changes since the reforms. Since its bureaus are primarily divided by regions, the new responsibilities have been taken on by the bureaus. For instance, the Europe Department (the Eighth Department), among some other European communist and socialist parties, used to deal only with the French Communist Party and Socialist Party, but since the 1980s it has extended its contacts to almost all parties which have an influence on French political life.²⁷⁸

The International Department consists of two offices, one functional bureau, eight regional bureaus, and an information center. The offices are responsible respectively for management and research.

General Office

The General Office is in charge of general coordination and management of political and administrative affairs within the International Department, information summaries

²⁷⁷ Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, p. 45.

²⁷⁸ Interview with an official in the Europe Department, June 23, 2006.

and submissions as well as financial affairs related to the International Department and its international work, and management and auditing of state-owned assets. In addition, it facilitates the decision making of the International Department leadership and execution of its decisions. It also coordinates administration of the international activities of other organs directly under the party Central Committee and international activities of party committees at the provincial, autonomous region, and municipal levels.

Research Office

The main mission of the Research Office is to carry out theoretical, strategic, comprehensive, and policy-oriented studies on the international situation, world political parties, the socialist movement, “contemporary capitalism,” and other important global issues; to coordinate the research efforts within the International Department and to conduct academic exchanges and cooperative projects with outside institutions; and to hold press conferences and publicity activities on the party’s international work. It is the counterpart of the Office of Policy Planning in the MFA.

Eight Regional Bureaus

There are eight regional bureaus which take care of relations with the political parties and organizations in the countries of the respective regions. The division of labor among these bureaus is as follows:

Table 3-8 The Division of Labor of Regional Bureaus of the International Department

Bureau I (South and Southeast Asian Affairs)
Bureau II (Northeast Asian Affairs and Indochina Affairs)
Bureau III (West Asian and North African Affairs)
Bureau IV (African Affairs)
Bureau V (Latin American Affairs)
Bureau VI (East European and Central Asian Affairs)
Bureau VII (North American, Oceanic, and Scandinavian Affairs)
Bureau VIII (Western European Affairs)

Source: "Introduction to the Structure of the International Department and Its Component Bureaus and Offices,"
Website of the Department of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee,
<http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/profile/office.htm>

Protocol Bureau

This bureau is in charge of protocol and reception arrangements for visiting foreign delegations that have been invited by the CPC or the International Department and is responsible for organizing outbound party delegations as well as other activities involving foreign affairs.

Personnel Bureau

The Personnel Bureau is responsible for personnel recruitment, assignment, assessment, appointment and removal, training, and salaries and welfare, as well as rotation and management of personnel posted abroad and clearance of staff members who travel abroad on short visits. It also takes care of structural readjustments, personnel arrangements, and controls the size of the payroll. With regard to personnel

management of non-public institutions affiliated with the International Department, it provides guidance, oversight, and control.

Information Center

The Information Center is commissioned to collect and analyze information on international issues and world political parties for the department's international exchanges and research work, to compile background materials for cross-regional research, to build and maintain the Department's Website on the Internet, the work station for the Department's internal work, and the database on foreign political parties around the world, and to provide technical services to ensure the smooth operation of the online information and office automation systems.²⁷⁹

The Center's main responsibilities are threefold: to implement the principles and policies of the Central Committee in its research regarding external work, to closely follow developments and changes in the world situation and key global issues, and to provide briefings and policy proposals to the Central Committee; to carry out party exchanges and communications with foreign political parties and organizations as entrusted by the Central Committee; to work with the General Office to coordinate the management of the international exchanges of the departments of the Central Committee and the party committees of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities.

The Current Leaders of the International Department are:

Minister: Wang Jiarui

Deputy Ministers: Ma Wenpu, Zhang Zhijun, Liu Hongcai, Chen Fengxiang

Assistant Minister: Tan Jialin

²⁷⁹ An introduction to the structure of the International Department and its component bureaus and offices can be found at <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/profile/office.htm>.

The former ministers of the International Department are shown in Table 3-9.

Table 3-9 Former Ministers of the International Department

Minister	Period
Wang Jiaxiang	1951-March 1966
Liu Ningyi (Acting)	June 1966-April 1968
Ji Pengfei	Jan. 1979-April 1982
Qiao Shi	April 1982-July 1983
Qian Liren	July 1983-Deember 1985
Zhu Liang	Dec. 1985-March 1993
Li Shuzheng	March 1993-August 1997
Dai Bingguo	August 1997-March 2003

Source: "Introduction to the Structure of the International Department and Its Component Bureaus and Offices," Website of the Department of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/profile/office.htm>

As minister of the International Department for eleven years, the first minister, Wang Jiaxiang, was well respected as one of the distinguished theorists within the Communist Party. He is known for challenging Mao's revolutionary strategy, that is, "domestically combating revisionism, internationally fighting against imperialism." After deliberations in 1961 and 1962 Wang questioned this slogan and suggested that in order to concentrate on domestic economic development and overcome its economic difficulties, China should adopt a more moderate foreign policy. In an internally circulated letter in 1962, Wang further recommended that China improve its relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and India; and, at the same time, it should reduce its economic assistance to national liberation movements in the Third World. Wang's idea was supported by some top leaders of the party and the state, including Liu

Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, but it was attacked by Mao Zedong as “*sanhe yishao*,” namely “three reconciliations and one reduction,” in other words, reconciliation with the imperialism led by the United States; reconciliation with the revisionism led by the Soviet Union; reconciliation with the reactionaries represented by India; and a reduction of support to national liberation wars and revolutionary campaigns.²⁸⁰

Wang’s challenge to Mao’s notion of continuous revolution was broadly discussed and criticized within the Communist Party under Mao’s instructions. Wang Jiaxiang himself was later labeled a “revisionist” and although he temporarily remained in his position, he was purged after 1966. Until Wang’s death in 1974, there was never any alternative systematic thinking on Chinese international strategy other than that of Mao.

Noteworthy changes in International Department activities occurred in 1993 when Dai Bingguo, who had worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a deputy minister, was appointed minister of the International Department. Familiar with government diplomacy, Dai introduced to the International Department the working style of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a new way of thinking about global relations and a work style that is compatible with that of other countries. The current minister, Wang Jiarui, was originally from the system of the Communist Youth League, which allegedly is characterized by its flexibility. Both ministers have had a robust impact on the International Department, and the dull and routine features of its former work style have gradually been transformed, making the International Department appear as a more normal bureaucracy rather than as an organization of Communist cadres as it was in the past.

²⁸⁰ Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 48-49.

It is interesting to note that in the 1960s most promising employees tended to move out of the International Department because they felt that it did not offer any creative and interesting work. As a result, the average age of employees in the department was in their fifties. In contrast, since the 1970s, many talented members of the generation born in the 1950s entered the Department, and they even preferred this department to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because during the Cultural Revolution the MFA did not have much work and the International Department was more popular and contained more experts.²⁸¹

Just as in the MFA, professionalization has also taken place in the International Department.²⁸² Since the 1978 reform and opening policy, many new employees were sent abroad to study in the West. Armed with improved foreign languages, communication skills, new theories about international relations, and broadened international perspectives, after returning to the Department they soon found themselves in leading positions, such as heads of bureaus or ministers of the International Department. One of such examples is Zhang Zhijun, now a deputy minister of the Department. He entered Peking University in September 1971, went to Britain to study in October 1973, and then joined the International Department in 1975. He served as the deputy head of a division, deputy head, and head of a bureau before being promoted to the position of deputy minister.²⁸³ Another example is Cai Wu, a former minister of the International Department. He graduated from Peking University, and moved to the

²⁸¹ Information from an interview with a former senior official in the DIR, September 23, 2006.

²⁸² For the professionalization of the MFA, see Xiaohong Liu, *Chinese Ambassadors: The Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism since 1949* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001). The information about the professionalization of the DIR comes from interviews with former and current officials in the DIR.

²⁸³ "Deputy Minister Zhang Zhijun," Website of the International Department, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/about/zzj.htm>.

International Department from the International Department the Communist Youth League.²⁸⁴ He was already recognized as a very eloquent and broad-minded leader when he was appointed to the position of minister of the international Department.

Changes in the domestic and international environments and the resultant changes in the views of the Communist elite have added two new functions to the International Department: promoting exchanges of Chinese labor, women, youth, and student organizations with their counterparts in foreign countries, and teaching about the Chinese reform experience to friendly parties and states. Accordingly, two new organs were established. One is the an agency responsible for approving visits abroad by Chinese NGOs, as well as foreigners' visits to China invited by Chinese NGOs.²⁸⁵ The development of Chinese NGOs is subject to some restrictions in practice, though in theory they are not discouraged from existing or engaging in activities. It is estimated that there are several thousand NGOs now in China, but a high percentage of them are not real NGOs since they are affiliated with formal government departments. In any case, the new task of managing activities and communications with NGOs resides in the portfolio of the International Department.

A second new organ, the Center for Training (*xunlian zhongxin*), is in charge of training programs for leaders of foreign parties. The purpose of this training is entirely different from that of the former College of Marxism and Leninism, which saw its mission as world revolution, and one of its tasks was to spread the revolutionary theory Marxist, Leninist, and Mao Zedong Thought and to support armed struggle movements

²⁸⁴ "Biography of the Cai Wu, Deputy Director of the Information Office," http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-08/19/content_3374695.htm.

²⁸⁵ Interview in June 2006; and Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, p. 47.

around the world. After the 1966 Beijing “Diplomatic Envoy Conferences,” the International Department began a program to train revolutionary military personnel in Third World countries.²⁸⁶ It is no secret that cadres and military personnel in the Southeast Asian parties, followed by those in other Asian, African, and Latin American parties, came to China to study the theory of revolution and the experience of armed struggle.²⁸⁷

Following China’s rapid economic development and increasingly enhanced living standards, the unique Chinese development model has become attractive to government and party officials in other developing countries. They are interested in exploring how China has resolved the issues of feeding and sheltering its people, how it has been able to develop its economy so rapidly, and how its industries have managed to ensure such high growth rates. Many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America want to learn from the Chinese experience and frequently send government and party officials to Beijing for training. For instance, Vietnam and Laos requested that the Chinese Communist Party train party cadres in economic and agricultural management. Visitors from Africa and Latin America have visited Chinese enterprises to learn new management techniques.²⁸⁸

The training now provided by Beijing differs from that in past years in three respects. First, such programs now come about at the request of the developing countries rather than from China’s own initiative; second, China does not force or

²⁸⁶ Information from an interview with a former diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 10, 2007.

²⁸⁷ Such seminars were organized by a bureau of the Department of Liaison in the name of Commission of Asian and African Solidarity, which is affiliated to the Department. Conversation with a formal officer who taught such courses and worked in the Commission of Asian and African Solidarity.

²⁸⁸ Information from an interview with an official of the DIR, June 6, 2006.

persuade them to accept the Chinese model, rather it simply shows them the Chinese experience, and lets them decide for themselves its merits or shortcomings; third, China stresses that they each should select a model that fits their own domestic conditions.

Similar to in the MFA, employees in the different regional bureaus of the International Department usually have dual roles. One is to contact and receive foreign visitors, in other words, Chinese delegations are organized to visit foreign countries and visitors from other countries are invited as part of exchanges. The second is policy research. The bureaus now provide policy advice to the top policy-makers. The difference between the employees in the regional bureaus and those in the Research Office is that the former focus on information collection and analysis, and policy recommendations linked to their respective regions, whereas the latter concentrate on comprehensive, macro policy analysis and suggestions. Of course, there may be overlap between the two, since policy analysis with respect to major countries inevitably has an impact on international relations as a whole and on other countries.

The Work Style of the International Department

The differing features of the tasks of the International Department and the MFA can be explained in that the task of the former is to make friends and build close relationships with people in foreign countries, no matter which party they belong to, and whether or not they are former state leaders or potential future leaders. There have been many changes in leaders, especially frequently in Latin America, but the International Department endeavors to maintain good relations with all. However, once a person comes to power, the task of contacting him or her is handed over to the MFA. For instance, Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush's secretary of defense, was out of office for

about ten years after working for the senior George Bush administration. During this period, the International Department maintained close relations with him. He was invited directly by the International Department to visit China as the head of a delegation of officials, scholars, and businessmen in both 1994 and 1999. His delegations traveled throughout the country, while at the same time Rumsfeld made efforts to persuade the Chinese to accept the new idea of a national missile defense (NMD) system. When he met the deputy minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee during the Munich International Security Conference in 2006, Rumsfeld was pleased to tell the latter “we once met in Beijing in 1999.” Also in 1999, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was invited to visit China by the International Department. Former Congressman Newt Gingrich visited China via the International Department as well. Owing to the division of labor between the International Department and the MFA, there is no need to set up a bureau in charge of state affairs within this party department.

The International Department has developed trusting and long relations with most Third World countries. These connections have evolved through the Department without hindrance, and various parties in these countries, both in and out of power, have maintained contacts with the International Department. This is also the case with most non-Communist parties in Europe. However, relations between the International Department and the United States are more ambiguous. As a Chinese Communist Party department, the International Department is under suspicion by most American politicians and some scholars. The domestic environment and partisan politics in the United States make American politicians concerned that having close relations with a Chinese CPC department will harm their political reputations and status at home.

Nevertheless, the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) has been a pioneer in having a fixed exchange program with the International Department.²⁸⁹

In fact, there are advantages to working through the International Department for those organizations and people who want to learn more about China. As a non-state department aimed at developing informal relationships, the International Department can act more flexibly. It has sufficient privileges and financial support to arrange travel throughout the country, including to the remote autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang (the only exception being Taiwan). If a visit is sponsored by the International Department, unlike trips sponsored by other departments or institutes, the fees for international transportation are covered, in addition to all expenses within China. With its own Protocol Bureau, the International Department grants its visitors treatment as national guests, thus allowing them to use the diplomatic channel at the airport and exempting their luggage from customs examination.

The other division of labor between the International Department and the MFA is that the latter is in charge of all visits of Chinese government officials to foreign states, whereas the former is only responsible for visits by those who hold only party positions and have no formal position in the government. The positions can be as high as members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC. This has included three members of the Standing Committee, Li Changchun, Zeng Qinghong, and Jia Qinglin. Li Changchun's visit to North Europe in June 2006 was announced by the Information Center of the CPC and arranged by the European Bureau of the International Department, instead of its counterpart in the MFA. On June 19, 2006, the Information

²⁸⁹ Information from an interview with an official of the DIR, June 6, 2006.

Office announced that Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee had concluded visits to Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Switzerland, and Norway. Li had visited the four nations from June 6 to 19 as a guest of the Legislative Chamber of Uzbekistan and the governments of Bulgaria, Switzerland, and Norway.²⁹⁰

Visiting foreign countries and meeting with foreign state leaders as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo does not mean that Li Changchun could not discuss state affairs with the leaders of the foreign states, or could not speak in the name of the Chinese government and Chinese people. In fact, on his visit to Norway on June 16, Li met with Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and acting Norwegian Parliament President Karl Hagen. Li told them that Sino-Norwegian relations were developing smoothly and the two nations had had fruitful cooperation in various fields, and cooperation in politics, economy and trade, culture, education, science and technology, as well as tourism had increased constantly and had yielded remarkable results.²⁹¹

In his meeting with Swiss President Moritz Leuenberger on a three day good-will visit to Switzerland, Li also spoke as a state leader saying that China would make continuous efforts to further improve relations with Switzerland and enhance the friendly cooperation between the two countries in the new century; the relationship between China and Switzerland had maintained a good momentum ever since the two countries set up diplomatic ties fifty-six years earlier, and China attached great importance to the friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Li stressed the great potential for economic cooperation between China and Switzerland, noting that there are still good

²⁹⁰ Website of the International Department, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/060616.htm>.

²⁹¹ Website of the International Department, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/060616.htm>.

opportunities for the two countries to enhance their cooperation. He also stated that the Chinese side welcomed more Swiss businessmen to invest in China. In addition, Li held separate talks in Bern with Swiss Interior Minister Pascal Couchepin and Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey respectively.²⁹²

Visits abroad by officials of the Communist Youth League of China, the All-China Federation of Women, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the Central Party School are also managed by the International Department. The International Department has authority to coordinate, approve, or veto such visits, if it is found that the visits are meaningless or repetitive or inappropriate in the current international situation or to the present bilateral relations with the counterpart countries. The primary decision for an approval or a veto is made by each country or regional division. If the division deems such a visit not to be suitable, it can suggest that the application not be approved. The recommendation will be reviewed by the heads of the bureau, and then by the minister of the department responsible for the region. The final decision is made by the heads at the departmental level.

The International Department has formal relations with four major international parties—the Socialist International, the International Democratic Union, the Liberal International, and the Centrist Democrat International.²⁹³ It has particularly frequent contact with the Socialist Party International. It also sends delegations to participate in the national conferences of almost all the African parties. The most constant relations are those with the remaining socialist countries, i.e., North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, etc. This is not because the International Department ignores its relationships with other

²⁹² Website of the International Department, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/060615.htm>.

²⁹³ Website of the International Department, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/navigator/zhengdang.htm>.

parties, but because quite a few non-Communist or non-socialist parties in the developed countries, especially the two major parties in the United States, are still suspicious of a Communist Party.

Policy recommendations made by each division may be written by individuals or by the group. However, even if they are drafted by an individual, that person does not sign his or her name to the report: it has to be submitted in the name of the group, in most cases the name of the country or regional division. If it is drafted by a group, or in the name of a division, the policy recommendation should be discussed collectively to reach consensus, and it should be examined and approved by the higher authority up to the level of the minister in charge of the affairs of the country/region. The minister may or may not be familiar with the affairs of the country/region; this depends on whether he or she has previously worked in the region. Deputy Minister Zhang Zhijun, for example, understands the region he oversees very well because he was promoted from the position of division head of United States and Canadian affairs, to the head of Bureau VII (North American, Oceanic, and Scandinavian Affairs), and then to the position of deputy minister of the Department.

Another important function of the International Department, indicative of its direct links with foreign affairs, is to appoint diplomats from the Department to Chinese embassies abroad. Nevertheless, only positions higher than councilor (attaché) can be appointed from the International Department officials. Currently, altogether 30 or so diplomats are appointed from the International Department.²⁹⁴

²⁹⁴ Interview, 2006.

Relations with the Workers' Party of North Korea

Among China's relations with other countries, the International Department plays a special role in relations with the People Republic of North Korea (PRNK), which in recent years has been the focus of attention in the international community. Although the six-party talks are sponsored by China through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, developing relations with the North Korean Workers' Party is the responsibility of the International Department.

In 2005 and 2006, all the visits between Chinese leaders and North Korean leaders were in the name of either the Chinese Communist Party or the Korean Workers' Party. In October 2005, in response to an invitation from Kim Jong Il, Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a formal visit to North Korea as general secretary of the CPC and chairman of the Central Military Commission, with some members of his delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was the International Department, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, that was in charge of the visit. Accordingly, thereafter, it was the Protocol Bureau of the International Department, rather than its counterpart in the MFA, that held a press conference to provide information about the trip. Nearly one hundred correspondents representing several dozen media outlets attended the press conference. At the press conference International Department Minister Wang Jiarui gave a briefing and answered questions about Hu's visit. Wang reported that the major achievements of the visit included:

1. General Secretary Hu Jintao and General Secretary Kim agreed that the two countries would continue close contacts at high levels, strengthen mutual communications, expand exchanges, enrich exchange programs, promote economic and trade cooperation, facilitate common development, and maintain mutual interests.

2. On the North Korean nuclear issue, the two countries confirmed that they would continue to promote the dialogue for a peaceful resolution. Hu emphasized that with multilateral efforts, the fourth round of talks had achieved significant results; China's goal was non-nuclearization in North Korea, and peaceful resolution and maintenance of stability in the Korean peninsula and the region. China would make efforts with North Korea and other parties to pursue the general aim worked out by the common declaration, and to promote the fifth and sixth round of talks. Kim highly evaluated China's active gestures and significant contribution to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula, and promised that North Korea would also pursue peaceful maintenance of non-nuclearization and resolution of the nuclear issue through dialogue. He agreed that the common declaration of the fourth round of dialogue was meaningful and valuable. As promised, he said that he would take part in the fifth and sixth round of talks.

3. Both sides emphasized that they would further promote economic and trade cooperation. China would encourage and support different forms of cooperative investment between Chinese and Korean enterprises, and would expand bilateral trade.

4. Both sides acknowledged that a development path conforming to each country's own conditions would be actively explored.²⁹⁵

From January 10 to 18, 2006, Kim Jong Il paid an unofficial visit to China. Hu Jintao and Kim Jong Il held talks in Beijing, exchanging views on bilateral relations and international and regional issues of common concern and reaching important and wide-ranging consensus. Wu Bangguo, member of the Politburo Standing Committee

²⁹⁵ "Zhonglianbu juxing hujintao zongshuji fangchao chengguo xinwen fabuhui" (The International Department holds a Press Conference on the Outcomes of General Secretary Hu Jintao's Visit to the DPRK), <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/duiwai/niandugaikuang/2005/051030-2.htm>.

of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Wen Jiabao, member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee and Chinese premier, met with Kim separately. All the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, and Luo Gan, accompanied Kim on his visit or took part in related activities. Kim's entourage included DPRK Premier Pak Bong Ju and senior officials of the DPRK's Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Ministry of Financial Planning, and the Science and Education Department of the Workers' Party Central Committee and the DPRK cabinet.

Describing the six-party talks as an efficient mechanism to appropriately solve the Korean peninsula nuclear issue, Hu reiterated China's principled stance, noting that it was correct to properly settle the relevant problems by peaceful means through dialogue. China was ready to unswervingly make joint efforts with relevant parties including the DPRK to promote the six-party talk process.

During his tour of Wuhan, Yichang, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, and Shenzhen in 2006, Kim visited with great interest about a dozen enterprises and institutes in the fields of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and education. He was deeply impressed by the progress in various fields in South China, especially in the special economic zones, as the outcome of the reform and opening policies. Kim said he had benefited from the visit, and he noted that China's comprehensive national strength was growing and the social outlook was changing day by day. Kim also stated that he had obtained a more

comprehensive understanding of China and better understood the policies of the CPC and the Chinese government.²⁹⁶

Although Chinese leaders would like to see a change in Kim Jong Il's domestic policies, they do not want to impose the Chinese development model on him. They showed him around China in the hopes that he would draw his own conclusions from what he saw. At the same time, Chinese leaders have consistently expressed their concerns over the North Korean nuclear program and have repeatedly emphasized that China is pursuing the goal of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.²⁹⁷

The important role of the International Department in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue has been recognized by American officials. Thus, whenever Christopher Hill, the current American negotiator in the six-party talks, visits Beijing, he requests meetings with officials in the North/South Korea division of the International Department. Given the important role of the International Department in PRNK-Chinese relations, coordination between the International Department and the MFA is essential.

International Department Minister Wang Jiarui summed up the "fruitful results" of the International Department's arrangement of Hu Jintao's visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Vietnam in 2005 as the culmination of the CPC's high-level exchanges with foreign political parties. "This has played an irreplaceable, important role in promoting the steady development of relations between China and other countries." He stressed that the International Department had made progress in helping the government properly settle thorny issues in foreign relations and international affairs

²⁹⁶ "Top Leaders of China, DPRK Hold Talks in Beijing," <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/060118.htm>.

²⁹⁷ Interview, 2006.

through party-to-party diplomacy, and took as an example the International Department's role in mediating the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. He also mentioned, "When Sino-Japanese relations face a predicament, the International Department maintains inter-party exchanges with political parties in Japan and urges the Japanese leaders to treat the historical issue properly."²⁹⁸

From formerly having to make efforts to insure its own survival, the International Department is now an important actor in Chinese foreign policy decision making and implementation. The enhancement of the International Department's status reflects the needs of the Chinese Communist Party. Wang Jiarui has noted: "The International Department is ready to do anything that is beneficial to the development of nation-to-nation relations and will carry out such work well with the utmost effort." Believing that the dynamic exchanges between the CPC and foreign political parties have helped foreigners better understand China and the CPC, Wang has stated: "We will further increase the transparency of the CPC's diplomatic activities and open up a window for people in the rest of the world to better understand China and the CPC through the party's external exchanges. ... This is an urgent task in order to help people in the international community understand China and the CPC, to dispel biases, and to clear up misunderstandings by enhancing inter-party exchanges."²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ Wang Jiarui, "The Achievement of the Communist Party's Foreign Work is Prominent," December 12, 2005, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/ziliao/wenzhang/051215.htm>.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

The International Communication Office/the State Council Information Office

Propaganda, domestic and external, has always been viewed as an important means for the Chinese Communist Party to impose its guiding ideology and to steer the developmental direction of the country; thus, propaganda has always been tightly controlled by the CPC. The organ through which the CPC controls propaganda to foreign countries is the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee/the State Council Information Office. As its name indicates, this organ is under the dual leadership of both the party and the State Council. Another dual subordinate organ is the Office of Taiwan Affairs, as it is also under both the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. Organs with such dual upper authorities are usually at a higher administrative level than other organs. Thus unlike other offices in the State Council, the Office of Taiwan Affairs and the International Communication Office are at the semi-ministerial level, rather than at the bureau level. This institutional arrangement demonstrates that those affairs under the purview of the two offices are considered particularly important.

The forerunner body to the International Communication Office (ICO) of the CPC Central Committee was the Central External Propaganda Group (CEPG). On December 16, 1987, the Politburo decided to abolish the CEPG because of “confusion over its authority and its ineffectiveness.”³⁰⁰ In its stead, the State Council Information Office was created. After the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, the Central External Propaganda Group was restored under the official title of the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee, by merging the Bureau of

³⁰⁰ Jiang Weiwan, “Zhonggong gaoceng jigou gaige gang’an da pilu: Zhonggong gaoceng renshi da tiaozheng” (A Big Exposé of the Reform Plan for High-Ranking Officials), *Guangjiaojing* (Wide Angle) (Hong Kong), No. 184 (January 16, 1988), pp. 6-7.

External Propaganda of the Department of Propaganda of the CPC Central Committee and other agencies. During the 1993 State Council institutional reform, it was announced in the State Council circular on establishing State Council agencies that the State Council Information Office and the International Communication Office of the CCP Central Committee would share the same staff members despite their two different names, and would belong to the category of CPC Central Committee organs.³⁰¹

The International Communication Office formerly was called the External Propaganda Office (*duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi*). Its name was changed because the Chinese leaders realized that “propaganda” has a negative connotation in English, meaning either twisting the truth or misrepresentation. Established in 1992, the ICO/SCIO was expected to help break through the political blockade due to the Tiananmen incident and the isolation faced by China after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Now the ICO/SCIO’s new aim is to encourage the Chinese media in their work representing China to the rest of the world, including presenting China’s domestic and external policies as well as its social and economic development, history, science and technology, and education and culture. It hosts press briefings for Chinese and foreign reporters and provides books, data, and film and video products in the hopes that China will be better known to the outside world through these presentations. It also offers assistance to foreign correspondents in China in their reporting work. In addition, the ICO/SCIO engages in extensive exchanges and cooperation with government departments and news media of other countries as well as with Chinese government

³⁰¹ State Council General Office, Secretariat Bureau, and the Central Editorial Office of the Comprehensive Affairs Bureau, *Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou* (Central Governmental Institutions) (Beijing: Zhongguo zhanwang chubanshe, 1994), p.18.

departments to organize cultural exchanges with other countries. It is expected to support the Chinese media's news coverage of foreign countries and international issues, including the latest developments in the fields of economics, science and technology, and culture.

According to an official introduction, the ICO/SCIO's functions include:

To promote, provide guidance for, and coordinate news coverage of China by the Chinese media to the rest of the world; to draw up plans for the development of external news reporting and to oversee its execution; to provide guidance for the work of the information offices of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities and services for Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan correspondents reporting on the mainland; to engage in exchanges and cooperation with foreign media organizations and to provide services for foreign reporters working in China; to draw up development plans, and to provide guidance and coordination for news coverage via the Internet; to introduce the progress China has made in the field of human rights and to organize related international exchanges and cooperation; to report to the rest of the world on developments in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and to organize exchanges with other countries in the world; to conduct research on major media organizations in the world and media opinion in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; to organize large-scale, comprehensive, cross-departmental and cross-regional exchanges and the publication of books and periodicals as well films and videos introducing China to readers and audiences abroad.

The office has nine bureaus, seven of which are functional bureaus (see Table 3-10).

Table 3-10 Structure of the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee/the State Council Information Office

Composition	Function
Secretarial Bureau	To liaise with other departments of the State Council and provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, and to handle office documents and administrative affairs.
Bureau One	To organize press briefings and reporting of major Chinese events for overseas consumption and to compile government white papers.
Bureau Two	To develop international public relations by promoting exchanges and cooperation with foreign media.
Bureau Three	To plan and organize the production and publication of overseas-oriented video programs and books and to organize comprehensive cultural exchange programs.
Bureau Four	To be responsible for studying policies, plans, and methods to introduce China to the outside world and to analyze international public opinion.
Bureau Five	To draw up plans for developing news reporting via the Internet and to promote the setting up of news Websites in China; to be responsible for collecting public opinion on the Web.
Bureau Six	To provide guidance for the work of the information offices of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities and services for reporters from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan who are reporting on the mainland.
Bureau Seven	To encourage reports on human rights in China and developments in Tibet for overseas readers and audiences as well as to organize exchanges in these areas.
Personnel Bureau	In charge of management and training of staff members of the SCIO and its subsidiaries.

Source: Brochure of the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, published by the Information Office in 2006.

Zhao Qizheng, the former director of the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee from 1998 to 2005, introduced new and modern concepts to the Information Office. Realizing that there is no corresponding word in English to the

word “propaganda” (*xuanchuan*) in Chinese,³⁰² he defined the Chinese word “*xuanchuan*” as expression, description, publicity, presentation, or communication,³⁰³ and defined the duty of his SCIO “to present China to the world.”³⁰⁴ He argued, “There are many ways to present or describe China to the rest of the world, but the only way which is proper is to show a real China; our explanation must be based on the facts.” Thus, Zhao required that officials and employees in the SCIO present a “real” China, not only about China’s progress, but also about its shortcomings, because to him the drive to progress constantly involves correcting shortcomings and developing merits to present new features.³⁰⁵

Zhao Qizheng developed the principle of the “three close” (*san tiejin*) to present China, that is, to be close to the reality in China, to be close to the needs of foreigners for information, and to be close to the foreigners’ way of thinking.³⁰⁶ It is noteworthy that a work conference of the CPC Central Committee in 2004 for the first time was called a “Work Conference on Foreign Communication.” This shows that the CPC has enhanced the importance of foreign communication. Three sentences are used to describe Chinese foreign communications work: it is work related to “China’s overall

³⁰² It is the name of the office. It used to be translated as “propaganda,” but unlike in English, the word in Chinese does not have a negative connotation. For this reason, the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party changed its name to the Publicity Department in English, but the name of the office in Chinese remains the “*duiwai xuanchuan*”. Thus it is subject to explanation.

³⁰³ Zhao Qizheng, ed., *Xiang shijie shuoming Zhongguo: Zhao Qizheng de goutong yishu* (To Present China to the World: The Art of Zhao Qizheng’s Presentation of China to the World), Vol. 2 (Beijing: Xinshijie chubanshe, 2006), p. 103.

³⁰⁴ Interview with officials in the ICO/SCIO in 2007.

³⁰⁵ Zhao Qizheng, ed., *Xiang shijie shuoming Zhongguo: Zhao Qizheng de goutong yishu*, p. 103.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

situation and strategy,” “a component of China’s comprehensive capacity,” and connected to “the needs of China’s national security.”³⁰⁷

Zhao Qizheng frequently emphasized the importance of the media in diplomacy. He introduced two English phrases to an audience at the China Foreign Affairs University. One is “media diplomacy,” meaning to use the media to formulate and advance foreign policies; the other is “infosphere,” consisting of information and atmosphere, implying information is as important as the air for people in a modern society.³⁰⁸ He indicated that there is a gap between the global communications work of foreign countries like the U.S. and that of China and that the Chinese media need to make a greater contribution to explaining Chinese foreign policy.

Communication with foreign countries is seen by Zhao Qizheng as a dialogue. From his perspective, a person is favored by others based on his or her popularity; a country is accepted by other countries also based on its national popularity and its behavior. Therefore, expressing Chinese views in accordance with international standards is the best way for the world to better understand China and to increase Chinese popularity. Zhao also noted that cultural exchanges are the foundation for political and economic exchanges.³⁰⁹

Under Zhao’s direction, the ICO/SCIO established many programs for cultural exchanges with other countries, such as an annual “China Week” held in different countries, for instance, France and Russia; Chinese singing performances in Vienna’s Golden Hall in 2005 and 2006; three large-scale cultural events, including the 2000

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 94.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 120.

“Chinese cultural trip to the U.S.,” which was supported by some American companies that have close relations with China;³¹⁰ the first “Golden Bridge Awards” for publications in foreign languages granted to nearly 100 publications in 1999; publishing the phone numbers of 75 spokespersons of 62 Chinese government departments and commissions; and organizing 60 press conferences in 2004 about various topics related to China. Zhao’s efforts have significantly changed the traditional way of thinking with respect to the ICO/SCIO’s work and the way in which China communicates with the outside world. Therefore, it has been said that it is due to Zhao’s contribution that China began to present itself to the world.³¹¹ Although this does not mean that it is only due to Zhao that CPC work on “presenting China to the world” has been fundamentally transformed, but, at the very least, it is due to Zhao’s input that the notion of how to present China has fundamentally changed and China’s communication work has been put on the right track.

The ICO/SCIO’s work closely follows the work of Chinese foreign affairs. The most remarkable program of the ICO/SCIO in this area is its training program. Since 2003, the ICO/SCIO began to train spokespersons in different departments and commissions of the central government on how to hold independent press conferences. In 2004, the ICO/SCIO organized two training seminars in Beijing, as well as three other seminars in northwest, northeast, and southwest China. Altogether some 2,000 spokespersons have been trained on how to perform their obligations and duties. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the first government department that has established such a spokesperson system. A CNN correspondent in Beijing publicly said that the spread of

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 232.

³¹¹ Information from interviews with an official in the International Communications Office; *ibid.*, pp.139, 205, 215.

the spokesperson system represents great progress in China since the 1980s, most importantly progress in the notion that the duty of a spokesperson is to provide information to the media and public.³¹² If spokespersons can actually do their jobs, the system will help to increase transparency in governance.

In the U.S., the annual reports on the human rights practices of other countries are published by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the State Department, whereas in China the issuance of reports on China's human rights situation is the responsibility of the ICO/SCIO. On November 1, 1991, China began to publish reports on China's human rights so as to introduce Chinese conditions and progress, and to refute the Western countries' attack on China's human rights practices. By 2002, the ICO/SCIO had published six reports on China's human rights, as well as twelve other white papers investigating specific human rights conditions, such as innovation in criminal law, poverty relief and development in rural areas, and human rights related to women, children, the elderly, ethnic minorities, religion, and Tibet. In addition, as a counterattack to the American government's accusation of Chinese human rights violations, the ICO/SCIO's publishes reports on the U.S. human rights record for the purpose of reminding Americans that their human rights practices are not perfect. At the same time, the ICO/SCIO arranges many field interviews for foreign reporters, issues related news, and publishes articles to clarify the facts regarding Chinese political prisoners, the sale of human organs, the export of prison-made products, the mistreatment of prisoners, and the mistreatment of children in Chinese orphanages.³¹³ On both May 31 and July 15, 1999, Zhao Qizheng, as spokesman of the Chinese government, told

³¹² Interview with Zhao Qizheng at the Chinese Central Television Station; *ibid.*, p. 209.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

Chinese and foreign correspondents that information about seven nuclear warheads was available on the Internet and could be accessed via the American Federation of Scientists' Website. Therefore, he concluded, the 872-page Cox Report charging China with stealing American high-tech national defense information was both ridiculous and nonsense.³¹⁴

As China in recent years has increasingly realized the importance of “soft power” in international relations, the work of the ICO/SCIO has been more consciously linked to the extension of Chinese “soft power.”

The Study Group of the CPC Politburo

It is well recognized that decisions on Chinese international strategy are made by the Politburo of the CPC. It should be noted that the “study group” of the Politburo is a tool to unify thinking and to form a consensus on international strategy among the members of the Politburo. The following are some examples of how fundamental concepts of Chinese international strategy have been shaped through “group study.” On August 26, 2006, Hu Jintao made a call to the twenty-fourth “study group” of the CPC Politburo to sum up the experience gained during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) for educating CPC members and all Chinese people. Two researchers from the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Jiang Ying and Luo Yuan, gave lectures on this topic. CPC Politburo members attended the lecture and thereafter held discussions. In his speech, Hu called for “keeping in mind the history, never forgetting the past, cherishing the peace, and opening up to the future.” He emphasized that increasing China’s comprehensive national power was the fundamental means for assuring that the Chinese

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. 362.

nation would stand up independently among all peoples in the world; following the road of peace and development was the correct road for the country to achieve its goals.³¹⁵

During the thirty-first “study group” of the Politburo on May 26, 2006, Hu Jintao underlined the importance of establishing a system to protect intellectual property rights. The topic of this “study group” was international intellectual property protection and the establishment of a Chinese legal system to protect intellectual property. A senior researcher from the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Professor Wu Handong, the director of the Center for Intellectual Property at South China University of Economics and Law (*zhongnan caijing zhengfa daxue*) presented lectures and gave policy recommendations on the subject. After the lectures, the members of the Politburo held discussions. Hu argued that protection of intellectual property was very important to create an innovative state; the Chinese government should support the emergence of autonomous intellectual property rights in key technologies and crucial technical equipment that could promote economic and social development; and China should improve its legal and regulatory systems, and strictly enforce the laws and regulations in order to fulfill its promises to protect intellectual property rights in conformity with international trends. Chinese laws and regulations should be adjusted to meet the demands of Chinese economic and social development. For this purpose, in addition to strengthening law enforcement, it was also necessary to provide education to

³¹⁵ See “Hu Jintao Calls for Learning Lesson from War,” August 26, 005, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/events/050826.htm>.

enhance consciousness of intellectual protection laws.³¹⁶ This view can be seen as the underlying basis of official Chinese policy on intellectual property.

The topic for discussion at the Politburo tenth study group on February 24, 2004, was the international situation and the Chinese security environment. After lectures given by Prof. Qin Yaqing from the Foreign Affairs College and senior researcher Zhang Yuyan from the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Hu Jintao stressed that the goal was to “to learn more fundamental knowledge on international relations, to learn more about the basic conditions in the international community, to look at the world from a broader perspective, and to work out an international strategy based on judgments about the international situation.”³¹⁷

Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs of the CCP Central Committee

In the past, some ten “Diplomatic Envoy Conferences” were held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The tenth Diplomatic Envoy Conference was held from August 25 to 29, 2004.³¹⁸ The participants included not only ambassadors and other representatives of all Chinese embassies to foreign countries, but also secretaries and deputy secretaries of provincial-level party committees. Such conferences are held irregularly, about once every three to five years, depending on whether there is a need for any macro-adjustment of foreign policies. During such conferences, the president and premier usually give

³¹⁶ “Hu Jintao zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju di sanshiyici jiti xuexi shi qianguangde yanjie guancha shijie fenxi xingshi” (Hu Jintao Emphasizes on Strengthening Building of the Intellectual Property System in China at the 31st Collective Study Session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee), May 26, 2006, Website of the International Department, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/zhonggong/060526-2.htm>.

³¹⁷ Hu Jintao, “Jianchi yi kuanguangde yanjie guancha shijie fenxi xingshi” (Hu Jintao, “Continue Observing the World and Analyzing the Situation with a Broad Perspective,” <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/zhonggong/040224.htm>).

³¹⁸ “Di shici zhuwai shijie huiyi zai jing juxing” (The Tenth Meeting of Diplomatic Envoys Is Held in Beijing), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t154816.htm>.

speeches on the international situation and Chinese international strategy. During the Mao period, the purpose of such conferences was to unify thinking on foreign policies so as to effectively carry out implementation thereafter. One typical example was the 1966 “pre-Spring Festival meeting of diplomats assigned abroad,” during which time the well-known international strategy to “support world revolution” was introduced. After the Spring Festival holiday, the diplomats returned to their respective countries and started carrying out the strategy. Criticism of some Third World countries, parties, or organizations was curbed to carry out the overall strategy. Nevertheless, because of the forthcoming Cultural Revolution and the “revolt” and power seizure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this international strategy was not effectively implemented.³¹⁹

On August 21-23, 2006, the first “Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs” was held by the CPC Central Committee. This represents an enhancement of foreign affairs to a higher level of consideration. All members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo took part in the conference, including Hu Jintao (president, general secretary of the CPC, and chairman of the Central Military Committee of the CPC), Wu Bangguo (chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress), Wen Jiabao (premier), Jia Qinglin (chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), Zeng Qinghong (vice president), Huang Ju (vice premier), Wu Guanzheng (secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission), Li Changchun (member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo), and Luo Gan (secretary of the Central Committee on Politics and Law), in addition to officials who were in charge of foreign affairs in various party and state organs. The meeting was aimed at reviewing Chinese

³¹⁹ Conversation with a university professor, July 16, 2007.

international strategy and arranging foreign affairs work for the future.³²⁰ Wen Jiabao provided an introduction to the arrangements for foreign affairs work. At the meeting a new international strategy was agreed upon, whereby China would adhere to a “mutual benefits and win-win” strategy in its exchanges with the rest of the world, creating a sound international environment and favorable external conditions for China’s reform, opening-up, and modernization and contributing to promoting the construction of a harmonious world abiding by peace and common prosperity. Moreover, China would transform the growth mode of foreign trade, expand the ratio of the services trades, take concrete steps to protect intellectual property rights, accelerate construction of free trade zones with other countries and regions, and coordinate development of imports and exports.

A consensus was reached at the meeting that China urgently needed to improve the quality of its foreign affairs work because of its current “unprecedentedly close links” with the international community in the economic, political, cultural, and security fields and the more pronounced links between domestic and foreign affairs. It was emphasized that foreign affairs work should center around the primary task of development, hold high the banner of “peace, development, and cooperation,” adhere to an independent foreign policy of peace, and “unswervingly” pursue the road of peaceful development. Once again a low-profile strategy was emphasized.³²¹

³²⁰ See “China Says It Will Adhere to ‘Mutual Benefits and Win-Win’ Strategy in Opening Up,” August 23, 2006, at <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/events/more.htm>; see also “Zhonggong zhongyang waishi gongzuo huiyi zai jing juxing” (CPC Central Committee Work Meeting on Foreign Affairs Is Held in Beijing), August 23, 2006, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/zhonggong/060823.htm>.

³²¹ Ibid.

It still remains questionable whether such kinds of conference will become annual events in the future or will replace the conventional conferences of foreign diplomatic envoys.

Chapter Four: The Proliferation of Think Tanks in Foreign Policy-Making

One of the major changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process has been the increased influence of Chinese think tanks. Many authors have observed this change.³²² The Chinese political leadership's need for support from intellectuals in foreign policymaking was noted by A. Doak Barnett as early as 1985 in his *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*,³²³ and later was discussed in David Shambaugh's 1987 article "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy."³²⁴ Since then, and increasingly in the recent decade, the role of Chinese think tanks in foreign policy-making has been the focus of many books and PhD dissertations in both English and Chinese.

As Xuanli Liao notes, the phrase "think tank" can be translated into Chinese as either *zhinangtuan* or *sixiangku*, with subtle differences between the two. The meaning of the former was originally close to that of *muliao*, referring to a small group of people who work as a policy advisory body to the policy-makers. Used in this way, the meaning is similar to that of a "brain-trust." "*Sixiangku*" is a relatively new notion in Chinese, which was first translated from the English and used to refer to research

³²² David Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," *China Quarterly*, No. 171 (September 2002), pp. 575-596.

³²³ A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

³²⁴ David Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," *China Quarterly*, No. 110 (June 1987), pp. 276-304.

institutions conducting policy research.³²⁵ Thus those people, such as Huang Hua, Ji Chaozhu, Zhang Wentian, and Tang Wensheng, who met Kissinger at the Nanyuan military airport south of Beijing during Kissinger's 1971 secret mission to China, strictly speaking, were intellectual officials, or *muliao*, rather than representatives of think tanks.³²⁶ Nevertheless, as institutions in international studies have been growing and playing a more important role in Chinese policy making, the difference between the two has become negligible, especially because serving as a *zhinangtuan* to Chinese policy-makers has become a desired goal of institutions in international studies. Therefore, *zhinangtuan* is now used as another term for think tank, as evidenced by the fact that in a 2004 official document the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences claims to pursue the role of both *zhinangtuan* and *sixiangku*.³²⁷ Logically, a member of a *sixiangku* can serve as a member of a *zhinangtuan*, but a member of a *zhinangtuan* is not necessarily a member of a *sixiangku*.

A think tank is defined as a common term for an organization that employs or sponsors professional intellectuals to study issues of public policy and to prepare books, reports, newspaper essays, magazine articles, and speeches promoting their conclusions. Most, though not all, think tanks adhere to some identifiable ideology that reflects the

³²⁵ Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006), p. 54.

³²⁶ See David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 6.

³²⁷ Li Shenming, "Jiaqiang dangde lingdao, fanrong zhexue shehui kexue: Xuexi dang zhongyang 'Guanyu jinyibu fanrong zhexue shehui kexue de yijian'" (Strengthen Party Leadership, Further the Prosperity of Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Studying the Party Central Committee's 'Views on Further the Prosperity of Philosophy and the Social Sciences'), *Guangming Daily*, March 23, 2004.

values and interests of their sponsors.”³²⁸ *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* defines a think tank as “an institute, corporation, or group organized for interdisciplinary research (as in technological and social problems)—also called think factory.”³²⁹ Donald Abelson’s definition is similar, but places emphasis on its “independent” and “non-profit” Nature. According to Abelson, think tanks are “independent, non-profit organizations composed of individuals concerned with a wide range of public issues.”³³⁰ In applying these definitions to Chinese think-tank research, the first problem is that in China, the majority of research organizations, especially those aimed at influencing government decision making in foreign policy, are not independent. In one way or another, they are all subordinate to and financially dependent on the government, including those institutions situated in the universities. For instance, the Institute of International Studies (IIS) is subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which contains eight institutes of international studies and an Institute of Taiwan Studies, is affiliated to the State Council and ranks as a ministerial bureaucracy, with its president holding a ministerial position. On the other hand, these research organizations, in spite of their ranks in the bureaucratic hierarchy, do not have as much political power as government agencies; at the same time, they enjoy a great deal of independence in their academic activities. For example, there are no arbitrary directions given to CASS institutes regarding required topics of research, though in recent years reports on certain issues have been requested by parallel or higher-level

³²⁸ Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson, *Logic of American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2003), p. 483.

³²⁹ *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, 11th ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2005), p. 1299.

³³⁰ Donald E. Abelson, *American Think-Tanks and Their Role in US Foreign Policy* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 3.

bureaucracies. Although not completely independent, compared to the research institutes within the government departments, such as the Bureau of Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the institutes of international studies outside the government have much looser relations with their upper authorities. Therefore, their influence on the foreign policy-making process is somewhat similar to the influence of think tanks in Western countries. Apart from the degree of independence, these organizations are “non-profit,” “applying full-time interdisciplinary scientific thinking to the in-depth improvement of policy making,” and they are virtually a bridge between power and knowledge. Taking these features into account, we may call these semi-independent research institutes Chinese-style think tanks, characterized by being semi-independent, semi-governmental, and dependent either directly or indirectly on the Ministry of Finance of the central government or the finance ministries of the local governments for their budgets. There are also some completely independent think tanks in China. One is the “Tianze” Institute (*tianze* means natural law in English, and its English name is Unirule), but this research institute focuses on economics. In the field of international studies, the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies may be regarded as a quite independent institute in terms of the sources of its funding. But thus far such an institute is very rare in the field of international studies. This perhaps reflects the fact that foreign policy is a special realm where decision making is much more centralized.

In fact, however, the dependence of these institutes on government support has been somewhat reduced over the last decade. An institute of CASS is allowed and even encouraged to apply for program funding to outside foundations, most of the time foreign

foundations. For instance, the Institute of American Studies (IAS) received \$50,000 for a program on the Congress and American Foreign Policy and \$80,000 for research on The U.S. Role in East Asia from the Ford Foundation.³³¹ Other institutes of international studies have received lump-sum financial support of \$50,000 to \$80,000 from Ford. In recent years, the Institute of European Studies received funding not only from the Ford Foundation for research on Chinese and Western foreign aid, but has also been provided a huge sum from the EU for research on European integration. In the early years of its existence (the early 1990s) the Center for American Studies of Fudan University received a special fund of \$1 million for facilities approved by the American Congress, and annual funding of \$110,000 from the Ford Foundation.³³² One of the significant research centers for international studies in the Ministry of Education, the Center for European Studies at the People's University in Beijing, has been generously supported by the EU. For an institute the size of the Institute of American Studies or the Institute of European Studies with an annual administrative budget (excluding the budget for salaries and program funds) of only slightly more than 1 million yuan, a fund of \$50,000 (now equal to approximately 700,000 yuan) from a foundation for a three-year research program is quite substantial. Financial support from outside of the government adds to the researchers' relatively low income; more importantly, it provides them with more independence to select research subjects based on intellectual interests and their understanding of the needs of policy-makers. In any event, in many regards Chinese

³³¹ The information is from a senior researcher at the Institute of American Studies and from the Ford Foundation, 2006.

³³² The information is from Ni Shixiong, the former director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University.

institutes in international studies have now begun to resemble typical think tanks. The Evolution of Chinese Think Tanks

The need for research on international affairs was first recognized in the wake of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. In the same year, Chinese Acting Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian suggested establishing a special agency for conducting research on the world economy and international relations. On November 26, 1955, Zhang presided over a meeting in which the decision was made to set up an institute for international studies. But the final decision for this had to be approved by the Politburo.³³³ Thus, on March 19, 1956, the Party Group³³⁴ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a letter in the name of Zhang Wentian to Deng Xiaoping, then the general secretary of the Communist Party, which was simultaneously reported to the Politburo. In an instruction of April 12, 1956, Deng Xiaoping “endorsed the ideas of developing the discipline of international studies and reinforced the training of researchers in this field.”³³⁵ The members of the Politburo then approved the suggestion by signing their names to the report. This institute was designated to be

³³³ Li Zong confirms the legend that Zhang Wentian put forth the suggestion; Zhou Enlai then supported his idea. See Li Zong, “Xin Zhongguo guoji yanjiu wushi nian” (Fifty Years of Research on International Relations in New China), in Scientific Research Bureau of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, *Xin Zhongguo shehui kexue wushi nian* (Fifty Years of Research on the Social Sciences in New China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2005), p. 612.

³³⁴ Communist Party organizations in the central government bureaucracies have different names at different levels. At the bureau level, it is called a party committee; at the ministerial level, it is called a party group. For below the bureau level it can be called either a branch committee of the party or a general branch committee of the party. For instance, as a ministerial-level agency, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has a party group, but the party organization in each institute of CASS is called a party committee, since they are all bureau-level agencies. However, this is not the case for local governments. For instance, in Shanghai Municipality, the party organ is called the party committee, as are the party organizations at the provincial level.

³³⁵ Ma Zhengang, ed., *50 chunqiu: jinian Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo chengli 50 zhounian* (Fifty Springs and Autumns: Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the China Institute of International Studies) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2006), p. 2.

under the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), but initially it was not under the management of the CAS, owing to the consideration that at the time the CAS was incapable of taking care of it. Instead, it was temporarily put under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for the purpose of entering into cooperation to train diplomats. On June 12, the Office of Foreign Affairs of MFA issued a notification that “the Institute of International Relations [*guoji guanxi yanjiusuo*] in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been founded, with Meng Yongqian [president of Nankai University] as director.” On October 10, the State Council notified the MFA that it had been approved the establishment of the “Institute of International Relations (IIR) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.” On November 28, 1958, the institute’s name was changed to the Institute of International Relations (IIR), implying that the institute’s affiliation had been shifted to the MFA.³³⁶

The background to the establishment of the IIR was that in the wake of the split between China and the Soviet Union, the “leaning to one side” (*yibiandao*, meaning to favor the Soviet Union, a principle in force since 1949) policy was facing a grave challenge as the result of the Khrushchev “secret speech” and the Budapest and Warsaw events that had not been foreseen by the Chinese intelligence agencies.³³⁷ In fact, the IIR is one of the establishments related to foreign affairs that was proposed by Zhang Wentian (the other three are a college for training cadres in foreign affairs based at a branch of Renmin University—now the University of Foreign Affairs, a publishing house

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ David Shambaugh connects the initiative to establish the Institute of International Relations with the events in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union in 1956, attributing the real reason for this decision to Mao’s shock over these events and Khrushchev’s “secret speech,” which had not been predicted by his advisers. See Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” p. 577.

on foreign relations—the World Knowledge Publishing House (*shijie zhishi chubanshe*), and a library). Zhang argued that international studies should pay attention to the current international situation and to policies to cope with it, and should directly help the actual work of foreign affairs. But this was not enough because systematic research on international relations and foreign countries were absolutely necessary, particularly on mid- to long-term significant issues related to the overall international situation and international strategy. Thus, Zhang argued, a special institute for studies on international relations and international organizations was critically needed.³³⁸

Zhang Wentian devoted himself to promoting nationwide international studies. He said that there should be a division of labor among the different institutes, and each should have its own concentrations according to its respective specialties, while cooperation and conciliation among them was needed as well. For instance, institutes on foreign affairs related to government departments could focus on the international situation and policy recommendations, whereas institutes in colleges could concentrate on systematic and theoretical studies. In 1958 alone, Zhang presided over two research projects—one on war and peace, and the other on fundamental theories of international law. These projects may be considered the first serious theoretical studies in international relations since the establishment of the PRC.³³⁹ It is said that Zhang's contribution to foreign policy-making was his emphasis on international affairs research based on both reality and theory. He once asserted that “research should be based on

³³⁸ Cheng Zhongyuan, *Zhang Wentian zhuan* (Biography of Zhang Wentian) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 2000), pp. 694-695.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

reality and theory; research on theory should promote research on reality, and the two researches should be combined.” (*Jiwushi, youwuxu, yixudaishi, xushijiehe*).³⁴⁰

The establishment of such an institute in international studies did not mean that the decision-making model in the Chinese central government could be transformed under Mao Zedong’s leadership. Unlike the forerunner of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies (ICIS)—a section of the Investigation Department of the CPC Central Committee, the IIR did not have many qualified, full-time researchers. It is alleged that many of its staff were either those who had been criticized for having committed political errors in their work at the MFA and forced to leave their diplomatic positions, or those whose diplomatic assignments were in transition. According to Yang Chengxu, the former director of the CIIS (1993-2001), from 1956 to 1996, over thirty senior diplomats worked at the CIIS after retirement, or took up senior diplomatic posts after working at the institute for while.³⁴¹ At most, these people were skillful in foreign languages and diplomatic practices, but they were not well trained in theory or policy research, and many of them would stay at the institute for only a short time. Thus, it was almost impossible for them to conduct serious research on mid- and long-term issues.

To make things worse, three domestic political developments affected the actual role that the institute would play in foreign policy-making in the coming years. First, three years after the institute was created, its initiator, Zhang Wentian, was accused by Mao Zedong of being a “member of Peng Dehuai’s Military Club” at the 1959 Lushan

³⁴⁰ From an interview with a professor at the University of Foreign Affairs.

³⁴¹ Yang Chengxu, “Liaojie shijie, renshi shijie: jinian Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo chengli 40 zhounian” (To Understand and Comprehend the World: The Fortieth Anniversary of the CIIS), *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (Journal of International Studies), No. 4 (1996), p. 2.

Conference,³⁴² and he was attacked for being a member of the “anti-party clique” headed by Peng Dehuai in the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth National Conference of the CPC. Thereafter, Mao had absolute authority over every major domestic and foreign policy decision. Under such a situation, policy analyses and advice by researchers were not considered important, and their sole role was to collect information to relay to the top leader to make his decision.

Second, Mao was assertive and arbitrary in his strategic thinking about China’s relations with the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries. Whoever challenged his views would face political attack. One example is Wang Jiaxiang’s final purge after he challenged Mao’s doctrine of continuing revolution, which had been the foundation of Chinese foreign policy since the establishment of the PRC.

The purpose of establishing the Institute of West Asian and African Studies was to provide Mao and other policy-makers with historical, geographic, and socioeconomic background to the countries in the region that Mao saw on the front lines of the international struggle.³⁴³ Mao’s talk on April 27, 1961 with some African visitors was distinctly indicative of this idea. “To me, we do not have a clear idea about the African situation. [We] should establish an institute for African studies to study Africa’s history, geography, and social-economy,” and we should publish a simple and clear book. “Its

³⁴² Bajie bazhong quanwei wenjian huiji (Compilation of Documents of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the CPC), “Zhongguo gongchandang bajie bazhong quanwei guanyu yi Peng Dehui weishou de fandang jituan de cuowu de jueyi” (Resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the CPC Central Committee on the Mistakes of the Anti-CPC Clique led by Peng Dehui), August 16, 1959, <http://www2.zzu.edu.cn/mzd/index.htm>.

³⁴³ Mao said, “Africa is the front line of the struggle. Some other places are also at front line of the struggle, such as the Arab countries, Indonesia, Laos South Vietnam, and Latin America. ... All of these struggles are a struggle against the imperialists and their lackeys.” See “Africa Is the Front Line of the Struggle,” in Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry and Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, eds., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* (Selected Writings by Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), p. 463.

content should include how the imperialists came to Africa, how they oppressed the people there, how they encountered the people's resistance, how the resistance failed, and how it has now risen again.”³⁴⁴

It is said that the proposal to found a West Asian and African institute was first initiated in 1959, but it was not implemented until Mao Zedong gave official approval for it in his 1961 talk.³⁴⁵ Thereafter, in 1961 some formal institutes for international studies were established, including the Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) and the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS). In 1963, under Mao's instructions, Zhou Enlai summoned the heads of various agencies to discuss research work in international studies. Afterwards, the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs drafted a report to the Politburo on strengthening research work on foreign countries.³⁴⁶ Consequently, some other institutes were established, such as the Institute of Indian Studies and the Institute of International Law under the MFA, and the Institute of Soviet Studies (ISS), which was set up in 1965 and later was renamed the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, then in 2002 was once again renamed the Institute of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies. The IWAAS and ILAS were initially affiliated with the Philosophy and Social Sciences Department of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, but they were transferred to the Liaison Department (now called the International Department) of the CPC Central Committee in 1964, and finally merged into the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which was established in May 1975 from on the Philosophy and Social Sciences Department of the CAS. The establishment of the ISS was aimed at

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 465.

³⁴⁵ Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan*, p. 67.

³⁴⁶ Li Zong, “Xin Zhongguo guoji yanjiu wushi nian,” p. 612.

coordinating and exploring the rationale behind the attack on Soviet hegemonism and revisionism.³⁴⁷ In the beginning it was subordinate to both Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee and the Philosophy and Social Sciences Department of the CAS, and was placed under the Liaison Department in 1966. However, between 1969 and 1975 during the Cultural Revolution it was dissolved. Since 1981 it has been subordinate to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Another institute established in the 1960s was the World Economy Institute. Among its various sections, there was a World Politics Research Section. All other currently existing institutes in international studies under the CASS did not come into being until the early 1980s. The concentration on the developing countries and the Soviet Union in international studies perhaps reflected Mao Zedong's revolutionary international strategy and preoccupation with competing with the Soviet Union for leadership in the national liberation movements and the socialist revolution.

The China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) was formally founded in 1965, one year before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. The institute was subordinate to the Investigation Department of the CPC Central Committee, and actually it was a bureau of the department responsible for information analysis.³⁴⁸ The precursor to the Investigation Department can be traced back to the Social Department of CPC Central Committee in Yan'an, when the Social Department dealt

³⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 613.

³⁴⁸ Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," p. 577.

with the Communist International as well as taking charge of intelligence collection and analysis for the CPC leaders.³⁴⁹

The Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 completely ruled out the possibility that research institutes on foreign affairs would play any role in foreign policy making, probably with the one exception of the CICIR. The IIR was shut down in 1967, and the other institutes were virtually paralyzed. Even the CICIR was ordered, like all other government departments, to send its researchers to May Seventh Cadre Schools in the countryside; thus most of its senior researchers temporarily departed for Shandong province. A small group of remaining personnel was merged into the Second Department of the General Staff of the PLA until the Investigation Department was restored in 1969. It can be deduced that the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia, its military clash with China, and the threats of a Soviet invasion, propelled the Chinese leadership to restore the CICIR.

Regardless, intelligence and analysis on international relations were still needed for the policy-makers, or rather for Mao. One example is that before the Ninth Congress of the CPC, in February 1969, Mao Zedong entrusted four old generals, Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying, to examine the international situation. The four marshals held twenty-nine seminars with experts on international affairs over the course of seven months, and finally submitted to the top leaders two reports entitled *Dui zhanzheng xingshi de chubu guji* (Preliminary Assessment of the War Situation) and *Dui muqian xingshi de kanfa* (A View on the Present Situation) which drew some decisive conclusions: "It is impossible that a war will occur, but we should be well prepared for

³⁴⁹ Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of the PRC's Diplomatic Institutions* (PhD dissertation), College of International Relations and Public Affairs Administration, Fudan University, March 12, 2005, p. 175.

it ... The Soviet Union does not dare to wage a large size invasion of China ... the contradiction between the Soviet Union and the United States is greater than that between China and the Soviet Union ... and it is possible to take advantage of the contradiction between the United States and Soviet Union.”³⁵⁰ These judgments contributed to Mao’s determination to open the door to the United States under the Nixon administration. In the process of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, CICIR researchers played a significant role by explaining the Nixon Doctrine and the Nixon administration’s willingness to change its China policy.³⁵¹ However, even when Mao and his assistants required help from researchers, what they needed was merely raw information, no analysis or policy advice. This is because all strategic decisions were always made by Mao himself. A good example is the decision to invite the American table tennis team to visit China. Zhang Wenjin’s comments make this very clear: “Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou actually knew very little about the United States; they had to rely on us. Now our leaders have much contact with Americans in China, and they read many articles and materials on the United States, but they still need us to help interpret the United States for them.”³⁵²

The nature of the totalitarian political process for a long time prevented experts on international relations from engaging in the policy-making process. China’s isolation from the rest of the world and the suspension of almost all of China’s foreign relations during the chaos of the ten years of the Cultural Revolution further reduced the demand for information analysis and policy recommendations from experts.

³⁵⁰ Yao Jianping, *Zhu De de zuihou suiyue* (The Last Years of Zhu De) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2002), p. 626.

³⁵¹ Li Zong, “Xin Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiu 50 nian” (Fifty Years of Research on International Relations in New China), in Scientific Research Bureau of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, *Xin Zhongguo shehui kexue wushi nian* (Fifty Years of Research on the Social Sciences in New China), p. 626.

³⁵² Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990*, p. 6.

The Development of Think Tanks in the First Decade of the Post-Mao Era

After Deng Xiaoping took charge of Chinese politics and foreign policy in 1978, the model for China's foreign policy decision making was gradually reframed. The 1980s and 1990s saw a mushrooming of institutes of foreign affairs and strategic studies. The first noteworthy development was the establishment of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Founded in 1977 as an expansion of and successor to the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the CAS, initially CASS did not have any comprehensive international studies, since the only institutes at that time were those for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, West Asia and Africa, and Latin America. It was not until the 1980s that institutes for the Western countries were established. The expansion of Chinese international relations prompted CASS to extend its fields of study to include the major Western countries. Thus, the Institute of American Studies, Institute of Japan Studies, and Institute of West European Studies (its name was changed to the Institute of European Studies after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union) were set up in 1981, and the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies was founded in 1988. Thereafter, all continents and important regions of the world were represented in the structure of CASS, which has become the highest national academic organization and a center for research on philosophy and social sciences in China, a system that copied the Soviet model. Each regional institute has its own publication, for instance, the Institute of American Studies publishes a journal entitled *American Studies* and the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies publishes *Asia-Pacific Studies*. These journals are regarded as authoritative publications in their respective fields.

After the establishment of CASS, the institutes of international studies began to serve different functions from in the past when some of them were subordinate to the Party Liaison Department. They now have a mandate to conduct comprehensive studies on mid- and long-term regional and national issues. Each institute with a country or regional focus is usually comprised of sections to study the economy, domestic politics, foreign policy, and society and culture of the respective country or region. During the first decade and a half after the emergence of CASS, its institutes on international studies generally were not given tasks directly by government ministries or the General Office of the State Council/CPC Central Committee, and they did not closely follow the dynamics of each country's domestic politics and foreign policies. Instead, they concentrated on the basic characteristics and theoretical approaches to the relevant states or regions. In other words, the CASS institutes for international studies were not necessarily policy-oriented. As David Shambaugh observes, policy relevance and policy influence are not their main goals or functions. Many of them are more interested in pure academic studies and "building and disseminating knowledge and information about foreign countries to other similar organizations and the learned public."³⁵³ For this reason, these institutes were not regarded as typical think tanks until the situation changed in the mid-1990s.

In 1980 the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) was formally established and began academic exchanges with foreign scholars, experts, and officials to discuss foreign policy and international relations. The China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), which was established in 1979 and headed by Wu

³⁵³ Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolution Structure and Process," pp. 596.

Xiuquan, a former PLA deputy-chief of General Staff and first Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia, was allegedly subordinate to the Second Department of the General Staff Department.

Many new institutes in universities were created in the 1980s as well. These include the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai (1985), the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Xiamen University in Xiamen (1980), the Institute of Middle East Studies at Shanghai Foreign Languages University in Shanghai (now called Shanghai International Studies University) (1980), and the Institute of South Asian Studies of Sichuan University in Chengdu (1978). In the 1990s, additional centers/institutes were established, such as the Center for European Studies at the People's University in Beijing (1994), the Center for Northeast Asian Studies at Jilin University in Changchun (1994), the Center for APEC Studies at Nankai University in Tianjin (1995), the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University in Shanghai (1999), and the Institute of International Studies at Qinghua University in Beijing (1999). Hitherto, among universities a network for international studies that is parallel to that at CASS has been set up. Although the creation of these centers/institutes contributed to advancing the disciplines of comparative political science and international relations in China, before the mid-1990s, they lacked capacity, experience, and interest in policy analysis, as well as access to government departments. Moreover, there was not much demand for policy analysis coming from government departments.

The growth of centers or institutes subordinate to different government departments reflects the fact that the Chinese decision-making model was changing. As analyzed in

Chapter Two, Deng Xiaoping did not have the absolute authority of Mao, and he thus had to share power with other aging cadres. There is no doubt that Deng Xiaoping had the final say on all major domestic policies and international strategies, but his power was balanced by the moderate reformers, the so-called “conservatives.” At the same time, daily policy decisions were made by a younger generation of leaders, like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who had much less experience and authority on domestic and foreign affairs.³⁵⁴ More importantly, as economic development became a top priority and the ideological factor in policy-making became less important, sometimes giving way to technological considerations, experts on economics became more involved in economic reform policy making. After the early 1980s, a host of economic think tanks subordinate to the State Council served as policy plants, producing packages of open-minded reform-related measures, and “the only game in town was to influence Zhao Ziyang.”³⁵⁵

³⁵⁴ A. Doak Barnett writes: “Day-to-day decision making on major policy issues has shifted from Politburo and its Standing Committee to the Party Secretariat, headed by Zhao himself. Zhao stressed that these two bodies cooperate closely and that both look ultimately to Deng Xiaoping, who makes the final decision on many issues.” See Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, p. 9.

³⁵⁵ Barry Naughton, “China’s Economic Think Tanks: Their Changing Role in the 1990s,” *China Quarterly*, No. 171 (September 2002), p. 626. But the author’s comments on economic think tanks in the 1980s are strange. In fact, all of the leading economic think tanks in the 1980s were government agencies, not, “independent think tanks.” They included one office and five centers founded under the State Council in 1980-81, serving as policy plants to provide policy recommendations to advance Premier Zhao Ziyang’s economic reform: the Office of Economic Reform (OER) (*jingji tizhi gaige bangongshi*), the Center for Research on Technical Economics (CRTE) (*jishu jingji yanjiu zhongxin*), the Center for Research on Prices (CRR) (*jiage wenti yanjiu zhongxin*), the Center for Research on Economic Laws and Regulations (CRELR) (*jingji fagui yanjiu zhongxin*), and the Center for Research on Rural Development (CRRD) (*nongcun fazhan yanjiu zhongxin*). In the 1985 institutional reform of the State Council, the OER’s name was changed to the Economic Reform Committee; the CRTE, CRR, and CRELR were merged into the Center for Research on Technology, Society, and Development (*jishu shehui fazhan yanjiu zhongxin*), and further renamed the Center for Research on Development; the CRELR was reorganized as the Bureau of Laws and Regulations of the State Council in 1985; the CRRD remained intact in 1985, but was reorganized as a bureau of the State Council. After the early 1990s

On the other hand, government departments related to foreign affairs also needed to open to the outside world to learn about the relevant countries or regions and to better understand the international situation. Because the bureaucrats in government departments could not contact foreign scholars or officials directly, or even if they could, it was impossible for them to have deep and straightforward exchanges of opinions, a window through which to look at and contact the outside world was needed. A semi-independent institute was such a window; thus CICIR, CIISS, and IIS became the windows of the MSS, the Second Department of the GSD, and the MFA respectively.³⁵⁶ All the ministries/departments to which these institutes were linked had responsibility for collection of information and policy analysis. Simultaneously, their foreign counterparts also needed windows to observe what the Chinese ministries/departments were thinking and doing, and to explore the views of China's top leaders regarding the specific foreign countries and general international relations. In addition, researchers at these institutes wanted their voices to be heard by Chinese policy-makers so that they would have an influence on Chinese foreign policy. For these reasons, such institutes rapidly developed communications with foreign think tanks and officials.³⁵⁷

However, although since late 1978 the change in leadership promoted the professionalization and institutionalization of policy making, Deng Xiaoping's charisma

when many new development centers emerged under different ministries of the State Council, the older centers did not play as important a role as they did during the Zhao Ziyang years.

³⁵⁶ Murray Scot Tanner also uses the metaphor of the think tanks as a "window," but he uses it in a different context. The Chinese think tanks "have become some of the most important windows through which foreign analysts can observe China's usually opaque policy-making system." See Murray Scot Tanner, "Changing Windows on a Changing China: The Evolving 'Think Tank' System and the Case of the Public Security Sector," *China Quarterly*, No. 171 (September 2002), p. 559.

³⁵⁷ Interviews with researchers at these institutes, 2006.

and authority did not leave much room for think-tank influence on foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, in the 1980s most think tanks were still at an infancy stage, and they did not have regular channels to reach the top policy-makers. Even so, in the 1980s, there is some evidence of think-tank influence on foreign policy making. For instance, Xuanli Liao believes that the fundamental change in Deng Xiaoping's views regarding the possibility of a world war came about due to Hua Di's 1978 report on the international situation, which challenged the prevailing belief that a world war was inevitable. There is evidence that Deng had read Hua Di's report and highly valued it.³⁵⁸ Huan Xiang, a distinguished diplomat and specialist on international relations and director of the China Center for International Studies, also worked on the topic of peace and war in the early 1980s. He and Liu Simu, deputy director of the China Institute of International Studies, shared the conclusion that since the possibility of a future world war could be delayed or avoided, China had an opportunity to have a "fairly long period of a peaceful international environment for [its] four modernizations."³⁵⁹ Although there is no proof that Deng had read their articles, they still had a strong impact on the intellectual environment for strategic thinking. In any event, *The Report on the Work of the Government* (1983) estimated that within the next ten years there would not be a

³⁵⁸ Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy toward Japan*, pp. 71-72; Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, pp. 9-11; Carol L. Hamrin, "Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.70-114 at p. 90.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91; Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China*, p. 12; Zhao Wei, *Zhao Ziyang zhuan* (Biography of Zhao Ziyang) (Hong Kong: Educational and Cultural Press, 1989), pp. 248-249; Susan L. Shirk, "The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform," in Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 65.

world war.³⁶⁰ Moreover, the fact that views totally different from those long held by the top leaders could even be uttered and that these views could have a direct influence on Chinese policy-making were signs of more independent thinking in international relations.

The establishment of the Center for International Studies (CIS) was an early attempt to bring experts into the foreign policy-making process at a time when China started to open up to the outside world and was becoming more active in the international arena, while most institutes for international studies had not yet come into being or were still in infancy. Based on a proposal by Huan Xiang, in 1982 China's new leadership decided to establish the CIS to coordinate nationwide agencies for international studies, in order to narrow the distance between academic circles and top decision-makers.³⁶¹ In 1988, the CIS was renamed the China Center for International Studies (CCIS), headed by Huan Xiang as its secretary general. In addition to a wide range of subjects, from political, economic, and security issues, the CCIS also studied the mid- and long-term international situation and strategies. It was entrusted with two tasks: to coordinate research on international affairs within the Chinese government and to channel this research to the Chinese leaders.³⁶² As a coordinating body, the CCIS had only twenty staff members, but it was associated with as many as fifty researchers from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, universities, and other organizations. In fact, the design of the functions and operations of the CCIS only served short-term purposes. At the same

³⁶⁰ Luo Zhaohong, "Globalization Challenge and the Role of Think Tanks in China," in John W. Langford and K. Lorne Brownsey, eds., *Think Tanks and Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991), pp. 75-76.

³⁶¹ Zhu Jianrong, "Shifts in China's Foreign Policy Decision Process," <http://www.nira.go.jp/publ/review/94authumn/zhu.html>.

³⁶² Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990*, p. 12.

ministerial rank as the MFA, the CCIS was not subordinate to the MFA, thus the MFA had no authority to require the CCIS to cooperate in research work.³⁶³ CCIS influence on foreign policy was based on Huan Xiang's personal relations with the top leaders rather than on the institutional structure. Therefore Huan Xiang's death in 1989 inevitably affected the fate of the CCIS. In 1998, in the process of the institutional reform of the State Council, the CCIS, formerly one of the most influential think tanks in China, was finally merged into the Institute of International Studies (IIS), which for years had been regarded as one of CCIS's competitors in terms of attracting the attention and endorsement of the premier.³⁶⁴ The participation of CCIS researchers greatly upgraded the quality of IIS research.

The 1990s witnessed a new trend of growth of Chinese think tanks in international studies. A major change was that the leaders of CASS realized the necessity to enhance its importance in the Chinese policy-making process. One of the underlying problems in the administration of the old-style research was the serious budget shortfalls due to the development of the market economy. As a non-profit organization, CASS could only rely on a modest government budget, and the financial support from the government to CASS could only guarantee CASS researchers salaries that were at most two-thirds of the salaries of most professors at universities. For this reason, many capable researchers of CASS transferred to the universities as the salaries at the major universities, such as Peking University and Qinghua University, were dramatically increased in the late 1990s. The CASS institutes therefore faced a serious problem of survival. Many people, both

³⁶³ Nina Halpern, "Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy," in Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, pp. 138, 147.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

inside and outside of CASS, felt that some of the CASS faculty should be integrated into the universities and others should be merged into government institutes. The leaders of the CASS recognized that to solve the problem CASS faced, it had to attract more attention from the government by demonstrating its significance not only in theoretical work but also in policy analysis.

Li Tieying, a member of Politburo who became president of CASS in 1994, had a very strong sense of serving politics and the four modernizations. In 1994 he argued that CASS “should develop a role as staff and assistant to the CPC Central Committee and the central government.”³⁶⁵ This tendency to stress the function of CASS as a think tank was reinforced at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 2003, Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, called for CASS “to endeavor to become a think tank and brain-trust for the CPC Central Committee and central government ... serving scientific policy-making of the CPC Central Committee.”³⁶⁶ This is the most direct and formal statement of the target of CASS. The change in direction was marked by a 2004 document of the Chinese Communist Central Committee entitled “Views on the Further Prosperity of Philosophy and the Social Sciences,” which calls for raising major questions of inquiry in philosophical and social science circles, and for applying research achievements to various policy-makings, using them to deal with issues in the process of reform, development, and stabilization, and making the philosophical and social sciences circles a “think tank” and “brain-trust” for party and

³⁶⁵ Li Tieying, “Yiding yao banhao Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan” (The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Must Definitely Be Run Well), <http://cass.net.cn/25zhounian/W4-XLHD/X2-BDH/bdh-12.htm>.

³⁶⁶ <http://cass.net.cn/webnew/file/200303045642.html>.

government work.³⁶⁷ The consultative role of the CASS institutes in international studies therefore apparently is no longer regarded as secondary or complementary. This trend became even more apparent in the twenty-first century as the CASS reservoir of experts began to meet the needs for foreign policy advice by government departments and policy-makers.

In retrospect, the milestone in the role of scholars in foreign policy-making was Li Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. in 1995. Before this event, experts and researchers at the IAS had few connections with the MFA. But in April 1995, researchers at this institute received a message that Li Teng-hui would be issued a diplomatic visa to visit the U.S. At a lecture at the IAS, Ralph Clough from the American Embassy in Beijing had commented that although the U.S. State Department believed that Li's visit to the U.S. was not consistent with the non-official nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations, President Clinton very likely would not be able to ignore the huge pressure from the Congress to grant him a visa. Thereafter serious discussions were held at the IAS and a report was later delivered to the MFA regarding the likelihood that Clinton would give permission for Li to visit the U.S. However, this news was not reported to the top leaders. It seemed that cooperation between the MFA and the Office of Taiwan Affairs (OTA) in the top leadership was inefficient, as evidenced by the fact that soon after Li's visit to the U.S., director of the OTA Tang Shubei was still preparing for Wang Daohan's projected visit to Taiwan! The backlash on Sino-American relations due to Li's U.S. visit was disastrous, and such misjudgments needed at all costs to be avoided in the future. Thus

³⁶⁷ Li Shenming, "Jiaqiang dang de lingdao, fanrong zhexue shehui kexue: xuexi dang zhongyang 'Guanyu jinyibu fanrong zhexue shehui kexue de yijian'" (Strengthen Party Leadership, Furthering the Prosperity of Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Studying the Party Central Committee's 'Views on the Further Prosperity of Philosophy and the Social Sciences'), *Guangming Daily*, March 23, 2004.

more information collection and policy analysis were required before reaching any consensus on foreign policy at the highest levels, and thereafter, the frequency of consultations with scholars by both the MFA and the OTA increased sharply.³⁶⁸

Categories of International Studies Think Tanks in China

Chinese think tanks can be divided into three categories, based on the degree of closeness with the government: government institutes, semi-government institutes, and institutes/centers in universities.³⁶⁹ Even among the institutes that are subordinate to government departments, the degree of closeness to their respective departments may vary. For instance, the CIIS is a branch of the MFA, but as a periphery agency it is not included on the list of the composition of the ministry; thus it has relatively looser connections with the ministry compared with, for example, the Department of Policy Planning (DPP) of the MFA, and it therefore has some autonomy. For this reason, the CIIS can be categorized as a government think tank, whereas the DPP is a component of the MFA. As a Bureau of the MSS, CICIR's ties with its upper authority, the MSS, are closer than CIIS's links with the MFA. But due to its academic nature, it is much different from other components of the Ministry. Institutes like the CICIR and the IISS, are the most policy-oriented among all categories of think tanks. Their personnel have regular channels to the top leaders as well as access to classified information. For instance, analysts at these institutes, especially those at the CICIR and CIIS, can regularly read diplomatic cables, presidential letters, reports on summit meetings, and other

³⁶⁸ Comment by a senior scholar in author's interview, 2006.

³⁶⁹ In Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan*, p. 76, the divisions are 1) the governmental think tanks; 2) the IR institutes under the CASS; and 3) the university-affiliated IR institutes.

classified materials.³⁷⁰ They often receive direct instructions for research from the upper authorities, and their work is directed to meet the urgent needs of the government.

In contrast, with few exceptions, the second and third categories of think tanks have no access to high-level confidential intelligence, including telegrams from delegations abroad, absolutely confidential reference materials produced by the Xinhua News Agency, intelligence from the MSS, and the journal *Junqing* (Military Intelligence). However, the advantage of the institutes in the first category is also their weakness, given that they are more preoccupied with short or medium-term research and are thus less familiar with theoretical research and with the history, culture, society, and overall political structure of the country or region that they study.

The second category of think tanks includes the institutes for international studies at CASS and those institutes under the provincial or municipal academies of social sciences, for example, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences or the Zhejiang (Province) Academy of Social Sciences. They are subordinate to either the authority of the State Council or the provincial/ municipal governments. However, even though they receive their budgets from either the Ministry of Finance of the central government or from the local government, they are not part of the formal power structure and they can play the role of a bridge between power and knowledge. Over the past dozen years or so, the focus of these institutes has changed to a great extent from being purely academically oriented to being relatively policy-oriented, and from long-term research issues to a combination of short-, medium- and long-term issues. They still pay more attention to basic studies on the history, culture, society, and economic and political structure of the

³⁷⁰ Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, "Chinese Civilian Foreign Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence," *China Quarterly*, No. 171 (September 2002), pp. 608-609.

various countries than the institutes in the first category, but to a certain extent they have shifted attention to policy analysis in order to meet the increasing needs of the government. In many respects, this second category should be seen as situated in between the first and third categories in terms of the closeness of its links with the government and the characteristics of its research. Serving mainly the needs of local governments, local academies have less influence on foreign policy-making that, in fact, is more centralized than policy-making in other fields.³⁷¹

The third category includes the centers/institutes in the universities. They have no organizational links with government establishments related to foreign policy making, except through the Ministry of Education to which they are subordinate. Their access to policy-makers depends on personal and informal rather than organizational and formal relations or connections. If they really want to be heard, they will make efforts to arrange personal relations. As the most independent and most peripheral in terms of policy making, this category of think tanks generally does not have an obligation to provide information analysis and/or policy recommendation unless they so desire. Their strength and advantage is basic theoretical research on long-term issues. One such example is the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. Established in 1985, the institute gradually established its reputation in Chinese academic circles for research on arms control and regional security, the American Congress, Sino-American relations, and American religion and culture. It also produces experts' reports on a regular basis and policy recommendations on an irregular basis, but it does not have direct or

³⁷¹ American scholars have observed that the institutes of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) as a whole do not play a significant policy role. See Glaser and Saunders, "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence," p. 600. This is also the case for institutes under the provincial academies of social sciences.

institutional connections with the Chinese central government apparatus. In general, university input to the policy-making process remains occasional and erratic, though some professors at major universities in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen have been asked for analysis on international issues.³⁷² All leading non-college think tanks are located in Beijing, except for the SIIS in Shanghai.³⁷³ From one perspective, this is indicative of the centralization of the foreign policy-making process in China.

There is another type of think tank which differs from the above three. An example is the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies. However, this type of think tank is so rare that it is treated here as an exception to all three categories. Its features will be introduced separately below (see Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 Principal Foreign Policy Think Tanks in China

Category I: Institutes under Government Departments

Institute:	Subordinate to:
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations	Ministry of State Security
China Institute of International Relations	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
China Institute for International Strategic Studies	General Staff Department of the PLA
Xinhua Center for World Affairs Studies	Xinhua News Agency
Institute of International Strategy Studies	Central Communist Party School
Shanghai Institute of International Relations	Shanghai Municipal Government

³⁷² Ibid., p. 604.

³⁷³ Gerald Chan, "International Studies in China: Origins and Development," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (February 1997), pp. 61-62. This article lists 60 centers/institutes in international studies at Chinese universities in 1995. In fact, among them only a few that are located outside of Beijing regularly provide policy recommendations to Chinese policy-makers.

Category II: Institutes under Government Academies

Institute:	Subordinate to:
Institute of World Economy and Politics	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Institute of American Studies	
Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies	
Institute of Russia and Central ASEAN Studies	
Institute of European Studies	
Institute of Japanese Studies	
Institute of Latin American Studies	
Institute of West ASEAN and African Studies	

Category III: University Institutes*

Institute:	Attached to:
*Center for American Studies	Fudan University
*Center for European Union Studies	People's University
*Center for Russian Studies	East China Normal University
*Center for Northeast Asian Studies	Jilin University
*Center for Southeast Asian Studies	Xiamen University
*Center for APEC Studies	Nankai University
*Institute of Middle East Studies	Shanghai Foreign Language University
*Institute of Taiwan Studies	Xiamen University
*Institute of South Asian Studies	Sichuan University
*Academy of Overseas Chinese Studies	Ji'nan University
Institute of International Studies	Qinghua University

Centers marked with an asterisk are national bases for innovation (*guojia chuangxin jidi*) approved by the Ministry of Education, meaning that they receive special large funds for research from the Ministry.

In some cases, the institutes in the first category enjoy substantial financial support, for instance, enough to subscribe to all the principal magazines and newspapers from around the world and to purchase extraordinarily large collections of foreign books.

Currently, as China's chief collector of books on international relations, the CICIR holds

more than 50,000 books in various languages and subscribes to over 1,000 periodicals and newspapers. This is unmatched in any other institute in China.³⁷⁴ Prior to the reform era when importing foreign periodicals and newspapers was forbidden, the CICIR was one of the few institutes in China that was allowed to import publications from abroad. Similarly, the CIIS can afford to subscribe to one of the only two collections of the American *Congressional Quarterly* in China (the other one is in the Beijing Library). Considering the cost of a subscription, this signals its unique privilege in international research. However, institutes in this first category usually do not have much funding for research, since there usually are restrictions on applying for funding from outside of government, and domestic financial support for research is limited. At the same time, reports prepared for the higher authorities must be submitted free of charge. For example, the CIIS must submit papers and reports to the MFA for free, since this was the purpose of its establishment. In contrast, institutes at CASS have adopted a “project system” (*keti zhi*), meaning researchers are permitted to apply for funds from different sources. Some CASS officials even complain that CASS researchers would not write a single word if they were not given the extra money. This might be an exaggeration, but it is indicative of the difference in management of research in institutes in the first and second categories.

Table 4-2 indicates the interests and focuses of the various institutes for international studies at CASS.

³⁷⁴ Official Introduction to the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, p. 5.

Table 4-2 Institutes of International and Taiwan Studies at CASS

Institute	Date of Establishment	Number of Staff	Research Sections	Affiliated Centers
Institute of World Economy and Politics (IWEP)	1981	120	Section on Transnational Corporations and International Economic Organizations Section on the Structure of Production Section on World Economic Statistics Section on International Politics Section on International Trade Section on International Strategy Section on international Finance	Center for American Economics Studies Center for World Economics History Center for International Finance Studies Center for Corporate Governance Studies Center for Global Mergers and Acquisitions Center for World Chinese Entrepreneur Enterprises Studies Center for Development Studies Center for World Agricultural Studies
Institute of American Studies (IAS)	1981	50	Section on American Foreign Policy Section on American Politics Section on American Economy Section on American Society and Culture	Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Studies
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (IAPS)	1988	60	Section on Politics and Society Section on the Economy Section on Security and Foreign Relations	Center for Korean Peninsular Studies Center for Southeast Asian Studies
Institute of Russian, East Europe, and Central Asian Studies (IREEMCAS)	1965	110	Section on Russian Politics Section on Russian Economy Section on Russian Foreign Policy Section on Central Asia Section on Ukraine Section on East Europe Section on Soviet History	
Institute of European Studies (IES)	1981	53	Section on International Politics Section on the Economy Section on Society and Culture Section on Law and Politics Section on EU Expansion	

(Continued)

Institute	Date of Establishment	Number of Staff	Research Sections	Affiliated Centers
Institute of Japan Studies (IJS)	1981	60	Section on Politics Section on the Economy Section on Culture Section on Foreign Relations	Center for Sino-Japanese Relations Studies Center for Sino-Japanese Economic Relations Studies Center for Sino-Japanese Society and Culture Studies Center for East Asian Peace and Development Studies Center for Japanese Political Studies
Institute of Latin American Studies (ILMS)	1961	29	Section on Politics Section on the Economy Section on Society and Culture Section on International Relations	
Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS)	1961	60	Section on the Middle East Section on Africa Section on International Relations Section on Society and Culture	Center for South African Studies Center for Persian Gulf Studies
Institute of Taiwan Studies (ITS)	1984	90	Section on Politics Section on the Economy Section on Comprehensive Studies Section on Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Statistics	

Source: Compiled from the Websites of the respective institutes.

In 2000, according to “211 Project”³⁷⁵ the Ministry of Education appropriated funding of 34 million yuan (approximately US\$4 million) to 100 significant research bases in the fields of the humanities and social sciences, ten of which were relevant to the field of international relations, including the Center for American Studies at Fudan

³⁷⁵ The “211 project” refers to the plan that in 21st century 100 significant research bases in the field of humanities disciplines and social sciences will be established in China.

University, the Center for EU Studies at People's University, the Center for Russian Research at East China Normal University, the Center for Northeast Asia Studies at Jilin University, the Center for Southeast Asian Studies in Xiamen University, the Center for APEC Studies in Nakai University, the Institute of Middle East Studies in Shanghai Foreign Languages University, the Institute of Taiwan Studies in Xiamen University, the Institute of South Asian Studies in Sichuan University, and the Academy of Overseas Chinese Studies in Ji'nan University (in Guangzhou City). The Ministry announced that these research bases should function as “think tanks,” “information tanks,” and “talent tanks.”³⁷⁶ In February 2003, the Ministry of Education issued “Some Views on the Further Development and Prosperity of Philosophy and the Social Sciences in Academics,” providing that the establishment of major research bases should be an important part of the “Plan for the Prosperity of Philosophy and the Social Sciences in Academics,” and for this purpose the Committee for the Social Sciences of the Ministry of Education was established.

The 2003 document affects the direction of the development of CASS in the same way that it affects centers/institutes at universities. Following the document's instructions, the Ministry of Education began the second stage of its “985 Project,” (985 *jihua*)³⁷⁷, relying on major universities to develop fifty so-called “Bases for Innovation in

³⁷⁶ Ministry of Education, “Putong gaodeng xuexiao renwen shehui kexue zhongdian yanjiu jidi guanli banfa” (Managerial Regulations for the Major Research Bases in the Humanities and Social Sciences in Ordinary Universities and Colleges), in *Jiaoyubu wenjian* (Ministry of Education Document) (Jiaoshezeng 2003, No. 1), cited in Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of the PRC's Diplomatic Institutions*, p. 182.

³⁷⁷ In May 1998, General Secretary Jiang Zemin delivered an address at a ceremony on the anniversary of the establishment of Qinghua University, calling for select several universities that would take the lead in becoming world-class universities. The Education Ministry soon worked out a project in accordance with Jiang's speech, called the 98/5 project. According to the project, for their more rapid development, twelve universities would receive extra funds from the central government. For instance, Peking University and Qinghua University would gain 1.8 billion

Philosophy and the Social Sciences,” with a planned contribution of 20 million yuan (approximately US\$2.67 million) within four years. The purpose is to accelerate the growth of think tanks in universities.³⁷⁸

China Institute of Contemporary International Relations

The China Institute of Contemporary International Studies (CICIR) was established in 1965, but its origins can be traced back to the Yan’an years and the Chinese Communist Social Department (*shehui bu*) headed by Kang Sheng. It is the oldest body bearing the function of intelligence collection for the Communist Party, and perhaps was the most important think tank for foreign policy in China until the 1990s.³⁷⁹ Since then it has remained important. Beginning in 1980, it was no longer a closed and mysterious agency, and it started to open to the outside world and gradually operate as a fairly normal think tank. In 1982 the CICIR was placed under the newly established MSS, which means that its upper authority was no longer the CPC Central Committee, but rather the State Council.³⁸⁰ This structural arrangement lasted until 1999, when the

yuan; Fudan University, Nanjing University, Shanghai (and Xi’an) Transportation University, and China Science & Technique University would gain 1.2 billion yuan. At that time (1998), the annual budget of universities like Fudan University was only 50-60 million.

³⁷⁸ Zhao Kejin, *Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of PRC’s Diplomatic Institutions*, pp.181-182.

³⁷⁹ According to an important source, in the eyes of Chinese foreign policy-makers, until the 1990s the most useful reports were those from CICIR, not from the Bureau of Policy Planning of the MFA.

³⁸⁰ According to Lu Ning, after the establishment of the Ministry of State Security and the closure of the Department of Investigation of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the institute shifted from the latter to the former. Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 141. In 1982 the Politburo approved a suggestion by Liu Fuzhi, secretary general of the Politburo and minister of Public Security, to establish a Ministry of State Security by merging the Investigation Department with the sections the Ministry of Public Security responsible for anti-espionage work. Since then, the CICIR has been subordinate to the Ministry of State Security and the State Council. Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of the PRC’s Diplomatic Institutions*, p. 194, footnote 52.

CICIR was placed under the dual leadership of the MSS and the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA), also directly serving the Politburo.³⁸¹ With a good reputation for research, its name was changed to the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in 2004.

The CICIR has now a staff of 380, among whom about one-fourth are researchers. It consists of seven institutes, three divisions, and eleven centers. The institutes are the Institutes of Russian Studies, American Studies, European Studies, Japanese Studies, Asian and African Studies, Security and Strategic Studies, and World Economic Studies; the divisions are the divisions for Central Asian Studies, Latin American Studies, and Korean Peninsular Studies. CICIR research covers world strategic, political, economic, and security studies; country and regional studies; China's relations with other states, etc.,³⁸² and its findings are either submitted to the various requesting ministries in the form of reports, or are published in academic journals. It also publishes a monthly journal entitled *Contemporary International Relations* in different versions in both Chinese and English, and internally circulated monthly reference materials entitled International Materials and Information (*Guoji ziliao yu xinxi*), which are only available to high-ranking officials. Since CICIR directly serves the needs of Chinese leaders, it specializes in studies of international strategy, overall international relations, Chinese border relations, and the backgrounds of foreign leaders whom Chinese leaders will meet

³⁸¹ Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," p. 582. Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of PRC's Diplomatic Institutions*, chap. 8, p. 194, fn. 52; Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan*, p. 67; Glaser and Saunders, "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence," p. 599.

³⁸² CICIR brochure, 2006.

either in Beijing or abroad,³⁸³ and it is well known for inquiries on current and short-term issues.

There is no doubt that CICIR is one of the most influential think tanks on foreign policy. It is “a major source for foreign policy studies that go directly to China’s top leaders” due to its direct links with the State Council and the LGFA.³⁸⁴ However, CICIR’s status in the think tank community has been declining. During the Cultural Revolution, it was the only think tank able to provide raw intelligence to the Chinese central government. However, as China has become more open to foreign countries, it has lost much of its traditional monopoly position in information collection and analysis, since many think tanks are now allowed to purchase foreign books and materials in foreign currencies. Furthermore, with the spread of the Internet, increased access to information has further eroded CICIR’s special position. Now CICIR must compete with other think tanks for influence in foreign policy making. However, because it is the largest single think tank, and because of its access to confidential government materials and its policy-oriented research, and most importantly because of its direct and institutionalized channels to the top leaders, it remains a very prominent think tank in China.

The China Institute of International Studies

The China Institute of International Studies, originally named the Institute of International Studies (IIS), was established in 1956, with 59 researchers from five sources: employees from the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs as translators and

³⁸³ Interview with scholars at CICIR, June 2006.

³⁸⁴ Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, pp. 123-124.

editors; a group for Southeast Asian Studies subordinate to the MFA; returning Chinese scholars from abroad; some officials who allegedly had made mistakes and were objects of criticism; and some college graduates or lecturers.³⁸⁵

However, over time most of the faculty of the institute were either retired diplomats, diplomats who had committed errors, or low/middle-level diplomats who were waiting for new appointments, thus no serious research or analysis was undertaken. In fact, it was not taken seriously either by the MFA³⁸⁶ or by the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs.

The IIS was formally affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and under the administration of the MFA. On December 28, 1958, the State Council approved the suggestion to change its name to the Institute of International Studies, and from then on its relations with CAS were severed, and it was officially subordinate to the MFA, even though informally this had also been the case prior to the State Council document.

During the Cultural Revolution, operations at the institute ceased, and in 1969 all members were sent to a May Seventh Cadre School and the IIS was disbanded. In early 1973, Zhou Enlai instructed that institute be rebuilt to meet the needs of Chinese diplomatic work after the breakthrough in Sino-U.S. relations.³⁸⁷ The restored institute was renamed *Guoji Wenti Yanjiusuo* (the Institute of International Relations), though its name in English remained unchanged. Its first new assignment was to translate some books from English into Chinese, one of which was (a translation of) the *International*

³⁸⁵ Ma Zhengang, ed., *Wushi zai chungui: Jinian Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo chengli 50 zhounian*, p. 41.

³⁸⁶ Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," p. 583.

³⁸⁷ A speech given by the minister of Foreign Affairs at a meeting of the Party Group of the MFA on the work of the institute, cited in Ma Zhengang, ed., *Wushi zai chungui: Jinian Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo chengli 50 zhounian*, p. 67.

Law of the Sea, because knowledge in this area was needed after China's accession to the United Nations. The pseudonym for the translators, who numbered about 30 or 40 at most, was Qi Peihe, meaning "working together."³⁸⁸ In 1988 the institute's name was changed again to the China Institute of International Studies for the purpose of differentiating it from the newly emerging institutes in other government departments or universities.

After the China Center for International Studies was merged with the Institute of International Studies in 1998, its size was enlarged and its analytical expertise was reinforced. Unlike in the past, the CIIS now includes experienced diplomats, specialists on area studies, and college-trained scholars. Its importance is indicated by the deputy ministerial level of its director, in contrast to the bureau-level position of the president of CICIR even though the latter is about four times larger and it has a higher reputation.

The latest reorganization of the CIIS occurred in 2006. The sections are no longer divided by regions, but rather by major international issues. Hence the five regional sections and three sections on International Politics, World Economy, and Situation Assessment (*dongtai*) were replaced by sections on American Studies; Asia-Pacific Security and Cooperation; European Union Studies; Developing Countries; Shanghai Cooperation Organization; International Strategy; Current Situation Intelligence and Unexpected Events; and World Economy and Development. This new arrangement, which highlights the targets of the research subjects of each section, aims at facilitating exploration of international issues and international exchanges.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 71.

As an institute under the MFA, the CIIS' relations with the Ministry are much closer than any other Chinese think tank in international studies. In the division of labor among the ministers of Foreign Affairs, there has always been a deputy minister who has been in charge of the CIIS. From 1980 to 1996 these deputy ministers were:

Wang Shu (May 1978-the end of 1979)

Pu Shouchang (Nov.1979-April 1982)

Yao Guang (Dec. 1982-Feb. 1986)

Qian Qichen (March 1986-May 1988)

Zhou Nan (May 1988-March 1990)

Tian Zengpei (March 1990-April 1993)

Dai Bingguo (April 1993-about 1995)

The above deputy ministers read daily reports from the CIIS, addressed concrete issues, and sometimes suggested research subjects. However, what keeps the CIIS and the MFA close to each other is not the institutional link, but the links of the director of the CIIS to the MFA. In recent years, the successive directors have always been formal employees of the MFA, usually former ambassadors. They thus have personal relations with leaders within the Ministry and they understand the needs of the decision-makers in the MFA and how to write reports or policy suggestions that are acceptable to the MFA. Therefore, the research conducted by the institute matches the needs of the leadership of the MFA.³⁸⁹

The CIIS's function is somewhat different from that of the Bureau of Policy Planning or other sections within the MFA. The division of labor was stressed by Qian Qichen in 1991 when he said that the CIIS should focus on medium- and long-term issues of strategic importance. Consequently, the leaders of the institute passed a resolution

³⁸⁹ Interview with senior researchers at CIIS, 2006.

providing details about the direction of research on strategic medium- and long-term issues.³⁹⁰

In fact, the CIIS serves as a window for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the outside world, even if it is not a MFA insider. The MFA needs such an agency to play this type of role since as a government agency it cannot have direct contacts with foreign scholars or officials. Aware of the links between the CIIS and the MFA, foreign officials and scholars often try to set up regular exchange relations with the CIIS in the hopes that their views will be transmitted to the MFA leaders through the CIIS. Thus, since the early 1990s, the number of scholars and officials from foreign countries at the CIIS has dramatically increased. In 1991 alone, the number of international meetings and discussions at the institute reached 118, averaging one every three days. The CIIS has also established regular relations with many important institutes attached to foreign ministries abroad and has emerged as their counterpart in discussions.³⁹¹

The CIIS since the 1990s has thus become more active in the form of “Track II” diplomacy. This is a typical way that the CIIS serves as a window to the outside world for the MFA. The foreign participants in the “dialogue” are either former senior officials or scholars with direct connections with MFA officials. Such “dialogues” began with annual discussions between the CIIS and the Institute of International Relations in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then were extended to similar communications with other countries for the purpose of learning the foreign

³⁹⁰ See Ma Zhengang, ed., *Wushi zai chunqiu: Jinian Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo chengli 50 zhounian*, p. 78.

³⁹¹ Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” p. 585.

governments' views and allowing them to better understand the Chinese government's views.³⁹²

The official publication of the CIIS is *guoji wenti yanjiu* (International Studies). It also publishes an annual *Collection of Essays* based on year-end discussions on the international situation, a *Bluebook on the International Situation and Chinese Diplomacy*, and the *Guoji fengyun lu* (Yearbook on the International Situation). The products of the CIIS are not only submitted to the MFA, but also to other government departments and the State Council or the higher authorities.

China Institute for International Strategic Studies

The China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), established in 1979, is called the “premier intelligence analysis think tank in the Chinese military” and is “directly subordinate to the Second Department of the General Staff Department.”³⁹³ Its mandate is to “carry on research on strategic questions and national security issues.”³⁹⁴ Its military connection is obvious in the backgrounds of its successive chairmen who also served as deputy chiefs of the General Staff and whose portfolios included foreign intelligence and military diplomacy, as well as the Second and Third Departments and the Offices of Foreign Affairs. For instance, among the first chairmen, Wu Xiuquan and Xu Xin, and the current chairman Xiong Guangkai,³⁹⁵ the latter has just retired from the position of deputy chief of the General Staff, but he is expected to stay in the position of

³⁹² See Ma Zhengang, ed., *Wushi zai chunqiu: jinian Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo chengli 50 zhounian*, p. 107.

³⁹³ Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese Military Related Think Tanks and Research Institutes,” *China Quarterly*, No. 171 (September 2002), p. 619.

³⁹⁴ Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, p. 101.

³⁹⁵ Gill and Mulvenon, “Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutes,” p. 619.

chairman for several more years. The CIISS was initially called the Beijing Institute for Strategic International Studies, but in October 1992 its name was changed to the China Institute for International Strategic Studies to underscore its nature as a “national” organization for international strategic studies to communicate with scholars from foreign countries. The researchers at the CIISS are all retired senior intelligence officers, most of whom have served as attachés in Chinese embassies abroad. One example is General Chen Kaizeng, former military attaché to the U.S. The faculty consists of permanent researchers and some intelligence officers as well as staff responsible for office work, daily affairs, and communications, though some of them have the title of associate senior researcher. High-level consultants for the CIISS from government, party, and military departments are often invited to take part in CIISS events—inner discussions and formal conferences—including those from the MFA, the Academy of Military Sciences, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force, or intelligence analysts from the Second Department of the General Staff. There are about thirty people working within or associated with the CIISS.³⁹⁶

The CIISS is called by outsiders a “military think tank.” In the past nearly thirty years since its establishment, the CIISS has played an important role in Chinese security and economic development through its consultancies and recommendations on Chinese foreign and military policies.

In spite of the division of labor for research depending on assignment, personal interests, and specialty, unlike other institutes, researchers at the CIISS are not organized into sections. However, all strategically important issues in international relations are

³⁹⁶ Interview with a member of the CIISS, 2006; introduction in a CIISS brochure, 2006.

covered. There are two centers in the CIISS, that is, the Center for Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, and the Center for Anti-Terrorism Studies, indicating its emphasis on the importance of these two subjects. The aim of studies at the CIISS is to offer “consultancy and policy advice and research papers to relevant departments of the Chinese government and the PLA,”³⁹⁷ focusing on the international strategic situation, global security, world politics and the economy, and regional issues. CIISS research is said to be financed by the government and military as well as from consultancy services.

The open and official publication of the CIISS is a journal entitled *guoji zhanlüe yanjiu* (International Strategic Studies). It also published books and pamphlets on arms control, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and peace keeping. The most important products of the institute’s research is not for publication, but for submitting to high-ranking officials of the PLA, members of the CPC Central Military Commission, and, in cases of especially important decision making, sometimes directly to the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo through the inner communications system.

Unlike the other sections in the Second Department, the CIISS was intentionally designed to be “window” to both civilian think tanks at home, and military and intelligence apparatuses abroad. Thus far the CIISS has established regular exchanges with over fifty countries and regions and one hundred prominent institutes for strategic and international research, and it has maintained contacts with several distinguished state and military figures.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁷ Introduction in a CIISS brochure, 2006.

³⁹⁸ Interview with a researcher at the CIISS, June 2007.

The Institute of International Strategic Studies of the Central Party School

The Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS) is subordinate to the Central Party School. According to an official IISS introduction, it is an organ for both teaching and research. Its primary research focus is major international issues of strategic importance, with Chinese foreign policy as a secondary interest, in addition to routine teaching and research on international politics and relations, the world economy, as well as issues related to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. The IISS includes forty-two faculty members, among whom thirty-eight are professors/researchers. They are divided into five sections: Section on International Politics; World Economy; Trends in Contemporary Global Thinking; Chinese Foreign Policies and International Relations; and Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.³⁹⁹

The emergence of this institute is indicative of the importance of international studies in recent years. The idea to create an institute for international studies at the Central Party School was first set forth in 2000 by Zheng Bijian, acting dean of the Party School, who is recognized as having a broad perspective on international relations. Zheng foresaw that international studies would be of increased significance as China gradually became integrated into the international community and the world economy. After talking with some members of the existing Center for International Studies, Zheng and other leaders of the school decided to establish an institute for strategic studies by reorganizing the existing Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies.⁴⁰⁰

Established in 1985, the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies had focused on Marxist and Leninist theories. Due to the reform and opening policies, the institute was

³⁹⁹ Introduction in a CISS brochure, 2006.

⁴⁰⁰ Interviews with researchers at the IISS of the Party School, 2006.

facing a problem of survival. The reorganization proposals included: those who wanted to stay in a reoriented institute would stay; and those who wanted to continue their current research interests could shift to other departments. Thus, the Section on Human Rights Studies was transferred to the Department of Politics and Law, and the Section on Studies of Mao Zedong Thought was moved to the CPC History Department, whereas a Section on International Politics was brought in from the Department of Politics and Law, and a Section on the World Economy came from the Department of Economics. Thereby, three new sections of the IISS were established: the Section on Marxist Strategic Theory, the Section on Chinese Foreign Policies, and the Section on Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan Studies. However, for ideological reasons, the Institute of Studies on Marxist-Leninist Theory was not disbanded: the new IISS thus had “one faculty and two names,” i.e., the Institute of International Strategic Studies and the Institute for Studies on Marxist-Leninist Theory, yet the latter name is less known now.

In 2001, the Establishment Committee (*jianzhi weiyuanhui*) of the CPC Central Committee and the leaders of the Party School formally declared that the name of the institute would be fixed as the Institute of International Strategic Studies (*guoji zhanlue yanjiusuo*), rather than the originally conceived Institute of Strategic Studies (*zhanlue yanjiusuo*), in order to avoid it being confused with the existing China Institute of International Strategic Studies, since the Chinese name of the CIISS does not include the word “international” (*guoji*)

Because the Central Party School’s leaders have close relations with the CPC general secretary through the president of the school, as well as with the deputy general

secretary of the CPC, the IISS has special access to the top leaders and can have a direct influence by providing proposals on important issues. In at least two cases, it has had significant influence (see below). Yet, the institutional set-up does not guarantee that the IISS will participate in the foreign policy-making process: there is no formal mandate to the IISS from the foreign policy establishments—neither the MFA (it is not in a position to mandate the Party School, since the latter is part of the party system rather than the government system), nor the Foreign Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee can ask it for reports on policy analysis. The IISS is thus not approached for policy advice. Furthermore, even if the research members of the IISS volunteer to write reports, complicated steps must be taken before the reports can be submitted to the top leaders: first, the approval of the Bureau for Scientific Research of the Party School is required, as well as discussion among the CPC Committee of the school—a procedure which takes a long time—unless under exceptional circumstances when special access is granted and procedures are simplified.⁴⁰¹

The other two reasons for the lack of IISS influence on foreign policy-making include, first, unlike other semi-governmental institutes, IISS researchers are preoccupied with teaching obligations; second, since most of the researchers are not well trained in international studies, they are less well equipped to provide policy advice in this field.⁴⁰²

However, there is no doubt that the CPC Party School enjoys some advantages that other think tanks lack. The direct affiliation with the Central Committee of the CPC offers close links with the top leaders. Because of this access, foreign scholars and officials have incentives to maintain connections with the IISS. For instance, at a

⁴⁰¹ Interview with a senior researcher at the IISS, 2006.

⁴⁰² Interview with a senior researcher at the IISS, 2006.

January 2001 conference sponsored by the IISS, Hu Jintao, then the president of the Party School and the forthcoming general secretary of the party, met the participants, including four former American ambassadors, Winston Lord, J. Stapleton Roy, James Lilley, and Chas W. Freeman.

The IISS publishes an internal journal entitled *Sixiang lilun neican* (Internal Reference on Ideas and Theories). All published articles must be approved by the Confidential Section of the Office of the School. The other internal reference is *Zhongyang dangxiao neican* (Internal Reference of the Central Party School), which collects controversial articles that cannot be openly published, even though they express some valuable views. The IISS also has exchange programs with the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan.⁴⁰³

Unlike other research institutes, the IISS has a very limited budget from the Party School to support its research projects. Most of its funds for research come from other sources, like the China Foundation for the Social Sciences or the Ford Foundation. The lack of adequate financial support from within the school probably accounts for the obstacles to IISS development.

Xinhua Center for World Affairs

The Xinhua Center for World Affairs (XCWA) was established in November 1992 under the International Department of the Xinhua News Agency. It includes some senior former correspondents who have served in the New China News (Xinhua) Agency branches abroad for one or two decades, for example, the directors of the Middle East

⁴⁰³ Interviews with a senior researcher at the IISS, 2006.

Xinhua Branch, the Moscow Xinhua Branch, the United Nations Xinhua Branch, and the chief correspondent to Iraq. These people have strong language skills and extensive knowledge about the countries to which they were assigned. Many of them returned from their foreign posts in the early 1990s. In addition to full-time researchers, there are about fifty associate researchers who have served as correspondents and international news editors.⁴⁰⁴ The XCWA was established to conduct research on “new trends in world politics, security, and the economy, including global issues of strategic importance and regional and country issues, while giving priority to comprehensive and far-sighted research.” The foremost research interests of the XCWA are global strategies and the United Nations.⁴⁰⁵ Its main task is to publish the *Neican* (Internal Reference).

Traditionally, through the daily *Cankao ziliao* (Reference Materials) the Xinhua News Agency (XNA), with its over one hundred branches in different countries around the world, has been a principal source of information on international events. Chinese top leaders used to heavily rely on the raw materials provided by the XNA to learn about what was happening abroad and what foreigners thought about various international issues. However, following China’s opening up to the outside world and the proliferation of international studies think tanks in China, the sources of outside information have become more diversified. Moreover, the top leaders no longer require merely raw material, but rather insightful and comprehensive analysis based on the raw materials. The XCWA often serves this purpose. As at the other think tanks, some of the research subjects of the XCWA are mandated by the top leaders. Although there are only about a dozen researchers at the XCWA, it has an extraordinary ability to mobilize

⁴⁰⁴ XCWA brochure, and interview with a senior researcher at XCWA.

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with a senior researcher at the XCWA.

its branches spread over the world through its Department of Reference Compilation (*canbian bu*). In cases of crises, XCWA researchers can immediately phone their colleagues abroad for the latest information, based on which they can then write their analyses in Beijing. Due to their special access to the top leaders, the products of the XCWA researchers can be delivered in a timely manner,⁴⁰⁶ and their analytical reports have often been favorably received by the top leaders.

Unlike the other foreign policy think tanks, however, the focus of the XCWA is not confined to international issues. Rather, it is also interested in domestic matters, such as the Bankruptcy Law. In fact, it is allegedly easier for the XCWA to receive reactions or written instructions from the top leaders on domestic issues, especially local issues that need to be dealt with immediately. In contrast, it is less likely that recommendations or analyses on the world economy will receive written instructions from the State Council, and even less so for works on international relations, simply because in most cases these are less pressing issues.

Shanghai Institute of International Studies

The Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) was established in 1960 on instructions from Premier Zhou Enlai as a comprehensive research institute on international politics, economy, security strategy, and China's foreign relations. Its first director was a former deputy mayor of Shanghai municipality. As the only local Chinese foreign policy-related research body, SIIS has a "dual leadership," i.e., it is subordinate to two higher authorities: the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office and the

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with a senior research at the XCWA.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a bureau-level institute with one hundred and eight faculties, among whom about eighty are researchers, and who are divided into six research offices, that is, the American Office, Japan Office, Asia-Pacific Office, Europe Office, South Asia Office, and Comprehensive Office (which has just been changed into the Middle East Office, in response to the recent international situation). The SIIS focuses on the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China's border relations, paying special attention to China's relations with the major powers and China's border environment. Compared with the institutes in Beijing, the SIIS seems to place special emphasis on South Asia, perhaps due to its location in Southeast China, as well as the focus of Shanghai's development in terms of opening to the outside world. It has closely followed the changes in international relations, paying particular attention to international hotspots.

SIIS publications include the *Yearbook on the International Situation* (from 1982), a journal entitled *Guoji zhanwang* (International Prospects), and the internally circulated *Guoji wenti luntan* (Forum of International Relations). It also publishes irregularly an internal reference source entitled *Xingshi yu jianyi* (Situation and Suggestions), usually four or five issues per month and peaking at some seventy or eighty issues per year. Unlike reports from institutes in Beijing, SIIS reports are submitted to the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office and through it to the municipal government and the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including the Information Office), and some other government ministries and departments of the CPC Central Committee.

For years, the products of SIIS research have directly reached the successive leaders of the city. After Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Huang Ju, and Wu Bangguo became

national leaders, and Jiang Zemin took charge of foreign affairs in the 1990s, the SIIS attracted special attention from the central government and its influence increased. Some senior researchers at the SIIS were invited to Zhongnanhai to attend discussions with policy-makers. When Wang Daohan, Jiang Zemin's mentor, was head of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), ARATS reports, particularly on the Taiwan question, went directly from Wang to Jiang. During the Jiang era, SIIS researchers were required to write quarterly analyses on the international situation, and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences was required to write quarterly analyses on economic situations.

The fact that many top leaders hailed from Shanghai gave the SIIS some special privileges. For instance, when Shanghai Mayor Zhu Rongji headed a Chinese mayors delegation, the highest-level delegation to visit the U.S. after the Tiananmen event in 1989, including mayors from Hefei, Ningbo, Chongqing, etc., as well as Wang Daohan as adviser, the SIIS was responsible for preparing all the background materials and memos. At the same time, at Zhu's suggestion, a delegation of Shanghai scholars was organized to travel with the mayoral delegation for the purpose of exchanging views with American scholars. Since the late 1980s the SIIS also coordinated preparations for the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office to prepare for the visits of two American presidents to Shanghai, i.e., Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. Moreover, prior to Jiang Zemin's state visit to the U.S. at the invitation of President Clinton, Jiang remained in Shanghai for a while doing preparatory "homework" for the visit. Some scholars, such as the director of the SIIS Ding Xinghao, briefed Jiang on the U.S. and Sino-American relations.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁷ Interviews with a senior researcher at the SIIS, 2005 and 2006.

However, after Jiang's retirement in 2002 and Wang Daohan's death in 2005, the SIIS lost some of its direct influence on foreign policy making. In fact, the physical distance from Beijing and the relatively inconvenient communications with the central bureaucracies always made it difficult for the SIIS to compete for influence with the think tanks in Beijing. It has come to be accepted that the function of the SIIS as a think tank on international studies is complementary, that is, to provide that which the Beijing think tanks do not or cannot provide (in Chinese, *shiyi buque*, meaning picking up what others lack, providing what others do not have). Therefore, most of the time, the direction of SIIS research is not specifically mandated. However, the SIIS plays a special role in many ways. For instance, a 1990 SIIS report analyzing the prospects for China's MFN status in the U.S. was the first such report delivered to the top leaders. Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji both gave written instructions on this report. The SIIS also played a role in promoting normalization of relations between China and Indonesia.⁴⁰⁸ Furthermore, the SIIS is regarded as one of the most important participants in the Track II dialogue on the Taiwan issue. It has also taken part in dialogues with other regions or countries, such as the United States and the EU.

China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies

The Chinese Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS) is different from the think tanks in the above three categories, thus it is not included in the above table. What makes CFISS unique is its claim to be the only nationwide foundation in the field of international and strategic studies in China in the nature of "exchange-related

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with a senior researcher at the SIIS.

think tanks.”⁴⁰⁹ Established in 1989, the CFISS is a non-governmental, non-profit, and legal person organization, whose goal is to exert influence on Chinese foreign policy. It devotes itself to international and strategic studies, domestic and international academic exchanges and cooperation, and consultation and advice for Chinese policy-makers. It also pursues “mutual understanding and strategic reassurance between China and other nations by sponsoring various academic activities and training programs.” Its research focus includes big power relations; regional security; crisis management and international conflicts; arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; economic, cultural, and social development; non-traditional security issues; and defense policy and strategic planning.⁴¹⁰

Despite its allegedly military background, partly due to the fact that its honorary chairman is Xiong Guangkai, a former Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff Department of the PLA, the CFISS does not represent the military. Consisting of only five or six researchers and some internal centers, the CFISS conducts studies through cooperation with other institutes or researchers. It has published a volume on the new American economy as a product of its cooperative research with scholars at the Institute of World Economy and Politics at CASS, as well a volume entitled *ZhongRi zhanzheng shilu* (The Historical Record of the Sino-Japanese War) (1995), which was favorably received in Japan. As a result of its cooperation with the American Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on crisis management, a book entitled *Managing Sino-American Crises* was published in 2007 both in Chinese and English. Like other think tanks, the CFISS submits reports to the top leaders through a special channel. On

⁴⁰⁹ Gill and Mulvenon, “Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutes,” p. 621.

⁴¹⁰ Brochure of the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies, 2007.

the eve of Jiang Zemin's 1997 visit to the U.S., the CFIIS submitted a report that claimed that in spite of the swing between the policies of engagement and containment by the Clinton administration between 1995 and 1996, the main trend in U.S. China policy would not be "containment." It has also submitted reports on economic security management, non-state actors and nuclear proliferation, and the Taiwan issue. Its recommendation endorsing the policy slogan linked to Taiwan, "Striving for negotiation, preparing for military attack, playing for time" (*zhengqu tian, zhunbei da, bupa tuo*) seemed to have an effect on the change in the official Chinese policy slogan from "long prolonging without a solution is intolerable" to "we have patience for peaceful reunification." In the wake of the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the CFIIS made concerted efforts with other agencies to set up "an inter-agency, crisis management-oriented 'national security council'"⁴¹¹ under the Politburo. Partly owing to this effort, a Leading Group on National Security was established, and it thereafter served as crisis management coordinator of the EP-3 crisis.

Well known for being "a critical interface for military and security-related exchanges between foreigners and the PLA,"⁴¹² the CFIIS has probably organized more high-level international academic activities than any other Chinese think tank, ranging from the 2005 Conference on the Overseas Development of Chinese Enterprises to the Sino-U.S. Security Dialogue. Most noteworthy, the CFIIS has sponsored: 1) a series of Track II security dialogues between the U.S and China; 2) discussions with American experts on Sino-American crisis management, and 3) two conferences on Sino-U.S.

⁴¹¹ Gill and Mulvenon, "Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutes," p. 622.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, p. 621.

nuclear dynamics and strategic reassurance, April 19-20, 2004 and June 20-21, 2006.⁴¹³ At the latter, the Chinese side was represented by delegates from the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), the First Academy of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, the Headquarters of the Second Artillery Force of the PLA, the Academy of Military Science of the PLA (AMS), National Defense University (NDU), the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the MFA, the Department of Scientific and Technological Development and Trade in Technology of the Ministry of Commerce, CICIR, and the Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics.⁴¹⁴ The CFISS has also been involved in resolutions on some critical issues, such as the North Korea nuclear crisis and the Sino-Japan rapprochement immediately after Shinzo Abe became Japanese prime minister.

Unique in terms of its funding, its independence, its apparent influence in Chinese foreign policy making, and its attractiveness to cooperation with foreign think tanks and officials or former officials, in many respects the CFISS seems to represent the future wave of Chinese think tanks.

Information Flows

The institutionalization and professionalization of the Chinese foreign policy-making process are also reflected in the way information flows and the way the think tanks engage in policy making. As shown above, think tanks in China require a channel to reach the policy-makers. Before a formal mechanism to serve as such a channel was

⁴¹³ Interviews with Zhang Tuosheng, director of the Department of Research of the CFISS, August 3, 2007, and with Peng Hongwei, former secretary general of the CFISS, September 16, 2006.

⁴¹⁴ China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, *Sino-US Nuclear Dynamics and Strategic Reassurance, Final Report* (October 2006), pp. 69-70.

instituted, in the first decade and one-half of the post-Mao era, in most cases the bridge between the international studies think tanks and the policy-makers consisted of personal relations, perhaps with the possible exception of the CICIR. Huan Xiang's China Center for International Studies (CCIS) is a good example of how personal relations determine the effectiveness of a think tank's influence or even its survival. Today many think tanks continue to rely on personal relations with the top leaders to influence the shaping of Chinese foreign policy. Although a mechanism has been established in recent years, formal and informal channels continue to coexist for think tanks to engage in the policy-making process. The formal or institutionalized channel is a network that covers all governmental or semi-governmental center/institutes. The informal channel consists of personal relations.

In the network to convey information, think tanks at universities have to go through an indirect process via the Ministry of Education, but this route is basically ineffective since it takes too long. Nevertheless, if a university institute has special direct or indirect personal relations with the policy-makers, or with preeminent figures such as Wang Daohan during the period of Jiang Zemin's rule, reports from the university think tanks can circumvent the Ministry of Education and be submitted directly to the top leaders.⁴¹⁵ It can also be assumed that there is at least some indirect access for some university think tanks to reach the policy-makers.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁵ It has been noted that "A report forwarded to Beijing with Wang Daohan's endorsement carried more weight with policy-makers than a report without such an endorsement." See Glaser and Saunders, "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence," p. 612.

⁴¹⁶ Researchers in all active think tanks proudly told the author in interviews that they had direct or indirect access to Chinese foreign policy-makers.

The formal mechanism is a fixed channel, for instance the channel between the LGFA or the Politburo and the State Council on the one side, and the CICIR on the other, between the MFA and the CIIR, or between the CPC Central Military Commission and the CIIS. But the border between a formal channel and an informal channel sometimes may be ambiguous, especially if the channel to a government agency or to one of the top leaders has lasted for so many years that it can almost be regarded as a normal channel. Sometimes an informal channel is used to complement the formal channel and the two are used simultaneously.

During the early stages of the reforms, the sources of information on the international situation and other countries' domestic politics, economy, society, culture, and foreign policies were very limited. Owing to the policies of opening up and reform and China's gradual integration into the international community, the sources of information have expanded rapidly and the amount of information has mushroomed. Openly published foreign newspapers and magazines which formerly were only available to researchers in the government apparatus are now readily accessible to everyone. In addition, the popularization of the use of the Internet has facilitated access to information. Moreover, there are new ways for scholars at non- and semi-governmental think tanks to exchange opinions and receive information. All international studies institutes tend to attempt to imitate Western think tanks in terms of wanting to be a part of the policy-making process. As a consequence of the competition among governmental or semi-governmental think tanks, the number of reports prepared for Chinese policy-makers is excessive. Basically, there are just too many reports written for Chinese policy-makers. In order not to be buried by the volume of information, the

information market was standardized in 2002: information regulation was centralized in the General Office of the State Council and the General Office of the CPC Central Committee (their short names in Chinese are *zhongban* and *guoban*). At the same time, the Information Office of the State Council/the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee stopped filtering reports from various sources to the top leaders.⁴¹⁷ For example, the Central Military Commission now collects the reports from the PLA departments to deliver to the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

Since 2004, a network for the flow of information has emerged, centering around the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council. These two offices call for and/or collect analyses and policy recommendations from various ministerial-level agencies on different issues, including the economy, social security, rural policies, foreign policies, and the international situation, among others. They then circulate this information among government ministries and party departments. According to the rules of the current system, for reports on foreign policy to reach the top leaders, each ministerial/provincial-level apparatus, including the central government ministries, departments of the CPC Central Committee, and the Second Department of the General Staff Department of the PLA, must go through one single outlet, no matter how many affiliated international studies institutes it has. For instance, in the CASS system, most institutions previously edited their own reports and circulated them by themselves, but now all reports have to be edited by the Report Section of CASS and then go to the *guoban* or *zhongban* via the Report Section for circulation. For centers/institutes at the universities, the flow is by way of the Ministry of Education.

⁴¹⁷ Interview with officials in the Information Office.

Since fall 2006, a further measure has been put into place: a barcode system was implemented, similar to that in supermarkets. If a report or compilation does not have a barcode, it is immediately destroyed. Of course, in addition to this routine channel, there are still some special venues for access to the top leaders, for instance, in cases of crises the military apparatus can reach the top policy-makers via the CPC Military Commission.⁴¹⁸

Each ministerial-level apparatus receives two copies of every report from each of the other ministerial-level organizations. Reports are available to officials at the deputy ministerial position and above. The General Office of the CPC Central Committee is in charge of distribution among the party organs, and the General Office of the State Council is responsible for circulation within the government ministries. The main function of the General Office of the State Council is to help the State Council leaders deal with their routine work. In 1998, the coordinating functions of the General Office were eliminated and its supervisory and policy research functions were reinforced. One of its main functions now is to put forward suggestions to the leaders of the State Council for solutions to inter-agency conflicts. It is also responsible for organizing specific studies to provide policy advice.⁴¹⁹ Its First Bureau, one of seven bureaus, is in charge of receiving and circulating documents; organizing member-wide meetings of the State Council; taking care of information, files, and data; maintaining secrets; and proofreading,

⁴¹⁸ Interview with a retired military person.

⁴¹⁹ Secretariat of the General Office of the State Council and the Department of General Affairs of the Office of the Establishment Committee for Central Institutions, *Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou* (The Apparatus of the Chinese Central Government) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1998), pp. 103-104.

communicating, and editing the *State Council Communiqués*.⁴²⁰ It is also responsible for collecting and circulating reports from various ministerial-level organizations.

The Main Forms of Think Tank Engagement in Foreign Policy Making

There are many ways in which think tanks engage in the Chinese foreign policy-making process and exert an influence on foreign policy. The main forms include internal reports, consultations with foreign policy-makers, conferences, Track II dialogues, policy recommendations, and publications.

Internal Reports

The traditional and most conventional form of think tank engagement in foreign policy-making is an internal report. As we have seen in the above, every think tank regards reports as an important way to be a part of the policy-making establishment and thus attempts to establish a regular channel to submit reports to the policy-makers. Reports may consist of information analysis, introductions to foreign views, or policy recommendations, and may be written in the middle of a conflict, prior to a planned event, such as an important visit abroad, or after a sudden or unexpected event. Reports are produced daily by the think tanks, but if a think tank wants its reports to generate influence on foreign policies, it must not only be innovative, it also needs to reach the policy-makers in a timely manner. On occasion policy-makers—the president, premier,

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p. 104.

members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, or the MFA—may actively “solicit analysis that addresses current policy issues or supports their views.”⁴²¹

An example of an internal report is the report by the Institute of International Strategy of the Party School produced immediately after the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. At that time, all think tanks were asked to provide policy advice to help Beijing make sober and wise policy decisions. Three senior researchers at the Center for International Studies (the precursor to the IISS) at the Party School thus wrote a 5,000-6,000-character report on how to assess international relations and Sino-American relations in the aftermath of the crisis. Three main points were stressed in the report:

1. Peace and development remain the main international trends in this era.
2. There are significant mutual interests between the U.S. and China, and there is room to improve Sino-American relations; the bombing does not mean that the Clinton administration has changed its policy toward China.
3. In any event, China should not abandon Deng Xiaoping’s development strategy of reform and opening.

This report was written against the following background: after the bombing, many Chinese anxiously and emotionally insisted that Beijing should take measures to avenge the U.S. action and should adopt a tougher policy toward the U.S. regardless of how it would affect China’s economic development. The above report was handed to the top leaders via Zheng Bijian, deputy president of the Party School when the president of the Party School was Hu Jintao.

⁴²¹ Glaser and Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” p. 614.

Typically, there is no way of knowing how much influence this report had on the thinking of the Chinese leaders, but it must have had some impact, together with similar proposals from other think tanks. Over the following days the Chinese leaders' public statements and announced official policy matched the recommendations in the report. Although no single think tank could take credit for the policy adoption, the policy was probably affected by the net impact of similar reports from like-minded think tanks. In fact, in the aftermath of the influence of these reports, Zheng Bijian decided that an institute of international strategic studies should be established at the Party School.⁴²²

It is true, as David Shambaugh cites from Bonnie Glaser and Philip Saunders, that the "policy influence" of think tanks is "difficult to assess and the indicators are difficult to measure."⁴²³ Many people working in different think tanks have expressed similar views. Even those people who work in the Bureau of Policy Planning of the MFA do not know the degree to which their policy recommendations are accepted by the top leaders. However, it is safe to say that the decision-makers definitely benefit from contributions by experts because their contributions provide more policy and strategy choices. In fact, in many cases, whether the leaders write commentaries or instructions about such reports can be indicative of whether they are impressed with their findings. If there is a written comment or instruction, it can be assumed that the report is considered valuable. Such a written commentary by a top leader usually occurs in cases of reports emanating from the CICIR.⁴²⁴ It is interesting to note that for a more

⁴²² Interviews with researchers at the IISS, 2006.

⁴²³ Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," p. 575.

⁴²⁴ Two senior researchers, then the heads of the American and European studies sections told this author that Jiang Zemin and Li Peng had written instructions on their reports. Based on these instructions, one of them was promoted to full professor.

academic-oriented organization such as CASS, written instructions by top leaders are not considered important for promotion, but in recent years, an award system has been implemented to encourage providing policy recommendations, thus, such written instructions may be regarded as a criterion for an award. In contrast, generally, in the universities, a leader's written instruction does not confer either an award or a promotion. This is indicative of the differences in the functions of the three categories of think tanks.

The experts at think tanks may automatically write reports on topics they deem important, or they may write reports called for by the *zhongban* or *guoban*, or by a member of Politburo or the premier himself. The subjects of these reports covered economics, international politics and relations, laws, and society. In recent years, culture has become more interesting to top leaders as China has become more economically developed and more experienced in the use of soft power. The OTA or the MFA may also ask for reports. In addition, starting from 1996, every time Chinese leaders visited abroad, scholars have been requested to write internal reports assessing bilateral relations and the international situation, as well as on the topics to be discussed. In April 1999, the Standing Committee of the Politburo met to decide whether it was a proper time for Zhu Rongji to visit the U.S. Thereafter, after a directors' meeting, Li Tieying, the president of CASS, asked the same question to all the directors or deputy directors of the CASS institutes involved in international studies.

The fact that there have been more calls for reports and an increasing number of written instructions indicate that the think tanks are becoming more involved in the Chinese foreign policy-making process, and the views or policy recommendations provided by scholars are increasingly reflected in practical policies. In practice, the role

of think tanks in foreign policy-making and China's international relations is now highly valued by Hu Jintao. He said in the meeting with American and Chinese Scholars, "Chinese and American experts and scholars have made great contribution to promoting Sino-American relations. I hope that both sides will have more contact, opinion-exchange and policy recommendations, continuing to make contribution to the development of constructive partnership relations between the U.S. and China."⁴²⁵

Consultations

Probably the first important consultation that Jiang Zemin made after he took over the post of general secretary of the Communist Party was a series of meetings in Huarentang Hall of Zhongnanhai. The ministers and deputy ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Department of the CPC, the Ministry of State Security, and the Second Department of the General Staff of the PLA; retired ambassadors; incumbent ambassadors to major foreign countries; and experts at think tanks were invited respectively to four consecutive meetings over four days to discuss how to break through the economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries and headed by the U.S. after the Tiananmen tragedy of 1989.⁴²⁶

The highest level face-to-face talks with the top leaders by scholars were the tenth series of workshops on international relations with the Politburo members. The scholars went through a rigid selection procedure—the candidates were tested in multiple rounds through mock lectures to Ministry of Education officials. The two scholars who were

⁴²⁵ "Hu Jintao huijian ZhongMei liangguo zhuanjia xuezhe" (Hu Jintao meets American and Chinese Experts and Scholars), April 20, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-04/20/content_4450260.htm

⁴²⁶ Interview with a retired senior officer in 2007.

finally selected were Qin Yaqing, a professor at the University of Foreign Affairs, and Zhang Yuyan, a senior researcher at the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies at CASS. Their respective lectures were on the international situation and the Chinese security environment, and the global challenges faced by China and how to deal with them.⁴²⁷ The purpose of such workshops is for the Politburo members to learn about international relations, as well as to broaden their knowledge related to good governance, in fields such as rule of law, economics, and sociology. The intended aim, first announced under Jiang Zemin's leadership but continued under Hu Jintao, was to establish a knowledge-oriented society in which the top leaders take the lead.

However, such lectures on international relations to top leaders are not a regular form of scholarly involvement in the process of foreign policy making. A more regular form is to provide consultations to the various bureaucracies. Every ministry or every bureau in the ministries, like the MFA and the MFA's International Cooperation Department, Bureau of Policy Planning, and Arms Control Bureau each has its own list of experts for consultation. These experts are periodically invited to the MFA for discussions with the staff or officials of the various bureaus. In 2000, when Deputy Minister Wang Yi was in charge of research policy, informal discussions were often held at the MFA. On political and security policies, the list of participants included—not at the same time—Wang Jisi, Wang Yizhou, Qin Yaqing, Qu Xing, Ruan Zongze, Zhang Tuosheng, Ding Yifan, etc. On economic issues, Fan Gang, Yu Yongding, Zhang Yuyan, and Yang Xiyu, etc. were invited. Nevertheless, this form of consultation is not

⁴²⁷ Interviews with the two professors, March 2006; also see Quansheng Zhao, "Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks," in Yufan Hao and Lin Su, eds., *China's Foreign Policy Making* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), p.128.

fixed and it was abandoned after Wang Yi's position shifted to take charge of other affairs.

Experts are also involved in policy-making on financial/economic affairs. For instance, China's minister of Commerce was invited to attend the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong on December 13–18, 2005. The WTO Ministerial Conference is the WTO's highest decision-making body, which is held at least once every two years and provides political direction for the organization. As Chinese Commerce Minister Bo Xilai said, "China very much values the opportunity to engage comprehensively in the design of WTO regulations."⁴²⁸ Since this was the first time that the Chinese had been invited, the relevant Chinese agencies needed help from experts. Beijing Normal University was requested to provide recommendations regarding China's position on certain issues, such as its exchange rate position. At about the same time, on October 15-16, 2005, another important conference, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting was convened in Beijing; similar help was enlisted from experts.

Personal conversations are another vehicle for consultation. On May 2, 1999, Sun Yafu, Chief of Staff of the Second Department of the General Staff Department, and Yu Huijun, Chief of a department in the International Department, invited some scholars to attend a meeting in Zhoushan to discuss Sino-American relations. Consultations may also take the form of a dinner. He Yafei and Zhou Wenzhong, both then heads of bureaus in the MFA, invited some scholars for dinner, during which time the scholars

⁴²⁸ "WTO Xianggang huiyi liutian wuye kaoyan shangwu buzhang Bo Xilai" (Six-Day, Five-Night WTO Meeting in Hong Kong Tests Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai), TanFo Online, <http://www.tfol.com/10026/10032/10033/2005/12/19/10090256.shtml>.

were asked to introduce the international situation and to offer opinions. Top leaders also sometimes directly talk with scholars on their own. A typical example is that Jiang Zemin spent three mornings listening to experts' lectures on the historical lessons from the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for world hegemony. Wang Huning, director of the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, and Dai Bingguo participated in these lectures. Hu Jintao has also arranged this type of lectures on Sino-American relations.⁴²⁹

Concrete policies are usually made by the bureaus of the different ministries, and most of the time information and policy recommendations provided by experts are collected by the ministries. For example, on issues like how to deal with China's MFN status in the early 1990s, the Office of Foreign Affairs of the State Council held many meetings to consult with scholars. Another topic of discussion with the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs was whether American President Clinton should be permitted to stop his car to meet the Chinese public during his visit to China. When considering an agreement between China and the U.S. in 1998, the suggestion that each country's missiles should not be targeted to the other reached the policy-makers, and was finally accepted as one of the items in the agreement. The various think tanks submitted different reports to the top leaders with their arguments whether or not China should take part in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The suggestion that China should be part of the treaty was so persuasive that it finally became part of official policy.⁴³⁰

Another example concerns the "Anti-succession Law." After the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan, the OTA convened many meetings to discuss how to deal with the

⁴²⁹ Interviews with scholars, 2006.

⁴³⁰ Interviews with senior researchers at CASS.

increasingly obvious intention of Chen Shuibian to separate from the mainland. Initially, a “National Unification Law” was put forth. Some scholars suggested that the government should shift its policy on Taiwan in a military direction. During this period, discussions on the Taiwan question almost became institutionalized; meetings were held once every one or two months. In addition, prior to his visit to the U.S. in 2002, Hu Jintao consulted with scholars on the Taiwan Strait situation seeking their advice on how to respond to questions on Taiwan when asked by the American leaders.⁴³¹

Another occasion when experts offered consultation was prior to when Premier Wen Jiabao would answer questions at a press conference. The head of the News Bureau of the MFA was responsible for working out likely questions. These questions were distributed to the MFA functional bureaus, which then called upon the experts to prepare the appropriate answers.

Track II Dialogues

There is another form of dialogue between the United States and China: the so-called Track II dialogue, meaning non-governmental dialogues among scholars.

When Dai Bingguo became the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and secretary general of the Office of the LGFA, he initiated an additional mechanism to facilitate mutual understanding with other countries—strategic dialogues (Washington calls this senior dialogues, meaning high-level dialogues, arguing that strategic dialogues can only be held among allies). So far five series of strategic dialogues have been implemented, between China and Japan, Europe, Russia, India, and the United States. The strategic

⁴³¹ Interviews with senior researchers at CASS.

dialogue between China and Japan began in 2003. The Sino-Indian and Sino-Russian dialogues were also advocated by Dai Bingguo. The Sino-European and Sino-Russian dialogues already existed during the Jiang Zemin period. After Hu Jintao took office, responsibility for the existing strategic dialogues and strategic studies gradually was re-assigned to the Office of the LGFA. Such dialogues are the so-called Track I dialogues. The dialogues have become an important venue for scholars to take part in policy making. On the eve of every Track I dialogue, experts are invited by the Bureau of North American and Oceanian Affairs and the Bureau of Policy Planning of the MFA to attend a meeting to provide advice. Chen Zhiya, Wang Jisi, Li Changjiu, Jin Canrong, and so on have been invited to participate in discussions revolving around what topics the Chinese delegation should discuss with their American counterparts, what issues the Chinese needed explained by the Americans, and what issues the Chinese should explain to the Americans. Dai Bingguo once said to some scholars, “I am engaged in five strategic dialogues, and you got to provide intellectual support.”⁴³²

The MFA, the FAO, and other ministries all carry out their own dialogues. Track II dialogues co-sponsored by the FAO and the American Committee on American Foreign Policy had been conducted seven times by 2007. Beginning in 2004, the MFA started to send scholarly delegations to the U.S. for Track II dialogues to exchange opinions with American officials and scholars. The trips were originally scheduled for three weeks, but they were shortened to two weeks as most scholars who took the trips believed that a two-week trip was more efficient. The fifth scholarly delegation visited the U.S. in March 2005, immediately after the Chinese National People’s Congress had

⁴³² Interview with two scholars, 2006.

passed the Anti-Succession Law.⁴³³ The sixth and seventh scholarly delegations visited the U.S. in 2006 and 2007 respectively.

The most notable and highest-level Track II dialogues seem to be the series of Sino-U.S. security dialogues sponsored by the CFISS. The origins of these dialogues can be traced back to the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis which led to discussions on “preventive defense.” Thereafter, Gong Ruxin, the widow of a Hong Kong millionaire, donated US\$7 million to Harvard University’s Kennedy School to set up a Preventive Defense Project for training Chinese officials, including military officials. Former ambassador to India and Harvard professor Robert D. Blackwill, and Professor Ashton Carter, chair of the International Relations, Security, and Science faculty at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, held talks with the CFISS, and via the CFISS a formal exchange program with the Chinese PLA Preventive Defense Project to train Chinese senior officials was set up, with Ashton Carter and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry as co-directors of the project. As part of the program, a Sino-U.S. security dialogue was held in Beijing, and President Jiang Zemin met with the American visitors. The dialogue was favorably evaluated by Liu Huaqiu, who said, “this form is very good, why don’t we do the same thing as well?” Thus an annual program for a China-U.S. Security Dialogue was initiated and sponsored by the CFISS. Although these dialogues are called Track II, they are in fact at a higher level than those sponsored by the MFA. The participants on the Chinese side were formerly headed by Wang Daohan, with important members from various ministries, including Chi Haotian, Zhang Wannian, Qian Qichen, Wen Jiabao, Li Zhaoxing, former Chinese Ambassador to the UN Qin

⁴³³ Interview with Tao Wenzhao, 2006.

Huasun, and acting President of the CPC Party School Zheng Bijian and other experts; on the American side, the delegation was headed by former Minister of Defense William J. Perry and Ashton Carter; members included President George Bush's National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Donald Rumsfeld. It is said that the Track II Sino-American dialogue was initiated by the CFISS.⁴³⁴

Human rights is also a subject of Track II dialogues. Scholars sponsored by the Information Office of the State Council in the name of the China Society for Human Rights Studies have been sent to Europe and the United States for discussions with officials, scholars, and human rights NGOs. Their exchanges of views help the Europeans and Americans better understand what Beijing's policies on human rights actually are, what the Chinese government has done to improve the human rights situation, what are the current conditions for Chinese human rights, and what are the most serious human rights issues in China, and also to help the Chinese understand how other peoples and governments abroad regard the Chinese record and progress on human rights. In many cases, Track II dialogues have been more effective than official meetings of leaders from China and abroad.

Research Projects

In 2005, the MFA started to arrange research projects, normally distributed to scholars by the Division of Strategic Studies of the Bureau of Policy Planning of the MFA generally through bidding, since the MFA recognized that on its own it was incapable of carrying out all the necessary policy analyses and in the hope that experts in

⁴³⁴ Interviews with Zhang Tuosheng and Peng Hongwei.

various fields could make more significant contributions than the bureaucrats. The main projects are in the field of economics, with mid- and long-term strategies receiving increasing attention. Sometimes one subject can be assigned to more than one institute. If so, similar or different policy recommendations may be offered as policy options. Each year ten projects are approved and granted 30,000 yuan in financial support.⁴³⁵ However, it is said that the quality of some of the results of these research products has not been high, thus improved management of the projects is currently being considered.

Other government ministries may also request experts to undertake research projects as needed. For instance, the Institute of American Studies has been given many projects to carry out studies in the fields of the U.S. economy, finance, and trade.

In addition to these projects, experts at CASS or at universities have been invited to join in the drafting of central government documents or conference resolutions. In particular, in the field of law, legal specialists are relied on to draft government documents.

Conferences

Think tanks often convene conferences for discussions among scholars and government officials. Both scholars and officials benefit from each other's presence at these meetings. Scholars can come to understand Beijing's current foreign policies and strategic thinking, while officials can grasp the historical or theoretical perspectives illustrated by the scholars. For instance, in June 2001, the Center for American Studies of Fudan University (CASFU) held a meeting on the U.S. Congress; Zhou Mingwei,

⁴³⁵ Interview with staff and scholars.

deputy director of the OTA, and Cui Tiankai, head of the Bureau of Policy Planning, both participated in the conference. At another conference sponsored by the CASFU, Xie Feng, deputy chief of the MFA Bureau of North American and Oceanian Affairs, and Xu Bu, the deputy chief of the MFA Bureau of Policy Planning, were invited to join discussions with the scholars.

A Case of Experts' Engagement in Policy Making

Experts in international relations often provide concrete policy recommendations mostly through reports, and many of their policy recommendations on various issues have been adopted by different levels of policy-makers.

A case of a policy recommendations related to China's policy toward ASEAN involved the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (IAPS) at CASS. In the course of talking with the ASEAN countries about establishing a cooperative mechanism between ASEAN and China, some experts, particularly Zhang Yunling, director of IAPS, played an important role. In this case, the policies suggested by the experts were directly put into practice.

Before the cooperative mechanism was established, Zhang Yunling had written many reports and articles on regional cooperation, arguing that having successfully entered the WTO, Chinese policy should shift its emphasis to regional cooperation; China's regional cooperation could begin with that between China and ASEAN, and could start in the field of economics and ultimately expand to overall cooperation. Zhang refuted the view that the market in the ASEAN region was too small for China to reap many benefits. He also urged looking at the cooperation from a broader

perspective as the first step in regional integration, and to draw experience from the process for more extensive cooperation in the future.

Appointed as a member of the Governmental Expert Group for China-ASEAN Cooperation, the ASEAN 10+3 Perception Group, and the head of the Group for ASEAN 10+3 Free Trade Zone, in 2000 Zhang headed a Chinese delegation that traveled to the ASEAN countries and carefully listened to what the officials in those countries really wanted from a potential cooperation. In order to relax their apprehensions about China's rise and promote their interests in the cooperative proposal, Zhang believed that the ASEAN states needed to be shown the actual benefits during the early stage. The phrase an "early harvest," mentioned by a Cambodian female diplomat during one discussion, was understood by Zhang as a key concept for planning the Free Trade Zone between ASEAN and China. An agreement on agricultural cooperation in agricultural output—of the utmost concern to many ASEAN states—was concluded in 2001. According to the agreement, China would train ASEAN exporters to import agricultural output into the Chinese market. These events convinced the ASEAN countries that China was really concerned about the interests of the ASEAN countries. As a result, steps taken for cooperation between China and ASEAN were much more forthcoming than those taken between Japan and ASEAN, even though Japan had expressed an interest in a Free Trade Zone with ASEAN for many years.

The Chinese experts further proposed that Chinese leaders should directly state that China would do its best to prevent a war in the South China Sea, and that China would like to develop cooperation in the disputed area, because if a war were to occur, it was most likely to occur in the South China Sea. Extensive cooperation between China and

the ASEAN countries would minimize the possibility of a war. Consequently, an agreement on the Kantan oil rig between Vietnam and China⁴³⁶ was reached.

In this process, experts did not make the actual decisions on policy toward ASEAN, but their views were expressed to different levels of policy-makers through reports, conferences, conversations, discussions, and consultations, and were largely accepted by the latter. When MFA attention focused on areas of conflict, such as the Korean peninsula, or Japanese or South Korean relations with China, experts, like Zhang Yunling, helped to come up with feasible ways of making progress in Chinese international relations and cooperation in the Southeast Asian region.

Publications and TV Programs

Scholars also exert an influence on official views through their openly published articles or books as the outputs of their research. When one Politburo member asked the Institute of American Studies to recommend a number of books on Sino-American relations, two books were recommended. Experts at various think tanks consistently publish articles in a great range of academic journals, magazines, and newspapers. These articles definitely have an impact on public opinion, which in turn has an influence on Chinese policy-makers' thinking on foreign policy.

TV programs are also a channel for scholars to influence foreign policy-making by influencing public opinion. They are often invited to provide commentary or analysis on various TV programs on international topics, on the effect of domestic politics, such

⁴³⁶ The Vietnamese protested after the Chinese Kantan-3 oil rig drilled near the Spratly Islands in March. The drilling occurred offshore of Da Nang, in an area that Vietnam calls Block 113. The block is located 64 nautical miles off Chan May cape in Vietnam, and 71 nautical miles off China's Hainan Island.

as a presidential election, on the big powers' foreign policies, particularly their policy toward China; and on China's relations with other countries in various regions.

Conclusion

In summary, although the role that Chinese think tanks have played in the Chinese foreign policy-making process is not compatible with the role of think tanks in Western countries, and experts in China often complain that their voices are not heeded by the policy-makers and that there is an asymmetry of information—too much information related to Chinese foreign policy is unnecessarily kept secret from them, which leaves them unable to base their advice on adequate information⁴³⁷—the current state of engagement by international studies think tanks in the foreign policy-making process today would have been unimaginable even a decade ago.⁴³⁸ The changes since the 1990s have been due to the following: 1) following China's unprecedented integration into the international community, China's relations with other countries and areas have been broadened both intensively and extensively, thus specialized expertise has been called for policy analyses and international strategic recommendations, especially as China shifted toward “fragmented authoritarianism” and non-idealization and intellectual pluralization;⁴³⁹ 2) armed with more sophisticated theories of international relations and

⁴³⁷ Zhao Kejin, *A Theoretical Clarification on the Transition of PRC's Diplomatic Institutions*, p. 186.

⁴³⁸ Xuanli Liao argues, “The professional input into China's foreign policy during the 1980s came almost exclusively from individual foreign policy specialists rather than from the IR think tanks as policy advising institutes,” and “... 1990s witnessed an increasing institutional role for the Chinese foreign policy think tanks.” See his *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan*, pp. 37, 73.

⁴³⁹ Merle Goldman writes “the cultural and intellectual pluralism of the Deng-Jiang eras...look more like the norm in the 20th century than Mao's totalitarian interregnum ... Deng's early reform reduced the state's control not only over the economy but also over society, culture and intellectual life in the belief that that it hindered China's modernization.” See Merle Goldman, “Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era: A Changing

comparative politics, Chinese scholars are now better trained, with many having spent considerable time in universities or research institutes in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Furthermore, scholars in think tanks are now more independent in their thinking and are more knowledgeable about foreign countries and the issues that they are analyzing; 3) although civil society remains at a nascent stage in China, the increasing role of think tanks still benefits from the growth of civil society in that it creates conditions and an environment favorable to the development of competition in a real sense among think tanks and to tolerance of diverse views.

Relationship with the Party-State," *China Quarterly*, No. 145 (March 1996), p. 49. Bates Gill and James Mulvenon also argue, "The emergence of a more pluralistic and competitive Chinese policy environment has increased potential influence of analysts at Chinese international relations think tanks." See Gill and Mulvenon, "Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutes," p. 618.

Chapter Five: Two Decision Making and Implementation Cases

In this chapter, two cases are examined to reveal how China's policies on foreign aid and in a crisis situation are made and implemented, including which governmental organs participate in the policy-making process, and how they coordinate with one another to implement policy.

Chinese Foreign Aid

As China has become integrated in the international economy and increasingly engaged in global affairs, it has changed its attitude with respect to foreign aid. After China adopted new models for foreign aid in 1982,⁴⁴⁰ the policy-making process for foreign aid changed: now more agencies are involved in the decision making, the divergent interests of the organizations must be reconciled, and compromise and cooperation among the different agencies are inevitable.

In the realm of foreign aid, China has a long history as a donor. Beginning in the early 1950s, China provided material aid to North Korea during the Korean War and also to Vietnam during its struggle for independence from France. From 1950 to 1954, at Vietnam's request, China granted military aid and a material aid grant of 176 million Chinese yuan.⁴⁴¹ These can be regarded as China's first foreign aid activities since the establishment of the PRC. In 1956 China began providing conventional economic and technical foreign aid to Cambodia. Thereafter, Chinese policy was to provide foreign

⁴⁴⁰ At this time Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visited several African countries. Since then, China has shifted the predominant form of its foreign aid from grants to loans. Author's interview, October 11, 2007.

⁴⁴¹ Xie Yixian, *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao sixiang shi* (History of Foreign-Policy Thought in Contemporary China) (Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 1999), p. 19.

economic and technical aid to the countries on its border.⁴⁴² The aid to Cambodia was followed by aid to Nepal, Sri Lanka, Burma, and Indonesia. China's foreign aid has continued for the last fifty years and is generally composed of three forms: economic development aid, military aid, and humanitarian aid. The majority of China's foreign aid programs are economic development aid, including grants, low-interest or interest-free loans, joint venture cooperation programs, and medical and training teams. The recipients have been the Third World countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Like many other countries, China distributes foreign aid in two ways—bilaterally and multilaterally.

In recent years, there has been a consensus in China that the most effective means of implementing foreign aid involves bilateral government-to-government cooperation. Most of China's foreign aid is given directly to the recipient governments, in the form of joint venture cooperation projects. The foreign aid projects over the last ten years have been approved and supervised by both the Chinese and the recipient governments. Although China has started to provide some aid through multilateral institutions, it still prefers that the aid go to the recipient government directly. Unlike the trend in the Western donor community, especially the United States, of carrying out foreign aid projects through the private sector or NGOs, China rarely engages in this kind of foreign aid due to the concern that the multilateral institutions are mainly controlled by the developed countries, whose foreign aid policy is different from that of China.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴² Zhang Yuhui, "Guojizhuyi yu Zhongguo waijiao" (Internationalism and Chinese Diplomacy), *Lanzhou xuekan* (Journal of Lanzhou University), No. 4 (2006), p. 103.

⁴⁴³ Interview with an official, February 2, 2007, and with a high-ranking official, December 13, 2007.

The History of Chinese Foreign Aid

The history of Chinese foreign aid has undergone three phases. The first phase was from 1950 to 1978; during this period, China's aid basically took the form of grants, or interest-free loans. Foreign archives indicate that from 1950 to the end of June 1960, China provided grants and loans to twenty-two countries, amounting to 402.8 million yuan.⁴⁴⁴ In an effort to improve relations with the newly independent countries, Premier Zhou Enlai traveled to eleven Asian and African countries in 1963-64. In a January 15, 1964 speech in Mali, Zhou laid out the "eight principles" upon which China's foreign aid would be based, emphasizing equality, mutual benefit, and respect for the sovereignty of the recipient countries.⁴⁴⁵ In fact, as early as 1962, Zhou indicated that the Chinese who had been victorious in their own proletarian revolution must do their utmost to help fraternal and nationalist countries. At the same time, such aid also benefited China, since the strengthening of the anti-imperialist forces based on the successful economic development of the developing world was regarded as an important factor in support of China's socialist cause.⁴⁴⁶ The formulation of the eight principles stimulated the growth of Chinese foreign aid. Thus the number of recipient countries suddenly increased while the amount of aid was significantly enhanced; China's expenditure on foreign aid amounted to one percent of total expenditure during its First and Second Five-year Plan

⁴⁴⁴ Yang Liqiong, "Xin Zhongguo de duiwai yuanzhu jiemi" (Exposing the Secrets of New China's Foreign Aid), *Wenzhaibao* (Digest Newspaper), February 16, 2007, http://www.gmw.cn/content/2007-02/16/content_549563.htm.

⁴⁴⁵ Zhou Enlai's eight principles include equality and mutual benefit; respect for the sovereignty of recipients, and never attaching conditions; providing interest-free or low-interest loans; helping recipients develop independence and self-reliance; building projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly; providing quality equipment and material at market prices; ensuring effective technical assistance; and pledging to pay experts according to the local standards of living.

⁴⁴⁶ Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai wenxuan* (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai), Vol. II (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), p. 383.

periods. Furthermore, foreign aid began to take the form of turnkey projects in which China took care of all aspects of the project, even sending Chinese volunteers to work on it. The 1,200-mile Tanzanian-Zambian railroad from the Zambian copper mines to Dar es Salaam is often mentioned as a typical turnkey project during this phase. Funds were usually provided in the form of interest-free loans. In the twenty-eight years from 1950 to 1978, China provided foreign aid to sixty-six countries, and completed 880 turnkey projects.⁴⁴⁷ From June 1965 to March 1973, China provided Vietnam with material aid totaling some US\$20 billion; of which US\$18.84 billion was distributed as grants.⁴⁴⁸ From 1965 to 1970, Vietnam received the largest amount of Chinese foreign aid, accounting for 57.6 percent of China's total expenditure on foreign aid.⁴⁴⁹

During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, radical thinking dominated Chinese foreign policy. China conceived of itself as the center of the “world revolution,” Mao Zedong declaring, “Wherever a revolution occurs, we support it.”⁴⁵⁰ Lin Biao's article in *The People's Daily (Renmin ribao)* in 1965 claimed, “Socialist countries should regard supporting the revolutionary struggles of the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as our own internationalist obligation.”⁴⁵¹ The Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighteen Congress of the CPC clearly declared that “the highest guiding principle” of the Chinese foreign policy was “proletarian

⁴⁴⁷ Liu Xiaoyun, “Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu gaige yu tiaozheng ershi nian” (Twenty Years of Reforms and Adjustment of China's Foreign Aid), *Guoji jingji hezuo* (International Economic Cooperation), No. 10 (1998), p. 30.

⁴⁴⁸ Xie Yixian, *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao sixiang shi* (History of Foreign-Policy Thought in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1997), p. 237.

⁴⁴⁹ Shi Lin, ed., *Dangdai Zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo* (Contemporary Chinese Foreign Economic Cooperation) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), p. 52.

⁴⁵⁰ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong wenxuan* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. II (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp. 1472-1473.

⁴⁵¹ *People's Daily*, September 3, 1965.

internationalism.”⁴⁵² It followed that during this period foreign aid was viewed as China’s special duty to support “world revolution” and as a tool to strengthen China’s leadership of the revolutionary cause. As a result, China’s foreign aid expanded tremendously, way beyond its capacity. For instance, according to the former minister of the International Liaison Department of the CPC, Geng Biao, Albania, a small country with a population of only two million, between 1964 and the end of 1970 received a total of Chinese aid valued at nearly 9 billion Chinese yuan, averaging over 4,500 yuan per Albanian (at that time, the monthly salary of a Chinese university graduate was only about 45 yuan)!⁴⁵³

Even the Western countries shied away from the famous Tanzanian-Zambian railway which China designed and built from 1967 to 1976.⁴⁵⁴ Tanzania and Zambia were eager for support to build this railway so as to increase Zambia’s mining exports after the route through white-ruled Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa was cut by sanctions. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was inclined to provide Chinese foreign aid for building the railway. Beijing regarded its decision to provide support as evidence to convince the Third World of Chinese sincerity in its recently announced eight principles on foreign aid and as means to make breakthrough in its relations with the African continent, countries with which China so far did not have close contacts. The evaluation of the project was carried out by the Third Design Institute of the Ministry of Railways under Zhou Enlai’s instructions, and the final decision was made by Mao Zedong himself in 1967, when Zambian President Kenneth David Kaunda visited China in search of

⁴⁵² *People’s Daily*, August 14, 1966.

⁴⁵³ Geng Biao, *Geng Biao huiyilu* (Geng Biao’s Reminiscence), *Xinhua wenzhai* (Xinhua digest), No. 4, 1998, p. 128.

⁴⁵⁴ Yang Liqiong, “Xin Zhongguo de duiwai yuanzhu jiemi.”

foreign aid to build the railway. It was estimated that the railway, which faced serious geological and climatic difficulties, would be 1,860-kilometers long and would require a budget of 2 billion renminbi. The Office of Foreign Aid of the Ministry of Railways was responsible for preparing for the construction, while the actual task of construction was undertaken by the Ministry of Railways.⁴⁵⁵ The final cost of the ten-year-long project is unknown,⁴⁵⁶ but clearly the final cost was much more than the original budget and it involved 6,000 Chinese construction workers in Africa.

In spite of the tremendous costs in terms of labor and materials, the completion of the railway enhanced China's reputation in the region. China had fully committed itself to aiding the newly established United Republic of Tanzania. In the 1970s China was the only foreign power that provided military personnel to Tanzania to train its armed forces. Tanzania was one of only nine non-Communist recipients of Chinese aid, and the only recipient in eastern or southern Africa. Chinese economic involvement in Tanzania increased gradually and by the 1970s China had replaced the United Kingdom as Tanzania's main source of foreign credits. Tanzania thus became one of China's closest overseas allies, and with the establishment of the Sino-Tanzanian Shipping Company in 1966, trade between the two countries flourished.⁴⁵⁷

An example of the interaction between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on Chinese foreign aid occurred when Mao criticized Zhou for being too selfish. Having learned that Zhou had told the State Planning Commission to only provide as much aid as it could to Pakistan, during the visit of Pakistani President Yahya Khan in 1970, Mao said: "How

⁴⁵⁵ Shi Lin, *Dangdai Zhongguo duiwai jingji hezuo (Contemporary Chinese Foreign Economic Cooperation)* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), pp. 605-613.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Ian Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 27.

can you give only one hundred million yuan? There will be hundreds of millions of yuan just by sweeping the warehouse.” Zhou Enlai took Mao’s comments seriously. He immediately asked the leaders of the State Planning Commission to summon a meeting of all departments related to foreign aid to evaluate China’s overall aid program. The Commission reported that China’s foreign aid faced a grave situation and expenses would have to be reduced first to 5 percent of GDP and then gradually to reach 1 percent of GDP. The report was approved by Mao himself,⁴⁵⁸ showing that Mao finally had to accept the reality.

The other reason for the fast increase in Chinese foreign aid during the 1970s was China’s return to the United Nations in 1971. After China’s recovery of its membership in the UN, it rapidly developed diplomatic relations with other countries, particularly the developing countries. In the negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations, some foreign countries requested Chinese foreign aid, which, in many cases, China agreed to provide, because “China’s friends in black Africa lifted us into the United Nations” so China needed to meet their needs in return.⁴⁵⁹

Thus, from this point on, the number of recipient countries doubled,⁴⁶⁰ extending from Asia and Africa to Latin America and the South Pacific. At the same time, in the three years from 1971 to 1973, an unprecedented amount of material aid to Vietnam exceeded 3 billion yuan each year.⁴⁶¹ From 1971 to 1975 foreign aid accounted for 5.88

⁴⁵⁸ Gu Ming, “Buyao zhitan chengjiu” (Don’t Just Talk about Achievements), *Wenhui dushu zhoubao*, March 7, 1998.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview with a professor in Beijing, October 11, 2007.

⁴⁶⁰ Wang Taiping, ed., *Xin Zhongguo waijiao 50 nian* (Fifty Years of New China’s Diplomacy) (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999), p. 717.

⁴⁶¹ Deng Lifeng, “YuanYue kangMei shulüe” (Briefing on Support to Vietnam against the U.S.), *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao*, (Research on Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy), No. 1 (2002), p. 92.

percent of Chinese government expenditures; in 1973 alone it reached 6.92 percent.⁴⁶²

On the other hand, the recipient countries were selected not only based on the principle of supporting proletarian internationalism, but also according to Mao Zedong's strategic ideas regarding the contest between the two superpowers in the Cold War. Foreign aid was thus considered in light of the relations of the Third World countries with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, and depended on which of the two superpowers was seen as a more dangerous foe. According to Singapore senior politician Lee Kuan Yew (Li Guangyao), on a visit to Beijing in 1976 Deng Xiaoping told him that total Chinese foreign aid amounted to US \$20 billion, mostly in grants.⁴⁶³

The second phase of Chinese foreign aid occurred between 1979 and 1994, with 1978 as a turning point. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC in 1978 shifted the focus of CPC work to the four modernizations, and placed an emphasis on economic cooperation with other countries based on equality and mutual benefit. In the process of the growth of the free market in China, enterprises gradually became the main actors in the economy. Simultaneously, financial agencies played more important and essential roles in economic activities. The prior foreign aid system in which the government was completely in control was no longer applicable to the Chinese domestic politics and economic reforms. In addition, Chinese decision-makers and scholars began to accept the concept of "national interest," viewing "safeguarding the national interest" as a top priority in China's foreign policy decision making and international relations. Against this background, the preoccupation with proletarian internationalism

⁴⁶² Shi Lin, ed., *Dangdai Zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo*, p. 68.

⁴⁶³ "Xin Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu jiuqing youduoshao" (How Much Foreign Aid Did the New China Provide?), <http://bbs.chinaiiss.org/dispbbs.asp?boardid=54&id=41796>.

declined and there was a strong focus on the national interest.⁴⁶⁴ China's enthusiasm for foreign aid cooled, bringing about a dramatic decrease in the amount of aid extended abroad. A new model for foreign aid began after Zhao Ziyang's 1982 visit to Africa, and loans became the more common form of aid.⁴⁶⁵

The other factor that had an impact on China's notion of foreign aid during this phase was the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the two-camp model disappeared. Other developing countries also started to stress economic growth, and many of them adopted policies of economic liberalization and enterprise privatization. They thus urgently needed foreign firms to engage in their economic development programs in order to reduce government debt. At the same time, the aim of China's foreign aid, which was no longer merely political in nature, was to pursue mutual economic benefits. Foreign aid in the form of loans and international economic cooperation began to take the place of China's traditional grant-based, non-profit foreign aid. The pattern of Chinese foreign aid therefore changed to be consistent with the changes in the recipient countries and to allow the projects to be more mutually beneficial. From 1991 to 1994 Chinese foreign aid consisted of medium- and small-size projects in recipient countries that had both a demand and resources for foreign aid, and bilateral or multilateral economic and trade relations with China. Mutual benefit and mutual development were considered more seriously, joint ventures between Chinese and firms in the recipient countries were encouraged, and cooperative management of production in aid programs was facilitated. During this period, turnkey projects accounted for about 60 percent of China's foreign aid projects. In addition, various forms of special funds,

⁴⁶⁴ Interview with an official, February 2, 2007.

⁴⁶⁵ Interview with a professor, October 11, 2007.

such as flexible and “in-time” small-sum grants, were set up.⁴⁶⁶ Two authors on Chinese foreign aid note that China’s foreign aid agencies began to decentralize after 1979, and field-level personnel were given more authority. Aid evolved from solely political ventures to contractual arrangements. The contracting firms involved in the foreign aid projects assumed much of the responsibility for implementing the projects, and the direct involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (the former Ministry of Commerce) was decreased.⁴⁶⁷

In 1995 there was an overall reform of the foreign aid framework, aimed at diversifying the forms and sources of funds for foreign aid. Interest-free loans were reduced, preferential loans and joint venture cooperation projects were pursued, and grants to poor and friendly developing countries increased on a fairly large scale. This adjustment of the framework of Chinese foreign aid changed the former non-profit and grant-style of Chinese assistance into profit-sharing and production-style programs. The latter involves input of funds for production, which is aimed at yielding long-term benefits to the recipient countries, while China as the donor shares the benefits through various forms of economic cooperation, such as investment, contracts, joint ventures, and participation in the management of the firms. This change originated from the “Grand Strategy on Economic Cooperation and Trade” developed by Wu Yi, the minister of Economic Cooperation and Foreign Trade, at the “1990s International Conference on Foreign Economic Cooperation and Trade in China” held in 1994. The strategy was “grounded on export/import trade, mutual penetration between coordinated development

⁴⁶⁶ Liu Xiaoyun, “Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu gaige yu tiaozheng ershi nian,” pp. 30-31.

⁴⁶⁷ Goran Hyden and Rwekaza Mukandala, *Agencies in Foreign Aid: Comparing China, Sweden and the United States in Tanzania* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 207.

of funds, technology, and labor service cooperation, and joint participation of agencies in foreign economic cooperation and trade, production, technology, and finance.”⁴⁶⁸ The “Grand Strategy” is characterized by organically combining foreign trade (exports/imports of commodities and services), capital flows (capital and goods exports), international economic cooperation (an international division of labor and coordination in the management of production), and the use of domestic and foreign funds, resources, and markets to promote economic development. As a tool of China’s participation in international economic cooperation, foreign aid programs were to be designed to carry out the strategic ideas formulated in the “Grand Strategy.” To fulfill this aim, Chinese foreign aid was to be reformed to diversify sources and forms of aid. The diversity of fund sources included both domestic funds and foreign funds. Domestically, it included mobilizing government, enterprise, and bank funds; externally, it included recipients’ funds, the funds of international financial organizations, and the funds of foreign financial banks, etc. The diversity of forms in Chinese aid implied eliminating the old models for foreign aid and exploring new business contents according to the different conditions, not only undertaking project contracts, but also running joint venture companies or cooperative management companies.⁴⁶⁹ The purpose of the reform was to help the recipient states develop projects for which they had both resources and market

⁴⁶⁸ Meng Dongping, “Zhongguo wajingmao qiye gaige 20 nian huigu” (Recollections of Twenty Years of Reform of Chinese Enterprises in Foreign Economic Cooperation and Trade), *Guoji shangbao* (International Business Daily), September 21, 2000, p. 6.

⁴⁶⁹ Zhang Yuhui, *Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu yanjiu* (A Study on Chinese Foreign Aid) (PhD dissertation), Central Party School, 2006, in the *Series of PhD Dissertations in the Chinese National Library*, pp. 126-127; Li Yuliang, “Shijie jingji yitihua zhong de Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu” (Chinese Foreign Aid in the Integration of the World Economy), *Beijing dier waiguoyu xueyuan xuebao* (Journal of the Second Beijing College of Foreign Languages), No. 4 (1999), pp. 92-93.

demand, while at the same time promoting Chinese enterprises with a capacity to explore markets in the developing countries, thus effectively combining foreign aid and economic cooperation.⁴⁷⁰ In other words, with the growth of the Chinese market economy, the benefits to the recipient countries are no longer the only factor to be considered in China's foreign aid policy making; China's own benefits must be simultaneously taken into account.

In September 1995, the State Council issued "Instructions on Issues Related to Reforms in Foreign Aid Work," providing concrete instructions on the reform of foreign aid work. The reform measures included: expanding the size of government loans, with subsidies for interest rates and increasing the ratio of free aid; mainly undertaking small- and medium-size production projects, while promoting joint ventures and cooperation foreign aid projects; combining government funds with bank loans and appropriately absorbing the funds of the relevant enterprises.⁴⁷¹ Apart from implementing the already-signed agreements for interest-free loans, no further interest-free loans would be issued to recipient countries. Thus, before 1995, there was only one source of foreign aid, that is, funds provided by the government through financial appropriations; from 1995 on, apart from government funds, there are also government loans provided by financial agencies on favorable terms. In the first five years, the maximum rate for loans was 5 percent and the maximum time limit was fifteen years (including the grace period). Since 2001, this has changed to 2 percent for the

⁴⁷⁰ Wei Hong, "Woguo duiwai yuanzhu fangshi gaige jingyan yu wenti" (Reform Experiences and Problems in China's Foreign Aid Model), *Guoji jingji hezuo* (International Economic Cooperation), No. 5 (1999), p. 4.

⁴⁷¹ Xing Houyuan, "Yi yuanwai gaige wei qiji jiasu shixian shiyehua huojihua" (Taking Reform of Foreign Aid as a Juncture to Accelerate Industrialization and Internationalization), *Guoji jingji hezuo* (International Economic Cooperation), No. 2 (1996), p. 10.

minimum interest rate and twenty years for the time limit (including the grace period). The funds for loans with favorable terms are raised by the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank). The gap between the preferential interest rate and the standard interest rate of the central bank is subsidized by government financing. After the government subsidy on the interest rate, the proportion of loans making up bank grants is over 25 percent. These loans are called funds in the nature of government aid.⁴⁷² In this way, the size of foreign aid could be expanded, the use of foreign aid amplified, investment cooperation pursued, and exports of Chinese equipment, material, and technology promoted. Investment cooperation with recipient countries facilitates combining government and firm funds, expanding fund sources and program size, and enhancing efficiency.

At the same time, joint venture cooperation in foreign aid is encouraged. This is cooperation between Chinese enterprises and enterprises in the recipient countries, with support from government funds and government-appointed agencies, in the form of loans to enterprises to carry out small- and medium-size production projects. In addition, enterprises may also raise some of the funds by themselves.

Therefore, in the three years from July 1995 to 1999, the Ministry of Commerce recommended 81 projects of the total 110 projects submitted. The Export and Import Bank completed evaluation of 38 projects, and signed 40 loan agreements.⁴⁷³ From the second half of 1995 to September 2000, China signed 78 low-interest loans with 48 countries ranging from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the South Pacific islands; the

⁴⁷² Fu Daopeng, *Guanfang fazhan yuanzhu yanjiu* (A Study on Government Developmental Aid), (PhD dissertation), Institute of Financial Science Studies of the Ministry of Finance, 2003, p. 88.

⁴⁷³ Wei Hong, "Woguo duiwai yuanzhu fangshi gaige jingyan yu wenti," p. 4.

Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Trade (now the Ministry of Commerce) evaluated 124 projects and recommended them to the Chinese Export and Import Bank. Up until 2000, agreements had been signed for 75 projects. There were 77 ongoing joint venture cooperation projects with Chinese firms in some 40 countries.⁴⁷⁴ From 1995 to the end of 2001, the Chinese Export and Import Bank approved 92 loan projects, amounting to 6,867 million yuan, accumulating a total of 86 loan projects that amounted to 6,081 million yuan involving 40 countries (among them, twenty in Africa, eleven in Asia, and nine in Latin America and other areas). The Chinese Export and Import Bank issued 3,855 million yuan in loans, and was repaid 238 million yuan; 67 projects were in post-loan management, with a credit balance of 3,617 yuan. By 2000, Chinese finance had subsidized 270 million yuan toward the low-interest loans.⁴⁷⁵ By 2004, China had issued preferential loans for approximately 100 foreign aid projects.⁴⁷⁶

Among the loan agreements that have been signed, resource exploration and production projects constituted the majority, amounting to twenty-eight out of the thirty-eight, including oilfield exploration in Sudan, two textile mills in Tanzania and Zambia, railway rebuilding in Botswana, and a cement mill in Zimbabwe. Loans for these projects amounted to over 100 million yuan (approximately US\$12.5 million). In terms of the loan patterns, among the 38 projects, 15 were direct loans to Chinese firms, 20 were either direct loans to firms in the recipient countries or indirect loans through

⁴⁷⁴ *Zhongguo duiwai jingji maoyi baipishu 2001* (White Paper on Chinese Foreign Economy and Trade, 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo Jinrong Chubanshe, 2001), p. 102.

⁴⁷⁵ Fu Daopeng, *Guanfang fazhan yuanzhu yanjiu*, p. 90.

⁴⁷⁶ Wang Ancheng, "Zhongguo yuanwai xiangmu gaikuang ji yuanwai youhui daikuan, yuanwai hezi xiangmu jijin de shiyong" (Outline of China's Foreign Aid Projects and Preferential Loans for Foreign Aid, and the Usage of the Funds in Joint Venture Projects under Foreign Aid), *Waimao diaoyan* (Survey of Foreign Aid), No. 28 (1996), p. 4.

them, and 3 were loans to joint venture companies.⁴⁷⁷ Sudan's oilfield exploration was China's first project which took the form of preferential loans. China has also continued to be the largest provider of foreign aid to North Korea. Although the total amount of aid to North Korea is unknown, it has been estimated to amount to US\$50 million annually, mainly in food and heavy oil.⁴⁷⁸

Most of China's aid is given through bilateral channels. From 1978 to 2005, China's GDP increased from US\$147.3 billion to US\$2.235 trillion, registering an average annual growth rate of 9.6 percent. In the same period, China's trade increased from US\$20.6 billion to US\$1.422 trillion, growing by 16 percent annually, and it has increased its foreign assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to the White Paper on *China's Peaceful Development Road* published by the Information Office of the State Council on December 22, 2005, hitherto China had provided foreign aid to 110 countries and regional organizations, involving over 2,000 programs, and had reduced or written off 192 accounts for 44 developing countries, totaling a value of 16.6 billion yuan.⁴⁷⁹ The data offered by China's Ministry of Commerce indicates that in the past fifty years up until 2007, China provided over 800 assistance and cooperative projects, including 137 agricultural programs, 133 infrastructure projects, and sending 16,000 persons abroad as part of medical teams (China began to send medical teams to the developing countries in 1963). In the three years from 2003 to 2005, China trained more than 10,000 various types of technicians or medical personnel in African countries.

⁴⁷⁷ Wei Hong, "Woguo duiwai yuanzhu fangshi gaige jingyan yu wenti," p. 4.

⁴⁷⁸ Nobuyoshi Sakajiri, "China Offers \$50 Million for North Korea to Keep Talking," *Asahi Shimbun*, January 12, 2004.

⁴⁷⁹ Information Office of the State Council, "Zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu" baibishu (The White Paper of the Chinese Government on China's Peaceful Development Road), on Dec. 22, 2005, <http://www.southcn.com/news/china/zgkx/200512220281.htm>.

The chief of the Bureau of Foreign Aid stated that there were no conditions attached to these programs and they did not interfere in the sovereignty of the recipient nations.⁴⁸⁰ At the first three summits of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (held in Beijing in 2000, in Ethiopia in 2003, and in Beijing in 2006), Chinese leaders announced a large amount of grants and loans to African countries. In 2002, China contributed \$50 million to the African Development Bank. It also decided to commit US\$20 million to establishing a “China Special Fund for Poverty Reduction and Regional Cooperation” in the ADB for poverty reduction and regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁸¹ According to Premier Wen Jiabao, under the framework of the China-African Cooperation Forum, China has undertaken 176 turnkey projects in 42 African countries, written off all the 10.9 billion yuan worth debts of thirty-one of the poorest and least-developed African countries, and has trained for African countries more than 10,000 various experts.⁴⁸² At a March 2006 press conference, Wen Jiabao announced that China had reduced or written off \$20 billion and would provide \$10 billion in low-interest loans without conditions⁴⁸³ to Asian, African, and Latin American countries.

The four forms of current Chinese foreign aid include:

⁴⁸⁰ “Zhongguo 50 nianlai xiang Feizhou tigong 800 duoge yuanjian hezuo xiangmu” (China Has Provided Africa a Total of 800 Assistance and Cooperation Projects in the Last 50 Years), January 29, 2007, <http://www.cnhubei.com/200701/ca1266242.htm>.

⁴⁸¹ “China Attaches Importance to International Anti-Poverty Cooperation,” *People’s Daily*, May 27, 2004, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/May/96679.htm>.

⁴⁸² Wen Jiabao, “Jiaqiang zhongfei hezuo, cujin huli gongying,” (Strengthening Sino-African Cooperation, Promoting Mutual Benefits and Win-Win Outcome), on November 4, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-11/04/content_5290230.htm.

⁴⁸³ Chen Jinmin, “Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu de wuda guanxilun” (Five Important Relations in China’s Foreign Aid), *Hubei xingzheng xueyuan xuebao* (Journal of Hubei Administrative College), No. 4 (2006), p. 94.

1. ***Preferential loans.*** This is a conventional form of global foreign aid. In this form the Chinese government nominates a financial agency to provide the foreign countries mid-and long-term low-interest-rate loans, with the minimum interest rate of two percent and twenty years as the time limit (grace period included). The gap between the standard interest rate and the preferential interest rate is covered by the Chinese government. Joint venture companies, firms in the recipient countries, and certified Chinese firms are eligible to apply for these loans, but the projects must be evaluated by the Export and Import Bank (and the credit institutions in the recipient country). Preferential loans are a typical means of assistance to aid developing countries that have economic difficulties to repay loans.
2. ***Joint venture cooperation.*** The Chinese government and the recipient government sign an agreement on principles, and both sides provide support in terms of policies and funds. The Chinese and foreign firms are responsible for carrying out the project in the form of either joint venture or cooperative management. The purpose is to contribute to developing the economy, as well as to train managers and technicians in the developing countries and to facilitate mutual economic growth in both China and the recipient country.
3. ***Grants.*** This form of foreign aid is generally given to friendly border countries with economic difficulties that lack a capacity to repay loans, including the poorest countries or countries with special needs. A part of the grant is combined with funds from UN development agencies for technical cooperation for developing countries. After the 1995 reform in foreign aid, China increased its

grants to the poorest developing countries that were incapable of repaying loans.

In addition, China's emergency humanitarian aid was increased (see Table 5-1).

4. ***Interest-free loans.*** This is the traditional form of Chinese foreign aid mainly used for civic infrastructure building. Over the past fifty years, China has subsidized a host of infrastructure projects in the developing countries. However, except for on-going projects already under agreement, no new programs have been initiated.⁴⁸⁴

China's expenditure on foreign aid in 1995 was 2,900 million yuan, by 2005 it had increased to 7,470 million yuan. Thus, in the ten years from 1995 to 2005, the amount of foreign aid increased 1.6 times (see Tables 5-2). In 2006, China's foreign aid budget was 8,500 million yuan.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with an official, February 2, 2007.

⁴⁸⁵ Ministry of Finance, "Guanyu 2005 nian zhongyang he difang yusuan zhixing qingkuang yu 2006 nian zhongyang he difang yusuan cao'an de baogao" (Report on Implementation of the 2005 Central and Local Government Budgets, and on the Drafts of 2006 Central and Local Government Budgets). See Website of the Ministry of Finance, at http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/20060320_2115_13827.htm

Table 5-1 2001-2005 China's Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (partial list)

Unit: Thousand

Year	Recipient	Reason for Aid	Value of China's Material Aid	Value of China's Material Aid	Value of China's Currency Aid	Value of China's Currency Aid
			Renminbi	U.S. Dollar	Reminbi	U.S. Dollar
2001	India	Earthquake	500			
2002	Afghanistan	Postwar Rebuilding	3000			100
2003	Iraq	Iraqi War	250			2500
2003	Iran	Earthquake	1500			
2003	Albania	Earthquake			500	
2004	Madagascar	Hurricane Tropical Storm	300			
2004	Korea	Train accident	1000			
2004	Sudan	Crisis in Darfar	500		500	
2004	Russia	Refugees	1000	120		
2004	Morocco	Earthquake	500			
2005	U.S.	Hurricane				500
2005	Pakistan	Earthquake		2673		100
2004-2005	Southeast and South Asian Countries	Tsunami	2173		5000	2000

Source: Zhang Yuhui, *Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu yanjiu* (A Study of China's Foreign Aid) (PhD dissertation, Central Party School, 2006), in the *Series of Dissertations in the Chinese National Library*, p. 133. The information is based on data provided by the *People's Daily*, the Ministry of Commerce Website, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website.

Table 5-2 China's Expenditure on Foreign Aid and Its Ratio to GNP (1950-2005)

Year	Foreign Aid Expenditure (million yuan)	Government Expenditure (million yuan)	Foreign Aid Expenditure/ Government Expenditure (%)	GNP (million yuan)	Foreign Aid Expenditure/ GNP (%)
1950-1952	22.919	3621.9	0.633	--	--
1953	29.505	2192.1	1.346	8240	0.358
1954	42.512	2441.1	1.742	8590	0.495
1955	33.479	2627.3	1.274	9100	0.368
1956	37.605	2985.2	1.26	10280	0.366
1957	32.02	2959.5	1.082	10680	0.3
1958	25.111	4003.6	0.627	13070	0.192
1959	33.709	5431.7	0.621	14390	0.234
1960	14.181	6436.8	0.22	14570	0.097
1961	44.632	3560.9	1.253	12200	0.366
1962	62.636	2948.8	2.124	11493	0.545
1963	110.854	3320.5	3.338	12333	0.899
1964	124.267	3937.9	3.156	14540	0.855
1965	184.514	4599.7	4.011	17161	1.075
1966	202.884	5378.4	3.774	18680	1.086
1967	197.238	4398.4	4.484	17739	1.112
1968	205.56	3578.4	5.744	17231	1.193
1969	219.62	5258.6	4.176	19379	1.133
1970	240.819	6494.1	3.708	22527	1.069
1971	366.649	7321.7	5.008	24264	1.511
1972	478.604	7658.6	6.249	25181	1.901
1973	558.391	8087.8	6.904	17209	2.052
1974	477.098	7902.5	6.037	27899	1.71
1975	422.584	8208.8	5.148	29973	1.41
1976	280.126	8062	3.475	29437	0.952
1977	210.783	8435.3	2.499	32019	0.658
1978	172.1	11220.9	1.534	36241	0.475
1979	98.2	12817.9	0.776	40382	0.243
1980	78.508	12288.3	0.639	47178	0.174

(Continued)

Year	Foreign Aid Expenditure (million yuan)	Government Expenditure (million yuan)	Foreign Aid Expenditure/ Government Expenditure (%)	GNP (million yuan)	Foreign Aid Expenditure/ GNP (%)
1981	78.779	11384.1	0.692	48603	0.162
1982	108.781	12299.8	0.884	53018	0.205
1983	100.075	1409.52	0.71	59574	0.168
1984	92.72	17010.2	0.545	72067	0.129
1985	124.807	20042.5	0.623	89891	0.139
1986	147.827	22049.1	0.67	102014	0.145
1987	145.874	22621.8	0.645	119545	0.122
1988	132.945	24912.1	0.534	149223	0.089
1989	139.353	28237.8	0.493	169178	0.082
1990	156.241	30835.9	0.507	185984	0.084
1991	168.151	33866.2	0.497	216625	0.078
1992	166.128	37422	0.444	266519	0.062
1993	185	46423	0.399	345605	0.054
1994	288.6	57926.2	0.498	466700	0.062
1995	290	68237.2	0.425	574949	0.005
1996	322	79375.5	0.406	668505	0.048
1997	354.5	92335.6	0.384	731427	0.048
1998	372	197981.8	0.345	769672	0.048
1999	392	131876.7	0.297	806794	0.049
2000	458.8	158865	0.289	882540	0.052
2001	471.1	189025.8	0.249	957279	0.049
2002	500.3	220531.5	0.227	1039353	0.048
2003	523.3	246499.5	0.212	1167412	0.045
2004	606.9	284868.9	0.213	1365843	0.044
Summary	11332.341	2126900.2	0.533	11877306	0.095

Source: Zhang Yuhui, *Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu yanjiu* (A Study on China's Foreign Aid) (PhD dissertation, Central Party School, 2006), in the *Series of Dissertations in the Chinese National Library*, pp. 165-166. The author provides some explanations of the data.

a. The data for foreign aid expenditures: the data for 1950-1992 are from Fu Daopeng, *Guanfang fazhan yuanzhu yanjiu* (A Study in Governmental Developmental Aid) (PhD dissertation, Institute of Financial Science Studies of the Ministry of Finance, 2003), p. 80 (Fu had worked on budget management for foreign aid in the Ministry of Finance, so

his data should be reliable). The data for 1993-2004 are from *Zhongguo caizheng nianjian* (Yearbook of Chinese Finance).

b. The data for expenditures: the data for 1950-1998 are from Lou Jiwei, *Xin Zhongguo 50 nian caizheng tongji* (Fifty Years of Financial Statistics for New China) (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 2000), pp. 25-26; the data for 1999-2004 are from *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2005* (China Statistical Yearbook 2005) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2005), p. 271.

c. The data for GNP: the data for 1953-1977 are from the Department of National Economic Comprehensive Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, ed., *Xin Zhongguo 50 nian tongji ziliao huibian* (Collection of Fifty Years of Statistical Materials of New China) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999), p. 3; the data for 1978-2004 are from *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2005* (China Statistical Yearbook 2005) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2005), p. 51.

The Structure of the Chinese Foreign Aid Decision-Making Establishment

Prior to the reforms and opening up, the Chinese central government played a decisive role in the decision-making and implementation process of foreign aid policy. Ranging from the objectives, specifically the amount and form of the aid, to the fund-raising and project design, the central government took the main role in overseeing and managing the completion of the projects. Even if some aid projects were implemented by state enterprises or other organizations, they were responsible to the central government, and the main consideration was the political benefit. In other words, the Chinese central government was the only independent actor in the process. Moreover, owing to the highly centralized institutions, Chinese foreign aid in fact was decided only by the top leaders. The guiding line for foreign aid was formulated according to the international strategy and ideology of the party, and foreign aid projects were usually initiated by the top leaders. Inevitably, the actual financial budget and economic conditions in China tended to be neglected, and foreign aid expenditures seriously exceeded the capability of the Chinese economy at the time, resulting in the Chinese aid

policy having a negative effect on economic development. This was extraordinarily apparent at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s.

In the twenty years of reform and reorganization there has been a reorientation of China's foreign aid in the direction of pluralization and institutionalization of the decision-making process. The foreign aid decision-making process has become more complicated due to the participation of various interests. The changes in Chinese domestic politics have also been reflected in Chinese policy on foreign aid.

The foremost change has been the change in the role of the Chinese central government in foreign aid and the pluralization of the actors involved in the process. The government, banks, and firms all play a role in the policy-making and implementation processes. Therefore, foreign aid is no longer controlled by the government, rather it is determined by a process of conciliation among the various interests. In most cases, the State Council is the highest executive organ in the government responsible for administering aid projects, but on the whole, the role of the Chinese government is one of directing, managing, and coordinating.

The Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance is in charge of drafting the foreign aid budget and appropriating funds. In other words, it determines how much of the budget should be directed to foreign aid each year, though funds for specific projects are appropriated for several years at a time. In the process of establishing the overall budget, the various actors in the foreign aid process do not hesitate to lobby the Ministry for more funds.

The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)

MOFCOM is the leading agency for China foreign aid programs. In the 2003 reorganization, MOFTEC was renamed MOFCOM, but most of MOFTEC's former functions, including foreign aid, remained within MOFCOM. In MOFCOM, the Department of Foreign Aid (DFA) is in charge of foreign aid to other countries, and Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) is responsible for directing and regulating foreign economic cooperation.

The DFA has several important functions including: implementing concrete projects, negotiating most intergovernmental agreements; devising turnkey projects, aid in materials, aid in cash; training; reviewing requests that come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and either approving or refusing them; conducting initial feasibility studies for aid projects; choosing aid implementers; and conducting project reviews. As part of the 1995 reorganization and the attempt to increase the number of preferential loans, MOFCOM was tasked with conducting initial feasibility studies.⁴⁸⁶ In the Ministry of Commerce, the Department of Foreign Aid has close cooperation relations with the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation in their jobs, since the latter approves, monitors and regulates investment and establishment of enterprises in foreign countries; etc.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁶ "The Major Functions of the Department of Foreign Aid," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://yws.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003746.html>.

⁴⁸⁷ "The Major Functions of the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation," Website of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, <http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200307/20030700105079.html>.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

The role of the MFA in foreign aid is secondary to that of MOFCOM, since the budget for foreign aid comes from the Ministry of Commerce, rather than from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the MFA lacks the economic and financial experts that MOFCOM has to evaluate the aid projects. However, the MFA has much say in decisions on the general direction of aid projects, especially those projects with strategic or diplomatic objectives. In the case of those projects for which less economic and financial aid is required, such as decisions on emergency humanitarian assistance, which in most cases are related to diplomacy, the MFA is more actively engaged.

The Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the State Council are responsible for foreign aid. It has been noted that with respect to policy-making related to foreign aid, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends to regard foreign aid as a part of the general international strategy, thinking about its direction from the perspective of political and diplomatic benefits, such as China's relations with the recipient countries, including their voting patterns in the United Nations and their attitudes toward Taiwan and to Japan's membership on the UN Security Council, whereas the Ministry of Commerce tends to consider the economic benefits, including the cost and gains, whether the projects promote China's exports and investments or increase domestic employment.⁴⁸⁸ Because of their shared dual roles, the two ministries must coordinate and cooperate in their work. Bargaining and compromise are necessary when there are contradictions between the objectives of the political- and

⁴⁸⁸ Interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 20, 2006.

strategic-oriented Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the economic-oriented Ministry of Commerce.

The National Commission of Development and Reform

If a single aid project exceeds 100 million yuan or so, the approval of the National Commission of Development and Reform is required.⁴⁸⁹

The Ministry of National Defense (MND)

The Foreign Affair Office of the MND is responsible for coordinating all of the foreign aid work of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Other organs such as MOFCOM may assign the MND specific tasks, for example when the MND and PLA provided assistance in the aftermath of the Southeast Asian tsunami.

Other Government Agencies

Similar to the United States, there are many agencies that play minor roles in foreign aid, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology for professional training and the Ministry of Health for aid projects related to infectious diseases.

The Export-Import Bank

The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) of China carries out most of the logistics pertaining to the granting of loans. However, MOFCOM still retains most or all of the important duties for deciding on the grants. Established in 1994 and under the direct

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

authority of the State Council, the Eximbank, in particular its Concessional Loan Department, is in charge of all loan programs. Foreign aid projects are set up by the Ministry of Commerce based on the requests of the potential recipients, and then the projects are evaluated by the Eximbank. If the projects are approved, the Eximbank is responsible for signing the agreements for preferential loans. Moreover, the Eximbank plays a mediating role for fund-raising and the issuance of the loans. The activities of the Eximbank increase the sources of funding by mobilizing funds from financial institutions. Since the Eximbank issues loans based on market principles, the feasibility evaluations are always grounded on predictions of benefits. Consequently, loan and foreign aid decisions are no longer determined solely by the government based on political gains.

Local Governments

With the pluralization of the policy-making process, local governments are also sometimes involved, especially when the foreign aid is given through direct exchanges between “friendship cities.” This complicates the process because the central and local governments may be seeking different benefits.

Firms

Firms too are now one of the main actors in implementation of foreign aid projects. Moreover, firm activities have become part of the policy-making process. Traditionally, construction projects were assigned to state-run firms according to intergovernmental agreements. The firms implemented the project in the recipient country, acting as the

executor of government policy. But they were not in a position to consider costs or benefits, and they had no autonomy or flexibility in terms of their role. Therefore the effectiveness of the implemented projects tended to depend entirely upon the efforts and inclinations of the personnel involved. However, after having undergone several rounds of reform, a new form of joint ventures that share the benefits with the foreign firms provides Chinese firms with more autonomy to carry out aid projects. As independently performing bodies in the free market, the firms can follow market principles on their own initiative. After a field survey, a firm can request a project evaluation and submit an application to the Eximbank for a preferential loan. Firms that apply for projects must be certified. From 1995 to 2001 500 companies were granted such certification to carry out foreign aid projects.⁴⁹⁰ Furthermore, since 2001 the Ministry of Commerce has required that foreign aid be carried out according to international standards, i.e., firms now have to bid for projects.⁴⁹¹

Occasionally some aid projects are still arbitrarily promised by top leaders when they visit foreign countries without previous approval by the Central Committee. According to convention in the Chinese foreign aid system, members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo are permitted to make foreign aid promises or to undertake projects on their own within certain limits. For instance, when he visited Budapest, without previous consultation Li Lanqing promised the Hungarian government that China would build them a concert hall.⁴⁹² In this case, however, the details of the project still had to be worked out according to the customary procedures for foreign aid projects.

⁴⁹⁰ Interview with a professor, October 11, 2007.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

Apart from these actors, there are also some non-governmental organizations that are active in Chinese foreign aid. Their roles in cases of providing emergency humanitarian relief assistance are most obvious. They monitor governmental foreign aid promises and assist the government in implementing foreign aid.⁴⁹³

On the one hand, the diversification of the actors, sources of funds, and forms of foreign aid make Chinese foreign aid more flexible and effective. But, on the other hand, this pluralization makes the decision-making and implementation processes for Chinese foreign aid more sophisticated and complicated, therefore requiring more cooperation and conciliation among the various needs, aims, and benefits of the increasing number of participating actors. According to one source, there can be as many as fifteen ministries and commissions engaged in the process, but so far there is still no efficient agency to coordinate among them. For this reason, it is even difficult to determine the aggregate total of Chinese foreign aid.⁴⁹⁴

As mentioned above, the total budget for foreign aid and economic cooperation is decided by the Ministry of Finance, while the management of the budget for foreign aid projects is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry of Commerce can decide how to cut the cake, in terms of how much is allocated for each region. But the final cake cutting is quite flexible—input from the regional bureaus of

⁴⁹³ See Yuan Xiaopeng and Yang Yang, “Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu: ZhengFu zai waiyuanzhong de juece bianhuan” (Chinese Foreign Aid: The Change of the Role of the Chinese Government in Foreign Policy), in Xiao Jialing and Tang Jiakuan, eds., *Daguo waijiao: lilun, juece, tiaozhan* (Big Power Diplomacy: Theory, Policy-Making, and Challenges) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003), Vol. III, pp. 581-586; Michael A. Glosny, *Meeting the Development Challenge in the 21st Century: American and Chinese Perspectives on Foreign Aid* (New York: National Committee on United States-China Relations, China Policy Series, No. 21, August 2006), pp. 24-27.

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with a professor, October 11, 2007.

the MFA may also affect how the cake is sliced, even if the funds were earmarked for a different region.

A Typical Foreign Aid Policy-Making Procedure

Under the typical procedures for foreign aid policy making, the first step involves the potential recipient country, through its president or a high-ranking official, expressing an interest in Chinese foreign aid to the diplomats of the Chinese Embassy in that particular country. The Embassy makes a primary evaluation regarding 1) whether such a program would be significant to this country's economy or welfare; 2) whether such a program would be feasible. If the answers are positive, the Embassy will fax back a preliminary proposal to the respective division of that country in the regional bureau of the MFA. An official in the regional division will evaluate this proposal according to the following principles:

1. **Feasibility.** The size of the program should be reasonable—it cannot be too large or too expensive in consideration of the moderate size of China's foreign aid budget and the fact that there are so many poor developing countries that require help.
2. **Ongoing programs.** If China has already carried out a foreign aid project in the country, it is likely that aid projects in other countries will be given a higher priority.
3. **Political significance.** The attitudes of the local people, and the benefits they stand to gain, are considered.

4. Chinese diplomatic relations. If relations have recently been established, or if the recipient country faces serious economic or political difficulties, the foreign aid is more likely to be granted.
5. Relations with Taiwan. If the country applying for foreign aid also has formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it is unlikely that the Chinese response will be positive. In any event, an official agency of Taiwan cannot be based in the recipient country.

Generally, the proposal for foreign aid is sent by the Embassy both to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. However, since embassies have direct links with the MFA, officials in the MFA usually receive the proposal before those in the Ministry of Commerce. After a primary evaluation by the official in the regional division of the local bureau of the MFA, the Bureau of Economic Cooperation or the Bureau of Foreign Aid in the Ministry of Commerce will be contacted, depending on the scope of the proposed project.⁴⁹⁵

For instance, if the program is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Foreign Aid, it will be evaluated according several criteria: What is the amount of funds required for this project? Are there sufficient funds for such a project available in the foreign aid budget? Is the project technically and economically feasible? If the conclusions are positive, the two ministries will work together to draft a project. At this stage, if the project involves funds in excess of 100 million yuan (about US\$12.5 million), the

⁴⁹⁵ Sometimes officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not sure which bureau should be contacted, since there is no precise demarcation between projects in economic cooperation and foreign aid. In such a case, they will phone both of them to determine with whom they should cooperate.

approval of the National Commission for Development and Reform, which oversees all large projects, is required.⁴⁹⁶

As the next step in the procedure, the potential recipient country and China will discuss the project, and the two sides will sign a broad framework for agreement in which they state their interest in the aid and their commitment to work together. After more discussion on the details and studies on the feasibility of the project, the two sides will sign an agreement on the specific project. The Ministry of Commerce then selects a company through bidding, and signs a contract with it. Monitoring and evaluation of implementation is shared by the MOFCOM, the Eximbank, and the respective Embassy. The Chinese Embassy in the recipient country is often in charge of reporting on the implementation and effectiveness of the program.⁴⁹⁷

It is interesting to note that although theoretically and practically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce have different considerations and interests in terms of foreign aid, the staff in the two ministries cooperate quite well. The Ministry of Commerce is willing to accommodate the MFA by taking the inclinations of the latter seriously. Even if there are insufficient funds for a particular project, if the MFA believes that the project is very important for bilateral diplomatic relations, or for the recipient country's domestic political stability or economic development, the Ministry of Commerce will in most cases find funds from other projects to guarantee the funding for the project under consideration. Usually, when the MFA insists, the Ministry of Commerce relents. When a disagreement emerges, meetings between the two ministries

⁴⁹⁶ Interview with an official, February 3, 2007.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

are held to reach a compromise. It has been observed that the two ministries work together as one.⁴⁹⁸

Although the Ministry of Commerce's respect for the ideas of the MFA may insure good cooperation between them, it may not insure the success of a project. An example occurred in 1997, when two Chinese firms and private firms in the Ivory Coast organized a joint venture to work on an automobile plant, whose outputs would include assembly, maintenance and service, and spare parts supply. The total investment was 59.57 million yuan, of which 51.23 million yuan would come from a preferential loan. The plant was completed in August 1997 and the first automobile came down the production line in October of that year. However, the automobiles did not sell. In one year, only forty-seven automobiles were sold, among which only fifteen were paid for in cash, and the remaining were bought on credit, some of which were bought by local Chinese companies. It is believed that the main reason for the failure of the project was that the project was promoted by the Chinese Embassy in the Ivory Coast, and that its view, or the view of the MFA, had a considerable impact on the evaluation and setting up of the project; even the local partner that included seven people was selected by the Embassy. They had worked as employees in a local customs agency, but they proved later not to be good partners.⁴⁹⁹ This failure was a serious lesson to those who were responsible for foreign aid in the Chinese Embassy.

Such forms of economic cooperation should be mutually beneficial. Although the firm received a preferential loan provided by the Eximbank, this project represented a firm-to-firm cooperation rather than a government-to-government cooperation. It can

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Wei Hong, "Woguo duiwai yuanzhu fangshi gaige jingyan yu wenti," pp. 7-8.

be seen as a kind of indirect foreign aid in terms of the firm receiving low-interest loans from the Eximbank subsidized by the foreign aid funds of the Chinese government.

Another example involves the Chinese company, Huawei, which won a contract from the government of Cameroon to set up three electronic political affairs networks. It thus applied to the Eximbank for a preferential loan. Its application was first evaluated by the Ministry of Commerce, and then evaluated and approved by the Eximbank. Profitability was a serious consideration when the firm decided to undertake the project.⁵⁰⁰

A firm can bid for a project which is under an intergovernmental agreement. If it is successful, it automatically gains access to preferential loans and the project takes the form of a joint or cooperative venture. When the project is completed, the Chinese firm, as an investor, has the right to run and manage the new firm to ensure the sharing of long-term benefits. For instance, if there is an agreement promising that the Chinese government will build a stadium in a particular country, the Ministry of Commerce will hold bidding for the contract. The contracting company thus gains the right to receive a low-interest loan.

A successful case related to Chinese foreign aid involves the Jilin Forest Industry Co., Ltd., which, after sixteen serious investigations in Southeast Asian, African, and Latin American countries, decided to focus on Equatorial Guinea. It then conducted a comprehensive survey of the local forest resources, carefully investigated the species of trees and log restoration, analyzed the overall conditions including the local political situation and infrastructure, and registered a company called “Chinese Jixing Limited”

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with an official, February 2, 2007.

that signed a lease for 50,000 hectare of forests. At about the same time, it received approval from the Eximbank for 48.8 million yuan in preferential loans. By the end of 1997, the company had cut 360,000 kilos of logs and had earned \$700,000. In 1999, it began to repay its loan.⁵⁰¹

Foreign Aid to Sudan and the Darfur Conflict

An example of a successful mutually beneficial cooperative project is the Chinese exploration of Sudanese oilfields. The exploration of the sixth district of Sudan's oilfields by the China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation (CNOGEDC) is the first program to use preferential loans to explore overseas oil resources. As early as 1994, to address the grave shortage of oil resources in China, the company started to search for oil resources overseas. Having learned that the Sudanese government was looking for foreign investment in its domestic oil exploration, the company began a preliminary evaluation of the project and sent technicians to conduct field surveys. After consultations with the relevant Sudanese agencies, the two sides decided to cooperate in oil resource exploration according to international conventions, that is, to share products proportionally, and at the same time to apply for a preferential loan from the foreign aid budget. This occurred exactly at the time when the Chinese government was undertaking reforms of its foreign aid program, such as implementing preferential loans with government interest-rate subsidies. The project soon gained robust support from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and Foreign Trade and the Eximbank. In September 1995, the two governments signed a framework agreement for China's provision of a 150 million yuan (about US\$18 million) preferential

⁵⁰¹ Wei Hong, "Woguo duiwai yuanzhu fangshi gaige jingyan yu wenti," pp. 4-6.

loan to Sudan. Three months later, the Eximbank and the Chinese National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company reached agreement on the loan. Following its excellent performance and reputation in oil exploration since the first drilling in the sixth district in January 1997, the company won the bidding among ten other transnational companies for the right to explore the first, second, and fourth richest oil-reserve districts; it also gained a 40 percent stake and the right to manage the field. These successes were followed up by a host of construction contracts in the field. It is believed that projects like this are not only of significance for the recipient economy, but also offer Chinese companies new opportunities to cooperate on subsequent trade and processing of products.⁵⁰²

Since 1997, China has become the largest foreign investor in Sudan. Chinese companies are active in energy-related sectors of the Sudanese economy, including construction of oil pipelines, electricity, and hydropower facilities. China is also the largest player in the world in Sudan's oil industry, with major roles in the development, extraction, and acquisition of Sudanese oil.⁵⁰³ China's National Petroleum Company is the largest stakeholder in Sudan's largest energy consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. China is also Sudan's largest trading partner in the world: it purchases 71 percent of Sudan's global exports and provides 21 percent of its imports. Sudan, in turn, is China's third largest trading partner in Africa, accounting for 13 percent of China's total trade with Africa. In 2006, Sudan's economic growth rate was 13

⁵⁰² Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁰³ "China, Sudan and the Darfur Conflict Fact Sheet," http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/china_sudan_and_the_darfur_conflict_fact_sheet.

percent⁵⁰⁴ against the background of its flourishing petro-economy and oil exports. Oil accounts for 70 percent of Sudan's total global exports (US\$5.25 billion in 2006), 70 percent of which is exported to China. Sudan's economic development can be attributed to Petrodar, a Chinese-Malaysian-United Arab Emirates oil partnership.⁵⁰⁵

However, Sudan's worsening political situation has become a serious concern of the international community. Since February 2003, Sudan's ethnic rebels in Darfur organized two armed forces—the “Sudanese Liberation Army” and the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement—in succession, and they took up arms against the Arab-dominated Sudanese government that they blamed for decades of discrimination and neglect.⁵⁰⁶ The Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir is accused of retaliating by unleashing in Darfur a militia of Arab nomads known as the Janjaweed. It is estimated by the United Nations that 200,000 people have been killed and 2.5 million made homeless since 2003 as a result of attacks by the Arab militias.⁵⁰⁷

Sudan's conflict in Darfur is viewed by the international community as a violation of the human rights of the ethnic rebels. The government has been condemned by numerous United Nations resolutions, and it has also been the target of U.S. sanctions since the 1990s. Western firms that do business there risk alienating both customers and investors. On the other hand, China's relationship with Sudan includes close and comprehensive bilateral economic, political, and military ties, and these ties have been

⁵⁰⁴ The World Bank Group, Sudan Data Profile, <http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=SDN>.

⁵⁰⁵ Editorial, “China and Darfur, the Genocide Olympics?” *Washington Post*, December 14, 2006, p. A30.

⁵⁰⁶ “Zhongguo lizu jiejie Darfur wenti” (China Presses to Resolve the Darfur Issue), August 5, 2007, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-08-05/192913598425.shtml>.

⁵⁰⁷ “China: Threats to Darfur Peacekeeper Won't Be Tolerate,” *USA Today*, November 28, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-11-28-china-darfur_N.htm.

seen as a source of leverage with Sudan. However, although China had been active in foreign aid to Sudan, China did not pay much attention to the humanitarian record of the Sudanese government. It insisted on the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and was satisfied with equal, mutually beneficial, transparent, and non-exclusive economic cooperation, convinced that China's foreign aid and investment in Sudan would make an important contribution to Sudan's economic and social development. Even after it changed its non-interventionist policy due to pressure from the international community, China still believes that economic cooperation with Sudan can create favorable conditions for a solution to the Darfur issue, because the fundamental roots of the conflict are poverty and economic backwardness.⁵⁰⁸ In the Chinese view, the growth of the population and the over-herding of the 1960s and 1970s, and the consequent desertification of the land, forced the local Arab dwellers to the south to look for water and food, resulting in a contest with indigenous black tribes for resources.⁵⁰⁹ Although China was well-positioned to use its leverage with the Sudanese government to ensure peace and security in Darfur, it did not take any major measures until April 2007. When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Sudan in February 2007, he privately criticized the Sudanese government's domestic policy, but he still emphasized that China's economic ties and assistance to Sudan were not conditional on the latter's political behavior. China has adopted a policy of "non-interference" in Sudanese domestic issues, arguing that settlement of the Darfur issue should be based on two

⁵⁰⁸ "Lutoshe caifang Zhongguo Darfur wenti tebie daibiao Liu Guijin dashi" (Reuters Interviews Chinese Special Representative Ambassador Liu Guijin on the Darfur issue), June 8, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-11-28-china-darfur_N.htm.

⁵⁰⁹ "Zhongguo lizhu jiejie Darfur wenti" (China Presses to Resolve Darfur Issue), August 5, 2007, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-08-05/192913598425.shtml>.

principles: respect for Sudan's sovereignty and territory integrity and a search for political solutions through dialogue and equal consultation. President Hu has also expressed Chinese support for the African Union and the constructive role of the UN.⁵¹⁰

China continued to offer significant economic aid to Sudan. During Hu's visit to Khartoum in February 2007, China agreed to write off US\$80 million in Sudanese public debt and to provide an interest-free, unconditional loan of US\$13 million to build infrastructure projects, including a new presidential mansion. Hu also pledged US\$5.2 million in humanitarian assistance for Darfur. Since 2004, China has provided four batches of assistance, totaling US\$10 million. In addition, China has provided US\$30 million for a dam project in north Darfur. China's humanitarian assistance includes prefabricated buildings for at least 120 schools, transportation vehicles, generators, water pumps, and other facilities to recover production and development.⁵¹¹

It is apparent that China's foreign aid had not been connected to its political relations with Sudan and until 2007 it was mainly decided by the Ministry of Commerce. Thereafter, there was a significant increase in criticism of China for its preoccupation with economic activities. International human rights groups, U.S. politicians, and Hollywood stars launched a broad media assault on China, arguing that China's money and weapons contributed to the crisis that had already claimed 200,000 lives. In an open letter to China's president Hu Jintao in early May 2007, 108 U.S. congressmen urged China to do its part to ensure that the government of Sudan accepts the best and

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ "Waijiaobu buzhang zhuli Zhai Jun jiu Sudan Darfur wenti juxing Zhongwai jizhe zhaodaihui" (Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun Holds Press Conference on Sudan's Darfur Issue), April 12, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t310576.htm>.

most reasonable path to peace, warning that the 2008 Olympics could be disastrously marred by protests if there was no change in the position of China as the host nation.⁵¹²

Nevertheless, Chinese leaders initially received the message about their responsibility not from a national government, but from non-governmental organizations and other groups,⁵¹³ particularly two individuals in Hollywood—actress Mia Farrow and director Steven Spielberg. These organizations and the two individuals linked the 2008 Olympic Games, which the Chinese government regards as the most significant single event in its international relations for the coming year, with the killings in Darfur. Mia Farrow, an ambassador for the UN Children’s Fund, began a campaign to call the games in Beijing the “Genocide Olympics,” and called on Mr. Spielberg, who is an artistic adviser to China for the games, to publicly exhort China to do something about Darfur. In her March 28, 2007 op-ed article in *The Wall Street Journal*, Farrow warned Mr. Spielberg that he could “go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games,” a reference to the German filmmaker who made Nazi propaganda films. Four days later, according to Mr. Spielberg’s spokesman Martin Levy, Mr. Spielberg sent a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao, asking the Chinese government to use its influence in the region “to bring an end to the human suffering there.”⁵¹⁴ These actions aroused a growing concern inside China that just as China was beginning to think more about its image as a responsible power, Darfur was hurting its image in the international arena⁵¹⁵

⁵¹² “Zhongguo lizu jiejie Darfur wenti” (China Presses to Resolve Darfur Issue), August 5, 2007, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-08-05/192913598425.shtml>.

⁵¹³ “Shaming China on Darfur,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 31, 2007, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/31/opinion/edsudan.php>.

⁵¹⁴ Helene Cooper, “Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields,” *New York Times*, April 13, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html>.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

and was defaming China's reputation as the host of the Olympic Games. Beijing officially condemned some media outlets that tried to politicize China's economic activities, even though they had already been working in Sudan as early as 1996.⁵¹⁶ Indeed, many Chinese remained suspicious that the entire incident was no more than a conspiratorial plot concocted by the United States and other Western countries that begrudged China's success in the Sudan oilfields, especially its insurance of an adequate energy supply.⁵¹⁷ However, the protests in the world media vividly reminded the Chinese leaders that globalization had watered down the supremacy of the principle of sovereignty in international affairs, and if they were to deal with the humanitarian crisis with a hands-off approach, they would be accused of acquiescence or even connivance in the activities of the Sudan government.

China soon dispatched Zhai Jun, assistant minister of Foreign Affairs responsible for West Asian, North African, and African affairs, to Sudan from April 4 to 9, 2007, to push the Sudanese government to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force. Since the matter is no longer purely economic, the Sudan issue is now mainly handed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presumably under instructions of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Zhai even visited Darfur and toured three refugee camps, a rare event for a high-ranking Chinese official to intervene in the internal affairs of another country.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁶ "Lutoushe caifang Zhongguo Darfur wenti tebie daibiao liuguijin dashi (Reuters Interviews Chinese Special Representative on Darfur Issue Ambassador Liu Jingui), June 6, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t328038.htm>.

⁵¹⁷ At least France and Britain did not hide their interest in Sudanese oil. This was mentioned by Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun in his speech on the Darfur issue. See "Waijiaobu buzhang zhuli Zhai Jun jiu Sudan Darfur wenti juxing Zhongwai jizhe zhaodaihui" (Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun Holds Press Conference on Sudan's Darfur Issue), April 12, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t310576.htm>.

⁵¹⁸ Helene Cooper, "Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields," *New York Times*, April 13, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html>.

During a news conference, Zhai called the activists who want to boycott the games “either ignorant or ill natured.” But he added, “We suggest the Sudan side show flexibility and accept” the United Nations peacekeepers, since the issue concerns the international community and perhaps the most effective way to solve the issue would be to take the positions of the different sides into account. China endorsed Sudan taking a small initiative during the Arab Union (AU) summit and agreed to consult with the UN and AU to implement Annan’s Phase III plan.⁵¹⁹

Thereafter, in response to a growing chorus of international pressure, the Chinese government started to play a more active role in mediating between the different sides on UN Secretary General Annan’s “Phase III” plan, which had been put forth in November 2006 and aimed at reinforcing the African Union forces in Darfur to settle the conflict. China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu announced at a press conference on May 10, 2007 that the Chinese government had decided to appoint Ambassador Liu Guijin as a special representative on African Affairs.⁵²⁰ Liu Guijin, a former ambassador to Zimbabwe and South Africa, would focus attention on resolution of the crisis in Darfur. The MFA also confirmed plans to dispatch 275 military engineers for UN peacekeeping operations.⁵²¹ Jiang Yu rebutted the accusations against China, saying that China’s non-confrontational approach was yielding results; “on the Darfur issue, China and the United States have the same goal. We hope to solve the issue by

⁵¹⁹ “Waijiaobu buzhang zhuli Zhai Jun jiu Sudan Darfur wenti juxing Zhongwai jizhe zhaodaihui”, April 12, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t310576.htm>.

⁵²⁰ “Zhongguo zhengfu sheli Feizhou shiwu tebie daibiao” (The Chinese Government Sets up a Special Representative on African Affairs), May 10, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t317749.htm>.

⁵²¹ Jonathan Watts, “China Defends Darfur Stance against Olympic Warning, in Beijing,” in *Guardian Unlimited*, May 10, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,2076662,00.html>.

political means, so we are ready to make joint efforts with the international community, including the U.S.”⁵²²

The mission of the special representative Liu Guijin was to communicate and exchange opinions with the Sudan government and other countries on the Darfur issue, exploring resolutions and making China’s basic stance and views known to the world. Essentially, China was intervening in the crisis: it attempted to mediate, contact, and exchange opinions among the Sudanese government, the African Union, the Arab Union, and the United Nations.⁵²³ Following a fact-finding mission to Sudan, Liu told the *Financial Times* that though China had not criticized Khartoum in public, it had been direct in private. “In our own way and through various means and various channels we have tried to advise the Sudanese government to be more flexible,” he said. “Even on certain issues like [whether] to accept the Annan plan [for a joint African Union-UN peacekeeping force], we use very direct language to persuade them.”⁵²⁴

Beijing played an important role in negotiating the November 2006 Addis Ababa “agreement” on Darfur,⁵²⁵ which won broad support from the international community and was finally accepted by Sudan on April 16, 2007. In the document, Sudan agreed to a UN-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force. China supported the key features of the agreement (“Phase II,” involving the large-scale introduction of additional

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ “Zhongguo lizhu jieju Darfur wenti” (China Presses to Resolve Darfur Issue), August 5, 2007, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-08-05/192913598425.shtml>.

⁵²⁴ “China Advises Peacekeeping for Darfur,” *China Daily*, June 19, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/19/content_897582.htm.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

peacekeepers into Darfar),⁵²⁶ and publicly and privately expressed displeasure at President al-Bashir's subsequent reversal of this commitment and thereafter pushed Sudan harder to live up to the agreement. This had an important influence on Sudan and its decision to reaffirm its commitment to Phase II of the agreement.

On July 31, 2007, the Security Council of the UN passed resolution No. 1769, which would deliver 26,000 troops from the UN-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force by December 3, 2007. The troops would be deployed in Darfur for one year.⁵²⁷ Although this resolution authorized the use of force by peacekeepers, it also emphasized that the conflict in Darfur cannot be settled by military means alone. After the voting on the resolution at the July session of the UN Security Council, China's permanent representative Wang Guangya said that peacekeeping was only one side of the solution; the other side was the political process, which needed to be accelerated. Therefore the solution should be "two-track strategy,"⁵²⁸ meaning that Track II—promoting negotiations between the Sudanese government and the local rebel organizations—should not be abandoned. The draft of this solution was actually initiated as early as July 11, 2006, but it had been strongly opposed by the Sudanese government and three non-permanent African members of the Security Council. Wang Guangya and other members of the Chinese delegation to the UN made efforts to consult with the delegations of the other states on the resolution, trying to water down the part that was unacceptable to the Sudanese government. The latter's dissatisfaction was focused on

⁵²⁶ "China, Sudan and the Darfur Conflict Fact Sheet,"

http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/china_sudan_and_the_darfur_conflict_fact_sheet.

⁵²⁷ "Zhongguo lizu jiejie Darfur wenti" (China Presses to Resolve Darfur Issue), August 5, 2007,

<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-08-05/192913598425.shtml>.

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

the citation in the resolution that authorized a peacekeeping force of 22,500 UN troops to supplement an under-equipped and besieged African Union force of 7,000 soldiers who had been trying, with dwindling success, to restore order in the Darfur region.⁵²⁹ The resolution also condemned the Sudanese government diplomatically. China insisted that the force be deployed only “with the consent” of Sudan, and China also opposed a resolution that would impose multilateral economic and diplomatic sanctions. After intensive consultations and decisive compromise, resolution No. 1769 was finally passed. The Sudanese government’s acceptance of the resolution meant that Phase I had been completed, and Phase II had begun. Although Sudan has some reservations about Phase III, it has agreed to discuss it with all the concerned parties.

China did not push the Sudanese government on this plan because the Chinese leaders understood that the Sudanese refusal was based on concern over issues of control and sovereignty. The revision now confines the use of force to defending the peacekeeping force itself, providing humanitarian assistance, or protecting civilians when attacked, which is the key part of the agreement that has mitigated the Sudanese government’s apprehensions.

Among the Phase II political resolutions, AU Special Envoy for the Darfur Talks and Chief Mediator Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim was urging groups that had not signed the Peace Agreement on Darfur to sit down together to reach agreement. The Sudanese government has announced that it is willing to consult with rival forces and to promote their taking part in the peace agreement in Darfur. In this case, from China’s point of view, further sanctions on Sudan will only complicate the situation, making no

⁵²⁹ Cooper, “Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields,” *New York Times*, April 13, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html>.

contribution toward reaching a resolution of the issue.⁵³⁰ To alleviate the tensions in Darfur, international organizations, including the United Nations, the African Union, and other countries have made great efforts. Having undergone many rounds of negotiations between the Sudanese government and the two rebel organizations, a peace agreement that provides that both pro- and anti-governmental organizations will be disarmed was finally signed in Abuja Nigeria. The Sudanese government insisted that the hybrid peacekeeping force should be commanded by an African country; after consultations between Sudan and the African Union, it was decided that a Nigerian would command this force.⁵³¹

On November 24, 2007, China began deploying an advance force of 135 peacekeeping engineers, whose tasks include well-digging, bridge and road building, and a medical contingent to prepare for Phase III—the early 2008 arrival of the proposed 25,000-strong hybrid African Union-UN peacekeeping force. The total number of the Chinese force will be 315.⁵³² More foreign aid to Sudan would come from Chinese companies in Sudan, such as Huawei Company and Zhongxin Company, which have already donated long distance educational facilities and 60 computers, and are considering other educational donations as well. Chinese oil and other companies are

⁵³⁰ “Lutoushe caifang Zhongguo Darfur wenti tebie daibiao Liu Guijindashi” (Reuters Interviews Chinese Special Representative Ambassador Liu Guijinon Darfur Issue), June 8, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t328038.htm>.

⁵³¹ “Wajjiaobu buzhang zhuli Zhai Jun jiu Sudan Darfur wenti juxing Zhongwai jizhe zhaodaihui” (Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun Holds Press Conference on Sudan’s Darfur Issue), April 12, 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t310576.htm>.

⁵³² “China: Threats to Darfur Peacekeepers Won’t be Tolerated,” *USA Today*, November 11, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-11-28-china-darfur_N.htm; and “Lianheguo: Dui Zhongguo Darfur weihe renyuan de weixie buke jieshou” (The United Nations: Threats to Chinese Darfur Peacekeepers Won’t be Tolerated), Xinhuanet, “China: Threats and November 29, 2007, <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gi/ywdd/news/2007/11-29/1090464.shtml>.

ready to raise US\$2 million worth of humanitarian aid. In addition, the Chinese government has sent agricultural experts to Sudan to design a model center for agricultural technology and to provide substantial assistance in agricultural development.⁵³³

The case of Darfur demonstrates that when foreign aid is linked to political issues, the continuation of aid and types of aid will primarily be determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Ministry of Commerce as a secondary actor and the Standing Committee of the Politburo as the final policy maker.

New Projects and New Approaches

At the June 2004 Tashkent (Uzbekistan) summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Hu Jintao announced that China would provide a US\$900 million in preferential buyer credit to the member countries of the organization. However, one year later, this promise had still not been implemented. At the July 2005 SCO summit in Astana (Kazakhstan), Hu Jintao once again promised that China would provide a US\$900-million loan with better interest, terms, and guarantee conditions. Reportedly, this loan was not initiated or decided by the Ministry of Commerce, but by the top leaders, i.e., the Politburo. The amount of the loan was promised even before the project was evaluated and before completion of the negotiations, and the procedures for the loan were completed some two years *after* this announcement. This is a typical case of strategic and diplomatic considerations as the top priority in the decision-making process. China's fundamental motivation behind this loan was to accelerate cooperation among

⁵³³ "Zhongguo lizhu jiejie Darfur wenti" (China Presses to Resolve Darfur Issue), August 5, 2007, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-08-05/192913598425.shtml>.

the SCO member states, including cooperation in China's war against terrorism in Xinjiang province.

Following a Shanghai summit in June 2006, it was announced that an agreement had been signed on June 14. According to the agreement, a Chinese company, Sinohydro Corporation, was awarded a contract to build a large hydropower plant in Yavan on the Zerafshan River in the Pendjikent district of northern Tajikistan. The project was to be funded with a US\$200 million low-interest Chinese loan. The total cost was estimated to be about \$340 million. The plant would produce approximately 600 million kilowatt hours of electricity per year, and when it becomes operational, the remote district of Pendjikent will no longer need to import electricity from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov concluded the deal during his visit to China.⁵³⁴ A Tajik delegation also visited several Chinese provinces to offer investment projects and seek other opportunities for cooperation.

According to a spokesperson for the Tajik Ministry of the Economy, Gafur Rasulov, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce plans to grant US\$172 million in loans to Tajikistan to implement investment projects; the loans are a part of a large Chinese credit package to the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, worth US\$900 million. At the beginning of 2006, a Chinese delegation visited Tajikistan and expressed willingness to finance several projects. Later the projects were the subject of Tajik-Chinese negotiations, when a Tajik delegation headed by Minister for the Economy and Trade Hakim Soliyev visited Beijing. During the negotiations, the two sides

⁵³⁴ "China Provides Loan for Tajik Hydropower Plant," *The European Weekly*, No. 714, January 30, 2007, http://www.neurope.eu/view_news.php?id=69725; and "Hu Jintao jieshou Shanghe zuzhi chengyuanguo jizhe lianhe caifang dawen quanwen" (Script of the Q and A Press Conference with Hu Jintao by the Press Corps of Shanghai Cooperation Organization [2]), <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2006/2006-05-30/8/736921.shtml>.

discussed projects to rebuild the Dushanbe-Khujand-Buston highway, construct the Shar-Shar and Shakhristan tunnels, and several other projects.⁵³⁵ Construction of the Dushanbe-Khujand-Buston highway project, estimated at a cost of US\$300 million, formally began on July 11, 2006.

A poorly operating turnkey project may be transformed into a joint venture project. A good example is the case of a textile firm in Zambia. This factory, originally initiated in 1983, was built with Chinese aid worth £ 11 million in interest-free loans. However, after the departure of the Chinese experts who had assisted the Zambians in management, it was soon shut down because of mismanagement and the worsening macro-economic situation. In July 1995, on a trip to Zambia, Chinese Vice Premier Zhu Rongji suggested changing the factory into a joint venture. An agreement was reached between the Chinese and Zambians that China's original £ 11 million investment and a further US\$1.5 million for overhaul would be shifted into a 66 percent Chinese stake, and the remaining 34 percent stake would be in the hands of the Zambians. Important management positions, such as the chairman of the board of directors and the general managers, would be held by Chinese nationals. The Textile Corporation of Shandong province was selected as the Chinese partner for the joint venture. In January 1997 the corporation sent some thirty managerial and technical staff to Zambia. It took only twenty days for them to reopen the factory after repairing all the facilities and working out new rules and regulations. The new joint venture, the Zambia-China Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture (ZCMT), was formally inaugurated in May 1997 by visiting Chinese Premier Li Peng. From 1997 to 2003 ZCMT spent about US\$20 million on

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

equipment. Now ZCMT is the largest textile company in Zambia, with 2,000 workers and producing 1,800 tons of cotton yarn, 17 million meters of various fabrics, and 100,000 garments every year. With 5,000 contracted farmers, ZCMT controls over 10,000 hectares of cotton farms in Zambia. In 2006, ZCMT had eighteen stores across Zambia and two subsidiary companies in Tanzania and Namibia, and ZCMT products were sold all over southern Africa. When President Levy Mwanawasa visited China in 2003, an agreement was signed between the Zambian government and the Qingdao municipal authority to encourage Chinese investors to set up businesses in a planned export-oriented industrial park in Mulungushi. Whenever Sino-Zambian relations are mentioned in the Zambian or Chinese media, or by either Chinese or Zambian leaders, the ZCMT, alongside the famed TanZam railway, is always referred to as *the* example of a successful cooperation.⁵³⁶

During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Zambia in 2007, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa announced at a press conference that China would invest \$800 million in the Zambian economy and would create a special economic zone in which Chinese firms could operate in the copper belt town of Chambishi. China would also write off 61.3 million yuan (\$508,900) and a further \$3 million in debt which matured in December 2005, and in addition would build schools and a stadium, train agricultural experts, and provide Zambia a loan to buy road-making equipment. Mwanawasa therefore believed that "China is looking for a strategic mutual friendship of a win-win situation in Africa," and he acknowledged that China's investment would contribute to boosting Zambia's economic development.⁵³⁷ However, resentment by local workers

⁵³⁶ Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*, pp. 177-179.

⁵³⁷ Shapi Shacinda, "Zambia wins Chinese Investment, Opposition Snubbed," February 3, 2007,

over lax working conditions and the deaths of forty-nine miners in an accidental explosion at a Chinese-owned Chambishi mine led to a riot over working conditions in 2006.⁵³⁸ Chinese enterprises now have more production autonomy in Chinese foreign aid projects, but they must consider how to improve working conditions while at the same time boosting the economic development of the recipient countries.

Although foreign aid via bilateral channels is overwhelmingly distributed through the Chinese government, China has already learned that there are also some advantages to foreign aid through international institutions. Participation by a Chinese delegation at a conference on international multilateral aid in October 2007 represented a breakthrough. It was the first time for the Chinese government to send a delegation to take part in an international conference on foreign aid. The delegation included Deputy Minister of Commerce Li Xiaozhun, Head of the Department of Foreign Aid Wang Chuisheng, and Head of the Department of WTO Affairs Zhang Xiangchen. The Chinese have realized that multilateral aid now represents a global trend, and one of its advantages is the resolution of specific problems after undertaking thorough surveys. The following case was illustrative to the Chinese. Mali is a big mango-producing country, but due to poor storage and transportation facilities, it did not hold an important position in the international market. An international organization discovered this problem, and then provided US\$200,000 to teach local planters how to store mangoes in refrigerators. As a result, Mali's mango exports increased some 30 percent annually. The message that

<http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL03330799>.

⁵³⁸ Chris McGreal, "Thanks China, Now Go Home: Buy-up of Zambia Revives Old Colonial Fears," *The Guardian*, February 5, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,2005902,00.html>.

multilateral foreign aid may be efficient has convinced Chinese policy-makers that they should pay more attention to it.⁵³⁹

Policy-making during the Belgrade Bombing Crisis

In his classic volume, James Spanier describes the situation that policy-makers face during times of crisis:

In moments of crises, decisions are made by a few men (the President, selected official advisers, and trusted friends and counselors from outside the government); that, as decision making “goes to the top,” the foreign-policy bureaucracies are “short-circuited”; that the decision makers feel under enormous pressure because crises tend to be short-lasting phenomena, which further raises the already high level of tension; that inaction permits the situation to worsen, so that the disposition is to act; that consequences of nonviolent responses are depreciated and the effects of violent action overestimated; that policy makers tend to have relatively little information at their disposal and, the less information they have, the greater their reliance on broad stereotypes or emotional images of the enemy...⁵⁴⁰

The U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade is such a typical moment of crisis. All phenomena describe by James Spanier in the above paragraph can be found in this event. The bombing is a good case demonstrating how Chinese policy-makers face a crisis, and how foreign policy decisions are made during a time of crisis. Yet, the

⁵³⁹ Interview with a high-ranking official, December 13, 2007; Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*, pp. 177-179; “China, Sudan and the Darfur Conflict Fact Sheet,” http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/china_sudan_and_the_darfur_conflict_fact_sheet.

⁵⁴⁰ James Spanier, *Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 37.

purpose of this research is not to focus on crisis management, but on how Chinese policy-makers make foreign policy decisions at crucial moments on major issues related to international strategy.

Here, it should be emphasized that Chinese policy-making in this crisis should be put against a specific background: the distrust and resentment toward the U.S. had accrued even before the bombing. When Zhu Rongji and his delegation visited Washington in late April, Clinton refused to conclude a deal on China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) because of pressure from the Congress.⁵⁴¹ China-hostile congressmen had forcefully condemned the so-called "political contributions" to the Democratic Party by Chinese and continued to investigate the case of Lee Wen-ho as evidence of China's "theft of nuclear secrets"; such events had led to a deterioration of U.S.-China relations in past months, making the conspiracy theories more appealing to Chinese intellectuals and the general population.⁵⁴² These events and the resulting Chinese distrust of the U.S. even aggravated the Chinese leaders' emotional speculation about the U.S. motivation of bombing.

Beginning in March 1999, U.S.-led NATO forces started to launch air assaults on Yugoslavia, leading to the Kosovo War. As early as a March 25 statement, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly demanded an end to the military assault, and

⁵⁴¹ David E. Sanger, "How Push by China and U.S. Business Won Over Clinton," *New York Times*, April 15, 1999.

⁵⁴² Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," p.358.

appealed to the international community and all sides in the war to cease the conflict, solve the crisis, and restore peace in the Balkans.⁵⁴³

One month and a half later, at 11:45 p.m. on May 7 (Belgrade time), or 5:45 a.m. (Beijing time) on May 8, 1999, two U.S. Air Force B-2 bombers launched five 2,000-pound joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) at the Chinese Embassy, located in Bulevar Umetnosti. The JDAMs penetrated the south side of the compound, with one of them failing to explode. The attack, guided by the extreme accuracy of the U.S. global positioning system, gravely damaged the complex and resulted in serious casualties—three Chinese journalists were killed and over twenty Chinese were wounded. The NATO planners later explained that the bombs had not deviated from their target, but the target itself had been misidentified as the headquarters of a Yugoslav military procurement organization. A spokesman for NATO attributed the confusion to “wrong information”—the CIA claimed that officials in the CIA had provided this wrong information due to an “old map.”⁵⁴⁴

In any event, an attack on an embassy is regarded as a serious incident in international relations. As early as 6:10 a.m. the domestic intelligence service, which received the information from Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Cable News Network (CNN), began to contact Chinese top leaders to inform them about the event. The bombing and casualty reports were confirmed at 7:30 a.m. by the Xinhua News Agency

⁵⁴³ “The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement, March 25, 1999,” in *Zhongguo bukeru, beiyue hongzha wo zhunan shiguan: jishi yu fansi* (China Cannot Be Bullied, NATO Bombing at Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia: Reality and Reflection) (Beijing: Dangdai shijie chubanshe, 1999), pp. 40-41.

⁵⁴⁴ At a meeting held by the American Embassy in Beijing, Assistant Secretary of State on East Asian Affairs Susan Shirk provided the same reasons for the “accidental bombing” to about two dozen Chinese scholars and correspondents invited by the Embassy, including this author.

and the PRC ambassador to Yugoslavia by phone.⁵⁴⁵ An emergency expanded meeting of the Politburo was quickly summoned on Saturday morning, before any detailed information or comprehensive analysis was made available from the intelligence agencies.

As yet, there are no official available records regarding the discussions among the members of the Standing Committee, the representatives of the various ministries, and selected retired elder cadres at the expanded meetings of the Standing Committee of the Politburo during the crisis. Yet, at least three volumes provide relatively detailed information on the meetings: Zong Hairen's *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng* (Zhu Rongji in 1999: First-Hand Materials Reveal the High-Level Policy-making Process) (2003); Jingbao Editorial Department, ed., *Jiang Zemin: yunchou weiwo* (Jiang Zemin: Devising Strategies within a Command Tent) (1999); and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin* (2004). The first book offers details on the content of the speeches by each participant; the second book provides three internal speeches by Jiang Zemin to the expanded meetings of the Standing Committee of the Politburo following the bombing, but their reliability is questionable. However, because there are no obvious contradictions between the contents of these speeches and resolutions and the measures that the Chinese government subsequently adopted, they can be regarded as having certain reliability. As for the third book, it is certain that the author received support

⁵⁴⁵ Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," in Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., *Managing Sino-American Crisis: Case Studies and Analysis* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 355.

from a Chinese government agency, and arrangement of some important interviews conducted by the author were helped by a Chinese government department. Thus putting aside the author's comments, which may be seen as more subjective elements, the narrations of facts given by the Chinese high-ranking officials should not be disdained as less authentic than those given by Zhao Ziyang in A. Doak. Barnett famous volume: *The Making of Foreign Policy in China, Structure and Process*.⁵⁴⁶

Decisions of the First Expanded Meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee and their Implementation

The first emergency expanded meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo in the post-bombing period convened at 10:00 a.m., and was aimed at making a decision on countermeasures to the sudden attack by the U.S.-led NATO forces. The participants included all seven members of the Standing Committee, representatives of the relevant government ministries and party departments, including the Central Military Commission, the Foreign Ministry, and the Information Office of the State Council, as well as some retired senior officials.⁵⁴⁷ All the participants were shocked and indignant about the event, believing the incident to be deliberate.

Thus, discussions focused on two main topics: 1.) if the bombing was not accidental, then what was the motivation of the Clinton administration to launch such an attack? and 2.) what immediate countermeasures should China adopt? As no reliable

⁵⁴⁶ The information from Robert Lawrence Kuhn's book was recommended by a Chinese senior officer. A scholar who read confidential governmental documents produced during the bombing crisis, suggested to reference Kuhn's book.

⁵⁴⁷ Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004), p. 4; Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng* (Zhu Rongji in 1999: First-Hand Materials Reveal the High-Level Policy-making Process) (Hong Kong: Mingjing chubanshe, 2003), pp. 74-88.

intelligence was available at that time, there could only be speculation. After listening to the local reports and raising questions, everyone at the meeting had a chance to express his or her views.

Questions were raised: Why did the U.S. bomb the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia? In recent years, there had been great improvements and developments in Sino-American relations, including high-level mutual visits and an agreement on “making efforts to establish a strategic partnership in the face of the twenty-first century.” Against the background of this peaceful atmosphere of detente, why did this pernicious event occur? Was it an isolated incident?⁵⁴⁸

Because it was difficult to grasp the nature of the event and procure reliable information about U.S. intentions due to the lack of rapid intelligence, there was much speculation about U.S. motivations. Some suggested motivations included:

1. To discern the card in China’s hand, if NATO were to carry out a new strategy and intervene in Chinese internal affairs.
2. To destabilize China. The year of 1999 was a special year to China: adverse currents against China had been raised in succession in the United States, such as “the spy case,” China’s entry into the WTO, and the TMD. There may have been a concealed greater conspiracy in the action of the Embassy bombing, aimed

⁵⁴⁸ Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng*, p. 81. This is not an academic book and it does not use official documents, so the quotations from the speeches by the top leaders may not be reliable. However, because there are no obvious contradictions between the content of these speeches and the Chinese government’s subsequent policymaking after the bombing of the Embassy, the contents may have certain reliability.

at, for instance, forcing China to become involved in this crisis and conflict, or detracting Chinese attention away from the “one center and two basic points.”⁵⁴⁹

3. To explore China’s reactive strength. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy was aimed at probing the degree to which the Chinese might react to and tolerate U.S. intervention in Chinese internal affairs and hegemonic intervention in international affairs.
4. China as the number one potential enemy of the U.S. In the post-Cold War era, the essence of historical circumstances had changed. China is now regarded as an imaginary U.S. enemy. Thus the United States seeks to create disturbances in China.⁵⁵⁰

In reviewing Chinese foreign policy over the past several years, divergent views were found to exist regarding overall foreign policy, including regarding China’s policy toward the United States, China’s policy toward the World Trade Organization, and whether should maintain low-profile international strategy.

At the meeting, there were extensive discussions on how to deal with the indignation of the Chinese students and the general population. Recommendations for countermeasures were proposed, including:

1. Maintaining domestic social stability is China’s top priority. Above all, China needed to maintain social stability and continue its economic development and should not destabilize its front on its own.

⁵⁴⁹ “One central task, two basic points” was adopted as the basic line of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978. “One central task” means “taking economic construction as the central task”; “two basic points” means “upholding the Four Cardinal Principles” and “upholding the policy of reform and opening up.” The Four Cardinal Principles include: 1) the socialist road, 2) the leadership of the Communist Party, 3) people’s democratic dictatorship, 4) Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

⁵⁵⁰ Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng*, pp. 74-81.

2. Keeping the students rational. The government needed to adopt measures to restrict protest activities and to continue normal work and study, adequately affirming the masses' patriotic enthusiasm, but simultaneously providing them with timely guidance.
3. Demonstrating Chinese solidarity. In the face of this U.S. provocation, the Chinese needed to exhibit their national strength, firmly making clear the government's position in dealing with this incident and maintaining national stability and solidarity.
4. Reacting with strength. The government needed to convince the population that it could effectively deal with the event and express the heartfelt wishes of the populace.⁵⁵¹

Some Standing Committee members called on Jiang Zemin to make a public speech to take a clear stand on behalf of the government and the Chinese people.

Apparently different views existed regarding how to respond to the U.S. government and whether China should continue its low-profile foreign policy. In the end, according to Wang Guangya, a deputy minister of Foreign Affairs who was one of the participants in the meeting, "It was left to President Jiang to weigh the long-term interests of the country against the short-term emotions of the people. This was not easy, although it was clear that China would have to respond sharply. Our sovereignty had been violated and the norms of international law flouted—and we knew that the Chinese public would be watching us."⁵⁵² Jiang Zemin asserted that although China had suffered a

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 74-82.

⁵⁵² Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 5.

tremendous grievance, China could not risk its future by overreacting.⁵⁵³ Grounded on this principle, a resolution to adopt countermeasures included the following:

1. A solemn statement on behalf of the People's Republic of China would be issued, most strongly protesting the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia;
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would summon the U.S. ambassador in Beijing and convey the strongest protest against the U.S.-led NATO forces;
3. The UN Security Council would be required to call an emergency meeting to discuss and condemn the brutal behavior of the U.S.-led NATO forces;
4. A group of experts would be sent to Belgrade to rescue the wounded personnel and to bring back all Chinese personnel;
5. An order would be issued throughout the country to guide the organized activities of the population, such as holding symposia and mass rallies, and publishing letters of protest;
6. Organized demonstrations would be held around the American diplomatic facilities in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chengdu, and Shenyang; meanwhile, security agencies would strengthen the police forces in the areas around these diplomatic facilities to firmly prevent radical actions;
7. Social stability would be assured, and vigilance would be maintained against those who might take advantage of the opportunity to disturb the normal social order and to shift the target of the people's anger.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵³ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁵⁴ Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng*, pp. 72-73.

No decision was made at this meeting as to whether the general secretary should deliver a speech, or if another official should make the announcement on behalf of the PRC. Several hours later in the afternoon, the Chinese government issued a statement, which strongly protested the barbaric behavior and demanded that the U.S.-led NATO forces bear all responsibility.

On the morning of May 8, American ambassador to Beijing James Sasser contacted the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying “sorry” for the “terrible mistake” of bombing the Embassy and expressing condolences for the deaths and wounded Chinese nationals. It was night in Washington at that time; no reaction came on behalf of the American nation and people.

The Department of Publicity immediately implemented the instructions of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. On May 8, a meeting was presided over by Ding Guan’gen, minister of publicity, on how to guide public opinion. A circular was distributed to all presses, requiring them to report in support of national solidarity, political stability, upholding party and government policy, and guiding the population to follow the path of reform and opening, to “transform resentment and patriotic enthusiasm into energy for studying and productive construction” and to protect the Chinese people from “the possible neglect of their long-term goals.”⁵⁵⁵

Immediately after the Chinese people learned about the bombing through different media channels, such as Internet sites, indignation spread throughout the country. The Chinese populace, especially college students, refused to accept President Clinton’s expression of sorrow and “regret,” as well as the explanation that it was an

⁵⁵⁵ Wu Baiyi, “Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident,” p. 360; Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 8.

“unintentional” accident. They poured into the streets to take part in anti-American demonstrations in front of the embassies or consular missions of the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands in major Chinese cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, and Hong Kong. The residence of the U.S. consulate general in Chengdu was burned, and dramatic and sustained demonstrations took place in front of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from May 8 to 14. U.S. Embassy personnel began to destroy confidential and sensitive materials as a precaution, since there was uncertainty whether the Chinese guards could protect them from the enraged masses during the climax of the demonstrations.⁵⁵⁶ After three days of siege, Ambassador James Sasser issued a report. “We’re inside the embassy here and we’re surrounded by a cordon of police. ... The embassy building itself has been damaged by tossed missiles and broken windows, and Molotov cocktails set at least two fires inside the embassy yesterday.”⁵⁵⁷ During the nearly week-long demonstrations, the Chinese populace demanded that the U.S. and NATO issue a formal apology and fly their national flags at half-mast to honor the Chinese deaths.

Immediately after the bombing, Beijing municipal Party Committee approved the students’ application to stage demonstrations in Beijing after getting approval from relevant upper authority.⁵⁵⁸ Now it was the duty of the Ministry of Education to decide how large a door would be opened for the students. On May 9, the Ministry summoned several meetings of university presidents to discuss whether the schools should allow the students to leave their campuses, and if so, how many; and whether the students should

⁵⁵⁶ James Sasser, conversation with David Lampton, cited in David Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dream, Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 60.

⁵⁵⁷ Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 8.

⁵⁵⁸ Suettinger, *Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000*, p. 370.

be offered public vehicles to reach the sites of the protests. It was suggested that the students be permitted to demonstrate off campus, but their number should be limited to 500 students per school. However, most of the university presidents at these meetings found this unacceptable. They complained that this number was too low to satisfy the anger of the students, and would likely trigger more intense resentment and radical actions by the students. Thus, it was agreed that 1,000 students from each university would be allowed to participate, and public vehicles would be provided since Beijing taxi drivers certainly would be willing to offer free rides, thus risking the danger of mass mobilization.⁵⁵⁹

On May 8, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan summoned U.S. ambassador, James R. Sasser, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive China's "strongest protest" against "the gross violation of Chinese sovereignty" (but Sasser declined to leave the Embassy compound because of the demonstrations outside). Vice Foreign Minister Wang described the bombing as an "act of barbarians" and warned that NATO would bear full responsibility for the consequences.⁵⁶⁰

It was the responsibility of the MFA to coordinate implementation of the top leaders' policies that had been put forth at the high-level meetings after May 8. But when matters exceeded the authority and responsibility of the MFA, a broader coordination meeting was held, with invited representatives from the relevant

⁵⁵⁹ Conversation with a professor at Beijing University, June 1999.

⁵⁶⁰ "Waijiao buzhang Wang Yingfan jinji zhaojian Mei zhu Zhongguo dashi, fengming xiang yi Meiguo weishou de beiyue tichu zuiqianglie kangyi" (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yingfan Urgently Summons the American Ambassador to China to Deliver Strongest Protest to the U.S.-Led NATO Forces), *People's Daily*, May 9, 1999, p. 4; Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weitz, "The Chinese Embassy Bombing: Evidence of Crisis Management?" in Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., *Managing Sino-American Crisis: Case Studies and Analysis*, p. 332; Suettinger, *Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000*, p. 520.

government ministries and party departments. Decisions on how to honor the victims, how to welcome the returning Embassy staff, and how to receive the U.S. president's special envoy were made either by the MFA on its own or after consultation with the other relevant government or party agencies. After such meetings, the various agencies would hold their own consultative meetings regarding their respective duties and execution of the specific instructions.

Simultaneously, the Ministry of Education, Beijing municipal government and the relevant authorities in other cities and provinces, as well as at universities and colleges, cautiously watched and escorted the demonstrators in order to prevent any overreaction. They also undertook additional safeguarding procedures around the missions of the NATO member states by reinforcing police forces in the area to keep order.⁵⁶¹

On the American side, immediately after the White House informed him of the bombing, Ambassador Sasser contacted the MFA to offer his condolences for the "terrible mistake." Time differences and other preoccupations kept U.S. officials in Washington from commenting on the matter for several hours. On May 8, a Saturday morning (Washington, D.C. time), Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Director of the CIA George Tenet issued a joint statement that called the incident a targeting error and said, "We deeply regret the loss of life and injuries from the bombing."

However, these acts were not regarded by the Chinese as a formal apology on behalf of the American government and people. Li Zhaoxing, Chinese ambassador to the United States, told Jim Lehrer on the Public Broadcasting Service's News Hour, "If you just say 'sorry' and walk away without doing anything else in a thorough manner, this

⁵⁶¹ Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," p. 356.

will only add (to) the anger and indignation of the Chinese people.” When Lehrer asked whether the ambassador doubted the U.S. government’s commitment to conduct a full investigation and punish those responsible, Li said, “We attach more to facts, rather than words. No matter how eloquent one can be.”⁵⁶²

The first expression of regret came from President Clinton on May 8 on an airport tarmac as he visited storm-damaged Oklahoma was “a seemingly casual apology,” which conveyed the impression that the United States did not take the bombing incident seriously. Chinese feelings were further offended when Clinton bristled after he was informed that China called the bombing “barbaric,” “It wasn’t barbaric. What is barbaric is what Milosevic has done. It’s tragic. It’s awful. What is barbaric is the intentional ‘ethnic cleansing’ that he has provoked for a decade now.”⁵⁶³ It was not until the evening of May 8 (May 9 morning, Beijing time) that Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright formally apologized.⁵⁶⁴

Discussion and Implementation of the Policy Decisions of the Second Expanded Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo

A second expanded meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo on the bombing crisis was convened on May 9. At this meeting, Jiang Zemin once again emphasized the necessity to continue economic development and maintain social stability. He said:

The bombing of the Chinese Embassy by U.S.-led NATO forces is by no means an accidental event, but an inevitable strategic step by the hostile Western forces to destroy

⁵⁶² Campbell and Weitz, “The Chinese Embassy Bombing: Evidence of Crisis Management?” p. 337.

⁵⁶³ Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989-2000*, p. 59.

⁵⁶⁴ Wu Baiyi, “Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident,” p. 358.

and Westernize China. The United States and the other Western powers fear seeing a strong China; China's support for justice on the Kosovo issue in particular makes the American government harbor deep resentment. They have never abandoned the idea of annihilating China. I will question Clinton on an appropriate occasion: Is your behavior fitting for "establishing a strategic partnership relationship" with China? Is what you have done consistent with the agreement on "establishing a strategic partnership" between the two states? Now we must remain vigilant and sober, and never let the hostile Western forces succeed in destabilizing China. However, fighting against the hostile Western forces and hegemonism relies not only on justice, but also on power. We must maintain stability. Our top priority at present is to maintain stability and firmly uphold the fundamental line of the party. Only in this way can we strengthen our comprehensive power and strongly oppose hegemonism and power politics. Comrade Deng Xiaoping repeatedly emphasized that we must keep a low profile. Unless an invasion occurs, we should never shift our political choice away from taking economic construction as the central task of the government. There is a huge gap between us and the advanced Western countries economically and technologically, thus we should concentrate our energy and seize the time and opportunity to develop ourselves. We are not cowards or spineless, but we should fight tactfully and take advantage of contradictions among our rivals. There are differences between NATO and the United States, thus we should treat them differently. We should make efforts to win popularity among the American people and welcome foreign investments in China. We should never adopt "exclusionism," and we should always be on the alert for it. Currently, the patriotic zeal of the ordinary Chinese people is on an upsurge. We should support and provide guidance for it. We should let them express their indignation at the U.S.-led NATO forces in accordance with the law, but we should prevent disturbances and intervention by external hostile forces. The Chinese policy of opening cannot be reversed, and we should insist on our principles.

China will benefit from entering the WTO, thus we should continue our efforts to gain entry, but we will not enter the WTO by abandoning our underlying or trade principles. We will not accept rigid conditions imposed on us by other countries, even if we have to wait for another ten years before we enter the WTO.⁵⁶⁵

After considering the various views that existed among his colleagues, Jiang strongly expressed his views. The Politburo concluded that China's foremost concern was social stability and upholding the current foreign policy line; the struggle with the United States would be prolonged, and would remain at the forefront of foreign policy. Dealing with the United States was based on the principle of "struggle without breakup"; external propaganda by the Xinhua News Agency must adopt a consistent tone; China must continue to carry out an independent, autonomous, and peaceful foreign policy, and continue to pursue Deng Xiaoping's line of reform and opening centering on economic construction.⁵⁶⁶

In order to preserve flexibility, and also to prevent deterioration in bilateral relations, the Politburo decided that General Secretary Jiang Zemin would not give a public speech. Instead, Hu Jintao would deliver a televised address for two purposes: to let the Chinese public know that the Chinese government was seriously dealing with this event, and to urge them to be self-restrained.⁵⁶⁷ It was also decided that the minister of Foreign Affairs would present a formal note to U.S. Ambassador James Sasser in Beijing, putting forth on behalf of the Chinese government a four-point list of demands to the "U.S.-led NATO" forces, including:

⁵⁶⁵ Yu Qingsheng, "Jiang Zemin shi neizheng wajiao fangzhen de sanci neibu jianghua" (Three Internal Talks on Domestic and Foreign Policies), in Jingbao Editorial Department, ed., *Jiang Zemin: yunchou weiwo* (Jiang Zemin: Devises Strategies within a Command Tent) (Hong Kong: Jingbao wenhua qiye youxian gongsi, 1999), pp. 286-287.

⁵⁶⁶ Zong Hairan, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng*, p. 73.

⁵⁶⁷ Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 5.

1. To officially apologize to the Chinese government and people, including the families of those killed or injured;
2. To undertake a comprehensive investigation of the incident;
3. To promptly publicize the results of the investigation;
4. To severely punish those responsible.

The note also urged NATO to immediately cease its military actions in Yugoslavia and to resume efforts to achieve a political solution to the Kosovo crisis.⁵⁶⁸

In addition, the meeting also decided to put off high-level military contacts with the United States; to prolong Sino-American consultations on non-proliferation, arms control, and international security; to end the Sino-U.S. dialogue on human rights; to firmly refuse to accept the explanation that it was a so-called “accidental” bombing, and to maintain that it was a deliberate action by the U.S.; and to continue normal foreign affairs activities, thus Li Ruihuan’s visit forthcoming visit abroad would proceed according to plan.⁵⁶⁹

Following these events, in the afternoon of May 9, Hu Jintao, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and vice president of the PRC, delivered a televised speech that reiterated the principled positions of the Chinese government and assured a firm and positive attitude to continue the policy of reform and opening. While stating

⁵⁶⁸ Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng*, p. 74; “Formal Note of 10 May to the U.S. by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan on the Embassy Bombing,” May 10, 1999, in East Asian Studies News File, UCLA Center for East Asian Studies News File, www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/newsfile/bombing05-99/990510-cmfa4.htm.

⁵⁶⁹ Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng*, p. 74.

adequate support for the patriotic zeal of students, Hu called on the people to lodge protests in accordance with social order.⁵⁷⁰

The MFA announced a postponement of high-level military-to-military exchanges and bilateral consultations with the United States on the subjects of non-proliferation, arms control, and international security issues; the human rights dialogue between the two countries was suspended,⁵⁷¹ as were the negotiations over China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Beijing stopped authorizing U.S. navy warships to call at Chinese ports, including at the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, which had been accessible to the U.S. Seventh Fleet since World War II. China soon also halted landings by U.S. military aircraft in Hong Kong.⁵⁷²

The Chinese government requested that the United Nations Security Council convene an emergency meeting to discuss the incident. The Chinese representatives insisted that Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright or some other senior U.S. officials travel to Beijing to explain to the Chinese leadership the results of the U.S. investigation into the bombing.⁵⁷³ On May 10, the MFA presented a formal diplomatic note to the United States in accordance with the decision of the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.⁵⁷⁴

Parallel to the student demonstrations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a storm of stinging, hostile criticism from ordinary Chinese people. Mountains of letters piled up, switchboards were jammed, and the Ministry's Website was almost paralyzed

⁵⁷⁰ Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," p. 352.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., p. 356.

⁵⁷² Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dream: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000*, p. 60.

⁵⁷³ Lynne O' Donnell, "China Demands an Apology in Person," *The Australian*, May 31, 1999, cited in Campbell and Weitz, "The Chinese Embassy Bombing: Evidence of Crisis Management?" p. 333.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 332.

by an e-mail overload. The phone calls, letters, and e-mails all conveyed public opinion that was extremely critical of the Chinese leaders' stance on the bombing, some using coarse or offensive words, some requesting that the government declare war on the United States, or retaliate with a missile attack against NATO headquarters. Others, after hearing of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's sharp remarks⁵⁷⁵ characterizing the incident as a "blatant outrage" lacking any justification and calling on NATO to end its bombing campaign, advocated a military alliance between China and Russia.

Immediately after the Embassy bombing, Yeltsin had made a phone call to Jiang Zemin and had an hour-long conversation with him on the hotline. Yeltsin expressed his strongest condemnation of the bombing, adding that "the stance of Russia is totally the same as that of China." In response, Jiang called the attack "an utmost barbarous act" and said that the two countries would strengthen cooperation on international issues, including Kosovo. Both leaders agreed that military intervention in the sovereignty of other countries was wrong and dangerous.⁵⁷⁶

On May 9, President Clinton made an effort to contact Jiang Zemin over the Sino-American hotline to offer his apologies, but the Chinese side initially refused to arrange the call. Clinton called the bombing the "worst political setback of the conflict." He later recalled "I was dumbfounded and deeply upset by the mistake and immediately called Jiang Zemin to apologize," but the Chinese leadership had decided that any apology by the United States must be made officially on behalf of the nation and should not be exchanged privately between the leaders.⁵⁷⁷ Apparently, there was also

⁵⁷⁵ Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 7.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7; Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 855.

indecision on the Chinese side about how Jiang Zemin should respond to Clinton due to fears that any quotations in the Western press would only further add to the emotions of the Chinese people. If Jiang's words were perceived as being too soft, then the Chinese might resort to further indignation toward the U.S., thus fueling resentment to the Chinese government.⁵⁷⁸

On May 9 (Washington time, May 10 in Beijing), Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright conveyed Clinton's letter to Jiang Zemin "to apologize and sincerely express condolences" to China on the bombing "on behalf of the American people" for the pain and casualties caused by the bombing.⁵⁷⁹ Clinton stressed that the attack "was in no way willful, was not intentional, and was clearly a mistake." He continued, "I don't blame people for being upset about it: I'm upset about it."⁵⁸⁰ The letter was delivered respectively through the Chinese Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in Beijing. But it took some time before the letter arrived in the hands of Jiang Zemin, thus it is reasonable that the letter was not reported in the *People's Daily* until the next day, i.e., May 11 (newspapers are always printed the night before).⁵⁸¹ Therefore, the editorial in the *New York Times* criticizing the Chinese government for deliberately delaying informing the Chinese people about the apology in order to shift attention from

⁵⁷⁸ A conversation with a senior journalist, June 1999.

⁵⁷⁹ Suettinger, *Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000*, p. 372; "Jiu beiyue xiji wo zhunan shiguan, Mei deng beiyue guojia lingdaoren biaotai" (Leaders of NATO, including the United States, Express their Attitudes on the NATO Bombing of the Chinese Embassy), *People's Daily*, May 11, 1999, p. 6.

⁵⁸⁰ Clinton, *My Life*, p. 855.

⁵⁸¹ Ding Xiaowen, *Zai weiji zhong wei hu guojia liyi: Zhongguo chuli ZhongMei waijiao weiji yanjiu (1989-2001)* (Maintaining the National Interests in Crises: A Study of China's Dealing with Crises in Sino-American Diplomacy, 1989-2001) (PhD Dissertation, Beijing University, 2005), in the *Series of Dissertations in the Chinese National Library*, pp. 125-126.

the anniversary of the “Tiananmen event” and to ignite anti-American sentiment was unreasonable.⁵⁸²

The first Chinese report on the apology from Clinton was a small item appearing in *Reference Information*, affiliated with the Chinese Xinhua News Agency, that picked up the news about the American apology from the foreign press. An experienced journalist noted that the major newspapers did not report it not because they were banned from doing so by the publicity organs, but because they were hesitant that such a report would only further ignite indignation among the Chinese.⁵⁸³ In retrospect, Americans say that the most incomprehensible thing during the crisis was that the Beijing leadership did not inform the Chinese people about the Clinton apology at the early stage of the crisis. The Chinese officially claimed that the superficial expression of “regret” and being “sorry” did not seem convincingly sincere, thus their announcement would only trigger stronger resentment and make the demonstrations even more difficult to control.

Many newspapers and magazines reported on the crisis with harsh headlines and strong conclusions. The *People’s Daily* carried a blistering set of authoritative “Commentator” articles calling the bombing a “flagrant attack,” “deliberate,” “a willful murder,” “a bloody atrocity,” “new gunboat diplomacy,” and a “barbaric crime.” The United States was reminded that “the Chinese people are not to be humiliated” and “China is not to be bullied.”⁵⁸⁴ Many foreigners believe that this is evidence of how the Chinese government controls public opinion, but the fact is that Beijing was making

⁵⁸² Editorial, “The Tempest in China,” *New York Times*, May 12, 1999, p. A24.

⁵⁸³ A conversation between the author and a senior correspondent in June 1999 at the American Embassy in Beijing when Susan Shirk, assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, provided a formal explanation of the reasons for the bombing to about two dozen Chinese intellectuals and correspondents.

⁵⁸⁴ Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dream: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000*, p. 60.

efforts to guide public opinion in the opposite direction so as to maintain China's international strategy and policy toward the U.S. In this aspect, Robert Lawrence Kuhn's observation was correct:

Although the media could never challenge or contradict the Party or the government, most Chinese dismissed the notion that they could any longer manipulate their thoughts or opinions. Instead, the public was dictating what the media broadcast and published. The headlines, outrage, and expert opinions all gave the masses precisely what they wanted to read and hear, just as the market-driven press did in the West. An intentional bombing only confirmed what most Chinese already believed: that America sought to contain and control China and would stop at nothing to do so.⁵⁸⁵

It should be added here that the Chinese media were not restricted by the government in reporting on the barbarous behavior of the U.S.-led NATO forces, but reporters were also not encouraged to provoke the emotions of the Chinese people. In this case, there was a large space for the media to decide by themselves how far they would go within the two poles of what was permissible by the government. Of course, without exception they all went as far as possible to be close to public opinion, a tactic called "*da cabianqiu*," meaning trying to be more self-regulating, while still staying within the bound, that is often practiced by the Chinese media. Even if this is the case, the basic tone of the media was in line with the requirements of the government: to make known the official positions and demands, to reflect the sentiments and activities of the Chinese people toward the event, and, most importantly, to emphasize the importance of domestic stability and unity. An editorial in the *People's Daily* was never quoted in Western press. It stated, "The power of the Chinese people is shown by indignation

⁵⁸⁵ Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 9.

rather than by confusion and by acting in strict observance of the law even with deep anger. ... Socialist China in the 1990s will not see another 'Boxer Rebellion' or 'Red Guard' movement."⁵⁸⁶ Wu Baiyi has concluded that in general the media's role in the policy-making process during the post-bombing period was helpful in dealing with the crisis.⁵⁸⁷

Furthermore, the media were not restricted from condemning the U.S. and the U.S.-led-NATO forces, and the Chinese leadership did not stimulate irrational nationalism. Instead, the leadership's reaction was based on domestic politics and its view of the U.S. attitude toward socialist China: the Chinese leadership did not want to be seen in the Chinese public's eyes as a "coward," "spineless," or "too soft" on the bullying powers. If so, its legitimacy would be seriously undermined. Indeed, the Chinese media's hiding of the fact of Milosevic's ethnic cleansing previously reinforced the perception of the U.S.-NATO forces as interventionists and aggressors,⁵⁸⁸ and helped strengthen Chinese sympathy to a "socialist Yugoslavia and their suspicion of the bombing of Yugoslavia as a conspiracy to reach NATO's strategic goal of eastern expansion.

It has been noted that following May 9, Premier Zhu Rongji made more public appearances and presided over more activities. Jiang provided adequate understanding and support, sharing and releasing the political pressure on Zhu. Hu Jintao also

⁵⁸⁶ "Zhongguo renmin de juewu he liliang" (The Awareness and Strength of the Chinese People), *People's Daily*, May 19, 1999, p. 1.

⁵⁸⁷ Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," p. 363.

⁵⁸⁸ Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000*, p. 60. According to Susan Shirk, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan later delivered a internal speech admitted that it had been a mistake for China to support Slobodan Milosevic because he was tyrants who had little support from his own people, see Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 108.

contributed to sharing the burden. The members of Politburo cooperated well together to form a consensus.⁵⁸⁹

The Discussion and Implementation of the Policy Decisions of the Third Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo

On May 11, another expanded meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo was held to arrange further work. Jiang Zemin spoke:

The policy we have adopted in this struggle has proved to be correct. We should continue the struggle; protecting, guiding, and developing the masses' patriotic zeal, maintaining political stability, and pushing forward various works. Our struggle with the U.S.-led NATO forces will not end in the short run. The United States has used quibbles such as bombing our Embassy in Yugoslavia, on which we shall retain our right to adopt appropriate measures. Against the background of the pluralization and globalization of the contemporary world, we must combat hegemonism and power politics; meanwhile, we should not close the door, and we should avoid turning away from the Western countries like the United States. Although knowing that wolves eat humans, we still can contact them. "Dancing with wolves" is the reality we have to face and the policy we must adopt. If we want to develop and become prosperous from our comprehensive capacity to fight hegemonism and power politics, we can neither change nor abandon our given correct line and policy, nor can we change our fundamental judgment on the development of the international situation; otherwise we cannot fight hegemonism and simultaneously maintain contact with them. Therefore, the key here is that we must hold our own basic line and guiding principle, channeling the people's patriotic enthusiasm nationwide into action to maintain stability and to

⁵⁸⁹ Yu Qingsheng, "Jiang Zemin shi neizheng waijiao fangzhen de sanci neibu jianghua," pp. 287-288.

firmly develop and strengthen our comprehensive capacity in light of our basic line and guiding principle, doing our work well in various respects.⁵⁹⁰

Obviously, Jiang's foremost concern was two-fold: the stability of domestic politics and China's staying on the "basic line"—reform and opening.

The following decisions were made at this meeting:

1. Together with the heads of the relevant agencies, on May 12 Hu Jintao would greet the arrival at the airport of the wounded personnel and the caskets of those who died in the bombing, along with the other diplomats who had evacuated the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.
2. All members of Standing Committee of the Politburo would take part in a ceremony to mourn the deaths and welcome the returning diplomats; Jiang Zemin would deliver a speech at the ceremony and would describe the three who had been killed as "revolutionary martyrs," etc.⁵⁹¹

A special delegation was organized and headed by Wang Guozhang from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁹² Its members included representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Health, the Chinese Xinhua News Agency, *Guangming Daily*, and medical doctors. Its task was to fly to Belgrade to bring back the dead, the wounded and other personnel of the Chinese Embassy.

On May 12 the *Guangming Daily* reported on the mourning for two of the dead journalists; Jiang praised their heroism and condemned the attack that "seriously infringed on Chinese sovereignty and constitute[d] an open provocation of the 1.2 billion

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 288-289.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., p. 289.

⁵⁹² "Waijiao buzhang Wang Yingfan jinji zhaojian Mei zhu Zhongguo dashi, fengming xiang yi Meiguo weishou de beiyue tichu zuiqianglie kangyi," p. 4.

Chinese people” and that was “a gross violation of international norms.”⁵⁹³ At the welcoming ceremony on May 13 Jiang conferred the title of “revolutionary martyrs” on the three dead reporters and praised the indignation of the Chinese people. He said their indignation evinced the “great patriotism and cohesive force of the Chinese nation, and stressed that China can never be bullied!” Jiang accused the United States of using its economic and technological superiority to pursue “power politics and to wantonly interfere in the international affairs of other countries.” He said that the United States must “make formal apologies, thoroughly investigate the bombing, and punish those responsible,” warning that “otherwise the Chinese people will never let the matter go.”⁵⁹⁴ At the same time, Jiang asked the Chinese people to channel their rightful ire into building the country’s economic, defense, and national strength. He asserted that social stability must be maintained.⁵⁹⁵

The Chinese media immediately highlighted the ceremony’s themes of reform, development, and stability and began a nationwide propaganda campaign. The reduction of condemnations in the press not only helped disseminate sober-minded views among the public but also contributed to mitigating the crisis itself.

But there was a small problem in all these arrangements. According to the original plan worked out by the Standing Committee, on May 12 when the casket of the three martyrs returned, the members of the Standing Committee were to go to the Xinhua News Agency and *Guangming Daily* to express their sorrow over the deaths, but the plan did not include lowering to half-mast the national flags in front of the Xinhua Gate in

⁵⁹³ Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 10.

⁵⁹⁴ Chinese News Agency, May 12, 1999, cited in Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 10.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Tiananmen Square and in the capitals of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government. However, in the evening of May 11, China received a message that the United States and other NATO countries would lower their flags to half-mast to recognize the three Chinese reporters who had been killed. This message was immediately reported to Hu Jintao, who then requested that the relevant protocol in China be consulted. Later Hu received reports that there was no protocol for lowering flags to half-mast for ordinary citizens. These reports reached the top leader Jiang Zemin. With the approval of the general secretary, in order to prevent embarrassment and complaints from the public, an emergency cable in the name of the General Office of the State Council was sent out to various locations ordering them to lower the flag to half-mast on May 12. It was already dawn when the cable was sent out.⁵⁹⁶

Actually, on May 10 the U.S. consulate in Guangzhou had lowered its flags to half-mast. On May 12, the embassies and consulates of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, and other countries simultaneously lowered their flags. After the mourning ceremony, the Chinese learned about the American official apology to the Chinese people, and the college students gradually returned to their campuses and the demonstrations faded away.⁵⁹⁷

The Chinese leadership then felt that it was time for the general secretary to talk with the American president. On May 14, after a week that was taut with silence, President Jiang Zemin accepted a phone call from President Clinton. In the thirty-nine minute conversation Clinton once again expressed his “sincere apology” and condolences

⁵⁹⁶ Zong Hairen, *Zhu Rongji zai 1999: diyishou cailiao jiekai gaoceng juece guocheng*, p. 97.

⁵⁹⁷ Wu Baiyi, “Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident,” p. 352.

to the injured and the families of the dead, and guaranteed that the Chinese people would learn the truth. He emphasized that Sino-American relations were very important, and he would do his best to address this tragedy.⁵⁹⁸ Jiang said that the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia seriously violated Chinese sovereignty and was a rude violation of the UN Charter and international rules. “These are the fundamental human rights that the Chinese government must maintain.” Jiang requested that the U.S. government undertake a comprehensive and just investigation and publicize the results, and meet all the demands made by the Chinese government and Chinese people.⁵⁹⁹ Clinton later described the conversation with Jiang. He said, “I apologized again and told him that I was sure he didn’t believe I would knowingly attack his Embassy. Jiang replied that he knew I wouldn’t do that but said he did believe that there were people in the Pentagon or the CIA who didn’t favor my outreach to China and could have rigged the maps intentionally to cause a rift between us. Jiang had a hard time believing that a nation as technologically advanced as we were could make such a mistake.” Clinton then mused, “I had a hard time believing it too, but that’s what happened.” Jiang accepted Clinton’s apologies and told Clinton that it was up to America to repair the damaged ties between the two countries.⁶⁰⁰ Later the same day, in the presence of Chinese Ambassador Li Zhaoxing in the Oval Office, Clinton signed the official Chinese condolence book.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁸ “Clinton zongtong yu Jiang Zemin zhuxi tonghua, zaici jiu wo zhunan shiguan zaoxiji shi daoqian, Jiang zhuxi chongshen wo zhengfu yanzhong lichang” (President Clinton Talks with President Jiang Zemin on the Phone, Apologizing Once Again for the Bombing of the Chinese Embassy, President Jiang Zemin Reaffirmed Our Government’s Solemn Stance), *People’s Daily*, May 15, 1999, p. 1.

⁵⁹⁹ Pan Zhanlin, *Zhanhuo zhong de waijiaoguan: qinli beiyue zhaguan he nanlianmeng zhanhuo* (A Diplomat in the Flames of War: My Experience in the Embassy Bombing by NATO and the Flames of War in Yugoslavia) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 2006), p.95.

⁶⁰⁰ Clinton, *My Life*, p. 855.

⁶⁰¹ Campbell and Weitz, “The Chinese Embassy Bombing: Evidence of Crisis Management?” p. 338.

On the following day, remarkably Clinton's apology was reported on the front pages of all the national newspapers in China, alongside Jiang's appeal to the Chinese people to channel their anger into making China sufficiently strong and prosperous to resist such affronts in the future. By the time the apology was eventually publicized, the rage and furor had run their course and the people were ready for a resolution of the crisis.

At the international level, the Chinese UN mission was successful in requiring the Security Council to convene an emergency meeting on the bombing. By the evening of May 14, the Security Council had adopted the chairman's statement that urged a comprehensive and thorough investigation of the incident.⁶⁰²

On the Investigation and Compensation

The crisis was reaching its last stage. Chinese efforts were now focused on the results of the investigation, U.S. compensation for the human casualties and property losses, and punishment of the perpetrators. On the American side, Washington sent a message that it had completed the investigation and was ready to send a special envoy to Beijing to give a briefing on the results of the investigation so as to end the crisis and normalize U.S.-Chinese relations. On May 19, the members of Standing Committee of the Politburo met once again to review the situation. Under the advice of the relevant ministries, the Standing Committee decided to accept in principle the suggestion that a special envoy would visit, but it did not agree to an immediate visit. Moreover, the negotiations on China's entry into the WTO were suspended by the Chinese side. These decisions were closely related to the consideration of Chinese domestic public opinion. On May 29 Beijing responded that it would not accept a visit by a special envoy if there

⁶⁰² Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," p. 353.

was no new explanation other than that it had been an “accidental” bombing and the murderers had not been punished.

Finally, after the Chinese government’s agreement, on June 16, a U.S. mission, led by presidential special envoy and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas R. Pickering visited Beijing to debrief the Chinese government on the outcome of the U.S. investigation. The U.S. mission included representatives from the White House, the intelligence community, the Department of State, and the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense. In his briefing, Pickering highlighted three overarching failures: a flawed technique to locate the intended target and a defective review process that should have exposed the error. Pickering stressed that United States had no reason to attack the Embassy on purpose. Such a decision would have violated U.S. doctrine and practice, would have worked against President Clinton’s “strong personal commitment to strengthening” Sino-American relations, and would have “failed to help achieve NATO’s military [mission to end] repression in Kosovo.” However, the Chinese side refused to accept Pickering’s explanation of the cause of the incident, saying that it was “anything but adequate and convincing, but rather unconvincing, and that the ensuing conclusion of the so-called mistaken bombing is by no means acceptable to the Chinese government and people.”⁶⁰³

From July 28 to July 30, the two parties held a second round of negotiations in Beijing on compensation for China’s human casualties and property losses. On July 30, the U.S. and Chinese governments announced an agreement, to be implemented the following September, in which the United States would pay \$4.5 million to the

⁶⁰³ Campbell and Weitz, “The Chinese Embassy Bombing: Evidence of Crisis Management?” pp. 339-340.

twenty-seven people injured in the bombing and to the families of the three Chinese citizens killed in the attack.⁶⁰⁴

On September 11, Clinton and Jiang held productive discussions at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Auckland. The two leaders were determined to immediately resume and continue a constructive bilateral relationship oriented toward the twenty-first century, thus bringing the crisis to an end.⁶⁰⁵ Thereafter, U.S.-China relationship was back on track. In November 1999, the two governments reached a deal on China's entry into the WTO, and on December 16, 1999, after five rounds of negotiations, the two sides agreed that the U.S. would pay \$28 million to the Chinese government as compensation for the damage to its Belgrade Embassy; China would pay \$2.8 million to the United States as compensation for the damage to the U.S. diplomatic facilities in China.⁶⁰⁶ In early 2000, China and the United States resumed military-to-military contacts, and on April 8, 2000, the CIA announced that the officials responsible for the Embassy bombing had been punished.⁶⁰⁷

Policy-Making and Domestic Politics

The management of the Embassy bombing crisis indicates that Chinese foreign policy has become closely interwoven with domestic politics. Popular emotion, the

⁶⁰⁴ Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," p.354.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶ Campbell and Weitz, "The Chinese Embassy Bombing: Evidence of Crisis Management?" p. 342.

⁶⁰⁷ The CIA announced that it had dismissed a mid-level officer and imposed administrative punishment on six other employees. See Steven Lee Myers, "China Rejects U.S. Actions on Bombing of Embassy," *New York Times*, April 11, 2000, Section A; p. 6; Column 6; Foreign Desk.

media's sympathy for the victims, the intellectuals' search for the truth, and public opinion were all factors that the Chinese policy-makers could not ignore in the process of policy making. In such a situation, the Chinese government adopted measures of "guiding rather than enforcing" students through the leaders of the universities, since it understood that enforcement would lead to adverse effects. As he later told the American side, Jiang Zemin believed that "If 1.2 billion people rage out of control, nobody can hold them back."⁶⁰⁸ Beijing carefully took a chance in bringing the students back to their campuses. It waited until after the Clinton administration had apologized several times, and the NATO states including the U.S. had lowered their flags to half-mast, so that the students' aims had been achieved.

China's victim mentality aggravated the difficulties among the Chinese leadership in terms of retaining flexibility to deal with the United States. After the attack on Chinese sovereignty and violation of international law, the Chinese people were waiting to see how their government would react to this latest humiliation. As a result of the bombing, the Chinese felt that they were victims of the U.S. and NATO strategy in the Balkans. This incident reminded them of what the imperialist powers had done to the Chinese in past history. Thus, the Chinese people immediately formed a consensus to lodge a strong appeal to the Chinese government that it should take a tough position and not to hastily compromise with the U.S. The author of an article published in the *People's Daily* connected the bombing crisis in 1999 with the 1899 U.S. "open door" policy in China and the principle of equality of opportunity after the burning of the old Summer

⁶⁰⁸ Interview with a senior scholar.

Palace and the concession of Hong Kong and Macao, even though the corrupt Qing dynasty and the rule of Chiang Kaishek had long since disappeared from China.⁶⁰⁹

The Jiang Zemin-led Chinese government wanted to continue pursuing the policy of reform and opening, and to maintain smooth relations with the United States. But paradoxically, only by showing its steadfast stance toward the United States before the Chinese population could the Chinese government win its own people's support, thereby convincing them that Deng Xiaoping's basic policies were correct and thus gaining diplomatic flexibility for the government.

When the prevailing view was that the bombing was intentionally carried out by the U.S. government or hostile forces in the U.S., even those Chinese scholars who did not believe that the bombing was intentionally launched had to keep silent, not only because they could not explain an "accidental event" technically, but also because they feared being labeled "traitors." Actually, many scholars who were more familiar with American policy-making and domestic politics were accused of being "pro-American" by public opinion for their more sober analyses. Under the specific circumstances, this description was no better than being labeled a "traitor." In fact, as U.S. policies toward China constantly swung between "engagement" and "containment," and Sino-American relations experienced ups and downs, there were no grounds for the Chinese to trust the U.S. government. The Embassy bombing event reveals that for the first time domestic public opinion has become an important factor shaping Chinese foreign policy decisions. In this crisis, due to the reform and opening, more nationalist voices could be heard in the

⁶⁰⁹ "Zhongguo, bushi 1899" (For China, It Is Not 1899), *People's Daily*, May 12, 1999, p. 12.

society and the policy-makers had to take these voices into consideration when searching for a way to resolve the crisis.

Actually, even Politburo Standing Committee member and Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen did not accept the “unintentional” theory. Six years later he said that “The American airplanes involved took off from the U.S. mainland, followed the route, and struck a target worked out by a control center. All five missiles hit the intended target. How could anyone say the attack was a “mistake”?”⁶¹⁰ But as policy-makers, the Chinese leadership had to balance Chinese short- and long-run interests. No matter what the real reasons for the bombing were, China’s strategic goal of the four modernizations as laid out by Deng Xiaoping should not be changed. In terms of economic development, as Jiang Zemin once pointed out, China’s most important relationship is with the United States, which is not only a source of investment and technology, but also a broad market for Chinese products. In addition, only by maintaining relatively good relations with the U.S., could China achieve a favorable global and regional environment for its economic development. Confrontation or military conflict with the United States was regarded as short sighted and not in the Chinese national interest. This view has been overwhelmingly shared by many intellectuals and think tanks.

Also, for the first time it was revealed that China lacked an effective mechanism for crisis management in Chinese foreign policy making. A report suggesting that China establish a National Security Council analogous to that in the White House was delivered to Jiang Zemin by the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies through

⁶¹⁰ Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 157.

Wang Daohan. Although Jiang was in favor of this idea, the recommendation could not be seriously discussed, since it was not an official report delivered through a formal channel. When Jiang Zemin then turned to Zhang Wannian, the Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission, telling him that there was such a report by Wang Daohan on this topic, Zhang Wannian totally understood Jiang's meaning. Later, a formal report on the topic produced by the Department of General Politics was handed to the Central Military Commission. This report stimulated a serious discussion on whether a National Security Council should be created, leading ultimately to the establishment of the Leading Group on National Security,⁶¹¹ which was mobilized to settle the 2001 Sino-U.S. EP-3 crisis.

Conclusion

The first case study indicates that China's foreign aid policy has undergone three phases. In the first phase from 1950 to 1978, foreign aid was viewed as China's duty to carry out "world revolution," and as a means to strengthen China's leadership of the world revolutionary cause. Accordingly, China's aid basically took the form of grants or interest-free loans.

The turning point occurred in 1978. In the second phase from 1979 to 1994, with the beginning of the reforms and opening up to the outside world, economic cooperation with other countries based on equality and mutual benefit was emphasized, and the concept of "national interests" began to be accepted as one of the important criteria in Chinese foreign policy making. The purpose of China's foreign aid was no longer merely political in nature; it also sought to pursue mutual economic benefits. China's

⁶¹¹ Interviews with two Chinese scholars, 2006 and 2007.

traditional grant-based, non-profit foreign aid was substituted with foreign aid in the form of loans and international economic cooperative ventures, and more foreign aid took the form of turnkey projects. Government ministries reduced their control over foreign aid projects, while contractual forms of foreign aid gradually became more widespread.

The year of 1995 was the second turning point for the overall reform of the foreign aid framework, signified by Wu Yi's "Grand Strategy on Economic Cooperation and Trade," which is characterized by a combination of foreign trade, capital flows, international economic cooperation, and use of domestic and foreign funds, resources, and markets to promote economic development. As a tool of China's participation in international economic cooperation, foreign aid projects must be designed to carry out the strategic thought found in the "Grant Strategy." For this purpose, China needs to pursue a diversity of sources of funds and a diversity of forms of foreign aid. With the growth of the Chinese market economy, the benefits of both the recipient country and the benefits to China are taken into account. Consequently, preferential interest loans provided by financial agencies have become the main form of Chinese foreign aid, and joint venture cooperative projects are promoted.

Reflecting the reform of the foreign aid framework, more government agencies and enterprises are engaged in the foreign policy-making and implementation processes, including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Reform and Development Commission, Ministry of National Defense, Export-Import Bank, and local governments and contracting firms. In this new foreign aid framework, coordination and compromise among various government agencies, between the central and local governments, and among different levels of government

and firms, all of which have their own interests and preferences in terms of foreign aid, became necessary. As independently performing bodies in the free market, firms follow market principles on their own initiative, and they are required to follow international standards in bidding for projects.

As for the Embassy crisis, the following conclusions can be drawn.

The Embassy bombing incident was the first serious crisis that the Chinese government confronted in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. Without a paramount and charismatic political leader, the characteristics of this crisis policy-making process differed from those in previous years. The characteristics of this process can be identified as:

1. From the breakout of the crisis on May 8 to mid-June, the Standing Committee of the Politburo met frequently. All major decisions during the crisis were decided by the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC at expanded meetings of the Standing Committee.

2. Generally, the participants at the expanded meetings of the Standing Committee included representatives of relevant government ministries and party departments, as well as some retired senior officials due to their political experience.

3. At the expanded meetings, every participant had the right to deliver his or her view and to make policy recommendations. Although the policy decisions were made collectively, the general secretary had overwhelming weight on the final decisions, showing his status as “the first among equals.”

4. A consultative meeting of an important policy-making organ—the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, which in non-emergency situations is an essential part of the

decision-making process—was impaired during the crisis, since time limitations and the need for a rapid reaction did not allow the organ to play its role as a bridge between the top decision-makers and bureaucracies, or to consult with think tanks, as it usually does in normal foreign/security policy-making process.

5. The military representatives at the meeting may have been hardliners, but they were not spokespersons for the military; they considered policy from the perspective of overall national interest.

6. The decisions made by the Standing Committee were immediately conveyed for implementation to the different ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Education, the Department of Publicity, and the Information Office of the State Council.

7. In the policy-making process, domestic stability was always the foremost concern, thus public opinion was considered much more seriously than before. At the same time, the government could not completely control domestic public opinion. All the government could do with the sentiment of the population was to let it run its course before resolving the issue. Thus, dealing with domestic public opinion became an important part of crisis management.

8. For this reason, some early interactions with the other side were seen as unacceptable, and Clinton's first "casual" apologies were not conveyed to the Chinese people.

9. Decision making took place without adequate information and thorough analyses, especially at the first expanded meetings of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

Intelligence or expert analyses were not considered until some time had gone and the tensions had been reduced.

10. Analyses of the causes of and likely outcomes of the crisis were requested by the top policy-makers during and after the crisis. As Chapter Four shows, experts and scholars actively provide analyses and policy recommendations in the form of reports. Their contributions considerably help the highest-level policy-makers make significant policy choices, for instance on Sino-American relations or on China's development strategy.

It can be assumed that these characteristics of policy-making process would largely come into view in crises in the years to come.

Chapter Six: What are the Reasons for the Changes in Chinese Foreign Policy-Making?

Scholars familiar with Chinese foreign policy have noted that there have been remarkable changes in Chinese foreign policy-making since the 1978 Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC, when a significant decision was made to pursue Chinese modernization. This chapter will explore the reasons for these changes, in particular the further changes since the early 1990s.

The Fundamental Reasons for the First Decade of Changes

The decision to change China's development strategy made at the 1978 Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC was accompanied by a resolution passed at the meeting on a critical leadership shift: Deng Xiaoping would become the chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC and the vice premier, positions that would make him the de facto top leader of the Chinese political apparatus.⁶¹² The new features of the Chinese political process brought about by these changes have been identified by many American scholars as China shifted from a totalitarian to an authoritarian regime.⁶¹³ Regardless of the changes in the type of political system, the

⁶¹² A. Doak Barnett was told by Zhao Ziyang that even though he did not hold the position of general secretary or prime minister, Deng Xiaoping continued to play a crucial personal role in Chinese policy-making and remained the ultimate source of authority for making policy decisions in China—on foreign as well as domestic issues. See A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 11, 12.

⁶¹³ A. Doak Barnett sees China's evolution under Deng as moving from "extreme totalitarianism toward liberalized authoritarianism" (H. Lyman Miller, "Politics Inside the Ring Road: On Sources and Comparisons," in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., *Decision-Making in Deng's China* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995), p. 207; Harry Harding calls the Chinese political system "consultant authoritarian," whereas Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton use a "fragmented authoritarian model" to describe bureaucratic politics and decision making in the post-Mao

shift in leadership certainly triggered changes in the Chinese policy-making process in general and Chinese foreign policy-making in particular. As analyzed in Chapter One, during the Mao period, it was always Mao, the paramount leader, who had the final say on grand strategic decisions. However, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, there was no longer a paramount leader who had absolute power in policy making. Deng's power was balanced by that of another faction, the moderate reformers, often referred to as the "conservatives,"⁶¹⁴ led by Chen Yun.⁶¹⁵

In the post-Mao era, the Chinese process of policy-making evolved from a paramount-leader-dominated, personalized, and non-institutionalized policy-making process, to a collectively-led, less personalized, and more institutionalized process. Although the policy-making process has not yet been fully institutionalized, a number of significant changes have occurred under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

When Jiang Zemin took over the position of general secretary of the CPC from Zhao Ziyang in 1989, the changes in the decision-making process during the Deng years were

period. The concept of a fragmented authoritarian model was first discussed in Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, in *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Process* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), where China's system is called a "fragmented, segmented, and stratified structure" (p. 4); and was later elaborated upon in Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), where the "fragmented authoritarian model argues that authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures. The fragmentation, moreover, grew increasingly pronounced under the reforms beginning in the late 1970s." (p. 6)

⁶¹⁴ The term "conservatives" as used in China is fundamentally different from how it is used in the U.S. Conservatives in China are in fact leftists who believe in a more orthodox Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and who favor equality over rapid economic growth; they are suspicious of the negative effects of China's reforms and opening to the outside world.

⁶¹⁵ However, Chen Yun is not analogous to most factional leaders within the CPC in that he never pursued the aggrandizement of his own political power; thus, he by no means competed with Deng Xiaoping for power.

extended and deepened. Selected by Deng Xiaoping, but without the charisma and reputation created by leadership in countless battles and crises during the early revolutionary wars and the War of Resistance against Japan before the establishment of the PRC in 1949, and lacking a long-term relationship with high-ranking officials, Jiang Zemin represented a new generation of Chinese leaders. Jiang's power thus was not only overseen by Deng Xiaoping until the latter's death in 1997, but also was shared with his colleagues on the Politburo. Although he held the highest position as general secretary of the CPC, Jiang was regarded as no more than "the first among the equals."⁶¹⁶ Until Jiang's retirement in 2002, most important foreign and defense policy decisions were made by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, in consultation with the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee and high-ranking officials in the party, government, and military.⁶¹⁷

Subsequent to the 2002 Sixteenth Congress of the CPC Central Committee, Hu Jintao became general secretary, president of the People's Republic of China, and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. It had been ten years since Deng Xiaoping had promoted Hu Jintao to the party Politburo Standing Committee and had appointed him to succeed Jiang Zemin as the "core" of the Communist Party's fourth generation of leaders. His official biography reports that Hu joined the party in 1964, one year before the Cultural Revolution, while he was studying hydroelectric engineering at Beijing's prestigious Qinghua University. After graduation, Hu worked his way up through the ranks of the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power. Thus, Hu Jintao is

⁶¹⁶ David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 30.

⁶¹⁷ Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," in Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, p. 45.

the first Chinese leader whose political career began after the Communist Party took power in 1949.⁶¹⁸ Even more technocratic than Jiang, Hu had to prove his capability and create his own authority in the top leadership position of the huge country that was facing various difficulties, of which the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis was the first.

Parallel with the transfer of power, changes in the foreign policy-making process occurred gradually and ultimately dramatically. As we have seen in Chapter One, the process has become less personalistic and more institutionalized. By institutionalization, here it is posited that certain institutions are established and gain authority over parts of the policy-making process, which confers greater predictability to the outcomes of the policy-making process. David Lampton refers to four characteristics of Chinese foreign policy making,⁶¹⁹ two of which—professionalism and corporate pluralization—can also be seen as manifestations of institutionalization: the bureaucracy has more say on routine decisions; decision-makers rely more on information provided by experts; and cooperation among different components of the foreign-policy establishment is increasingly important.

⁶¹⁸ “China Today, China’s Who’s Who,” <http://www.chinatoday.com/who/h/hujintao.htm>; and “Profile of Hu Jintao” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ahk/asia-pacific/2404129.stm>.

⁶¹⁹ For David M. Lampton, the four characteristics are 1) professionalism, including the trend toward a higher level of specialized knowledge among the Chinese elite and bureaucrats, the extension of expert-based bureaucracies in the decision-making process, and the increased reliance by decision-makers on information provided by specialized bureaucracies; 2) Corporate pluralization, referring to the proliferation of organizations, groups, and sometimes individuals in the policy-making process; 3) Decentralization, namely, the gradual decentralization of power at both the central and local levels, occasionally in policy formulation and more often in implementation. This trend is more evident in the area of economics and trade; and 4) Globalization, specifically economic and information globalization, and the increasing degree to which national security must be multilaterally negotiated inevitably leads to international interdependence, which is in turn presumed to foster cooperation. Globalization thus has reshaped Beijing’s concepts of national interest and its practice of realpolitik. See Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, pp. 5-27.

However, if the changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process during the first decade or so were derived largely from the transfer of leadership and adoption of the new reform and opening policies, then it can be said that in the following years the further changes can be attributed to the consequences of the domestic and foreign policies—China’s rapid and sustainable economic growth and the change in China’s status in the international arena.

The Impact of Chinese Economic Development on Its International Status

In the first decade of the reforms, China’s average annual GDP growth rate was 9.1 percent; in the second decade, the growth rate was as high as 10.4 percent. By 2001, Chinese domestic GDP had reached 9,580 billion renminbi, approximately US\$1,160 billion, surpassing Italy and following France, Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States as the sixth largest economy in the world. In 2001, China’s foreign trade amounted to US\$509.77 billion, ranking seventh place in the world.⁶²⁰ According to a different source, by the end of 2005 when China released its economic statistics, economists and financial prognosticators were surprised to find that the Chinese economy was considerably larger than what they had previously estimated, and probably had surpassed France, Italy, and Britain to become the world’s fourth-largest economy. Thus, they called for a reassessment of China’s rise and its role on the world stage. Some economists even amended their timetables for when China would eclipse the United States as the largest economy in the world. With the new numbers providing an

⁶²⁰ Lin Limin, “Dui 21 shiji Zhongguo guojia zhanlüe de ruogan sikao” (Some Considerations on Chinese National Security Strategy in the 21st Century), in Chu Shulong and Geng Qin, eds., *Shijie, Meiguo he Zhongguo: xin shiji guoji guanxi he guoji zhanlüe lilun lunwen ji* (The World, the U.S., and China: A Symposium on International Relations and International Strategic Theory in the New Century) (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 2003), p. 336.

eye-opening view of Chinese economic activity, some predicted that China could surpass the United States by 2035, i.e., five years earlier than the previous forecast.⁶²¹

According World Bank statistics, China's GDP growth in 2005 was 10.2 percent, amounting to US\$2,243.85, the two numbers for 2006 are 10.7 percent and US\$2,668.1 billion relatively.⁶²² *The Economist 2007 Yearbook* predicts that the growth rate will maintain a growth rate of 9.9 percent in 2007. In 2005 merchandise exports from China amounted to US\$762.0 billion, and imports amounted to US\$660.0 billion.⁶²³ With an average 9.4 percent annual GDP growth from 1979 to 2004—one of the highest growth rates in the world—and US\$851 billion in foreign trade in 2004—accounting for 4 percent of the world economy—China has come to be regarded as one of the big rising powers.⁶²⁴ In 2003 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. coined the term the “golden BRICs” comprising Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC is a combination of the first letters of their names).⁶²⁵ In fact, the order of the GDP growth of the four countries is just the reverse. The rapid growth of their economies can be seen in the following figures.

⁶²¹ David Barboza and Daniel Altman, “That Blur? It’s China, Moving up in the Pack,” *New York Times*, December 21, 2005.

⁶²² [ASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20394802~menuPK:1192714~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html](http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=CHN;http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20394802~menuPK:1192714~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html); [http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=CHN](http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=CHN;); <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>.

⁶²³ World Trade in 2005, on the WTO Website, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its06_overview_e.pdf.

⁶²⁴ Zheng Bijian, “China Peaceful Rise to a Big Power,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005).

⁶²⁵ Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Global Economics Paper, No. 99, October 1, 2003, on the Goldman Sachs Global Economics Website, <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf>.

Table 6-1 GDP of “Golden BRICs”

(Unit: Billion dollars)

	China	India	Russia	Brazil
GDP in 2005	2228.862	785.468	763.762	794.098
Increase Rate*	9.9%	8.5%	6.4%	2.3%
Predicted GDP in 2007	30100.00	9280.00	11400.00	9340.00
(PPP)	106700.00	47200.00	18600.00	17700.00
Predicted Increase Rate**	9.9%	7.4%	5.9%	3.3%

Source: * 2005 World Bank statistics.

** predicted by *Economist Yearbook* (2007).

All figures show that China has been substantially integrated, with more weight, in the world economy. As a consequence, China is viewed either with suspicion and wariness, or with neutrality, by other countries. Seen as a rising big power in terms of its economy, China is required by foreign and neighboring countries to behave responsibly.

Therefore “international responsibility” is a new concept being imposed on China, causing China to rethink its foreign policy patterns. International responsibility was hardly regarded as a self-requirement by China when it was isolated from the international community as an outlier before the PRC was formally admitted to the United Nations in 1971. Even when China recovered its membership in the UN Security Council, the fact that the world was divided into the two Cold War camps prevented China from making foreign policy in light of the mutual interests of the international community. As a socialist country ruled by Communist revolutionaries, China under Mao’s leadership played the role of a challenger to the existing international

order and institutions.⁶²⁶ Nevertheless, China's difficulty in learning how to become a responsible power was due not only to the existence of the two camps in the Cold War, but also to its bitter experiences in recent history, known as the "one-hundred-year humiliation"—1840 (the first Opium War) to 1949 (the establishment of the People's Republic of China). Hence, to understand China's difficulties in adjusting to contemporary international institutions, one needs to re-trace its history.

One Hundred Years of Humiliation

During the one-hundred-year history of humiliation, China was constantly defeated or invaded by the Western powers. Beginning with the first unequal treaty at the end of the Opium War in 1840, the big Western powers, including the United States, France, Russia, and Germany, and the newly rising imperial power, Japan, repeatedly imposed unequal and unfair treaties on China. These treaties compelled China to accept unequal conditions, such as treaty ports, concessions, foreign leaseholds, spheres of interest, extraterritoriality, one-sided most-favored nation status with its trading partners, and foreign control over the Chinese customs, salt, and postal administrations.⁶²⁷ The most prolonged and arduous war in this period was the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression that lasted for eight years from 1937 to 1945 and in which thirty million Chinese lost their lives.

Unlike many developing countries, China has a several-thousand-year brilliant history during which it created an outstanding culture of which the Chinese are proud. To the Chinese, the nature of the aggression by the modern Western powers differed from

⁶²⁶ Only in terms that Mao took the world revolution as China's obligation can China be seen as having sense of international responsibility. But this responsibility exactly means posing challenge to the existing international rules.

⁶²⁷ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 34.

that of the so-called “barbarians” in history—most of the latter were nomadic tribes or their confederations, and they either disappeared for unknown reasons or eventually integrated into Chinese culture, becoming integral components of the Chinese nation. Imposed from the outside, the modern Western powers’ aggression, oppression, and unequal treaties, in contrast, largely destroyed the Chinese economic and political foundation and civilization, and humiliated Chinese self-esteem, hence leaving a much deeper and more lasting impression on the collective memory of the Chinese nation and greatly dampening Chinese traditional pride in the “Middle Kingdom.” The one-hundred-year humiliation suffered by the Chinese had such a profound impact that it still shapes Chinese outlooks on the world to this day. Consequently, the combination of the one-hundred-year period of humiliation and pride in the “Middle Kingdom” played a vital role in the formation of Chinese foreign policy during the Mao period, and even later as Chinese policy-makers are still highly sensitive over issues of security and the sovereignty of the nation. Without understanding this point, as Michael Hunt points out, one can hardly understand contemporary Chinese foreign relations.⁶²⁸

The history of the “one hundred years of humiliation” has had a negative influence on Chinese thinking about the world. It created the “victim mentality,” which deeply rooted in the heart of the Chinese nation as a whole. “Communist China’s image of

⁶²⁸ Michael Hunt comments that Chinese leaders’ “behavior may be perfectly explicable and in a sense rational in the Chinese context at the same time that it seems puzzling and even irrational from the perspective of an outsider attuned to power politics but not to the power of the past.” See Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 28. Michael Swaine and Alastair Iain Johnston also state: “Many other major powers bullied and coerced China during its ‘century of humiliation’ from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. That experience pervades much of current Chinese strategic thinking.” See Michael D. Swaine and Alastair Iain Johnston, “China and Arms Control Institutions,” in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 100.

those days (the humiliated century) is one of victimization at the hands of a great evil force invading China.”⁶²⁹ This caused feelings of “self-pity” and “resentment” among the Chinese toward the Western powers that dominated the international community.⁶³⁰ It can be assumed that a country with deep victim mentality and suspicions about international regimes can hardly gain the sense of being a responsible member of the international community.

On the other hand, China’s difficulties in learning how to become a responsible power in the international community are due to the fact that China had never been an equal member of any kind of international community before it regained its seat in the United Nations from the Kuomintang’s Republic of China. Traditionally, in Chinese there had never been a concept of an international community, because China had been regarded as “*tian xia*” (everything under heaven, or the world). The Emperor who governed “*tian xia*” was regarded as the “Son of Heaven” (*tianzi*). He was the spokesman of Heaven in the world of mortals and the ruler of all vassal kingdoms surrounding China. Not until the 1880s does China’s written history contain a few records about “foreign relations,” as we understand the term today. For centuries in Chinese ancient history, China’s contacts with the outside world remained tributary in nature and in fact China saw itself as superior to all other states. The world beyond the Great Wall of China did not attract much interest in China, except for security reasons,

⁶²⁹ John G. Stoessinger, “China and America: The Burden of Past Misperceptions,” in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, eds., *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 90.

⁶³⁰ John K. Fairbank, “Why Peking Casts Us as the Villain,” *New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1966, cited in *ibid.*, p. 90.

since it was inhabited by what the Chinese viewed as barbarians.⁶³¹ There was no concept of sovereignty or equality among nations until China was dragged into the modern world dominated by the West in the mid-nineteenth century, yet still as a junior or subordinate member-state. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to arrange the post-World War I peace order, China had no voice regarding its territory in Shandong that had been seized by Germany during the war.⁶³² Chinese representatives were excluded from the 1951 San Francisco Conference for Peace with Japan, and China was not consulted regarding the status of Taiwan after Japan's surrender.⁶³³ This led to the future trouble over the "theory that the status of Taiwan is still undecided."

After over one hundred years since the first Opium War, China was again isolated by the West as the PRC chose to lean to the side of the Soviet Union and was excluded from the international community against its will for more than twenty years since the start of the Cold War. The Cold War, which divided the international community into two camps, one led by the Soviet Union and one led by the U.S., stripped China of any opportunity to be a normal member of the international community. As a result, in the post-Cold War era, it naturally took a long time for China to abandon its victim mentality and to learn how to become a responsible power. During this period China's adjustment to living in the international community was made even more difficult, since it now faced

⁶³¹ Michael H. Hunt, "Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective," in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 5-6, 40; See also Stoessinger, "China and America: The Burden of Past Misperceptions," pp. 73, 89. The author argues that during the latter half of the nineteenth century "the leadership of the Chinese Empire did not alter its self-image of moral and cultural superiority and its conviction that the barbarians would recognize this superiority and behave like the tribute-bearing mission of old."

⁶³² Baidu Encyclopedia, <http://baike.baidu.com/view/13852.htm>.

⁶³³ Lin Cheng-jung, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Lack of Conclusions on Taiwan's International Status," September 10, 2001, <http://www.twhistory.org.tw/20010910.htm>.

a world order with two new features: the world had become more globalized and more interdependent, and China, as a big power, was required to bear more responsibilities.⁶³⁴

One lesson the Chinese drew from the one-hundred-year humiliation was that China must become a strong, prosperous, and internally stable state, otherwise invasion and intervention from outside will be inevitable. Throughout Chinese history, as Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis observe, there have been two concerns at the forefront of Chinese thinking: namely, an intense fear of social chaos and political fragmentation internally, and aggression or intervention externally. Domestic chaos and disorder have been seen as security problems because they inevitably lead to a weakening of China's defense capacity, which in turn invites foreign manipulation and aggression.⁶³⁵ In the Chinese phrase, this situation is described as "*neiluan waihuan*." Therefore, China's security problems and resultant strategies have traditionally focused on the priority of maintaining domestic order and prosperity.

⁶³⁴ Rosemary Foot expresses this view in the following way: "Soon after Beijing decided to fully integrate into international society, it found that it did not share the dominant new definitions of a responsible state. The changes in definition posed particular dilemmas for a government keen to be recognized as a great power. It did not meet some of the criteria that more recently had become associated with the modern state in international society, especially those that shone the spotlight on the domestic organization of states, such as the concepts of good governance, humanitarian intervention and the protection of human rights." See Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State," *The China Journal*, No. 45 (January 2001), pp. 2-3.

⁶³⁵ Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and the Future* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2000), pp. 13-16; This view is also shared by Zheng Yongnian, see Zheng Yongnian, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 15.

China's Self-image

Richard Lebow argues, "A nation's self-image can actually exert a significant influence on its foreign policy."⁶³⁶ Without understanding American exceptionalism one can hardly understand American foreign policy.⁶³⁷ Similarly, without understanding China's victim mentality, one can hardly comprehend contemporary Chinese foreign policy. The victim mentality is a kind of self-image of the Chinese nation as a whole. It has long shaped the way the Chinese view the world, the international regime, and China's relations with other countries, particularly with the big Western powers.

Image is defined as the organized representations of certain attributes in an individual's mind about objects, events, people, nations, and policies. An image is, of necessity, a simplification of reality. This characteristic makes an image both functional and dysfunctional. Separate images are organized into a more or less coherent and integrated whole—into a kind of "belief system" of the organism about itself or the world—which contains beliefs, explanations, hypotheses, feelings, predispositions, and attitudes. The belief system orients an individual to his environment, identifying the characteristics that are most important to him, acting as a set of lenses through which information about the environment is obtained, ordering perceptions into a coherent guide

⁶³⁶ Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War, The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 200.

⁶³⁷ Bernard Fensterwald, Jr. explained that "the United States rationalized its overseas expansion as a commitment to liberate the oppressed and bring the blessings of democracy and capitalism to the weak and poor." See *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

for action, and establishing goals and preferences. Without such images, what the observer sees would be “an unmanageable amount of information.”⁶³⁸

The concept of image, and the concepts of perception⁶³⁹ and misperception, are very important in foreign policy decision making at both the individual level and the bureaucratic level. Individual images and perceptions are significant because different images and perceptions of the world shape policy decisions at the individual level,⁶⁴⁰ and at the same time shape public opinion regarding what kinds of relations a nation should have with other states, thus shaping the climate in which foreign policies are made. Deng Xiaoping’s comments on China’s policy regarding sovereignty over Hong Kong and Taiwan provide an apt example.

It is argued that there is often a gap between the world as perceived by the decision-makers, and the world as it really is. Images constantly shift and are reappraised as new information is received.⁶⁴¹ The images are constantly tested against the observations and experiences of people in the real world. Furthermore, what

⁶³⁸ Kenneth Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 11-14; Ole Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy,” in Farrell and Smith, eds., *Image and Reality in World Politics*, p. 18.

⁶³⁹ In his 1991 study of China’s image of the United States, David Shambaugh argues that the distinction between “image” and “perception” was unclear in the literature. But he states that Allen S. Whiting’s distinction is applicable: “Image refers to the preconceived stereotype of a nation, state, people that is derived from a selective interpretation of history, experience, and self-image. ... Perception refers to the selective cognition of statements, actions, or events attributed to the opposite party as framed and defined by the preexisting image. To use a figure of speech widely found in the literature, image provides the frame and the lenses through which the external world is seen or perceived.” See David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 4, note 2.

⁶⁴⁰ Kenneth E. Boulding argues that “The reactivity coefficients are themselves functions of the value systems of the decision-makers and of their general image of the international system, or perhaps of their images of other people’s reactivity. And all these in turn are related to the gathering and processing of the information on which the decision-makers depend.” See Kenneth E. Boulding, “The Learning and Reality-Testing Process in the International System,” in Farrell and Smith, eds., *Image and Reality in World Politics*, p. 8.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

decision-makers learn from crucial events in international history is an important factor in determining the images that shape the interpretation of incoming information. But usually this kind of learning inhibits rather than promotes productive thinking.⁶⁴²

Robert Jervis stresses that history has an impact on the creation of the images of national leaders, and more importantly, a major change in the images of national leaders always brings about a change in policy.⁶⁴³ The perceptions of the historical past become linked with what K. J. Holsti calls the national self-image or national role conceptions—the way people view their own nation and its status in the world. How a state’s leaders view its role in the world affects its behavior. For instance, American interventionism around the world stems at least in part from the American self-image of “exceptionalism,” that is, seeing Americans as a people chosen by God, with values and a political system superior to that of other peoples; they thus have special responsibilities to spread their values of freedom and democracy to every corner of the globe.⁶⁴⁴ The Israeli perception of Jews as victims—the “Holocaust syndrome”—has led to an exaggerated fear for Israel’s survival in the face of Arab aggression, which is seen as another attempt to impose a “final solution” upon the Jews.⁶⁴⁵ Hence, the following question should be raised: To what extent has its historical experience and the traditional Chinese self-image/national role affected China’s foreign policy making?

⁶⁴² Robert Jervis, in John A. Vasquez, *Classics of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996), p. 166.

⁶⁴³ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Image in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 4-6.

⁶⁴⁴ Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), pp. 36-37. David Forthes, “Meiguo waijiao zhengce yu renquan: Lilun de fenxi” (American Foreign Policies and Human Rights: A Theoretical Analysis,” in Zhou Qi, ed., *Renquan yu waijiao* (Human Rights and Foreign Policies) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2002), pp. 108-109.

⁶⁴⁵ Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 335, 514.

How much of a gap, if there is one, exists between the world as perceived by Chinese decision makers and the world as it really is?

Here we have to be careful in using the theory of image, because, according to Jervis, the effects of image and perception may weaken the explanatory power of the bureaucratic politics model used in this dissertation through historical lessons constituted by the initial images at the bureaucratic level. These historical lessons may form the basis of future planning, becoming permanent features of standard operating procedures and creating preferred frameworks for viewing events or preferred options for dealing with contingencies.⁶⁴⁶ Some examples include: the serious lesson the U.S. learned from the appeasement of the aggressors in the 1930s, which has been regarded by U.S. policy-makers as a guide for dealing with all future crises, from Korea to Vietnam to Kuwait in 1991. It is alleged that one of the most powerful “lessons of history” for Russian leaders has been that Russia’s security depends on the creation of buffer states to ensure that when the flames of war burn, Russian territory will not be involved.⁶⁴⁷ What are the powerful “lessons of history” for China? Perhaps, as discussed above, “*neihuan waihuan*” has shaped Chinese foreign policy making. For our purposes, it is fortunate that the effects of the institutionalization of image and perception are not overwhelming when issues are routine rather than unusual and when organizational perspectives and loyalties are more important.⁶⁴⁸ Even if the impacts of image and perceptions are

⁶⁴⁶ “If people in different units share the same policy preference or if preferences are distributed at random throughout the government, then the assertion that bureaucrats’ policy preferences are determined by their positions in the government: ‘Where you stand is determined by where you sit’ would be undermined.” See Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 24-25.

⁶⁴⁷ Greg Cashman, *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), p. 60.

⁶⁴⁸ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, p. 27.

powerful, bureaucrats may view them in different ways and therefore their opinions on policy options may differ. In addition, in the following narrative we will see that the new Chinese self-image as a rising power has narrowed the gap between its perceived status and the reality, not only affecting China's policy making, but also reducing the weakening effects of the historical lessons on the explanatory power of the bureaucratic politics model.

Misperceptions occur when an individual's perceptions of the world do not correspond to reality.⁶⁴⁹ People's understanding of external events is subject to the misinterpretations that are provided by their preexisting images and belief systems.⁶⁵⁰ It can be fairly confidently stated that misperceptions have been the direct cause of crises. In the case of Chinese policy making, the fact that the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and the EP-3 crisis in 2001 did not turn into a military conflict owes much to the Chinese leadership's finally overcoming a preexisting image and successfully resisting being guided by the public emotion that had been provoked by historical lessons and images. Thus, the Chinese leadership (and the Americans) could correctly perceive the other side's moves toward de-escalation and respond in a like manner. However, the difficulties the Chinese leaders faced in dealing with the crises derived not only from poor communications and negotiations with their counterparts in the United States, but also as much from patriotic domestic public opinion. Judgments and analyses on the U.S. motives and reasons for the bombing on the Website and in the press by some knowledgeable intellectuals incited

⁶⁴⁹ Cashman, *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict*, p. 61.

⁶⁵⁰ Robert Jervis, "How Decision-Makers Learn from History," in John A. Vasquez, ed., *Classics of International Relations*, p. 166.

the public to have an even tougher reaction during the crisis, as the historical lessons were regarded as a mirror to reach contemporary conclusions.

The reactions by the Chinese leaders in these two crises contrast with those by Deng Xiaoping immediately after the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989, when Deng announced that the rhetorical attacks and punitive sanctions by the seven Western powers reminded him of the intervention in Chinese domestic affairs by the eight Western powers in the late Qing dynasty. Deng noted that if Russia and Austria were added and Canada omitted, then these were exactly the eight powers that had invaded China in the late Qing Dynasty.⁶⁵¹ Because of this perception, for a while Beijing refused the Bush administration's suggestion that China should take the first step so as to give the Bush administration an excuse to lessen its punitive measures and to help it appease the resentment in the U.S. Congress.⁶⁵² In this case, it is obvious how the historical lessons shaped Beijing's uncompromising stance.

However, whereas Mao Zedong, the designer of China's grand strategy, perceived that a large-scale war was inevitable, from 1984 on Deng Xiaoping insisted that China was a peace-maintaining power⁶⁵³ and from 1985 on he argued that a world war could be

⁶⁵¹ Deng Xiaoping, "Zhenxing Zhonghua minzu" (We Are Working to Revitalize the Chinese Nation), April 7, 1990, in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 358.

⁶⁵² Deng Xiaoping's talk with former American President Nixon when he visited Beijing, "Jieshu yanjun de ZhongMei guanxi yao you Meiguo caiqu zhudong xingdong" (The United States Should Take the Initiative In Putting An End to the Strains to Sino-American Relations), October 31, 1989, in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 330-333.

⁶⁵³ Deng Xiaoping first openly stated this in "Zai Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli 35 zhounian qingzhu dianli shang de jianghua" (Speech at the Ceremony Celebrating the 35th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China), October 1, 1984, in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, Vol. 3, p. 69.

avoided.⁶⁵⁴ This reconfigured the framework of Chinese international strategy and foreign policies. More recently, Jiang Zemin's 2002 report to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPC developed a new conception of the world situation: war would not possibly occur for at least the first twenty years of the twenty-first century, thus there would be a period of strategic opportunity for China to continue its economic development. This new notion came to direct Chinese international strategy, which in turn shaped Chinese foreign-policy decision making.

It is probably natural to believe that others see us in the same way as we see ourselves and to expect them to respond to us accordingly. In China's case, the evidence is that the Chinese leaders lack an understanding about the importance of religion in American society and politics, as evidenced by Jiang Zemin's conversation with President Clinton, when he wondered why in a scientifically and technically advanced country like the U.S., religion was so influential and significant.⁶⁵⁵ On the other hand, American policy-makers do not understand (they are coming to understand but still their understanding is insufficient) why the Chinese are so sensitive to intervention in Chinese domestic affairs by foreign powers—it

⁶⁵⁴ Deng Xiaoping asserted that the maintenance of peace was developing, though the danger of war remained, in "Heping he fazhan shi dangdai shijie de liangda wenti" (Peace and Development Are the Two Outstanding Issues in the World Today), March 4, 1985, in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, Vol. 3, p. 105.

⁶⁵⁵ Jiang Zemin's remarks at a news conference held by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin in Beijing, June 27, 1998, as recorded by the Federal News Service, a private transcription company, and transmitted by the Associated Press. President Jiang Zemin's remarks were translated by the Chinese. During the press conference, Jiang stated that he still had a question: "During my visit to the United States last year, and also during my previous visit to other European countries, I found that although education and science and technology have developed to a very high level and the people are now enjoying a modern civilization, still quite a number of them have a belief in religion. So this is a question that I'm still studying and still looking into. I want to find out the reason why." In this paragraph, strangely, the word "zongjiao" (religion) was translated by the Chinese side as "Lamaism." Obviously, in the context here "zongjiao" logically does not refer to Lamaism, but rather to religion in general. See "the transcript of the news conference that President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin held in Beijing June 27, 1998, as recorded by the Federal News Service, a private transcription company, and transmitted by The Associated Press. Mr. Jiang's remarks were translated by the Chinese, <http://www.zpub.com/un/china27.html>.

is simply because of the historical lessons and the role of the victim mentality. Therefore, it is difficult for American leaders to understand why the Chinese harbor hostility toward the U.S. on the Taiwan issue, and why the Chinese feel threatened by the U.S. when it closely cooperates with Japan and Taiwan in defense policy in the Asian-Pacific region. Similarly, the Chinese cannot perceive why there is any reason for the U.S. to regard China as a potential threat to American security and interests, and why the Western powers regard military capacity as more decisive than intention—Americans cannot accept the logic of the explanation that traditionally China is a peace-loving country.

If there is misperception in Chinese foreign policy making, one of the reasons is, as Richard Ned Lebow suggests, that decision makers are more responsive to internal imperatives than to external developments. Lebow assumes that whatever stimuli people receive from their environment are mediated through their perceptions and images of those stimuli. These perceptions of stimuli may distort the reality.⁶⁵⁶

Since Chinese decision-makers, as noted above, always regard domestic politics as the top priority—because the greatest lesson they draw from history is that under certain circumstances domestic social chaos and disorder will incite aggression or intervention from outside—misperceptions may be difficult to avoid.

Victim Mentality

China's victim mentality and sensitivity to sovereignty is easy to stimulate China to react to territorial conflicts by using force, as it did in the Spratly Islands in 1988. This and other actions in the late 1980s and early 1990s added to concerns in Southeast Asia

⁶⁵⁶ Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War, the Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 148-153.

about the China threat. Moreover, these two factors and the experience of the early Cold War incited Chinese suspicions about the rules of international regimes, fearing that their rules were tools of the Western powers to pursue or defend their own interests, e.g., the U.S. during the Korean War. The prolonged debates among Chinese leaders, economic experts, and the public about whether China should enter the WTO also were derived from the Chinese general sense of distrust of the international regime. Even today, after China has become a formal member of the WTO, such suspicions can still be heard. Moreover, the victim mentality tends to ignite emotional nationalism, and occasionally can lead to outbursts of indignation on the part of the Chinese public toward specific events, as we have in the case of the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

China's self-image—as a victimized developing country—has deeply influenced Chinese foreign policy making. In contemporary Chinese foreign policy, there are a number of examples that demonstrate how the Chinese people and Chinese policy-makers are sensitive to issues related to China's security and sovereignty. One example is China's position on the issue of Hong Kong's return to China. In his conversation with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Deng Xiaoping steadfastly refused her suggestion to exchange jurisdiction for sovereignty. Deng stated that on the issue of Chinese sovereignty, there was no room for China to make compromises. He asserted to Mrs. Thatcher that China would restore sovereignty over Hong Kong regardless of the results of the negotiations, since there was no room for negotiation on this issue. If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997 when the "lease" imposed on China became due, "no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify

themselves for that failure before the Chinese people..." in such a case, any Chinese government would lose its legitimacy. "It would mean that the present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty, and that the present Chinese leaders were just like Li Hongzhang."⁶⁵⁷ The late Qing dynasty is seen as responsible for the one-hundred-year history of humiliation, and Li Hongzhang, a top military and administrative official dealing with foreign affairs during that period, is regarded by Chinese as a national traitor.

Another example is the official Chinese position on Taiwan. Beijing's stance has been repeatedly affirmed on many different formal international occasions: China will not abandon military force as a last resort to reunify China, if Taiwan's policy-makers announce independence. This hints that China will pay any price to save the unity of China even at the high expense of slowing down its economic progress. Many Westerners argue that the official Chinese position is due to the leadership's concerns about regime survival, since it tends to take advantage of crises to deflect the attention of the Chinese populace. But those who hold this view fail to realize that the Chinese people as a nation care about the loss of territory and sovereignty even more powerfully than their leaders, though as individuals they may not care very much about territory like Taiwan. This has been revealed in many polls conducted in China that show that over 95 percent of the Chinese people who were questioned responded that Taiwan independence should not be allowed. If the Chinese Communist leaders are concerned about their legitimacy, their concern must be grounded on the emotions of the ordinary Chinese, which in turn are grounded on a victim mentality.

⁶⁵⁷ Deng Xiaoping, "Women dui Xiang Gang wenti de jiben lichang" (Our Basic Position on the Question of Hong Kong), September 24, 1982, in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, Vol. 3, p. 12; also "Zai zhongyang guwen weiyuanhui disanci huiyi shang de jianghua" (Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the CPC), October 22, 1984, in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, Vol. 3, p. 85.

Westerners often discuss Chinese nationalism, assuming it is deliberately triggered by the Chinese leaders, but they fail to see that Chinese nationalism is both directly and indirectly stimulated by the Chinese victim mentality.

The Chinese self-image is changing as China is coming to be seen more as an emerging great power with varied interests and responsibilities and less as the victimized developing nation of the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping eras.⁶⁵⁸ The Chinese leadership has gradually realized that Chinese actions in the international arena and reactions to the outside world not only influence the PRC's international relations, but also have an impact on the relations of other states in the Asia-Pacific region, and beyond. This is exemplified in the cases of China's search for oil on the international market and China's role in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis. Therefore, a new thinking regarding Chinese international strategy has been formed, as exemplified in the words of senior diplomat Cui Tiankai, now Ambassador to Japan: "The world which is a subject observed by China must also include China itself."⁶⁵⁹

A Responsible Big Power and Peaceful Rise

The idea of a responsible power entered the Chinese mentality accompanied by the change in the Chinese self-image as a rising power. The latter did not appear in Chinese publications until the late 1990s. It is a description of the outcome of the rapid

⁶⁵⁸ Evan S. Medeiros and Fravel M. Taylor, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82 (November/December 2003), pp. 22-33, at p. 23.

⁶⁵⁹ Interview.

economic development and the tremendous changes brought about by Deng Xiaoping's talk on his journey to the South in 1992.⁶⁶⁰

Nevertheless, China's self-image as a rising power differs from how Westerners perceive China. For the Chinese, at least in Chinese government documents, China's rise is no more than a rise to its historical status. In Chinese, this is referred to as "the great revitalization of the Chinese nation," "the realization of modernization," etc.; or in the words of the report of the Political Report of the Sixteenth Party Congress of the CPC, the pursuit of "the great revival of the Chinese nation on the socialist road with Chinese characteristics."⁶⁶¹ Thus, Chinese leaders use a historical frame of reference, i.e., in the future Chinese development of modernization, "success" implies the reappearance of China's historical brilliance; "failure" implies the disastrous humiliation that China endured in the century following the Opium War of 1840.⁶⁶² Ordinary Chinese take China's rise for granted: it was not only a dream of generations of Chinese after China lost its historical pride as it became a semi-colony of the Western powers, and was finally invaded and bullied by the Japanese, but also their right to live decent lives like the people in the advanced countries and to enjoy a respected world status. In thinking of China's rise in this way, however, China seems not to have changed its self-image completely: the historical/vertical thinking prevents it from considering how people in the rest of the world look at China's rise and its possible consequences to the international order.

⁶⁶⁰ Niu Jun, "Zhongguo jueqi, mengxiang yu xianshi zhijian" (The Rise of China, Between Dream and Reality), *Guoji jingji pinglun* (International Economic Review), No. 11-12 (2003), p. 45.

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶⁶² Ibid.

The Chinese have no experience living in international society. The Chinese historical environment was vastly different from that in Europe. But they could not simply adopt the Western states' perception of the world in recent history because in their eyes, it was the international order dominated by the Western powers that had brought them so much suffering and that reduced China to a weak and subordinate state. Only when the Chinese as a nation perceives itself horizontally, putting themselves in the context of the environment of the contemporary world will China be able to be aware of the reasons why the rise of China arouses so much concern not only among Western states, but also among the nations along its borders.

The victim mentality has undergone a change, though gradual and inconspicuous, but ultimately fundamental. In parallel with the fading of the victim mentality, there has been a consensus in China's international strategy regarding "integrating into the international community." Simultaneously, the Chinese have realized that China has become a beneficiary of international institutions. Considering that China has been a state with its own developmental orbit for several thousand years and a century of enduring humiliation, such a change, within only thirty years of reform, is extraordinarily dramatic.

The changes in China's image of the world and self-image in the international community occurred initially within the confines of Southeast Asia. But China's image was gravely damaged after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. "Perhaps no image of China lingers more strongly than the photograph of a lone Chinese young guy standing in front of a column of tanks," though "the images that prevailed at the time of Tiananmen

greatly distorted the reality of China even at the time.”⁶⁶³ Indeed, a gap between China’s self-image (or the Chinese leadership’s image of China) and China’s real image in the international community was so large that the degree of damage to China’s image caused by the crackdown might have never been fully recognized by Beijing in the aftermath of Tiananmen. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership made great efforts to calm international criticism and to end its isolation by, for instance, de facto cooperation with the U.S. on the UN resolution on Saddam’s Iraq in 1991, and identification of good relations with Southeast Asia as in its important interest.⁶⁶⁴ As Quansheng Zhao writes, “for Deng the very threat of international isolation was sufficient to inspire a rapid improvement in China’s relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors.”⁶⁶⁵ These actions were also aimed at improving China’s image on the international stage. However, the effects were relatively limited. Actually, against its will China’s relations with Southeast Asia reached a low ebb in 1995. Because of the friction with the Philippines on Mischief Reef, an atoll in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the Southeast Asian states responded by condemning Beijing as a diplomatic bully.

However, it is well recognized that the 1997-99 financial crisis was a turning point for China’s image. It provided an opportunity for China to make a breakthrough in transforming its image, starting among the Southeast Asian states. China’s gestures in this crisis and thereafter confirmed China’s goodwill and commitment to the region, and helped remove some of the Southeast Asian wariness about China’s growing economic

⁶⁶³ Joseph Fewsmith, *China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 2, 3.

⁶⁶⁴ Samuel S. Kim, “Peking’s Foreign Policy in the Shadows of Tiananmen,” *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 39-69.

⁶⁶⁵ Quansheng Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” *World Affairs*, Vol. 159, No.3 (Winter 1997), pp. 122-124.

presence. During the crisis, China kept its promise not to devalue its currency, which would have allowed it to profit at the expense of its weakened neighbors, and supported the ASEAN economies through both the IMF, for example, an IMF loan to Thailand and Indonesia, and bilateral aid, for example, US\$1 million in economic aid to Thailand. By contrast, the United States that dominated international economic and financial affairs not only allied with the IMF prescriptions to address the financial crisis (which were perceived as aggravating rather than alleviating the crisis), but also refused to offer bilateral aid to Thailand, and was widely perceived as benefiting from Southeast Asia's financial problems. The U.S. was blamed for "letting down" Asia and thus became a target of resentment.⁶⁶⁶ Even Japan was criticized for not doing enough to help the ASEAN countries. In retrospect, several years after the crisis it was recognized by ASEAN and the United States that "among the United States, Japan and China, China was the only one to emerge from the crisis with an improved image among ASEAN members."⁶⁶⁷ When a research group in Bangkok conducted an investigation in November 2003 regarding which country was considered Thailand's closest friend, approximately 76 percent pointed to China, whereas only 9 percent chose the United States, a long-time military ally in the Cold War and the world's largest importer of Thai products. Alice D. Ba points out that over the last decade nothing more than the financial crisis highlighted the fact and strengthened the awareness among ASEAN that

⁶⁶⁶ Douglas Webber, "Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific after the Asian Crisis," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2001), pp. 356-358.

⁶⁶⁷ Alice D. Ba, "China-ASEAN Relations: The Significance of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area," in Tun-Jen Cheng, Jacques deLisle, and Deborah Brown, eds., *China under Hu Jintao: Opportunities, Dangers, and Dilemmas* (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2006), p. 318.

there were important areas of “divergence” from the United States and that ASEAN’s “convergence” with Western neoliberal models could not be assumed.⁶⁶⁸

Once largely seen as an intimidating trade competitor, a diplomatic bully, and a potential military threat, according to diplomatic analysts in Asia, China is building a new reputation among its neighbors as a responsible regional power and an essential engine of Asian economic growth. Although wariness regarding a rising Chinese power has not yet been completely eliminated across the region, the view of China has shifted considerably. In November 2002 China signed an agreement with ASEAN to exercise self-restraint concerning the Spratly Islands, which are also claimed, at least in part, by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.⁶⁶⁹ By so doing, China put the dispute on the back burner without giving up its claims to the islands, located near busy sea lanes and rich fishing waters. China has articulated a “new security concept” aimed to present a kinder, gentler China to its Southeast Asian neighbors. Most notably, the articulation of a “new security concept” was put forth in the 1998 *Chinese White Paper on China’s National Defense*, as well as emphasized by Chinese officials including Qian Qichen and Hu Jintao. The new security concept is expressed as “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation,” implying that mutual security will be enhanced if security is pursued through mutually beneficial cooperation, and through dialogue and consultation, not competition and confrontation.⁶⁷⁰ Beijing has argued that economic development in China promotes growth across Asia and it has promised to further open

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 317.

⁶⁶⁹ “Zhongguo dongmeng qianshu xuanyan gongbi nanhai chongtu, nansha buzai jiang diaobao” (China and ASEAN Sign a Declaration on Jointly Preventing Conflict in the South China Sea, Blockhouse Will Not Be Built on Spratly Islands), *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), November 7, 2002, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2002-11-07/1621799589.html>.

⁶⁷⁰ “White Paper on National Defense: China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm>.

its huge market to Asian products. In November 2002, China and ASEAN concluded a landmark framework agreement on establishing an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) by 2010 for China and the original five ASEAN members plus Brunei, and by 2015 for ASEAN's newest members; the relevant negotiations were completed in 2003.⁶⁷¹ If put into practice, the free trade area will be the world's largest free trade area. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area has the potential of not only transforming East Asia's economic and political landscape but also of playing a powerful role in the larger world economy. In South Korea, China has replaced the United States as its top trading partner and has won praise for endeavoring to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis by sponsoring and making progress in the six-party talks. In Australia, China's new president Hu Jintao delivered a speech before the Federal Parliament in October 2003, becoming the first Asian head of state to address Australia's parliament in more than one hundred years. China also signed a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the ASEAN summit, becoming the first non-member to sign a friendship treaty with ASEAN, which was an important gesture of its acceptance of Southeast Asian institutional norms and values.⁶⁷² In addition, China has improved relations with all fourteen neighboring countries, settling territorial disputes from Laos to Kazakhstan and even narrowing its contradictions with India. It signed a friendship treaty with Russia, and created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a security forum with Central Asia and Russia.

⁶⁷¹ Raul L. Cordenillo, "The Economic Benefits to ASEAN of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA)," January 18, 2005, <http://www.aseansec.org/17310.htm>.

⁶⁷² For further discussion of this topic, see John Wong and Sarah Chan, "China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May/June 2003).

China's changing image and rising status led a *Washington Post* article to warn, "China's rising status and influence present a challenge for the United States."⁶⁷³

Finally, the Asian financial crisis spawned an outcome that the Chinese leaders had vigorously pursued over the previous eight years, but until then had met with little success—an improvement of China's image in the world. Whereas the principal consideration during the crisis was for China to solve the crisis by helping the other East Asian states, China's image was substantially improved, a consequence that can be described by the Chinese phrase "*wuxin chaliu liu chengyin*" (doing something not deliberately for a particular purpose, but by so doing gaining exactly what is really wanted).

Even the Clinton administration noted in formal policy speeches that the Chinese government had begun to refer to itself as "responsible power."⁶⁷⁴ Susan Shirk observed how Chinese scholars connected this term with China's self-image, quoting Wang Yizhou who said in 1999, "Maintaining a proactive and constructive posture, China will enter the twenty-first century with the image of a responsible big power. With the passing of time, the so-called 'China threat theory' will be defeated automatically."⁶⁷⁵ Tang Jiaxuan also uses morality to express "international responsibility." He said in an internal speech that "we shouldn't give the world the impression that we only care about own interests, we should show that we also care about morality."⁶⁷⁶ An effort by China to become a responsible power does reduce concerns about the China's threat: there is scholarly consensus that contemporary Chinese

⁶⁷³ Philip P. Pan, "China's Improving Image Challenges U.S. in Asia," *Washington Post* (November 15, 2003), p. A01.


⁶⁷⁴ Susan L. Shirk, China, *Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 107.

⁶⁷⁵ Cited in *ibid.*

⁶⁷⁶ Susan L. Shirk, China, *Fragile Superpower*, p. 108.

foreign policy has countered its negative reputation through a commitment to building a cooperative, responsible image in international society. Indeed, according to a BBC World Service poll, China's influence in the world is regarded as positive. In total, of 22,953 people in twenty countries who answered the questionnaire, 48 percent believed that China's world role was mainly positive. Only 30 percent saw it as mainly negative. The majority of respondents were also positive about China's growing economic power, but far fewer people wanted to see an increase in its military might. In seventeen of the twenty nations polled, more people thought China had a positive rather than a negative influence. China comes out favorably when the results are compared with similar questions exploring the global influence of Russia and the U.S.⁶⁷⁷ (see the following figure). Gradually China's self-image as a rising power has taken shape.

Figure 5-1 BBC World Service Poll - Chinese Influence



Source: "BBC World Service Poll, Chinese Influence,"
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4318551.stm>.

⁶⁷⁷ "China's Influence Is seen as Positive," *BBC News*, March 5, 2005,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4318551.stm>.

“*Taoguang yanghui*” (“low profile” strategy), the Chinese developmental strategy designed by Deng Xiaoping, seems not to leave much room for a high profile in international affairs. Deng Xiaoping formulated this strategy at the turning point between the Cold War and the post-Cold War period when the effects of the end of the Cold War were not yet clear. China’s burgeoning and potential economic strength gives it growing confidence that its rise will not be fleeting. But China needs to do more to define its objectives, and also to enhance other nations’ demands on China, for instance, with respect to China’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Observers have noted that the developing countries have pushed Beijing to become more actively involved in activities that they see as beneficial to domestic stability and regional peace.⁶⁷⁸ Thus China’s decision to act like a “big power” with responsibility across the Asia-Pacific region instead of merely acting with a victim mentality does not mean that China has changed its developmental strategy as defined by Deng Xiaoping, but rather that China recognizes the responsibilities of a rising big power in the new international environment and faces the new challenge of how to balance between a “low profile strategy” and international responsibility.

It is not surprising that when interviewed by foreign researchers as to why China joined treaties or processes on arms control, a common response among Chinese was that China had to do so, because it was a part of a world historical trend, it was a part of China’s role as a responsible major power, and it would help improve China’s image, or because it helped China to break out of the post-June 4 attempts by some Western states

⁶⁷⁸ Samuel S. Kim, “China’s International Organizational Behavior,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 421.

to isolate China diplomatically.⁶⁷⁹ Such responses are the honest reactions of the Chinese.⁶⁸⁰

This change helps explain why China began to aggressively push for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula, and why China has offered to step into regional disputes in which its interests are not clear. For example, when the Cambodians staged anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh early in 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Thai ambassador in Beijing and promised to provide support.⁶⁸¹ China invited forty-eight African countries to Beijing in November 2006 to the Sino-Africa Cooperation Forum aimed at promising closer cooperation and trade.⁶⁸² In 2007 Beijing agreed to send 1,000 peacekeepers to Lebanon, its first such a big action in the Middle East. At the United Nations Security Council, China cast aside its longstanding policy of opposing sanctions against other nations. It worked to impose penalties on North Korea for testing nuclear weapons. Although Beijing is extremely wary of Security Council authorizations under Provision VII of the UN Charter (related

⁶⁷⁹ Rosemary Foot does not accept this explanation. She believes that it is not so easy to explain why China should be concerned about its international image and identity as a responsible state. See Foot, "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State," p. 15.

⁶⁸⁰ Initially, when discussions turned to how China would rise, some voices claimed that China should pretend to be modest, but as soon as China entered the international regime, China should make efforts to completely renovate the regime. But such voices have scarcely been heard since 2000, especially after China formally entered the WTO. After perusing many publications and in many conversations, I have never encountered this explanation. Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China and Multilateral Security Institutions," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 253.

⁶⁸¹ Philip P. Pan, "China's Improving Image Challenges U.S. in Asia," *Washington Post*, November 15, 2003, p. A01.

⁶⁸² "Zhongfei xuanbu jianli xinxing zhanluo huoban guanxi" (China and Africa Announce to Establish the New Type of Strategic Partnership), December 5, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-11/05/content_5292709.htm.

to enforcement measures in reference to breaches of the peace), between 1990 and 1999 Beijing supported such authorizations 84 percent of the time, abstaining on the rest.⁶⁸³

Awareness that China should become a responsible state was also stimulated by a remark by Robert B. Zoellick, American deputy secretary of state, to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York on September 21, 2005: “It is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a *responsible stakeholder* in that system.”⁶⁸⁴ At the December 8, 2005, conclusion of the second high-level Sino-U.S. strategic dialogue, Zoellick again stressed: “As it becomes a major global player, we are now encouraging China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ that will work with the United States and others to sustain, adapt, and advance the peaceful international system that has enabled its success.”⁶⁸⁵ The Chinese leadership accepted an invitation by the Bush administration to discuss becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the American-dominated international system. However, the questions of what are the criteria of a responsible power and how to become a responsible stakeholder have triggered heated discussions in China. The key question in the discussions is that if U.S. national interests and the interests of the international community are not always compatible, then should China cooperate with the

⁶⁸³ It voted for 91.5 percent of the 625 resolutions passed during this period. For details see Sally Morphet, “China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, Oct. 1971-Dec. 1999,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2000), Table 2, pp. 154, 160. This compares with 42 percent between November 1971 and December 1981, 66.7 percent between 1982 and 1986, and 86 percent between 1986 and July 1990. With reference to Chapter VII resolutions, it is worth noting that the 1990-1999 period included the Gulf War, and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, East Timor, and so on.

⁶⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” September 21, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>.

⁶⁸⁵ Office of the Spokesman, Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second U.S.-China Senior Dialogue, Washington, DC, December 8, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57822.htm>.

U.S. in any event if it wants to be seen as a responsible power? For the Chinese, the answer is negative.

“Peaceful rise” and “responsible state” may be seen as two sides of the same coin. The phrase “peaceful rise” was first suggested by Zheng Bijian, vice president of the Central Party School in China. During his talks with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, responding to Rice’s concern about China’s rise as a potential threat to the U.S., Zheng said: “China’s rise will be peaceful.” Rice immediately replied: “It is a good idea, I like it. We should have more discussions on it.” Thereafter, Zheng Bijian reported this conversation to President Hu Jintao, his former boss at the Party School, and “peaceful rise” was endorsed by Hu as a proper term to describe China’s foreign policy goal, that is, to develop into a big power without disrupting the existing international order and challenging the current leading powers’ status in international relations. The purpose was to relieve the concerns of other states, especially those of the remaining superpower, the United States.

With Hu’s endorsement, Zheng Bijian introduced “peaceful rise” in his speech “China’s New Road to Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia” at the Boao Forum in China in November 2003. It was at a December 10, 2003 speech at Harvard University that Premier Wen Jiabao first used the phrase “peaceful rise.” Then at the press conference following the Second Plenum of the Tenth Congress of the National People’s Congress he formulated the gist of “peaceful rise.” At a symposium on the 110th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth on December 26, 2003, Hu Jintao stressed that China would insist on the developmental road of peaceful rise and the foreign policy of independence and autonomy. However, the phrase still aroused internal debate. At a regular meeting of

retired ambassadors presided over by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan,⁶⁸⁶ some twenty-four participants found that peaceful rising could not reflect China's real status in the world—China was not rising—and using this phrase could only arouse instead of relieve the concerns of other states. They also argued that talking too much about China's rising was incompatible with Deng Xiaoping's "low profile" strategy. After this discussion, these arguments were included in a report to Tang Jiaxuan that through Tang was delivered to the top leaders. Allegedly the arguments were seriously considered by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Hu directed that the term was not to be used on official occasions and in official documents, but he allowed that informal discussions could continue. Thereafter, in Hu's formal speeches, he dropped the term "peaceful rise" in favor of the tamer-sounding "peaceful development," considering that using "rise" risked stoking fears of "the China threat," particularly in Japan and the United States.⁶⁸⁷ To many countries "rise" could imply that other states decline, at least in a relative sense, whereas "development" suggests that China's advance can also bring other states along. Indeed, historically and theoretically no state has been found to rise to big power status peacefully.

The Road from a Challenger to a Responsible State

In her article "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State," Rosemary Foot raises the question of whether China has been a responsible government. She cites the views of Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull who argues "institutional society exists when a

⁶⁸⁶ Former ambassadors meet to discuss Chinese foreign policy and international relations and to write reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the higher authorities. In this way, they remain involved in Chinese foreign policy-making in an advisory capacity.

⁶⁸⁷ Joseph Kahn, "China Shy Giant, Shows Signs of Shedding Its False Modesty," *New York Times*, December 9, 2006.

group of powerful states recognizes that it shares certain common interests from which limited rules of coexistence can be derived, and exhibits a willingness to share in the workings of institutions that maintain those arrangements.” Foot believes that international society in this formulation acknowledges diversity in values but a set of reciprocal interests.⁶⁸⁸ This might seem always true to a Westerner, but if one examines the period of history prior to the Cold War, it certainly is not true to most Chinese according to their understanding of Chinese and world history over the past two centuries. In fact, Foot fails to take into account the fact that if the concept of “international responsibility” is based on the mutual interests of international responsibility, this is only possible in the post-Cold War era when globalization has become an irreversible trend and non-traditional threats require the collective efforts of human beings and their governments. Regardless of the reasons, when it was established in 1949, the PRC did pose a challenge to the so-called existing “common interests” and to the international rules that had been developed to underpin them. The PRC formally returned to the international community when it replaced Taiwan in China’s seat in the United Nations in 1973. However, the real changes occurred in 1978 when the Chinese leadership decided to abandon domestic class struggle and world revolution, and actively became engaged in international affairs. But China did not have the concept of a responsible state in mind, and was unfamiliar with the criteria for membership in the international community. In fact, although the membership criteria have changed from being pluralist (accepting an “ethnic difference”) to embracing “solidarist” (the idea of a global common good, under which common values, rather than the interests of sovereign and diverse states, are given

⁶⁸⁸ Foot, “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,” p. 2; see also, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

priority),⁶⁸⁹ which has enhanced the invisible threshold that China has to cross over to become a qualified member, and thus making the way longer for China to become a responsible state. Morally China perhaps feels more comfortable applying itself to a “solidarist” principle-directed international regime than to becoming a part of a regime perceived to be dominated by principles designed by the big Western powers, by which it had been oppressed for over a century.

The initial desire and primary efforts of the Chinese leadership to integrate into the international community were strengthened by its frustration with the backlash after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, when China was viewed as one of the few countries where authoritarian impulses remained strong, and when, at the same time, the third wave of democratization was seen as prevailing throughout the world. However, the side-effect of the tragedy was that in order to end its international isolation, China had to make greater efforts to show its willingness to be a normal member of the international community. In contrast to the marginalization of China’s strategic significance in world affairs immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, China escalated steps for integration into the international community. It expanded the number and depth of its bilateral relationships, joined various trade and security treaties, deepened its participation in major multilateral organizations, and helped address global security issues.⁶⁹⁰ From 1977 to 1995, China’s

⁶⁸⁹ Foot, “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,” p. 2.

⁶⁹⁰ Evan S. Medeiros and M. Fravel Even, “China’s New Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec, 2003, Vol. 82, Issue 6, p. 23.

membership in international governmental organizations grew from 21 to 49; its participation in non-governmental organizations grew from 71 to 1,013.⁶⁹¹

Deng's 1992 Southern Tour speech advocating far-reaching reforms and opening, faster growth, and a more rapid advance toward the market system triggered a fundamental change in Chinese attitudes toward international institutions.⁶⁹² According to Alastair Iain Johnston, in 1996, the number of various types of institutions, global and regional, in which China was a member, was 70 percent the number of international institutions that the U.S. had joined; 80 percent of the international institutions that India had joined; and about 180 percent of the world average. As for global international organizations, China had joined 27 out of 30; the U.S. had joined 30 out of 33. The degree of Chinese participation was about 90 percent that of the U.S. If considering that in the early 1970s, China's membership in inter-governmental international organizations was nearly zero, and in the mid-1990s this number was close to that of the developed countries, this is a remarkable change. Johnston notes that China has basically recognized and participates in almost all important international institutions.⁶⁹³ In regard to China's integration into the international trade and investment system, Margaret Pearson draws the conclusion that China made considerable concessions to enter the WTO, and the speed, magnitude, and depth with which China integrated into the world

⁶⁹¹ Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., "Introduction: China Joins the World," in Economy and Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects*, p. 41, n. 1.

⁶⁹² Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution through Reform*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 319.

⁶⁹³ Jiang Yien (Alastair Iain Johnston), "Zhongguo canyu guoji tixi de sikao" (Thinking on China's Participation in International Regimes), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economy and Politics), No. 7 (1999), p. 5.

trade and investment regimes have been much beyond all people's imagination.⁶⁹⁴ The depth and breadth of China's integration into the international community can also be seen in the fields of arms control, environmental protection, and human rights, as analyzed below.

Arms Control

Arms control belongs to the traditional security area. According to Michael Swaine and Alastair Iain Johnston, China's participation in the international arms control and disarmament system is characterized by more support for agreements that tend to reduce other states' capacity, and less support for agreements which are more restrictive to China's capacity; managing to prevent or not to fully implement the agreements which may restrict or reduce China's capacity; supporting agreements that are in favor of China's image while not hurtful to its interests; supporting agreements that help domestic economic development and stabilizing international peace; and finally hesitating to give more transparency of its military equipment. These are consistent with the assumptions of "realpolitik."⁶⁹⁵

However, in the area of arms control, since 1980 China has acceded to treaties that have imposed some constraints on its military power, even though its non-participation was unlikely to have incurred severe material costs.⁶⁹⁶ China's views toward and involvement in these and other lesser arms control processes have changed substantially since the late 1970s. During the Maoist period, the Chinese approach to arms control

⁶⁹⁴ Margaret M. Pearson, "China's Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime," in Economy and Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World*, p.191.

⁶⁹⁵ Swaine and Johnston, "China and Arms Control Institutions," pp. 92-93, 98-99.

⁶⁹⁶ Johnston and Evans, "China and Multilateral Security Institutions," pp. 247-251.

was highly negative and dismissive. China criticized arms control regimes as discriminatory, serving to “limit the activities of the have-nots while placing no requirements on the haves to disarm.”⁶⁹⁷ Beijing thus refused to participate in multilateral arms control processes and denounced them, as well as the U.S.-Soviet bilateral arms control agreements, as sham disarmament or as efforts by the superpowers to institutionalize their hegemony.

The reform period has witnessed a change in Chinese perspectives from viewing arms control as largely an adjunct of the East-West struggle and without any benefits to China, to recognizing that China could gain from arms control efforts and should become involved in international arms control regimes.⁶⁹⁸ After China engaged in more international negotiations on arms control, China shifted to the view that a robust international non-proliferation system is in the interests of all countries, and any country that pursues its own short-term political, economic, or strategic interests, while ignoring the serious consequence of proliferation, or even does something damaging to other countries, will find its own interests to be hurt in the end.⁶⁹⁹ As a result, China began to develop a more comprehensive and less-dismissive stance toward arms control. Beijing has signed onto agreements or made arms control commitments that it previously vigorously opposed. Indeed, China’s participation rates increased dramatically over the 1980s and 1990s. In 1970 the number of arms control agreements China had signed

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No.3 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 43-48; Swaine and Johnston, “China and Arms Control Institutions,” p. 101.

⁶⁹⁹ Zhongguo lianheguo xiehui, ed., *Zhongguo daibiaotuan chuxi lianheguo youguan huiyi fayan huibian, 1999* (Compilation of Chinese Delegation Speeches to the Relevant Meetings of the United Nations, 1999) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2000), p. 281.

amounted to 10 to 20 percent of all arms control agreements for which it was eligible. By 1996 this figure had soared to 85 to 90 percent.⁷⁰⁰

China began to join the arms control negotiations under the UN framework in 1980. In 1981 it indicated that it would be supportive of creating a working group on nuclear test bans in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and in 1985 it agreed that it would join such a group. Initially, China merely wanted to indicate to the outside world its desire and goodwill to engage in international efforts for disarmament. Having become familiar with the meeting process and having cooperated with Western counterparts, Chinese representatives were finally able to issue some concrete suggestions. All the Chinese delegation could offer at first in the negotiations in the CD was definitions of toxicity and chemical agents, and its working papers to the CD in the early and mid-1980s were no more than “reiterations of China’s rather vague proposals” for comprehensive disarmament in conventional, nuclear, and naval, and space weapons. However, as observed by Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, in the early 1990s, during the last stage in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations, China collaborated with many G-21 states in drafting detailed working papers “suggesting treaty language” ruling activities banned by the treaty, definitions of terms, the handling of abandoned CW, on-site-inspection (OSI) provisions, and so on. By the 1990s, it was recognized that the Chinese were able to create quality working papers with CWC or CTBT treaty language, or on China’s position on transparency in armaments (TIA). For instance, in 1994, China presented working papers with a range of suggestions from entry into force, to peaceful nuclear explosions, to verification.⁷⁰¹

⁷⁰⁰ Swaine and Johnston, “China and Arms Control Institutions,” p. 101.

⁷⁰¹ Johnston and Evans, “China and Multilateral Security Institutions,” p. 245.

In the 1990s Beijing took some big steps. For instance, in 1993 for the first time Beijing showed its readiness to participate in negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to conclude the treaty by the end of 1996. It subsequently signed the CTBT and joined the global suspension on testing in mid-1996. China officially acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1992, and in 1995 supported its indefinite extension. It committed not to advocate, encourage, and proliferate or help other countries develop nuclear weapons, and worked out three principles on nuclear exports, i.e., for peaceful purposes, acceptance of supervision by the International Nuclear Energy Agency, and prohibitions of transfers to third parties. This is regarded as a reversal in previous Chinese policy. China has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. On April 5, 1995, China made another official statement reiterating its unconditional provision of “negative security assurance” to all non-nuclear-weapon states, at the same time undertaking to provide these nations with “positive security assurance.” It participated in the CWC talks from their inception and remained active until their conclusion in the fall of 1992.⁷⁰²

Beijing introduced its own proposals on nuclear arms control in the United Nations in 1994. It proposed a convention on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and it called for a no-first-use of nuclear weapons treaty among the five declared nuclear powers and negative security assurances by the nuclear weapons states that they will “not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.” A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was negotiated and concluded by the end of 1996.

⁷⁰² Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, comp., *White Papers of the Chinese Government (1991-1995)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2000), p. 507.

China has also formally acceded to the UN Conventional Arms Register, negotiated after the Gulf War and approved by the UN General Assembly in 1991.⁷⁰³

In recent years China has participated in a variety of bilateral and multilateral confidence- and security-building measures, including the ASEAN Regional Forum. China has signed all protocols for nuclear weapon-free regional treaties which are open for signing. The only one in which China has not taken part is the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, but China has reached agreement with ASEAN on the treaty, and has signaled that it would like to sign the protocol on this treaty as soon as it is open.⁷⁰⁴

In May 1996, Chinese promised not to provide help to countries whose nuclear equipment is not under inspection by the International Nuclear Energy Agency, including not to export nuclear materials, nuclear equipment, and nuclear technology, and not to have technical exchanges and cooperation with such countries. China also set up a series of measures on nuclear exports to implement regulations according to international conventions. In September 1997, the Chinese government issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Control of Nuclear Exports, providing that China shall tightly control nuclear exports and strictly perform its international obligations with regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; it does not advocate, encourage, and engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor does it assist other countries with the

⁷⁰³ Ibid., p. 508. Regarding China's observation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), see also Swaine and Johnston, "China and Arms Control Institutions," pp. 106-108.

⁷⁰⁴ "Zhongguo daibiao Hu Xiaodi dashi zai Bukuosan hewuqi tiaoyue 2005 nian shenyi dahui disanci choubai huishang guanyu wuhe guojia anquan baozheng wenti de zhuanti fayan" (Chinese Representative Ambassador Hu Xiaodi Speech on Security Assurance for Non-Nuclear Weapon States at the Third Preparatory Meeting of the 2005 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Their Destruction), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/xw/t94689.htm>.

development of such weapons; nuclear exports are conducted only for peaceful purposes and subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency; a nuclear exports licensing system is imposed.⁷⁰⁵ At the same time, a detailed Nuclear Export Control List was drawn up in accordance with international conventions. In June 1998, China issued the Regulations on the Administration of the Export of Dual-Use (Military and Civil) Nuclear Facilities and Related Technologies of the PRC, imposing stricter controls on the transfer of nuclear-related dual-use technology.⁷⁰⁶

Moreover, China has acceded to a series of major international arms control and disarmament treaties and conventions, including the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. In September and December 1996, China signed and approved the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Destruction. China attaches great importance to the active role

⁷⁰⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Control of Nuclear Export, February 20, 2004, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zjjg/jks/jksxwlb/t66896.htm>.

⁷⁰⁶ Li Shaojun, "Zhongguo yu he bukuosan tizhi" (China and the Non-Proliferation System), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economy and Politics), No. 10 (2001), pp. 60-65, at p. 62; see also <http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=20093>.

these international legal documents play in promoting international arms control and disarmament and has earnestly and conscientiously fulfilled its own obligations under the agreements.

In the process of China's participation in the international framework on arms control, the Chinese foreign policy-making process has undergone noticeable changes, which have been observed by many American scholars. For instance, Alastair Iain Johnston has described the Ministry of the Chemical Industry's involvement in the policy-making process and association with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military to address arms control issues. According to Johnston, at the beginning of Chinese participation, the Chinese delegation was composed only of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, so that the Chinese delegation could not even find a proper interpreter. The interpreter who worked for the delegation knew English well, but he was not familiar with the chemical terms, let alone the concepts used in disarmament negotiations. To solve this problem, the Chinese delegation was later joined by representatives from the Ministry of Chemical Industry. The frequency, intensity, strength, and quality of Chinese participation in international disarmament programs have been increasing, and with the passage of time, the deepening of the process, and communication with delegations from other countries, the Chinese side has been able to better understand the nature of arms control issues politically and technically, and able to let their counterparts understand the precise grounds of Chinese positions. In the process, the Chinese military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a number of officials to Western countries to improve their language skills, to learn

international rules and worldwide changes, and to familiarize themselves with developments in various fields of expertise.

Following China's rapidly expanding role in these preceding regimes and processes, the bureaucracies that participate in the China's policy-making process on arms control have been broadened. With the international arms control agenda becoming more technical, and with China increasingly involved in technical arms control processes that impose limitations on the extent of potential military programs, technical specialists are now essential components of the team. This in turn has helped create opportunities for interaction with technical arms control specialists inside and outside governments in other countries. The sources of the personnel who take part in the arms control policy-making process have been expanded to at least three agencies: in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament); the PLA General Staff Department (including the Chemical Defense subdepartment, the Intelligence subdepartment, and the Equipment subdepartment), and the nuclear weapons and missile technical communities (i.e., the China Academy of Engineering Physics, the China Aerospace Corporation, the General Equipment Department, and the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense's [COSTIND] Arms Control and Disarmament Program). It is alleged that at least one hundred people are involved, although many are only part-time participants in arms control research.⁷⁰⁷

In the control of nuclear exports, where nuclear exports have an important impact on state security, social and public interest, or diplomatic policy, some agencies are assigned responsibilities for the examination and approval of the export applications. The China

⁷⁰⁷ Swaine and Johnston, "China and Arms Control Institutions," pp. 104-105.

Atomic Energy Authority, the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, and the Ministry of Commerce coordinate with one another during the examination or reexamination, and consult with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If necessary, the cases are submitted to the State Council for examination and approval.⁷⁰⁸ China has also established an agency to control the transfer of military equipment and related technologies—the State Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT), under the leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission. The members of the Committee are representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Headquarters of the General Staff, the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, the Ministry of Commerce, and other relevant departments. The State Bureau of Military Products Trade, as the executive body of the SACMPT, is in charge of daily affairs.⁷⁰⁹

Here one clearly sees that China's view on arms control has been changing from one dominated by Chinese national interests into one based on the perspective of the mutual interests of the international community. Chinese willingness to actively participate in the arms control process is motivated by two purposes: to protect China's national security interests in pursuing military modernization—a passive and protective motive—and to cooperate with the international community in dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—an active and cooperative motive, which is the result of a consciousness that preventing proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide is also in China's own interest. Having realized the importance of arms

⁷⁰⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Control of Nuclear Export, February 20, 2004, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/jks/jksxwlb/t66896.htm>.

⁷⁰⁹ Lu Ning, "The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments," p. 49.

control in Chinese foreign affairs and in order to deal with the matter more effectively, a new bureau has been set up in the MFA, i.e., the Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, which was formerly a division under the Bureau of International Organizations. In addition, a new division in the Bureau of Asia has been introduced to handle multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific area.

Environmental Protection

As part of its non-traditional security, as opposed to traditional security (for instance, non-proliferation), environmental protection is a new dimension of international relations, attracting increased attention from the international community and calling for international cooperation and management. Within the category of non-traditional security, China's increasing integration into international regimes has brought to its foreign policy-making process more bureaucracies, agencies, and ministries, which never before had been on the international stage and had never negotiated or cooperated with foreigners. Thus, globalization pressures on China have led to more decentralization and professionalization of the Chinese foreign policy-making process. One can hardly imagine that a Chinese leader, even if he were a paramount leader dominating domestic and foreign policies, could make arbitrary decisions in a non-security field on his own, unless he were to totally ignore globalization and the increasing necessity for international cooperation.

China began to be aware of its environmental problems in the early 1970s, at approximately the same time that it replaced Taiwan in the United Nations. In 1971, China established a leading group under the State Council to supervise China's preparation for the June 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment

(NUCHE) in Stockholm. However, China did not play a particularly constructive role in international environmental protection until the early 1990s.

After China embarked on its reforms and opening, economic development has always been the top priority. The tradeoff between environmental protection and economic development for quite a long period deflected Chinese government interest in the former. Beijing consistently holds that economic development is correlated with environmental protection; environment protection is recognized as a common task for mankind, but Beijing also argues that the economically developed countries should take more responsibility for environmental protection.⁷¹⁰ Thus, like other developing countries, China assigns principal responsibility for pollution control to the advanced industrialized countries and it has defended the developing countries' right to exploit their own resources without external interference.⁷¹¹ The head of China's National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) proclaimed in 1991 that environmental protection was one of China's basic national policies, but at the same time he cautioned that environmental protection must be coordinated with economic development.⁷¹²

Not until the Chinese government realized in the early 1990s that the environmental situation in China was serious and that increasing water and air pollution, as well as deforestation and desertification, would threaten the base of China's economic development⁷¹³ did the government begin to regard environmental protection as a national policy and as an essential ingredient in the formulation and implementation of its

⁷¹⁰ China in Brief, Environment, Taking Vigorous Action to Promote International Cooperation in Environmental Protection, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/environment/e-8.htm>.

⁷¹¹ Lester Ross, "China and Environmental Protection," in Economy and Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects*, pp. 297-298.

⁷¹² Index-China.com, Environment, Summary, <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/environment-s.html>.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

national economic plan. Thus the 1982 Constitution of the PRC statement that “the state protects and improves the living environment and ecological environment, prevents and bring under control pollution and other public hazards”⁷¹⁴ began to be implemented in serious manner.

Although the Chinese government still insists on its sovereignty in environmental protection and assigns greater responsibility to the developed states for pollution, today it recognizes that no country can effectively protect its environment and solve the myriad environmental problems on its own. Viewed as a global problem, environmental protection requires a global effort. Environmental problems include, to name a few, pollution of the atmosphere, of marine life, of coastal and inland waters, and of all areas affected by acid rain. Thus, China has escalated its integration into the international environmental regime. Beijing has adopted positive attitudes toward negotiation and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Lester Ross and Mitchell Silk commented that Beijing has become extensively involved in environmental treaties, providing that these are not perceived as hindering its search for higher levels of economic development.⁷¹⁵

By 2007 China had become a contracting party to more than fifty environmental conventions, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the International Convention for the Regulations of Whaling (in 1980), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol (in 1992), the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the

⁷¹⁴ *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa* (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe, 1982), p. 12.

⁷¹⁵ Lester Ross and Mitchell A. Silk, *Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China* (New York: Quorum Books, 1987), p.3.

Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (revised version) (in 1991), the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade. China signed and approved the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in May 2001 and June 2004 respectively, which is the third mandatory international convention that requires a decrease in the discharge of pollutants after the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1987, the Convention on Biological Diversity and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention on Combating Desertification, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol. China actively implements its duties under those conventions.⁷¹⁶ Importantly, in May 1998 China signed and in August 2002 approved the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.⁷¹⁷ China has been active in performing its obligations as stipulated in all these conventions.⁷¹⁸ In June 2006 the Chinese National People's Congress ratified an international treaty on preserving the marine environment

⁷¹⁶ State Environmental Protection Administration, "China's International Cooperation on Environmental Protection," August 3, 2006, <http://www.chinagate.com.cn/english/reports/48290.htm>; <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/environment/e-8.htm>.

⁷¹⁷ "Environment, International Cooperation," http://chinaabc.showchina.org/chinaabc_en/enviroment/200701/t105739.htm.

⁷¹⁸ <http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/170388.htm>; Index-China.com, Environment, Summary, <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/environment-s.html>; "Environment, International Cooperation," http://chinaabc.showchina.org/chinaabc_cn/enviroment/200701/t105739.htm.

and preventing pollution on the high seas. Following ratification, the Chinese National People's Congress will amend existing laws and regulations in order to bring them in line with the convention.⁷¹⁹

To implement the conventions and agreements, Beijing attaches great importance to the formulation of laws and regulations on environmental protection, and has brought environmental protection work into the legal domain. Apart from the Constitution, dozens of laws and regulations to protect the environment have been enacted. Up to 2007, five special laws on environmental protection and nine natural resources laws related to environmental protection had been promulgated. In addition, the State Council has worked out over thirty administrative laws and regulations on environmental protection. In tandem with the increase in large construction projects, in 1998 Beijing worked out the Regulations on Environmental Protection Management of Construction Projects to further strengthen environmental protection management of construction projects, control new pollution sources, and protect the ecological environment.⁷²⁰ Thus new laws establishing comprehensive regulations have begun to curb environmental damage. As Lester Ross and Mitchell Silk noted, "environmental protection has been among the most heavily legislated sectors of public policy in the post-Mao period."⁷²¹ Furthermore, China has promulgated more than one hundred normative environmental standards, including an environmental quality standard, a pollutant discharge standard, and an environmental base standard. For instance, in November 1995, China published

⁷¹⁹ Agence France-Presse (Beijing), "China Ratifies International Convention On Oceanic Pollution," June 29, 2006, http://www.terraily.com/reports/China_Ratifies_International_Convention_On_Oceanic_Pollution_999.html.

⁷²⁰ China in Brief, Environment, Taking Vigorous Action to Promote International Cooperation in Environmental Protection, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-china/environmentalprotection/legal.htm>.

⁷²¹ Ross and Silk, *Environmental Law and Policy in the People's Republic of China*, p. 3.

the Urgent Announcement on Strictly Controlling Trans-Boundary Movement of Wastes to China, and in March 1996 it published the Provisional Regulations on Environmental Protection and Management of Importation of Wastes.⁷²² All these standards comprise the framework for Chinese environmental law.⁷²³

China took an active part in preparing for and attending the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, and it made great efforts for the smooth convening of the conference. Environmental cooperation under the mechanisms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China (10+1) and ASEAN and China, Japan and the ROK (10+3) has begun. At the proposal of the Chinese government, the first Environment Ministers' Meeting (EMM) of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was convened in 2002. It released a Chairman's Statement of the ASEM EMM and reached agreement on the basis, potential, and principle of Asian-European environmental cooperation, defining the key fields and priorities for such cooperation. In recent years, a China-Europe ministerial dialogue on environmental policy and a meeting of the China-Europe environment liaison officers were established, and the first China-Arab Cooperation Conference on the Environment was held in early 2007.

During 2004 and 2005, China intensified its international environmental cooperation; the State Environmental Protection Administration organized 90 major international events relating to environmental protection. Chinese delegations paid environmental visits to countries such as Japan, Korea, Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Russia, and Sweden, and China concluded twelve international environmental protocols

⁷²² China in Brief, Environment, Taking Vigorous Action to Promote International Cooperation in Environmental Protection, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/environment/e-8.htm>.

⁷²³ "The Status of Third-World States in International Environmental Legislation and Its Implementation," <http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu25ee/uu25ee0j.htm>.

and multilateral environmental negotiations. As one of the twelve-member team of the Coordinating Mechanism of Regional Cooperation in Asia, China energetically promoted ASEAN-China, Japan and Korea, and ASEAN-China and Mekong River environmental cooperation. It began a China-EU ministerial dialogue on environmental policies, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific and Technological Cooperation for Environmental Protection with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and took part in the WTO negotiations on trade and the environment.⁷²⁴

Moreover, China has been active in environmental cooperation and exchanges with the developing countries. To support the follow-up actions of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China has sponsored thematic activities on environmental protection oriented toward Africa. In 2005, China and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) jointly hosted the China-Africa Environmental Cooperation Conference, and the Chinese government organized classes for the Workshop on Water Pollution and Water Resources Management for African Countries, helping the African countries with environmental training.⁷²⁵

A member-state of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), an international fund-management partnership founded in 1992 that has become the largest investor in the world in the field of international environmental protection, China maintains a close cooperative relationship with the organization. China is also one of the few donors among the developing countries that plays an active role in fund-raising. At the same time, the GEF has provided financial and technological assistance to help China protect

⁷²⁴ "Environment, International Cooperation,"

http://chinaabc.showchina.org/chinaabc_en/enviroment/200701/t105739.htm.

⁷²⁵ "China Development Gateway," August 3, 2006,

<http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/170388.htm/www.china.org.cn/engli>.

the environment and meet the requirements of international treaties. With the help of the GEF, China has undertaken dozens of projects and has received some several hundred million U.S. dollars in donations from the GEF.⁷²⁶

The Chinese government budget for environmental protection has rapidly increased. According to China's National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), from 1981 to 1985 US\$3.2 billion was expended on pollution prevention and environmental rehabilitation, from 1986 to 1990 the figure increased to US\$8.8 billion, and during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-95) it reached about US\$15 billion.⁷²⁷ China signed the Stockholm Convention in May 2001, and it came into effect in China in November 2004. On June 22, 2006, Zhuang Guotai, deputy director of the office of the Stockholm Convention Implementation under the State Environmental Protection Administration, announced that China planned to spend at least 34 billion yuan (US\$4.3 billion) over the next ten years to phase out persistent organic pollutants (POPs), one of the most dangerous pollutants released into the environment every year by human activity, and that China had drafted a plan to phase out the world's most toxic chemicals as required by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. According to the plan, China would stop the production and use of chlordane, mirex, and DDT used in anti-dirt paint by 2010, and would safely dispose of electric appliances containing POPs by 2015. Also by 2015, China would stop the production and use of POPs in pesticides. This plan was submitted to the State Council for approval in July 2006. Funding to control POPs would come from the central government, local governments, and domestic

⁷²⁶ "Environment, International Cooperation,"

http://chinaabc.showchina.org/chinaabc_en/enviroment/200701/t105739.htm.

⁷²⁷ Index-China.com, Environment, Summary, <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/environment-s.html>.

companies as well as from international organizations and foreign governments. The Italian government has promised to provide US\$7 million in aid, so far the largest sum promised by a foreign government.⁷²⁸ A fifth meeting to discuss China's implementation of the Stockholm Convention was held in June 2006, attended by more than one hundred government officials and representatives from China, Italy, Germany, Norway, Japan, Finland, and UN organizations.⁷²⁹

China has actively developed bilateral cooperation in the field of environmental protection. Over the past ten-plus years China has successively signed bilateral environmental protection cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding with the United States, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Canada, India, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Russia, Germany, Australia, Ukraine, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Exchanges and cooperation have been carried out in environmental planning and management, global environment problems, pollution control and prevention, protection of forests and wild animals and plants, marine environment, climate change, air pollution, acid rain, and sewage disposal, and important achievements have been made in all these areas. China has also taken part in the Global Learning and Observation to Benefit the Environment, as proposed by the United States.⁷³⁰

Beijing has compiled the State Report of the PRC on Sustainable Development and the China Action Program for Sustainable Development in the Twenty-First Century,

⁷²⁸ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, Home, about China, China to Spend 34b Yuan to Phase out Pollutants, June 22, 2006, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t259325.htm>.

⁷²⁹ "China to Spend 34b Yuan to Phase out Pollutants" (June 22, 2006), <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t259325.htm>.

⁷³⁰ Index-China.com, Environment, Summary, <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/environment-s.html>.

clarifying the key fields and action plans for sustainable development for the early twenty-first century. It has approved the Chinese State Plan on Gradually Eliminating Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, has drawn up more than one hundred policies and measures with relation to protection of the ozone layer, has built development and production bases for products that can substitute for ozone-layer-depleting substances and other environmentally-friendly products, and has met the phasing-out target set in the Montreal Protocol. According to a World Bank estimate, among the developing countries, China has eliminated 50 percent of all ozone-layer-depleting substances.

In order to improve policy-making and implementation in the area of environmental protection, in 1998 China transferred responsibility from the China Meteorological Administration to the Office of the National Coordination Committee for Climate Change (ONCCCC), first under the Department of Regional Economy, then under the Department of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection when the latter was set up in the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The purpose of the ONCCCC is to examine and resolve major problems regarding the coordinated development of the economy, society, environment, and resources; to put forward policies and plans for resource conservation and comprehensive utilization; to participate in the formulation of environmental protection plans, coordinating work related to environmental protection, and promoting clean production; and to coordinate the implementation of key demonstration projects and the popularization of new products, new technologies, and new equipment.

A policy coordinating mechanism on climate has been established among the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of

Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Bureau of Environmental Protection, and the China Meteorological Administration.⁷³¹ The addition of more organs involved in the policy-making process on international environmental protection make the process more sophisticated and allow for more bargaining and compromise.

In order to facilitate further international cooperation in the environment and development fields, Beijing set up the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CICED) in April 1992, comprising more than forty leading specialists and well-known public figures from China and other countries and responsible for submitting proposals and advisory opinions to Beijing policy-makers. The CICED has put forward valuable concrete proposals on energy and the environment, biodiversity protection, ecological agriculture, resources accounting and pricing systems, public participation, and implementation of environmental laws and regulations, which have attracted the attention of and a response from the Chinese government.⁷³² SEPA also established a leading team and an office to implement protocols.⁷³³

In March 1998 the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was officially upgraded to a ministry-level agency, and renamed the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), reflecting the growing importance the Chinese government attached to

⁷³¹ Chen Ying, "Lianheguo qihou bianhua kuangjia gongyue de yanjin yu Zhongguo lihai he zhanlüe xuanze" (The Evolution of the Climate Convention and China's Interests and Strategic Choices), in Wang Yizhou, *Mohe zhong de jiangou* (Construction in Contradiction) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 2003), p. 267.

⁷³² "China in Brief, Environment, Taking Vigorous Action to Promote International Cooperation in Environmental Protection," <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/environment/e-8.htm>; "Environment, International Cooperation," http://chinaabc.showchina.org/chinaabc_en/enviroment/200701/t105739.htm.

⁷³³ "Environment, International Cooperation," http://chinaabc.showchina.org/chinaabc_en/enviroment/200701/t105739.htm.

environmental protection.⁷³⁴ At the national level, policies are formulated by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and approved by the State Council. The role of SEPA is to disseminate national environmental policy and regulations, collect data, and provide technological advice on both national and international environmental issues.

Even though China has made big efforts to promote environmental protection since the early 1990s, it has faced the criticism that environmental protection has occupied, at best, the margins of China's developmental agenda. Climate change it is argued has been on the margins of China's environmental agenda, since targets set in the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans and the State Council decision on reinforcing environmental protection all failed to identify it as part of the core environmental agenda.⁷³⁵ However, the year 2006 might herald a turning point. In the Eleventh Five Plan (2006-2010) China set a target to put the emissions of greenhouse gases under the control of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to reduce energy consumption per unit GDP by 20 percent.⁷³⁶

In June 2007, a National Climate Change Program, which was prepared under the auspices of National Development and Reform Commission, was released to indicate China's stance and policy on climate change. It requires relevant ministries and departments of the State Council to seriously fulfill their responsibilities, and strengthen coordination and cooperation in addressing climate change. It also requires local

⁷³⁴ Index-China.com, Environment, Summary, <http://www.index-china.com/index-english/environment-s.htm>

⁷³⁵ Zhang Haibin, "China and the US Moving Forward on Climate, January 28, 2008, <http://www.chinadialogue.net/homepage/show/single/cn/1665?page=1>.

⁷³⁶ "Premier: China Endorses and Honors International Environmental Obligations," March 16, 2007, www.chinaview.cn.

governments at different levels to strengthen their organizational and leadership capacity on local responses to climate change, and to make the formulation and implementation of local climate programs a priority.

On June 19, in order to facilitate coordination in addressing global climate change, the State Council decided to establish a National Leading Group to Address Climate Change (NLGACC), founded on the basis of the existing National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC). The leading group is headed by Premier Wen Jiabao, with Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan and State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan serving as the deputy heads. The other twenty-nine members include Director of National Development and Reform Commission Ma Kai, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi, Administrator of the China Meteorological Administration (CMC) Zheng Guoguang, Minister of Science and Technology Wan Gang, and representatives from other relevant agencies.⁷³⁷

The NLGACC is responsible for deliberating and determining key national strategies, guidelines and measures on climate change, as well as coordinating and resolving key issues related to climate change. The Office of the NLGACC is established within the National Development and Reform Commission. To ensure completion of its mission, the government published a notice on a program of work to reduce power usage and emissions. It also established a responsibility system and a veto mechanism that will see the environmental targets become part of development

⁷³⁷ “Guowuyuan chengli yingdui qihou bianhua jieneng jianpai gongzuo lingdao xiaozu” (The State Council Establishes the National Leading Group to Address Climate Change), June 19, 2008, http://www.cma.gov.cn/qxxw/t20070619_198631.phtml.

evaluation in different areas, along with the performance of government officials.⁷³⁸

Furthermore, in Hu Jintao's October 2007 report to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPC, managing environmental resources, which is viewed as the principal challenge to China's development, is enhanced to the height of relating to "ecological civilization."⁷³⁹

For our purposes, here the point is not to what extent China has taken responsibility that others countries perceive it should have taken, or whether China has actually done enough in line with its commitments—certainly, there is much room for China to improve its implementation of environmental protection policies, and higher standards on environmental protection need to be worked out given that pollution remains a serious problem in China not only for human survival, but also for China's sustainable economic development. It is rather that what China has done in terms of environmental protection has opened a new arena of policy-making which requires consultation, cooperation, and more bureaucracies and expert participation, simultaneously making competition and compromise inevitable in the policy-making process.

Human Rights

Human rights is perceived by Westerner observers as a problematic area in China. China began to attend meetings of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1979, and became a member country of the Commission in 1982. The Chinese government is an active participant in the international human rights regime. By 2001, it has acceded to

⁷³⁸ National Development and Reform Commission of the PRC, June 2007, <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/P020070604561191006823.pdf>.

⁷³⁹ "Guowuyuan chengli yingdui qihou bianhua jieneng jianpai gongzuo lingdao xiaozu" (The State Council Establishes the National Leading Group to Address Climate Change), June 19, 2008, http://www.cma.gov.cn/qxxw/t20070619_198631.phtml.

nine human rights conventions. It signed the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on October 27, 1997, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on October 5, 1998. The former was approved by the National People's Congress on February 28, 2001.⁷⁴⁰ China has accepted some domestic scrutiny of its practices by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights that condemned China's human rights record. As Rosemary Foot observes, in the human rights area directly coercive means are lacking, but "China has been steadily drawn into procedural if not substantive support of a regime that in some senses represents a threat to Communist Party rule." Foot also notes that many American congressmen and senators who are concerned about "the China threat" would agree that China's respect for human rights and its record on human rights have improved since the 1980s.⁷⁴¹ Even Andrew Nathan, a severe critic of China's human rights policies, has asserted that China has begun to have respect for international human rights law.⁷⁴²

Like many other Third World and non-Western countries, China "has its own understanding, priority, arguments, and limits on human rights,"⁷⁴³ but with the changes in domestic politics and increasing interactions with foreign countries, and as a reaction to the criticism of the Western states, especially the United States, China's formal declarations with respect to the international human rights regime have been increasingly positive since 1991. In its second Human Rights White Paper entitled *The Progress of*

⁷⁴⁰ Mo Hongji, "Yong xinde shijiao shenshi guoji renquan gongyue yu Zhongguo de guanxi" (Examining the Relations between the International Covenants on Human Rights from a New Perspective), in Wang Yizhou, ed., *Mohe zhong de jiangou*, p. 223.

⁷⁴¹ Foot, "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State," p. 15.

⁷⁴² Andrew Nathan, "China and the International Human Rights Regime," in Economy and Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects*, p. 136.

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

Human Rights in China, issued in December 1995, Beijing states, “China respects the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations related to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In recent years China has, as always, actively supported and participated in international activities in the human rights field and has made new efforts to promote the healthy development of international human rights since the cold war.”⁷⁴⁴ In its third Human Rights White Paper entitled *Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights* (2000), the Chinese government notes, “to fully realize human rights is a basic goal of China’s cross-century development.” And at the Fifteenth Congress of the CPC in September 1997, emphasis was placed on continuing the reform of the political system, the further expansion of democracy, the perfection of the legal system, and making “exercising the rule of law” a basic state policy. In March 1999, the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress put “exercising the rule of law and building a country governed according to law” into the state Constitution.⁷⁴⁵

According to formal procedures, just as in other countries where treaties must be approved by congresses or parliaments, the two human rights covenants signed by China have to be approved by the Chinese National People’s Congress. Prior to submitting a signed covenant to the National People’s Congress, the State Council must examine it to determine whether there are conflicts between the provisions of the covenant and the Chinese Constitution or other laws. If so, the experts suggest making qualifications or understandings to the provisions. For instance, as an established policy of the Chinese

⁷⁴⁴ “The Progress of Human Rights in China,” (December 1995),” in *White Papers of the Chinese Government (1991-1995)*, compiled by Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2000), p. 579.

⁷⁴⁵ “The Progress of Human Rights in China (February 2000),” in *White Papers of the Chinese Government (2000-2001)*, compiled by Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2003), p. 97.

government, birth control has been enshrined in the Chinese Constitution,⁷⁴⁶ thus China has to make a qualification to the provisions regarding individual freedoms. Experts in domestic and international law have been invited to participate in this work. In this way legal experts are involved in the examination process, including scholars from the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Human rights issues often relate to other issues either directly or indirectly when Western countries, typically the United States, link China's human rights record to other matters. One example is President Bill Clinton's linkage of China's Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status and China's eligibility to host the Olympic Games with its human rights record. There was also an attempt at such a linkage when President Clinton moved to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status (in 1998 the U.S. Congress changed the term in the resolution from MFN to PNTR) and to allow its entry into the WTO. Clinton justified his policy by saying, "Only by making China more open to the world would ordinary Chinese people have the information and contact with the democratic world" that could support the kind of Chinese development the U.S. hoped for.⁷⁴⁷ But this time it was the Congress that stressed the linkage. After the House passed the resolution, 237 to 197, giving China PNTR status, the Senate's vote became crucial.

A powerful lobbying campaign directed at U.S. senators had been conducted by American business interest groups like the U.S.-China Business Council, diplomats at the Chinese Embassy in Washington contacted many senators and found that a majority of

⁷⁴⁶ Item 25 of the Chinese Constitution provides "the State carries out a birth-planning policy, making the growth of the population applicable to the economic and social development plan." *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa*, p. 12.

⁷⁴⁷ Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America, "President Clinton on Trade Relations with China," *Washington File*, January 11, 2000, p.1.

senators seemed to favor the President's proposal, but no one could assure a positive outcome of the voting. At this decisive moment, a meeting to coordinate the actions of the various ministries was convened by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). A deputy minister of the Ministry presided over the meeting, with representatives from the MOFTEC, the Commission on National Economy and Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Central Bank. One of the questions raised during the meeting was how to reconcile policies of these bureaucracies in order to get more senators' votes in China's favor. Finally, the policies were reconciled at the ministerial level, and agreement was reached among the various bureaucracies. A resolution could be reached because everyone who attended the meeting understood that the main goal at that time was for China to receive PNTR status and to enter the WTO, and they all understood that the underlying principle at such a decisive moment was "everything has to give way to the top priority."⁷⁴⁸ The Senate vote on China's PNTR status was held on September 20, and the resolution, in favor of China, was passed 83 to 15.

Conclusion

In sum, among those factors that facilitated changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process since the early 1990s, two major issues can be singled out—China's new economic and political status in the world as the outcome of the policies of reform and opening to the outside world, and China's new self-image.

China is coming to see itself not so much as a victimized developing nation but as an emerging great power. Correspondingly, it has started to look at international rules and

⁷⁴⁸ Interview in Beijing in 2001.

regimes in a different way, not so much as constraints imposed by the Western powers led by the United States for their own interests, but as means to promote the common interests of the international community and to maintain peace and international economic and political order. The evolution in Chinese views of arms control and environmental protection issues are two typical examples.

Although here China's new economic and political status and China's new self-image are identified as two independent variables bringing about the changes in policy making, they are in fact correlated with each other. Certainly, China's new global economic and political status contributes to changes in China's self-image, directly or indirectly, and vice versa. China's new economic and political status implies that China's expanding interests and responsibilities require an increasing capability to look after its interests and to carry out its responsibilities, while China's new self-image implies that increasingly viewing itself as a rising power and recognizing its responsibilities as such, China is more willing to cooperate with the international community to address global issues, including arms control, peacekeeping, human rights, terrorism, environmental protection, infectious diseases, drugs trafficking, etc.—issues faced by all humans in the contemporary world. The effects of these two factors may not be easy to differentiate, but the first tends to be passive and protective, and, in contrast, the actions precipitated by the second tend to be active and cooperative.

The two factors have required reorganization both within and among departments and a redefinition of their foreign policy functions. As a result, the pace of the changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process has escalated since the 1990s, and the

process has become further institutionalized and less personalistic. Significant changes in the Chinese foreign policy-making process can be identified as follows:

1. Following China's expanded responsibilities and interests, the problems facing Chinese leaders have become more complex. These require the increasing involvement of numerous bureaucracies and the creation of new establishments in China's foreign relations, therefore promoting competition, bargaining, and compromise among them.
2. The inner structures of the various ministries, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, have been changed, and new functions have been assigned to existing agencies to meet their additional requirements in foreign policy making.
3. Think tanks have played a more important role in policy making. Foreign policy recommendations are now based on more information and analysis. Thus, a number of new institutions for information collection and analysis have been established. Some existing think tanks have been reorganized, or have been expanded to facilitate access to policy-makers. More interactions exist among officials in the foreign affairs establishment and experts, through, for instance, discussions on macro international relations, reports on specific topics, policy recommendations, and so on.
4. Although the relationship between the CPC and the policy-making establishments has not essentially changed, the functions of the party's foreign policy-making establishment have changed. The roles of the departments of the Central Committee of the CPC in Chinese foreign policy decision making, for instance,

the roles of the International Department and the International Communication Office, have been modified. The former used to deal only with relations with Communist parties or social democratic parties around the world, but now its contacts have been broadened to include relations with different types of parties in Europe and non-Communist parties in the United States, and it has been more active in inter-governmental relations. The latter affects Chinese international relations by presenting an improved image of China to the outside world, though in inter-governmental relations the International Communication Office has been more involved in policy implementation rather than policy making.

5. The Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA) plays a more significant consultative and coordinating role in foreign policy making. As more governmental/party departments aside from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now participate in the decision-making process, a cross-agency body performing coordinating function is essential. The LGFA provides a forum for discussion, analysis of policy recommendations, and consensus formation, as well as a channel between the Politburo and experts on foreign affairs. Moreover, a Leading Group on National Security has been established to deal with the increasing number of national security issues and to manage crisis situations.
6. With greater integration into international society, particularly in the information era, the general public has become more interested in foreign policy and more knowledgeable about other states and international relations. Consequently, public opinion is more seriously taken into consideration by Chinese foreign

policy-makers, as was indicated in the management of the Belgrade Embassy bombing and the EP-3 crises, as well as in China's policy toward Japan.

In conclusion, China's foreign policy-making process has been shaped by China's rapid and sustainable economic growth and its status in the international arena, and by China's new self-image, which has stimulated a rethinking and a redefining of China's national interests and responsibilities.

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